New Mexico Historical Review Volume 35 Number 2 Article 4 4-1-1960 Western Silver and the Tariff of 1890 H. Wayne Morgan Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr Recommended Citation Morgan, H. Wayne. "Western Silver and the Tariff of 1890." New Mexico Historical Review 35, 2 (1960). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol35/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. WESTERN SILVER AND THE TARIFF OF 1890 By H. WAYNE MORGAN* GROUP of far western senators known as "Silver Repub­ A licans" gained national influence and political importance in the last decade of the nineteenth century. They were, by and large, men of intellect and political ability, committed to the causes of the west, the foremost of which was the free coinage of silver. In the forefront of this group of congress­ ional leaders stood Henry Moore Teller, "The Defender of the West," who spoke for Colorado in the United States senate for 30 years, and whose words carried such conviction and earnestness that none denied his sincerity even as they disagreed with him. Second in importance and first in volu­ bility was William M. Stewart, who represented Nevada in the senate for 30 years. This tall, silver haired silverite, the "Moses of the West," resembling nothing so much as a bib­ lical prophet, went on many a good crusade and lent his eloquence and zeal to the silver movement with a fervor that matched and sometimes exceeded Teller's. These two men were the best known far western silver leaders of the decade, but they were joined then and later by other talent: Edward O. Wolcott of Colorado; John P. Jones of Nevada; Fred Dubois of Idaho; Frank Cannon of Utah; and others.1 In an age of fierce party strife and dramatic electioneer­ ing they cast their lot with the Republican party despite its constant wariness of their pet shibboleth, free silver, and its final rejection of the doctrine in 1896. They might quarrel with their eastern brethren on the silver question, but they adhered to the historic principles of the Republican party, and to none more strongly than the protective tariff. Though it was often said that the west had no interest in the tariff, the judgement is not borne out by the facts.2 .. 1023 Westholme Avenue, Los Angeles 24, California. Professor of History, University of California. 1. Teller was a senator from 1876 to 1882, and 1885 to 1909; Stewart from 1864 to 1875, and 1887 to 1905; Wolcott from 1889 to 1901; Cannon from 1895 to 1899; Jones from 1873 to 1903; and Dubois from 1891 to 1897. 2. Cf. James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States From the Compromise of 1850 to the McKinley-Bryan Campaign of 1896, Volume VIII (New York, 1920), 355. 118 SILVER AND TARIFF 119 At first glance it may seem strange that the western states should be interested in a protective tariff 'Yhich was allegedly devised for eastern manufacturing interests. Their relative isolation and lack of diversified economic development seemed to belie their interest in tariff protection. The reasons for their support of silver are patent-it was their basic industry -but their reasons for adhering to the tariff are not far to seek. The very fact. that their economies were undeveloped and isolated swung these states behind the flag of protection and made their arguments in favor of the tariff seem logical; how else could they prevent the undermining of what eco­ nomic progress they had made except through protection? Foreign competition in wool, hides, and mineral ores would greatly reduce their incomes.3 It was for these interests, as well as silver, that the western legislators fought in Congress. The turbulent fifty-first Congress of 1889-1891, the ','Bil­ lion Dollar Congress" of Czar Tom Reed which concerned itself with legislation on the three great issues of the day­ tariff, trusts, silver--'-found the westerners ready to break with their party unless favorable silver legislation was adopted, but extremely reluctant to abandon the tariff pro­ tection which meant so much to their constituents. The western silverites went to the sessions of the fifty­ first congress with grim faces; for once they were united in their determination to secure legislative relief for the de­ pressed silver industry which meant so much to their section.4 But even as they talked of silver they thought of the tariff. In numbers and eloquence they had "a very decided advan­ tage in tariff legislation," John .Sherman remembered.5 One source of influence was their threat to block the passage of the McKinley tariff bill unless they were rewarded with sat­ isfactory silver legislation. It was rumored ·that they were willing to disrupt the party if necessary. They had waited 3. Western interests petitioned Republican leaders from other states as well as their own representatives. Cf. C. T. Stevenson to John Sherman, September 25, 1890; John Sherman Papers, Library of Congress. 4. Fred Wellborn, "The Influence of the Silver Republican Senators, 1889-1891," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 14 (March, 1928), 462. 5. John Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Cabinet and Senate' (New York, 2 vols., 1895), II, 1084-85. 120 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW long enough for remedial silver legislation and had only seen deepening economic troubles in the west. Now they were desperate and determined. While there were doubts about the lengths to which the westerners were willing to go in blocking the passage of a tariff bill in return for a silver bill, their adherence to the tariff was well known. Stewart never denied that he was a protectionist and with characteristic vigor and verbosity he answered many letters from constituents and critics who at­ tacked the pending tariff bill in 1890. "I do not think that the country is suffering from protection; on the contrary, I be­ lieve that our protective tariff, although defective in many respects, is all that saves the country from ruin," he wrote one critic.6 In response to demands from constituents, Stew­ art worked for protective duties on wool, mineral ores and other western products even before the tariff bill was sent to the senate.7 Teller, then and later while the bill was being debated, supported protective duties on ores.8 To the people of their states, the westerners justified protection on the grounds that while it benefitted the manufacturer and pro­ ducer, it also benefitted the laborer with higher wages-the classic protectionist argument,9 While the House Ways and Means Committee held hearings in the early spring of 1890, the westerners, especially Stewart, did their best for protec­ tion by assisting witnesses, bringing discreet pressure to bear, and making it clear that they stood for protection. In doing so they made it equally clear that their votes for the tariff would be secured at a price, and never ceased to remind their eastern colleagues that they held the balance of power in the evenly divided senate. While debates on the tariff unfolded in the House, the Senate turned to silver. Stewart was confident that adequate 6. William M. Stewart to Q. R. Cooley, February 17, 1890; William M. Stewart Papers, Nevada Historical Society, Reno, Nevada. 7. Stewart to Thomas Nelson, April 15, 1890; to W. G. van Horne, February 17, 1890; Stewart Papers. 8. Congressional Record. 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 9122ff. 9. Stewart to Hugh A. Teel, January 21, 1890; Stewart Papers. The argument was potent in Nevada, where competition from cheap Mexican labor was fierce. SILVER AND TARIFF 121 remedial legislation would be passed.lO It was the understand­ ing among silverites, rightly or wrongly, that Harrison had pledged himself to silver prior to his election in 1888.11 This supposed assurance, plus the fanaticism and real economic distress which motivated the westerners drove them on. Speaker Thomas B. Reed insisted that the silver delusion was temporary and that it would be dispelled as soonas prosperity showed its face in the west. Senator Stewart denied this. "Speaker Reed is mistaken; the excitement of the West is not temporary. It will last as long as contraction continues, and the people will have relief or know the reason why."12 Though they talked constantly about the poverty of the "friends of silver," the westerners kept up a steady stream of correspondence and maintained strenuous speaking sched­ ules that compensated for any lack of funds.13 "Keep up the agitation," Stewart wrote a constituent. "It is the agitation from the outside that affects Congress."14 Thus did they strengthen the image of their power, power that would place them in an excellent bargaining position if all else failed. The debates in the Senate on the silver question revealed the stresses and strains at work within the Republican party in 1890, and as the days and weeks passed it became evident that once the tariff was passed by the House and sent to the Senate it would become the object of bargaining. Though the Senate seemed likely to pass a free coinage measure-which it did on June 17, 1890, by a vote of 42.:25-any such bill would either die in the House or be vetoed by President Har­ rison. As early as January, Harrison had made it clear to Teller that he would veto any free coinage measure, and western hopes for free silver fell accordingly; the silverites 10.