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October 2016 Akram Umarov1 ASSESSING CHINA’S NEW POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN CAP PAPERS 177 (POLICY BRIEF SERIES) October 2016 Akram Umarov1 As one of the neighboring countries of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghanistan, IRA), the People's Republic of China (PRC) keeps intra-Afghan processes under continuous scrutiny as they may seriously threaten Chinese interests. Notably, at different times from the 1950s up until now, Beijing's activity toward Afghanistan was characterized either as intense or expectant and static, depending on its own interests. Xi Jinping’s leadership in the PRC marked a major shift in Beijing's foreign policy agenda towards Afghanistan and led to the growth of China's interest in Afghan issues and greater participation in their settlement. It also reflects changes in the traditional Chinese principles of non-interference into foreign conflicts. In this article, we (1) conduct a comparative analysis of China's foreign policy strategy in Afghanistan since 2001, (2) illustrate the increasing importance of the Afghan conflict in the foreign policy agenda of Beijing since Xi Jinping’s rise to power, and (3) shed light on the motives of the new Chinese policy towards Afghanistan. Afghanistan in China’s foreign policy Afghanistan has a noteworthy position among China's neighbors. Paradoxically, of the 14 other continental states that share a border with China, the one with Afghanistan is the shortest (92 km). The two countries are connected through the Wakhan Corridor, located between the Pamir and Tian Shan mountain systems.2 China established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in 1955, and in 1963 the two parties resolved the issue of common border demarcation.3 During the Cold War, the strained relationships between Moscow and 1 Akram Umarov is a senior research fellow and PhD candidate at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. His main research interests include regional political processes, security and development problems in Central Asia, Post-Soviet states, Iran and Afghanistan, their relations with China, the USA, the EU and Pakistan. The author can be reached by email at [email protected]. He thanks Dr. Alisher Faizullaev, a Professor in the Department of Practical Diplomacy and the Director of the Negotiation Laboratory at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy for his constructive feedback and constant support to his work. 2 Zhao Huasheng, “Afghanistan and China’s new neighborhood diplomacy,” International Affairs 92 (2016): 891. 3 Artemy M. Kalinovsky, “The Sino-Afghan border in Cold war,” in Bruce Elleman, Stephen Kotkin, and Clive Schofield, eds, Beijing's Power and China's Borders: Twenty Neighbors in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2014). 1 Beijing had a tremendous impact on Chinese policies in Afghanistan. Beijing was trying to avert the overwhelming influence of the USSR over Kabul and to prevent the encirclement of China by pro-Soviet states. Moscow’s actions explain the Chinese interest in improving relationships with Kabul—the apogee of which was the historic visit of the PRC’s president, Liu Shaoqi, in 1966.4 However, the turbulence in Afghanistan in the 1970s and the USSR’s attempts to take control of the country through the introduction of troops in 1979 had a major impact on Beijing's attitude toward Afghanistan and on its foreign policy during that period as a whole. The events in Afghanistan served as a catalyst for the abrupt improvement and convergence of China-US relations. Together with a number of other countries, China and the United States collectively prevented the establishment of a complete Soviet domination in Afghanistan. Several scholars argue that China, with the help of Pakistan,5 armed the rebel groups opposing Soviet troops. They also document how China cooperated with Washington to open several centers for electronic intelligence in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in order to track the actions of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.6 The withdrawal of the USSR’s troops from Afghanistan in 1989 led to a significant loss of Beijing’s interest for Afghan affairs. However, the increased activity of Uyghur separatist groups, which had the opportunity to settle and prepare terrorist acts in Afghanistan,7 renewed the attention of Chinese leadership in the 1990s. Chinese officials entered into negotiations with the Taliban movement, which controlled a substantial part of Afghanistan at that time, to secure guarantees that they would not support the activities of Uyghur groups in the territories under their control. In December 2000, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Lu Shu Lin, met with the head of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, to discuss the Uyghur issue.8 The international military presence in Afghanistan under the US command in 2001 caused different sentiments in China. On the one hand, Beijing was interested in eliminating sources of terrorism in Afghanistan, and supported the UN Security Council’s resolution on the introduction of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2001.9 With that, after the tragic events of September 11, Beijing allowed the opening of a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) office in October 2002 to enhance anti-terrorism cooperation with the United States.10 On the other hand, Beijing essentially abandoned any military presence in Afghanistan and did not provide international coalition forces with land or air routes for cargo delivery.11 4 Nadine Godehardt, “The Chinese Constitution of Central Asia: Regions and Intertwined Actors in International Relations,” Springer (2014): 185. 5 Chinese covered support for ISI’s operations in Afghanistan is also affirmed by Kinsella Warren, Unholy Alliances, (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992); Yitzhak Shichor, “The Great Wall of Steel: Military and strategy in Xinjiang”, in Frederick Starr, ed., Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 157-158; Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics, (London: Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2015). 6 Andrew Small, “China's Caution on Afghanistan–Pakistan,” The Washington Quarterly 33 (2010): 82-83. 7 Dewardric L. McNeal and Kerry Dumbaugh, “China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism. Congressional Research Service,” The Library of Congress (2002): 12. 8 Andrew Small, “China, the United States, and the question of Afghanistan” (testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing: Looking West: China and Central Asia, March 18, 2015): 3. 9 Resolution 1386 (adopted by the Security Council at its 4443rd meeting, December 20, 2001), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement. 10 I. C. Smith and Nigel West, Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2012), 92. 11 Jonathan Z Ludwig, “Sixty years of Sino-Afghan relations,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26 (2013): 402. 2 After the international coalition began operations in Afghanistan in 2001, the Chinese government allocated US$4 million of humanitarian aid toward the restoration of the Afghan state. In addition, in the Tokyo donor conference in 2002 it promised to provide an additional US$1 million for the same purposes.12 On December 22, 2002, China—together with the countries neighboring Afghanistan (Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)—signed the Declaration on Good-Neighborly Relations.13 In 2006, China and Afghanistan signed the Agreement on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation, and in 2012 a new document crucial for interstate relations: the “Joint Declaration between the People's Republic of China and the Islamic State of Afghanistan on Establishing Strategic and Cooperative Partnership.”14 Chinese Minister of Public Security, Zhou Yongkang—also a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the secretary of the Political and Legislative Affairs of the CPC Central Committee—came to the ceremony of signing the agreement. At that time, Yongkang was the most senior official of China to visit the IRA since 1966.15 Remarkably, Beijing has been a committed participant in almost all international arrangements working toward the reconstruction of Afghanistan: London in 2006, Paris in 2008, and The Hague in 2009, along with meetings in London, Istanbul, and Kabul in 2010.16 Beyond that, China has paid considerable attention to the socio-economic recovery of Afghanistan. First, in 2008, the Chinese iron and steel corporation Metallurgical Group Corp and Jiangxi Copper Corporation pledged to invest approximately US$4 billion to acquire 100% of the rights in the Afghan field Aynak, the second largest undeveloped copper deposit in the world. Within the framework of this project, China also committed to build a thermal power plant with a capacity of 400 megawatts, a railway from Afghanistan to Xinjiang, a hospital, and a mosque.17 In addition, in 2011 the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a 25-year contract for oil extraction in the Northern provinces of Faryab and Sar-e Pol in the Amu-Darya basin.18 The planned amount of Chinese investments in the Afghan economy is about US$10 billion.19 However, Chinese projects remain uncompleted due to the challenging security situation countrywide, especially in some provinces where Chinese firms planned to participate in building infrastructure facilities. Second, China has allocated a number of grants for the recovery of Afghanistan since 2001. In 2002, it announced about US$150 million of aid,20 and in 2009, another grant of US$75 12 Daniel Korski and John Fox, “Can China save Afghanistan,” September 29, 2008, http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/can_china_save_afghanistan/ . 13 Kabul Declaration on Good-Neighborly Relations [Afghanistan], S/2002/1416, December 22, 2002, http://www.refworld.org/docid/42ef429e4.html. 14 Jane Perlez, “China Shows Interest in Afghan Security, Fearing Taliban Would Help Separatists,” The New York Times, June 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/asia/china-signals- interest-in-afghanistan-after-nato-leaves.html.
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