DOCSLIB.ORG

A Natural Law Approach to Teaching Values Corrected

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Natural Law Approach to Teaching Values Corrected A NATURAL LAW APPROACH TO TEACHING VALUES by William Scott Johnson A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Law University of Birmingham September, 2011 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract The teaching of values to youth in contemporary societies is more problematic than ever before. Globalisation, technological change, the decline of belief systems, and the breakdown of the family have created an environment where people fear that character education may impart values to children which conflict with their own. Natural law holds the potential to identify basic values which almost all can embrace. Some believe Hume’s Guillotine has rendered natural law reasoning invalid. The perceived objections to ethical naturalism of Hume, Moore, and Mackie are herein shown to pose no significant obstacles to natural law thought. A contemporary form of ancient natural law reasoning is advanced here; it is then combined with a uniquely simple and practical approach to pedagogy. This pedagogy is shown to have exceptional motivational power. The ability of the form of natural law reasoning here set forth to deduce prescriptivity from the natural world is then demonstrated, using the area of reproductive and gestational health in order to give an instantiation of legitimate derivation of values from facts. This ethical reasoning and teaching strategy will likely be approved by those who would otherwise object to children being taught values while at school. I would like to dedicate this thesis to my wife Deborah Johnson for her patience, support, and help throughout the entire process, to my dear friend and writing coach Rosalie Williams for her encouragement, editing, and oversight of my work, to my supervisor Iain Law for his wise and subtle style of supervision, and to the congregation of Pittsfield First Baptist Church for releasing me to pursue this project. Table of Contents Section Heading Page I.0 INTRODUCTION page 1 I.1 Beginning with an Axiom page 3 I.2 Gauging Well-being page 4 I.3 Natural Law page 6 I.4 A Particular Pedagogy page 8 I.5 The “Vagueness” of Natural Law page 9 I.6 Thomistic Natural Law page 10 I.7 Early Natural Law page 10 I.8 Natural Law in Legal and Moral Philosophy page 14 I.9 A Response to the Fact-Value Challenge page 17 I.10 Natural Law Ethical Instruction: Theory, Content, and Practice page 19 1.0 CHAPTER I: DAVID HUME AND THE “IS-OUGHT” PROHIBITION page 20 1.1 What David Hume Really Said: Values Derived from Facts page 21 Through Sentiment 1.2 Hume and Hutcheson: Similarities and Differences page 25 1.3 Reasoning from Fact to Value by Way of Sentiment page 29 1.4 Hume’s Milieu page 33 1.5 Hume’s Discomfort with His Own Assertions page 35 1.6 Questioning the Anti-Metaphysical Stance of Humeanism page 38 1.7 Reason’s Relationship to Desire page 40 1.7.1 Reason and Emotion Inseparable page 43 1.8 Hume and the Reality of Virtue page 44 1.9 Conclusion: The Relevance of what Hume Actually Said page 46 2.0 CHAPTER II: G. E. MOORE page 48 2.1 Pinning Down ‘Good’ page 50 2.2 The ‘Naturalistic Fallacy’ page 54 2.3 The ‘Open Question Argument’ page 57 2.4 Moore’s Repudiation of Idealism page 59 2.5 The ‘Linguistic Turn’ page 61 2.6 Getting it Wrong: Comparing Good to the Colour Yellow page 63 2.7 The Problematic Nature of Intuitionism page 70 2.8 Why the ‘Naturalistic Fallacy’ Isn’t page 72 2.9 Appraising the ‘Open Question Argument’ page 74 2.10 Conclusion: The Consequences of Moore’s Linguistic Approach to page 76 Good 3.0 CHAPTER III: THE ETHICAL THEORY OF JOHN L. MACKIE page 81 3.1 Mackie’s ‘Error Theory’ page 84 3.2 The Argument from Relativity page 85 3.3 The Argument from ‘Queerness’ page 87 3.4 The Subjectivity of Values in Brief page 89 i 3.5 A Response to Mackie’s Claims page 89 3.6 Answering the Argument from Relativity page 91 3.6.1 Mackie Cannot Account for Moral Progress page 91 3.6.2 Mackie’s Presuppositions page 92 3.6.3 Differences in Norms vs. Differences in Basic Moral Values page 93 3.6.4 Insights from Anthropology Regarding Cultural Relativism page 97 3.6.4.1 The Possible Risks of Assuming the Validity of Moral Relativism page 98 3.6.5 Pedagogical Entailments of Mackie’s Failure to Account for Ethical page 102 Progress 3.7 Answering the Argument from ‘Queerness’ page 103 3.7.1 The Limitations of Science as Regards Identifying Objective page 105 Reality 3.7.2 The Inseparability of Fact and Value page 107 3.7.2.1 Mackie’s Inability to Avoid Value-Laden Terminology page 109 3.7.2.2 Mackie’s Ethics Fails the Test of Practical Living page 110 3.7.3 Should We Find Intrinsic Prescriptivity Problematic? page 112 3.7.3.1 The Eclipse of Reductionist Physicalism page 114 3.8 Mackie’s Theory Appears Unworkable for Mackie Himself page 116 3.9 Conclusion: Mackie in Retrospect page 118 4.0 CHAPTER IV: NATURAL LAW REASONING AND ETHICAL INSTRUCTION page 121 4.1 Hart’s ‘Minimum Content of Natural Law’ page 121 4.1.1 The Widespread Appeal and Usage of Teleological Language page 123 4.1.2 The Ethically Unifying Potential of This Kind of Teleology page 124 4.2 The Minimalism of Hart’s Telos page 127 4.3 Locating This Proposal in the Field of Natural Law page 130 4.3.1 Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle page 130 4.3.1.1 The First Principle of Practical Reason page 130 4.3.1.2 The Seven Self-Evident Goods page 132 4.3.1.3 GBF’s Epistemological Departure from Traditional Natural Law page 133 Thought 4.3.1.4 The First Principle of Morality page 135 4.3.2 The Natural Law Implications of GBF’s Rejection of Teleology page 136 4.3.2.1 The Absence of the Notion of Flourishing from GBF’s Theory page 138 4.3.2.2 GBF is Pedagogically Unwieldy and “Top-Heavy” with Theory page 139 4.4 Help from Hume: “Utility” of a Different Kind page 140 4.4.1 The Inescapable Telos of Human Well-Being page 143 4.4.2 Attractionally Imperative page 144 4.5 Right Desire as a Source of Real Knowledge page 145 4.5.1 Truth of Another Kind page 147 4.5.1.1 Right Desire and Moral Truth page 148 4.5.2 Reuniting Reason and Passion in Ethical Reasoning page 150 4.5.2.1 Making Use of the Brain’s Internal Imagery page 154 4.5.2.2 The Motivational Power of Negative Imagery page 155 4.5.2.2.1 Bringing Potential Loss “Near” to the Student page 157 4.5.3 The Primacy of Human Needs page 159 ii 4.6 In Search of a ‘Law Conception of Ethics’ page 162 4.6.1 A Teleological Strategy for the Recovery of a ‘Law Conception of page 163 Ethics’ 4.6.2 Kant’s Ethics Implicitly Dependent Upon Human Nature page 166 4.6.3 Human Nature is the Context of All Moral Inquiry page 167 4.6.4 The Morally Inert Nature of Facts May Actually Give Rise to page 168 Philosophy 4.6.5 Looking Toward Human Nature for Moral Norms page 169 4.6.6 Donnelly’s Form of Practical Reasoning page 172 4.6.6.1 Donnelly’s Usage of Entelechy page 176 4.6.6.2 Goods Based Upon Realisation of Potential page 178 4.6.6.3 Nature in Terms of Potential Maximised page 179 4.7 Conclusion: What I am Claiming About Natural Law page 180 4.7.1 Practical Application of This Methodology page 181 5.0 CHAPTER V: REPRODUCTIVE AND GESTATIONAL HEALTH page 183 5.1 The Goodness of Human Sexuality page 186 5.2 Values: Agreement and Disagreement page 187 5.3 Imparting Sexual Principles to Young Children page 190 5.4 Teenage Sexuality: Acting According to Bodily Design page 192 5.4.1 Female Adolescent Sexual Development page 195 5.4.1.1 Factors Contraindicating Sexual Debut page 196 5.4.1.1.1 Vaginal Acidity, Lactobacilli, Hydrogen Peroxide and Sexually pa ge 199 Transmitted Infection 5.4.1.1.2 Asymptomatic Infection and PID page 201 5.4.1.1.3 Risks Associated with Adolescent Pregnancy page 202 5.4.2 The Process of Female Sexual Maturation page 203 5.4.2.1 Wide Age Variances for Attainment of Tanner Stage V page 205 5.4.3 Basing Prescriptivity on Facts page 206 5.5 Male Adolescent Sexual Development page 208 5.5.1 Adolescent Male Sexual Vulnerability page 209 5.5.2 Tendency Toward Immaturity and Irresponsibility page 210 5.5.3 Male STD Infection and Infertility page 210 5.6 Ethical Implications Regarding Adolescents and Sexual Debut page 212 5.6.1 The Need to Teach Youth to Reason Ethically About the Long- page 212 Term Effects of Their Behaviours 5.7 Adult Human Design: A Basis for Monogamous Behaviour page 214 5.7.1 Condoms vs.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • In Order to Continue My Education With
    Contemporary Metaethics Part 1 My Personal Notes © James Gray 2009-2011 Originally published at http://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/ 1 Table of Contents 1. What is “Morality?”................................................................................................................5 What does “morality” mean?..................................................................................................6 Moral and nonmoral standards...............................................................................................9 2. The Debate Over Moral Realism..........................................................................................11 What is Moral realism?........................................................................................................11 Is moral realism true?...........................................................................................................14 3. Meta-Ethical Theories...........................................................................................................16 Moral naturalism..................................................................................................................16 Moral intuitionism................................................................................................................17 Emotivism.............................................................................................................................17 Moral relativism...................................................................................................................18
    [Show full text]
  • Contemporary Ethics
    Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics Christian Miller Wake Forest University [email protected] The Journal of Ethics 7 (2003): 365-392 Several philosophers claim to have discovered a new and rather significant problem with virtue ethics.1 According to them, virtue ethics generates certain expectations about the behavior of human beings which are subject to empirical testing. But when the relevant experimental work is done in social psychology, the results fall remarkably short of meeting those expectations. So, these philosophers think, despite its recent success virtue ethics has far less to offer to contemporary ethical theory than might have been initially thought. In this paper, I hope to suggest some plausible ways in which virtue ethicists can resist arguments based on empirical work in social psychology.2 My plan is to proceed as follows. In the first three sections, an attempt will be made to reconstruct the line of reasoning being used against virtue ethics by 1 See for example Gilbert Harman, “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999), pp. 315-332 and “The Nonexistence of Character Traits,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000), pp. 223-226, John Doris, “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics,” Noûs 32 (1998), pp. 504-530 and Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and John Campbell, “Can Philosophical Accounts of Altruism Accommodate Experimental Data on Helping Behavior?” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999), pp. 26-45. Other philosophers who seem to show some sympathy towards this objection include Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 of Law, Virtue and Justice – an Introduction
    1 Of Law, Virtue and Justice – An Introduction AMALIA AMAYA AND HO HOCK LAI I. THE REVIVAL OF VIRTUE N THE LAST decades, there has been a blossoming of virtue-based approaches to a number of philosophical problems. Virtue theory has a I prominent place in both contemporary ethics and epistemology. A. Virtue Ethics Virtue ethics has its origins in Classical Greece and it was the dominant approach in western moral philosophy until the Enlightenment. During the nineteenth cen- tury and the first half of the twentieth century, virtue theory faded from the land- scape of moral philosophy, and the discussion on ethics centered around two traditions, namely, deontology and utilitarianism. Virtue ethics re-emerged in the late 1950s, with Elizabeth Anscombe’s important article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, and has established itself as a major approach in normative ethics.1 The revival of virtue ethics was motivated by an increasing dissatisfaction with deontology and utilitarianism. Proponents of virtue theories objected that these theories sidestepped or ignored a number of topics that any adequate moral phi- losophy should address, such as motives, moral character, moral education, the moral significance of friendship, family relations, and community bonds, ques- tions about what sort of person one should be, the role of emotions in our moral life, and a concern with happiness and flourishing.2 There is a wide variety of views that fall under the heading of virtue ethics, as critics have objected to differ- ent aspects of modern ethical theory and have developed a virtue-based approach 1 Anscombe (1958), reprinted in Crisp and Slote (1997).
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Unit 5 Ethics in Contemporary Philosophy
    UNIT 5 ETHICS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY Contents 5.0. Objectives 5.1. Introduction 5.2. Definition 5.3. Normative Ethics: A New Look 5.4. Meta-ethics or Second Order Ethics 5.5. Virtue Ethics: The Aristotelian Revival 5.6. Practical Ethics: Forgotten Past Unearthed 5.7. Let Us Sum Up 5.8. Key Words 5.9. Further Readings and References 5.10. Answers to Check Your Progress 5.0. OBJECTIVES An overview of history of western ethics (which is a branch of philosophy), called “Moral Philosophy” as well, gives us an idea that there are at least five important epochs in the philosophical enterprise regarding moral matters. “Contemporary Western Ethics” is the fifth epoch; the objective of this paper is: • to bring out the characteristic features of contemporary ethics 5.1. INTRODUCTION First, there is early and rich Greek Ethics marked by Pre- Socratic, Socratic, Platonic, Aristotelian and Sophistic original thinking and writings. Furthered by some equally influential writings of some Hellenistic and Roman ethicists, the Cynic and the Cyrenaics and the Stoics in the main. And then after Epicurus’ Cyrenaicism, Plotinus was responsible for what we now call, “Neo-Platonism.” Contemporary ethics owes much to these early and rich ethical reflections, about which we shall come to know later on in the discussion. Nothings less do we owe to the Medical Moral philosophy, especially to the ethical thinking and writings of some remarkably eloquent Christian ethicists like Augustine, Aquinas, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. This paved way to what we may call, the third epoch, the Early Modern ethical epoch, growing particularly during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries influenced by religious Reformation, and the scientific revolution of Copernicus and Galileo, Francis Bacon, Erasmus, Luther and Calvin, However the real modern turn came with the radical writings of Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) and the Cambridge Platonists like, Cudworth, Cumberland, Malebranche.
    [Show full text]
  • Beyond Cultural Relativism: an Ecological Model for Rhetorical Ethics
    DOCUMENT RESUME ED 314 807 CS 507 036 AUTHOR Mackin, Jim TITLE Beyond Cultural Relativism: An Ecological Model for Rhetorical Ethics. PUB DATE Nov 89 NOTE 8p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association (75th, San Francisco, CA, November 18-21, 1989). PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150)-- Viewpoints (120) -- Reports - Evaluative/Feasibility (142) EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS Communication Research; Cultural Context; Ecclogy; *Ethics; *Models; Moral Values; Research Nee0s; *Rhetoric IDENTIFIERS Aristotle; Communication Theory; *Cultural Relativism ABSTRACT A model intended to overcome the cultural relativism of determining what is an ethical act draws an analogy to environmental studies. Beginning with the concepts of "telos" (final purpose) and "archai" (priority), the notion ofan ecosystem of ethics avoids limitation to a particular historical definitionof good. Since the telos of human life is the quest for the good,a communicative ecosystem's virtues are those which enable its members to seek the good. An ideal communicative system supports all parts equally, and the parts in turn support the system. The telosof the individual and of the system are interrelated; both must be taken into account in making ethical decisions. The practice of living ethically will include system building and transforming. How to help the present system become more like the ideal without making the system less viable is the central question. Combining the notionsof public and private into a systems relationship should increase understanding of the problem of morality, but also will raisenew inquiries. (Twenty-five notes are included.) (SG) ****************************.****************************************** Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best thatcan be made from the original document.
    [Show full text]
  • Contemporary Ethical Theories and Jurisprudence George Nakhnikian
    Notre Dame Law School NDLScholarship Natural Law Forum 1-1-1957 Contemporary Ethical Theories and Jurisprudence George Nakhnikian Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Nakhnikian, George, "Contemporary Ethical Theories and Jurisprudence" (1957). Natural Law Forum. Paper 17. http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum/17 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Law Forum by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORIES AND JURISPRUDENCE George Nakhnikian FOUR TYPES of ethical theory have been the ones most heatedly debated among analytic philosophers since the appearance in 1903 of G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica. Each type has certain consequences for jurisprudence. This essay describes the essential features of the theories and points out some of the readily discernible consequences. For the sake of clarity, I shall explain how I am using the terms 'juris- prudence' and 'ethical theory' and make some remarks concerning the relevance of ethics for jurisprudence. I have adopted Julius Stone's definition of 'jurisprudence' and his three- fold division of jurisprudence into analytical, ethical, and sociological. "Juris- prudence," writes Stone, "is the examination of law in the light of other disciplines than the law." ' The following three main questions may be asked concerning the
    [Show full text]
  • Ethics Content
    Ethics Content I Introduction to Ethics Unit-1 Nature and Scope of Ethics Unit-2 Importance and Challenges of Ethics Unit-3 Ethics in the History of Indian Philosophy Unit-4 Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy II Ethical Foundations Unit-1 Human Values Unit-2 Human Virtues Unit-3 Human Rights Unit-4 Human Duties III Applied Ethics Unit-1 International Ethics Unit-2 Bioethics Unit-3 Environmental Ethics Unit-4 Media Ethics IV Current Ethical Debates Unit-1 Natural Moral Law Unit-2 Deontology and Moral Responsibility Unit-3 Discourse Ethics Unit-4 Social Institutions UNIT 1 NATURE AND SCOPE OF ETHICS Nature and Scope of Ethics Contents 1.0 Objectives 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Moral Intuitionism 1.3 Human Person in Search of Himself/Herself 1.4 Love and the Moral Precepts 1.5 The Dynamics of Morality 1.6 The Constant and the Variable in Morality 1.7 Let Us Sum Up 1.8 Key Words 1.9 Further Readings and References 1.0 OBJECTIVES This unit aims at introducing the students to the philosophical need for Ethics starting from a brief discussion of Moral law and how the human person in his or her process of growth intuits the ethical principles. Discussions pertaining to the dynamics of morality is undertaken to show how on the one hand new situations call for new responses from moral point of view and on the other hand certain fundamentals of ethics remain the same in so far as there is something of a common human nature adequately understood.
    [Show full text]
  • Rawls and the Kantian Ethos*
    Polity . Volume 39, Number 1 . January 2007 r 2007 Northeastern Political Science Association 0032-3497/07 $30.00 www.palgrave-journals.com/polity Rawls and the Kantian Ethos* Nicholas Tampio Hamilton College John Rawls had a life-long interest in Kant. To provide a new perspective on Rawls’s political thinking, to illuminate Kant’s legacy for political theory, and to contribute to current debates about the Enlightenment, I track how Rawls interprets and transforms Kant’s legacy. In this essay, I show how Rawls reconceptualizes four key Kantian activities: the identification of the problem, the engagement with common sense, the construction of principles, and the authentication of principles. I defend Rawls from the charge—made by Allan Bloom, Michael Sandel, and Allen Wood, among others—that Rawls fundamentally misunderstands or misuses Kant. The basis of my defense is that Rawls considers a critical intellectual sensibility (or ethos), rather than a specific doctrine (e.g., the categorical imperative), as the most valuable component of Kant’s legacy. Polity (2007) 39, 79–102. doi:10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300044 Keywords Rawls; Kant; Enlightenment; ethos Nicholas Tampio teaches political theory at Hamilton College. He researches the legacy of the Enlightenment in contemporary political theory. He can be reached at [email protected]. Introduction John Rawls, it is well known, was a life-long student of Kant.1 One of the most famous and controversial sections of A Theory of Justice (1971) is entitled, ‘‘The *This essay grew out of seminars on Kant and Rawls at Johns Hopkins University with William E.
    [Show full text]
  • 57 G. E. Moore and Theory of Moral/Right Action in Ethics of Social
    Ethics & Bioethics (in Central Europe), 2017, 7 (1–2), 57–65 DOI:10.1515/ebce-2017-0002 G. E. Moore and theory of moral/right action in ethics of social consequences Vasil Gluchman Abstract G. E. Moore’s critical analysis of right action in utilitarian ethics and his consequentialist concept of right action is a starting point for a theory of moral/right action in ethics of social consequences. The terms right and wrong have different meanings in these theories. The author explores different aspects of right and wrong actions in ethics of social consequences and compares them with Moore’s ideas. He positively evaluates Moore’s contributions to the development his theory of moral/right action. Keywords: G. E. Moore, right, wrong, ethics of social consequences Introduction When formulating the theory of moral/right action in ethics of social consequences,1 I took inspiration from G. E. Moore’s critical analysis of right action in utilitarian ethics and his consequentialist concept of right action (Moore, 2000; 2005), which I adopted as the starting point of my reasoning (Gluchman, 2000, pp. 9–23; 2001, pp. 633–634). I follow the view of action similar to that of Moore, which means he evaluates the actions of a moral agent on the basis of their consequences. However, unlike Moore, I form in ethics of social consequences a broader scope of evaluative judgements,2 and what is also broader is the value structure of ethics of social consequences, as among the fundamental values there are humanity, human dignity, the moral right of man to life, its development and cultivation, as well as the values of justice, responsibility, tolerance and obligation (Gluchman, 2003; 2009, pp.
    [Show full text]
  • Course:Cca/Ai 322 Course Title:Problems and Issues In
    1 DePaul University School of Continuing and Professional Studies COURSE: CCA/AI 322 COURSE TITLE: PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS WINTER 2021 INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION Name: David Simpson Cellphone: 812-322-4325; email: [email protected] Course Dates: January 4, 2021 – March 21, 2021 Course Location and Delivery Format: Online COURSE DESCRIPTION Syllabus, AI_322_701 2 An introduction to moral philosophy with emphasis on the important differences between realist and relativist theories and comparing consequentialist, deontological, ethics of care, pluralist, contractarian, and virtue approaches. During the course you will be introduced to classic theories and leading figures in the history of ethics, from Aristotle and Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, to Peter Singer and John Rawls. Course content will focus on issues (e.g., wealth and poverty, privacy, healthcare, capital punishment, euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, biomedical research, animal rights, etc.) at the center of contemporary ethical debate in the United States and throughout the world. LEARNING OUTCOMES: After completing this course, SCPS students will be able to: Define and apply basic critical concepts and vocabulary terms relating to philosophy and ethical theory. Identify and compare key figures, texts, and ideas in the history of moral philosophy. Identify and describe at least four major ethical theories or moral principles and apply them to contemporary issues. Apply insights and theories from moral philosophy to personal ethical decisions. Apply concepts and theories from moral philosophy to analyze issues and resolve disputes in the contemporary workplace. After completing the course, Liberal Studies students will be able to: Critically think about and analyze philosophical questions and problems.
    [Show full text]
  • In the Philosophy Section of the Catalog
    Philosophy Chair: Michelle Jenkins Patrick R. Frierson Mitchell S. Clearfield Rebecca Hanrahan Thomas A. Davis Julia A. Ireland Wenqing Zhao Philosophy courses provide the opportunity for the development of a critical and unified understanding of experience and nature. This is accomplished through their concern — from both historical and contemporary perspectives — with the ethical, social and political, aesthetic, religious, metaphysical, epistemological, and scientific dimensions of existence. All four-credit courses in philosophy meet the equivalent of three periods per week. Learning Goals: Upon graduation, a student will be able to: develop individual insights, pursue them with depth, and present them clearly in writing. develop individual insights and present these insights clearly and rigorously orally. understand the history of philosophy and be able to reconsider questions and problems as they are raised and transformed by a succession of thinkers. use philosophical tools for close reading, investigation, analysis, and argument. discover and question hidden assumptions in their own work and the work of others. Distribution: Courses completed in philosophy apply to the humanities distribution area, except for Philosophy 200 and 488, which apply to quantitative analysis. Philosophy 260 may be applied to either humanities or cultural pluralism. Total credit requirements for a Philosophy major: 32 The Philosophy major: 32 Credits (36 credits if pursuing honors) Required Courses o Philosophy 201 and 202 o One course from each of the three categories: Analytic, Continental, Ethics (see course list below) o At least two courses from the 300 or 400 level Other notes o No one course can be used to satisfy two categories o Philosophy 201 and 202 should be completed before the end of the students’ seventh semester o No courses may be taken PDF Senior Requirements o Rewriting of a seminar paper from a 300- to 400-level course o Written comprehensive exam o Oral exam .
    [Show full text]
  • Perfectionism and Pragmatism
    European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy II-2 | 2010 Perfectionism and Pragmatism Sandra Laugier and Piergiorgio Donatelli (dir.) Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/886 DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.886 ISSN: 2036-4091 Publisher Associazione Pragma Electronic reference Sandra Laugier and Piergiorgio Donatelli (dir.), European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010, « Perfectionism and Pragmatism » [Online], Online since 21 December 2010, connection on 23 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/886 ; DOI : https:// doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.886 This text was automatically generated on 23 September 2020. Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Symposia. “Perfectionism and Pragmatism” Pragmatism, Transcendentalism, and Perfectionism Introduction to the Symposia Piergiorgio Donatelli, Roberto Frega and Sandra Laugier Emerson and Skepticism A Reading of “Friendship” Russell B. Goodman Must We Do What We Say? Truth, Responsibility and the Ordinary in Ancient and Modern Perfectionism Daniele Lorenzini Wittgenstein, the Criticism of Philosophy, and Self-Knowledge Tarek R. Dika Cavell’s “Moral Perfectionism” or Emerson’s “Moral Sentiment”? Joseph Urbas Emersonian Moral Perfectionism An Alternative Ethics – But in What Sense? Heikki A. Kovalainen Internal
    [Show full text]