A NATURAL LAW APPROACH TO TEACHING VALUES by William Scott Johnson A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy College of Arts and Law University of Birmingham September, 2011 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract The teaching of values to youth in contemporary societies is more problematic than ever before. Globalisation, technological change, the decline of belief systems, and the breakdown of the family have created an environment where people fear that character education may impart values to children which conflict with their own. Natural law holds the potential to identify basic values which almost all can embrace. Some believe Hume’s Guillotine has rendered natural law reasoning invalid. The perceived objections to ethical naturalism of Hume, Moore, and Mackie are herein shown to pose no significant obstacles to natural law thought. A contemporary form of ancient natural law reasoning is advanced here; it is then combined with a uniquely simple and practical approach to pedagogy. This pedagogy is shown to have exceptional motivational power. The ability of the form of natural law reasoning here set forth to deduce prescriptivity from the natural world is then demonstrated, using the area of reproductive and gestational health in order to give an instantiation of legitimate derivation of values from facts. This ethical reasoning and teaching strategy will likely be approved by those who would otherwise object to children being taught values while at school. I would like to dedicate this thesis to my wife Deborah Johnson for her patience, support, and help throughout the entire process, to my dear friend and writing coach Rosalie Williams for her encouragement, editing, and oversight of my work, to my supervisor Iain Law for his wise and subtle style of supervision, and to the congregation of Pittsfield First Baptist Church for releasing me to pursue this project. Table of Contents Section Heading Page I.0 INTRODUCTION page 1 I.1 Beginning with an Axiom page 3 I.2 Gauging Well-being page 4 I.3 Natural Law page 6 I.4 A Particular Pedagogy page 8 I.5 The “Vagueness” of Natural Law page 9 I.6 Thomistic Natural Law page 10 I.7 Early Natural Law page 10 I.8 Natural Law in Legal and Moral Philosophy page 14 I.9 A Response to the Fact-Value Challenge page 17 I.10 Natural Law Ethical Instruction: Theory, Content, and Practice page 19 1.0 CHAPTER I: DAVID HUME AND THE “IS-OUGHT” PROHIBITION page 20 1.1 What David Hume Really Said: Values Derived from Facts page 21 Through Sentiment 1.2 Hume and Hutcheson: Similarities and Differences page 25 1.3 Reasoning from Fact to Value by Way of Sentiment page 29 1.4 Hume’s Milieu page 33 1.5 Hume’s Discomfort with His Own Assertions page 35 1.6 Questioning the Anti-Metaphysical Stance of Humeanism page 38 1.7 Reason’s Relationship to Desire page 40 1.7.1 Reason and Emotion Inseparable page 43 1.8 Hume and the Reality of Virtue page 44 1.9 Conclusion: The Relevance of what Hume Actually Said page 46 2.0 CHAPTER II: G. E. MOORE page 48 2.1 Pinning Down ‘Good’ page 50 2.2 The ‘Naturalistic Fallacy’ page 54 2.3 The ‘Open Question Argument’ page 57 2.4 Moore’s Repudiation of Idealism page 59 2.5 The ‘Linguistic Turn’ page 61 2.6 Getting it Wrong: Comparing Good to the Colour Yellow page 63 2.7 The Problematic Nature of Intuitionism page 70 2.8 Why the ‘Naturalistic Fallacy’ Isn’t page 72 2.9 Appraising the ‘Open Question Argument’ page 74 2.10 Conclusion: The Consequences of Moore’s Linguistic Approach to page 76 Good 3.0 CHAPTER III: THE ETHICAL THEORY OF JOHN L. MACKIE page 81 3.1 Mackie’s ‘Error Theory’ page 84 3.2 The Argument from Relativity page 85 3.3 The Argument from ‘Queerness’ page 87 3.4 The Subjectivity of Values in Brief page 89 i 3.5 A Response to Mackie’s Claims page 89 3.6 Answering the Argument from Relativity page 91 3.6.1 Mackie Cannot Account for Moral Progress page 91 3.6.2 Mackie’s Presuppositions page 92 3.6.3 Differences in Norms vs. Differences in Basic Moral Values page 93 3.6.4 Insights from Anthropology Regarding Cultural Relativism page 97 3.6.4.1 The Possible Risks of Assuming the Validity of Moral Relativism page 98 3.6.5 Pedagogical Entailments of Mackie’s Failure to Account for Ethical page 102 Progress 3.7 Answering the Argument from ‘Queerness’ page 103 3.7.1 The Limitations of Science as Regards Identifying Objective page 105 Reality 3.7.2 The Inseparability of Fact and Value page 107 3.7.2.1 Mackie’s Inability to Avoid Value-Laden Terminology page 109 3.7.2.2 Mackie’s Ethics Fails the Test of Practical Living page 110 3.7.3 Should We Find Intrinsic Prescriptivity Problematic? page 112 3.7.3.1 The Eclipse of Reductionist Physicalism page 114 3.8 Mackie’s Theory Appears Unworkable for Mackie Himself page 116 3.9 Conclusion: Mackie in Retrospect page 118 4.0 CHAPTER IV: NATURAL LAW REASONING AND ETHICAL INSTRUCTION page 121 4.1 Hart’s ‘Minimum Content of Natural Law’ page 121 4.1.1 The Widespread Appeal and Usage of Teleological Language page 123 4.1.2 The Ethically Unifying Potential of This Kind of Teleology page 124 4.2 The Minimalism of Hart’s Telos page 127 4.3 Locating This Proposal in the Field of Natural Law page 130 4.3.1 Finnis, Grisez, and Boyle page 130 4.3.1.1 The First Principle of Practical Reason page 130 4.3.1.2 The Seven Self-Evident Goods page 132 4.3.1.3 GBF’s Epistemological Departure from Traditional Natural Law page 133 Thought 4.3.1.4 The First Principle of Morality page 135 4.3.2 The Natural Law Implications of GBF’s Rejection of Teleology page 136 4.3.2.1 The Absence of the Notion of Flourishing from GBF’s Theory page 138 4.3.2.2 GBF is Pedagogically Unwieldy and “Top-Heavy” with Theory page 139 4.4 Help from Hume: “Utility” of a Different Kind page 140 4.4.1 The Inescapable Telos of Human Well-Being page 143 4.4.2 Attractionally Imperative page 144 4.5 Right Desire as a Source of Real Knowledge page 145 4.5.1 Truth of Another Kind page 147 4.5.1.1 Right Desire and Moral Truth page 148 4.5.2 Reuniting Reason and Passion in Ethical Reasoning page 150 4.5.2.1 Making Use of the Brain’s Internal Imagery page 154 4.5.2.2 The Motivational Power of Negative Imagery page 155 4.5.2.2.1 Bringing Potential Loss “Near” to the Student page 157 4.5.3 The Primacy of Human Needs page 159 ii 4.6 In Search of a ‘Law Conception of Ethics’ page 162 4.6.1 A Teleological Strategy for the Recovery of a ‘Law Conception of page 163 Ethics’ 4.6.2 Kant’s Ethics Implicitly Dependent Upon Human Nature page 166 4.6.3 Human Nature is the Context of All Moral Inquiry page 167 4.6.4 The Morally Inert Nature of Facts May Actually Give Rise to page 168 Philosophy 4.6.5 Looking Toward Human Nature for Moral Norms page 169 4.6.6 Donnelly’s Form of Practical Reasoning page 172 4.6.6.1 Donnelly’s Usage of Entelechy page 176 4.6.6.2 Goods Based Upon Realisation of Potential page 178 4.6.6.3 Nature in Terms of Potential Maximised page 179 4.7 Conclusion: What I am Claiming About Natural Law page 180 4.7.1 Practical Application of This Methodology page 181 5.0 CHAPTER V: REPRODUCTIVE AND GESTATIONAL HEALTH page 183 5.1 The Goodness of Human Sexuality page 186 5.2 Values: Agreement and Disagreement page 187 5.3 Imparting Sexual Principles to Young Children page 190 5.4 Teenage Sexuality: Acting According to Bodily Design page 192 5.4.1 Female Adolescent Sexual Development page 195 5.4.1.1 Factors Contraindicating Sexual Debut page 196 5.4.1.1.1 Vaginal Acidity, Lactobacilli, Hydrogen Peroxide and Sexually pa ge 199 Transmitted Infection 5.4.1.1.2 Asymptomatic Infection and PID page 201 5.4.1.1.3 Risks Associated with Adolescent Pregnancy page 202 5.4.2 The Process of Female Sexual Maturation page 203 5.4.2.1 Wide Age Variances for Attainment of Tanner Stage V page 205 5.4.3 Basing Prescriptivity on Facts page 206 5.5 Male Adolescent Sexual Development page 208 5.5.1 Adolescent Male Sexual Vulnerability page 209 5.5.2 Tendency Toward Immaturity and Irresponsibility page 210 5.5.3 Male STD Infection and Infertility page 210 5.6 Ethical Implications Regarding Adolescents and Sexual Debut page 212 5.6.1 The Need to Teach Youth to Reason Ethically About the Long- page 212 Term Effects of Their Behaviours 5.7 Adult Human Design: A Basis for Monogamous Behaviour page 214 5.7.1 Condoms vs.