Wake Forest Journal of Business and Intellectual Property Law
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! ! ! WAKE FOREST JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ! ! !9%29 "*!9&$%29 "!9&9 FLAWS IN THE EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSTITUTION’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE C. Todd Mosley†! I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 283 II. RELEVANT ENGLISH COPYRIGHT HISTORY ............ 286 ! III. COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION .................... 289 A. THE NEED FOR COPYRIGHT PROTECTION ................ 289! B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE “LIMITED TIMES” ! P! ROVISION ............................................................... 293! IV. C! OPYRIGHT EXTENSION ......................................... 294 ! V. FROM PUBLIC BENEFIT TO ECONOMICS: CONGRESS CHANGED THE INTENT OF COPYRIGHT..... 297! VI. WE WOULD LIKE TO PUNT THIS ISSUE: THE SUPREME COURT’S ABILITY TO AVOID THE ! QUESTION..................................................................... 303 VII. RECENT SHIFT IN COPYRIGHT PROTECTION: TOWARDS A MORE PUBLIC CENTERED REGIME . 3 0 6 ! VIII. SOLUTIONS ........................................................... 310 A. TERM LIMITS .......................................................... 311! B. REINSTATE THE RENEWAL REQUIREMENT .............. 312! C.!REVERSIONARY CLAUSE ......................................... 312 ! D.!COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT EXONERATION ! ! ! ! † © 2018 Assistant Public Defender, Hancock County, Ohio. I want to sincerely thank my beautiful wife, Susanna Fleites, for her love, support, and most of all her patience. I am eternally grateful to Professor Deidré Keller for igniting my passion for intellectual property law. Lastly, I want to thank the entire staff at Wake Forest Journal of Business and Intellectual Property Law for their professional candor, expediency, and incredible insight. Any errors found herein are mine and mine alone. 9&2&9 "#!9$!959 6!59%29 9 " 5949*!59595! CLAUSE .................................................................... 313 IX. CONCLUSION ........................................................... 314 ! ! &$%279 8!9!!!*99*!!% #9 &2'9 !#9%# !! 9 I.!INTRODUCTION Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution confers onto Congress the authority “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.1 By design, and with the understanding of the immense power a monopoly can have, the framers of the Constitution found it necessary to grant such monopolies to better society.2 This compromise would allow all those who created something useful, creative, or furthered science to reap the fruits of their labor.3 However, this incentive was not intended to be a license that guarantees riches to the inventor, author, or assignees, but rather a reward for their societal contribution.4 This incentive was a quid pro quo between the authors and the public.5 The quid pro quo found in the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution had a simpler understanding when it was drafted than it does today.6 Originally, it was understood that we as a society would 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 2 See Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 1009 (2013) (exploring the framers’ understanding and common hatred of monopolies). 3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 4 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); Dennis Harney, Mickey Mousing the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Eldred v. Reno, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 291, 308 (2002); Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 924–25 (2002). 5 See Harney, supra note 4, at 299. 6 The predominant idea that intellectual property is a natural right is evidenced in our congressional enactments and even in our court cases. See Robert Epstein, The Constitutional Foundations of Intellectual Property By Randolph J. May & Seth L. Cooper, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 54, 54 (2016) (reviewing RANDOLPH J. MAY & SETH L. COOPER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015)) (explaining that the Lockean Natural Law Theory heavily influenced the Founding Fathers in crafting the Constitution); see also Gene Quinn, Patents, Copyrights and the Constitution, Perfect Together, IP WATCHDOG (May 4, 2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/05/04/patents-copyrights-and-the- constitution-perfect-together/id=16769/ (demonstrating that Congress has repeatedly passed legislation to grant patents and copyrights). The Founding Fathers hesitantly recognized monopolies. See James Madison, Monopolies Perpetuities Corporations Ecclesiastical Endowments, in WORDS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 143, 143 (Steve Coffman ed., 2012) (reiterating Madison’s view of the forbidden sense of monopolies while acknowledging that in certain case they can be useful). While they may be useful, monopolies must be “guarded with strictness against abuses.” Id. The Founders found it necessary to state that we are not to have a perpetual right in copyright and other intellectual property regimes because the right of a learned man trumps the statutory right to a monopoly. Id. continued . 9&2(9 "#!9$!959 6!59%29 9 " 5949*!59595! grant you, inventor or author, a statutory monopoly right in your work, and in return, after the expiration of said monopoly, your work would move into the public domain 7 for all to use freely. 8 Today the prominent understanding – or misunderstanding – of intellectual property tends to be more towards allocating intellectual property the same rights found in natural property.9 Many, including some members of Congress, believe that since it is the author’s creation, the author should have a perpetual property right in the work.10 This perpetual right theory is detrimental to the existence of the public domain. The transition from monopoly to public domain is fundamentally necessary for the progress of science and the useful arts, as most, if not all, intellectual property has an essential connection to earlier creations and discoveries.11 John of Salisbury wrote: “We are like dwarfs sitting on the shoulders of giants. We see more, and things that are more distant than they did, not because our sight is superior or because we are taller than they, but because they raise us up, and by their great stature add to ours.”12 John was a distinguished philosopher, educationalist, 7 Public Domain, NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 2009). The public domain is a collection of works that do not have, or no longer have, copyright protection. See id. It is free for anyone to use any of the works in the public domain. See id. The public domain consists of: Ideas and facts; Works with expired copyrights; Works governed by early copyright statutes that failed to meet the requirements for copyright protection, i.e., notice, registration, and renewal requirements; U.S. government works; Scientific and other research methodologies, statistical techniques and educational processes; Laws, regulations, judicial opinions, government documents and legislative reports; Words, names, numbers, symbols, signs, rules of grammar and diction, and punctuation. Public Domain, U.C. COPYRIGHT, http://copyright.universityofcalifornia.edu/use/public-domain.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2017). 8 See James E. Rogan, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Prepared Remarks at the Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (Feb. 6, 2002), https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news- updates/competition-and-intellectual-property-law-and-policy-knowledge-based- economy (“While patents can encourage risk-taking and investment in new ideas, patent law also limits the advantage that a patent confers. An inventor does not have exclusive rights to his invention forever. Once the term of the patent expires, the invention is in the public domain and may be used or manufactured by anyone.”). 9 See generally Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law: Forgetting the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365 (2004) (elaborating on the issues Congress faces when enacting copyright law). 10 See id. at 447. 11 See Harney, supra note 4, at 299. 12 See Linda Chatman Thomsen, Standing on the Shoulders of a Giant, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 2 (2006). continued . &$%279 8!9!!!*99*!!% #9 &2)9 !#9%# !! 9 and historian from the twelfth century.13 His quote was referring to the idea of education, which is still relevant today, as this idea is the driving force behind the public domain.14 The limited monopoly of intellectual property rights was created to spur creativity,15 and did so quite well, as early inventers and authors were very successful in their creations.16 But what changed? This Article will explore the question of why Congress, over the past forty years, has found it necessary to extend the period in which the author, or even an assignee, may legally keep others from sitting on the shoulders of giants. Furthermore, this Article will explore the issue of whether authors were unhappy with the length of the original monopoly term granted by copyright law and were therefore unwilling to create new works of expression. This Article will explore the fundamental causes behind unconstitutional overextensions of intellectual property rights. In doing so, it will reveal the foundation of copyright law, highlight the Founding Fathers’ intent