The Expedition of 1875-76 Author(s): Clements R. Markham Source: Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of , Vol. 21, No. 6 (1876 - 1877), pp. 536-555 Published by: Wiley on behalf of The Royal Geographical Society (with the Institute of British Geographers) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1799926 . Accessed: 17/06/2014 03:42

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ADDITIONAL NOTICES.

(Printed by order of Council.)

1.?The Arctic Expedition of 1S76-76. By Clements B. Markham, c.b., f.r.s., Secretary B.G.S. 1.?History of the Efforts to obtain a Renewal of Arctic Eesearch.

In the followingPaper I wish it to be understoodthat any views or opinions that may be expressed are my own, and that I am solely responsiblefor them. When, in 1865, the Council of the Royal GeographicalSociety undertook to advocate and promotethe explorationof the unknownregion round the Pole, it was fullyunderstood that the great work could only be accomplished gradually,and that one expedition must follow anotheruntil all the know? ledge attainableby human means, in this fieldof inquiry,had been obtained. One importantstep in advance has been made by the discoveriesof the Arctic Expedition of 1875-6; and it now becomes necessaryto take stock of our increased knowledge,and by its light to considerthe next step in advance that should be advocated. 2. The duty of thus summing up the case at the terminationof the first effort,would have fallen upon our lamented Associate, Admiral ,had he been sparedto us. He it was who firstraised the questionin 1865, who perseveringlyand ably kept it alive, who by his winningeloquence and well-deservedinfluence won adherents,and who at length secured the despatchof an expeditionby the route which he had advocated forten years. His effortswere crownedwith completesuccess, in the veryyear that he died. The cause of Arctic discoveryhas sustained a loss which cannot be replaced. We can no longer be sustained by that help which neVerfailed; yet the memoryof Osborn's cheeryvoice, and heartyjoyous smile, which won upon men's feelingsnearly as much as his close reasoningand well-marshalledfacts affectedtheir judgments,will nerve us still to do battle in the same noble cause. 3. I have undertakento sum up and take stockof what has been achieved, partlyas the constantassistant and adviserof Sherard Osborn fromthe day when he began to advocate the renewal of Arcticresearch in 1865, until the day of his death. But I do not take upon myselfto assertthat the views and opinions I now put forwardare necessarilythose which Osbornwould have adopted; althoughwe neverdiffered while workingtogether. We had been messmates during four years, we had served togetherin the same Arctic Expedition, and our friendshiphad stood the test of thirtyyears. When Osbornwent to Bombay in March 1865, he entrustedall his notes and cor? respondenceon the Arctic question to me, and he did so again on a later occasion. Togetherwe discussed each point as it arose, everystep that should' be taken, and togetherwe prepared the memoranda,drafts of letters,and reportswhich were adopted by the Council of the GreographicalSociety. So that the duty of discussing the question at the point it has now reached, which would have belonged to Osborn if he had been spared to us, does

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This content downloaded from 188.72.127.178 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:42:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ADDITIONAL NOTICES. 537 not unnaturally fall upon one who, in this matter,was his coadjutor and assistant. 4. It will be well, beforemarshalling our new knowledge,to recapitulate the historyof our effortsto obtain a renewalof ,since their commencementin 1865. 5. In determiningthe policy to be pursued forsecuring the despatchof an Arctic Expedition,it was above all things necessaryto ascertain the points which formerArctic experiencehas firmlyestablished, and to formulatethem, so as to have a firmstand-point from whence to start. 6. This experience bears upon the two main divisions of the subject, namely,the objects of Arctic exploration,and the means of securing those objects. 7. Formerly,and since 1775, the objects,or at least the main objects,of Arctic voyages had been to make the North-west Passage or to reach the . The last voyage forthe formerobject leftEngland in 1845, and forthe latterin 1827. But the advance of knowledge had since proved that therecould be no usefuland tangibleresults either in making the North-west Passage or in reaching the North Pole. These objects had, therefore,to be finally discarded. It was quite clear that Arctic discoverywould have no influentialsupport from any of the learned Societies,without which success was impossible,if to reach the North Pole?an utterlyuseless ?was its main object. 8. The objects of Arcticexploration, in these days, must be to secure useful scientificresults ; in geographyby exploringthe coast lines, and ascertaining the conditionsof land and sea within the unknown area; in geology by collections and by a carefulexamination of the land; in zoology and botany by observationand by collections; in physicsby a completeseries of observa? tions extendingover at least a year. 9. Such being the scientificobjects of Arcticexploration, they must be kept in mind when the rules for securing them,based upon long experience,are formulated. But thereis anotherobject which had greatweight with Sherard Osborn. He specially dwelt upon the importanceof encouraginga spiritof maritimeenterprise, and of givingworthy employment to the Navy in time of peace?a truly national object,and one which,as the result proved,had as much influencein formingthe decisionof statesmenas the scientificresults. 10. We now come to the means wherebythe unknown Polar area is to be penetrated,and the desired success to be secured. The firstgreat lesson taughtby two centuriesof experienceis that no extensiveand usefulexploring work can be calculated upon by merelyentering the driftingpack; and that effectiveprogress can be made only by followinga coast line. The second Arctic canon is that,to secureefficient work, at least one wintermust be faced in a positionbeyond any point hithertoreached. This is essential in orderto obtain seriesof observationsof any value. The thirdrule is that mere naviga? tion in a ship cannot secure the results desired from Arctic exploration, and that it must be supplementedby sledge-travelling. The explorationof 50 miles of coast by a sledge-partyis worth more to science than the dis? covery of 500 miles of sea or coast by a ship. In the formercase the land is accurately mapped, and its fauna, flora,geology, and physical featuresare ascertained. In the lattera coast is seen and its outline shown by a dotted line on a chart,and that is all. The two methodswill not bear comparison. 11. The experienceof centuriesof Arcticresearch has thus resulted in the establishmentof threecanons, which form unerringguides to us who inherit that experience: I. Navigate along a coast line, and avoid the driftingpack. II. It is necessaryto pass at least one winterat a point beyondany hitherto reached.

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III. The ships must be looked upon merelyas the base of operations,and sledgesas the main instrumentsfor and exploration. 12. With the objects of Arctic research,and the means of securingthose objects thus distinctlyformulated; the next point was to decide by which route leading to the unknown area round the North Pole those essential conditionscould best be found. In the firstplace, there must be coast lines leading into the unknownspace both fornavigation and forsledge-travelling. In the second place, there must be a prospectof findingsuitable winter quarters beyond the thresholdof the hithertodiscovered region. At that time, Smith Sound, and the east coast of ,alone met such con? ditions. Of these two, Smith Sound offeredtwo coast lines forexploration instead of one ; its navigationwas believed to be less difficult,and to offer a better chance of securing winter quarters beyond the threshold of the unknown region,and finallythe means of retreat,in case of disaster,were betterby that route. The Smith Sound routewas consequentlythe best by which to commeneethe discoveryof the vast unknownarea. 13. This was the trainof reasoningby which we arrived at the conclusion,. that to securethe true objects of Arctic discovery,and to make a successful commencementof the examinationof the unknown area, the firstexpedition should proceedby the routeof Smith Sound. 14. On the 23rd of January,1865, afterall these points had been most carefullyinvestigated and considered,Sherard Osborn read his firstPaper at a memorablemeeting of the GeographicalSociety, on the Exploration.of the North Polar Eegion. His proposalwas thattwo steamersshould be despatched to Smith Sound, that one should winternear Cape Isabella, and that the other should press up the westernshore as faras possible. In the followingspring, sledge-operationswere to be directedover the unknown area. Osborn also enumeratedthe valuable resultsto be securedfrom Arctic exploration. 15. In the long and interestingdiscussion which followed the reading of the Paper, the views of Sherard Osborn received cordial support fromSir Eoderick Murchison, General Sabine, Captain K. V. Hamilton, Captain Inglefield,and Dr. Donnet. They were opposed by Captain Eichards, the hydrographer. 16. But in March 1865, Osbornwas obliged to go to Bombay,leaving the cause in my less-experiencedhands, and an oppositioncommenced, the text of which was two letters from Dr. Peterrnann. On April 1Oth, 1865,1 read a Paper at a meetingof the Geographical Societyon the Best Eoute forNorth , in which 1 added some fresharguments in support of Osbom's views. But Dr. Petermann'sletters were also read, and, almost singlehanded(supported only by Sir and Admiral Collinson),I had to defendthe positionagainst a numberof Dr. Petermann'sEnglish sup- porters. These letters,which proved to be a disastrous apple of diseord> might now be advautageouslyforgotten, if they had not been quite recently npheld by Admiral Eichards as models of wisdom and logical reasoning.* This makes it desirablethat a refutationof each pointin the two lettersshould be submitted. 17. Dr. Petermann's letterswere writtento advocate the Spitzbergenroute forPolar exploration,that is, the despatch of vessels to the open pack, away fromthe land, to the northof the Spitzbergengroup. In his firstletter he assigns eightreasons forhis preferencefor this route. The firstis that the voyage fromEngland to the North Pole is shorterby Spitzbergen; a matter which mightbe importantto a companywishing to establisha line of packets betweenthe two points,but which has no bearingon the question of explora-

* In the discussionafter the readingof Sir GeorgeNares's Paper,on March 26, 1877.

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.178 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:42:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ADDITIONAL NOTICES. 539 tion. The second is that the Spitzbergensea formsthe widest entranceto the unknownregion. This is one of the strongestobjections to the route,for the navigationmust be conductedin a driftingpack away fromland. The third allegation is that the Spitzbergensea is more free fromice than any otherpart of the Arctic Regions. This statementis directlyopposed to the evidence of every navigator who has ever reached the edge of the pack on those meridians. They have all, without a single exception, found an impenetrablebarrier of ice between Greenland and Spitzbergen,and to the north of that group. The fourthis that the driftice to the northof Spitz? bergen offersjust as much or as little impedimentto navigation as the ice in Baffin'sBay. When it is rememberedthat no vessel has ever pene? tratedthrough the ice-fieldsnorth of Spitzbergen,notwithstanding numerous attempts,while a fleetof whalers has annually got throughthe Baffin'sBay ice since 1817, an idea may be formedof the value of this assertion. The fifthargument is that the sea north of Spitzbergenwill never be entirely frozenover, not even in winter,nor coveredwith solid ice fit for sledge-tra? velling. This is really the strongestobjection to the Spitzbergenroute, for the constantmovement of the ice away fromland will make it impossibleto winterin it, and most dangerousto enterit at all. The sixth assertionis that from Sir Edward Parry's farthestpoint a navigable sea was extending,far away to the north; and that old Dutch skippersvowed they had sailed to 88? N., and beyond the Pole itself. The statementrespecting Parry is the very reverseof the real fact. That officer,at his extreme point,found the ice thickerand the floes more extensive than any he had previouslymet with; and there was a strong yellow ice-blink always overspreadingthe northern horizon,showing that the Polar pack still stretchedaway to the northward. The argumentderived from the old Dutch skippersmay safelybe leftto shift foritself. The seventh point is, that the Polar region north of Spitzbergen consistsof sea and not land. This is a mere assumption; but, if correct,it is the very reason that the Spitzbergenroute is the worstthat could be selected. The eighth argumentis that Parry's expeditionoccupied six months,a cir? cumstance which can only have weightwith those who prefera hasty and perfunctorycruise to deliberateand carefulexploration. 18. So much forthe firstletter. The second lettercontains the following argument. Dr. Petermann urges that there will be no difficultyin boring throughthe Polar ice-fieldsnorth of 80?, because Sir James Ross got through an extensivepack in the AntarcticRegions in latitude 62?, afterit had drifted and become loose formany hundredsof miles over a boundless ocean. The * fallacy of this comparisonwas shown by Admiral Collinson at the time. Finally, Dr. Petermannasks forany reason,however slight, why it would not be as easy to sail fromSpitzbergen to the Pole and back as to go up Baffin's Bay to the entrance of Smith Sound. The reason is clear enough, and is well knownto all Arcticnavigators. Northof Spitzbergenany vessel pushing into the ice is at the mercyof the driftingfloes and fields. In Baffin'sBay there is land-ice,ralong which a vessel can make progresswhile the pack drifts past. The consequence is, that while a fleet of whalers passes up Baffin'sBay everyyear, no vessel has ever penetratedthrough the pack north of Spitzbergen. 19. Such were Dr. Petermann'sarguments. They had the effectof delaying the resumptionof Arctic researchby the English for ten years. For they were adopted by Admirals Belcher, Richards, Ommanney, and Inglefield; unanimity among Arctic authoritieswas thus destroyed,and, in Osborn's absence, success was obviously hopeless. I, nevertheless,prepared draftsof lettersto otherscientific Societies, and a most encouragingreply was received * ' Eoyal GeographicalSociety's Proceedings,'vol. ix. p. 118.

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.178 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:42:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 540 ADDITIONAL NOTICES. fromthe Linnasan. I also drewup a letterto the First Lord of the Admiralty, which was signed by Sir Eoderick Murchison,and the Duke of Somerset received a deputation. His Grace, however, naturally said that as Arctic authoritiesdiffered as to the route, the Admiralty could not decide that question; and that it would be better to wait forthe result of the Swedish Expedition,which was then about to be sent to Spitzbergen. 20. It only remained to watch foranother favourable opportunityof re- openingthe question. But SherardOsborn, on his returnfrom India in 1866, did not relax his efforts. Every endeavourwas made to interestthe general in Arctic work,and, under Osborn's inspiration,I wrote an article in public' the QuarterlyEeview' forJuly 1865, and several reviewsand articleson the subjectbetween 1866 and 1871. Papers were also prepared and read at the annual meetingsof the BritishAssociation in 1865 and 1866. 21. At last SherardOsborn decided that the time had arrivedfor a formal renewal of his proposal; ancl at a meeting of the GeographicalSociety on April 22nd, 1872, he read his second Paper on the Exploration of the North Polar Area. The great point now was to secure unanimity among Arctic authorities,before approaching the Governmenton the subject: and the Paper was mainlyintended to reviewthe work of Swedes, Germans,and Austrians in the Spitzbergendirection since 1865; and to show that the theory maintained in Dr. Petermann's letters was in oppositionto the practical of recent Those had with no uncertain experience explorers. explorers " spoken voice. For instance,M. Nordenskioldsaid that the fieldof driftice to the northof Spitzbergenconsists of ice so closelypacked togetherthat even a boat cannot forceits way between the pieces,still less a vessel, though propelled by steam. All experienceseems to prove that the Polar basin, when not coveredwith compactunbroken ice, is filledwith closely-packedunnavigable drift,in which, during certain very favourable years, some large apertures may be found,which apertures,however, do not extendvery far to the north." Osborn quoted Nordenskiold,Koldewey, and Payer as practical men ; and again urged the adoptionof the routeby Smith Sound. On this occasion Sir Henry Eawlinson,then Presidentof the GeographicalSociety, advocated the resumptionof Arctic discovery,and ever afterwardsnot only co-operated with Osborn, but took a leading and active part in furtheringthe cause. Dr. Hooker and Dr. Carpenterdwelt upon the valuable scientificresults of Arctic research. Sir George Back again warmlysupported Osborn'sviews; and Admiral Eichards, who had at the formermeeting opposed the move? ment,now gave in his adhesionto it. 22. I then drafteda Eeport forthe adoptionof a Committeeappointed by the Council of the GeographicalSociety to considerthe best means of bringing the subject beforethe Government: consistingof Sir George Back, Admiral Collinson,Admiral Ommanney,Admiral Eichards, Sir Leopold McClintock, Captain SherardOsborn, Dr. Eae, Mr. Findlay, and myself. 23. In this Eeport the threecanons of Arcticexploration were repeated,the various scientificresearches were enumeratedin detail, and all mention of reaching the North Pole as an object,was purposelyexcluded. The Smith Sound route was recommendedas the best for exploringnew coast-lines, and thus increasinggeographical knowledge. The Eeport was unanimously adopted by all the membersof the Committee,and also by the Council of the on the 29th of 1872. Society, April, ' 24. In July 1872 I began the work of editing the Geographical Maga? zine,' and my firstnumber opened with an articleby Sherard Osborn,on the renewalof Arctic In the same number1 commencedthe publica? * discovery. tion of the Thresholdof the UnknownBegion,' which was continuedmonthly until March 1873, and published as a separatevolume in July 1873. The plan of this work had been conceived,and the greaterpart was writtenin

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1865, but it was not then published. The second edition rapidly followed the first,the third edition appeared in January 1875, and the fourth in December 1875. The success of this little work proved the greatchange in public opinion which had taken place since 1865. A healthyinterest in the glorious achievementsof the Arctic worthiesof formerdays was taking the place of sneeringindifference, and Englishmenwere once morebecoming alive to the importanceof maritimeenterprise. 25. In August 1872, a Paper on the Renewal ofArctic Research,by Sherard Osborn,was read at the meetingof the British Associationat Brighton. 26. On December 16th, 1872, Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sherard Osborn, accompanied by Dr. Hooker and a large deputation,had an interviewwith Mr. Lowe and Mr. Goschen,to urge the importanceof despatchingan Arctic Expedition; and the whole matterwas fullyexplained both by Sir Henryand by Osborn. But the reply was unsatisfactory. 27. Official doubts were, however, on the eve of being overcome. All classes of the people, thanks to Osborn's exertions,were beginningto unite with men of science in the desirethat the traditionof Arctic discoveryshould be preservedand handed down to posterity; and that Englishmen should not abandon that careerof noble adventurewhich has done so much to formthe national character,and to give our countrythe rank she still maintains. The interest,once very keenly feltin such enterprises,was rapidlybeing revived. 28. The year 1873 was one of much activity. On the 10th of FebruaryI read a Paper, at a meetingof our Society,on recentDiscoveries east of Spitz? bergen and on attemptsto reach the Pole on the Spitzbergen meridians,in which it was shown that the best route forthe objectswhich the Society had in view was by Smith Sound. On that occasion Sir Henry Rawlinson declaredthat the Society would recommendand promotethe despatch of an expeditionby way of Smith Sound, because by that route the widest extentof coast line would be discoveredand explored,and the most importantscientific resultsobtained. 29. The goal was now in view. A fewmore well-conceivedefforts, and success was secured. Osborn found that the objectionto which officialand otherpersons most obstinatelyclung was based on the supposeddangers and difficultiesof ice-navigation. He thereforecame to the conclusion that nothingwould tend moreto dispel this objectionthan some practical proofor trial,and that it was desirablethat a naval officershould proceedto the Arctic Regions in a whaler, and returnwith a full reportof all he had seen and experienced. He selected for this serviceCommander A. H. Markham,who had been a volunteersince the questionwas firstraised in 1865 ; and who now made a cruise with Captain Adams in the whalerArctic fromMay to August, 1873. The publication of his narrative in 1874, 'A Whaling Cruise in Baffin'sBay and the Gulf of Boothia, with an Introductionby Rear-Admiral Sherard Osborn, c.b.,' the second edition of which appeared in 1875, was anothermeans of excitingpublic interestin Arcticwork. 30. In the springof 1873, a JointCommittee of the Royal and Royal Geo? graphicalSocieties was appointed to prepare an exhaustiveMemorandum on the scientificresults to be derived fromArctic exploration,and on the reasons why such researchescan best be accomplishedby a naval expeditiondespatched under Governmentauspices. The Committeewas composed of the same membersas sat on the Arctic Committeeof 1872 forthe GeographicalSociety, and of Dr. Hooker, Mr. Busk, Mr. Prestwich,Dr. Carpenter,Dr. Allman, Mr. Evans, GeneralStrachey, and Mr. Fergussonfor the Royal Society. In this Memorandum,dated June 1873, which was widelydistributed, the scientific resultswere fullydiscussed in a seriesof paragraphsfurnished by Dr. Hooker, ProfessorAllman, Mr. Prestwich,General Strachey,and ProfessorNewton; while the argumentsderived fromformer experience and general policy were

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.178 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:42:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ,542 ADDITIONAL NOTICES. by Sherard Osborn. "With these materials I drew up the Memorandum, which was unanimouslyadopted by the Joint Committee,and also by our Council. In this manifesto,as in that of 1872, the object was declaredto be the explorationof as large an area as possible of the unknown region; while all allusion to attainingthe highestnorthern latitude possible, or reachingthe Pole, was again purposelyomitted. 31. In August 1873,1 read a Paper on the Importanceof ArcticExploration, at the of the BritishAssociation at Bradford; and in the meeting ' following OctoberI contributedan article on the same subject to the Contemporary Eeview.' 32. The year 1874 was destined to see the completesuccess of the efforts of SherardOsborn and those who had workedwith him for the previous ten years. The Society,which had approved and encouragedthese efforts,thus has the honour of having initiated,steadily and perseveringlyadvocated, and finallyof having securedthe adoption of a measure of great importancefor the advancementof geographicalknowledge. 33. On the lst of August,1874, Sir Henry Eawlinson and AdmiralSherard Osborn,accompanied by Dr. Hooker, had a verysatisfactory interview with Mr. Disraeli, and on the 17th of Novemberthe Prime Ministeraddressed a letter to Sir Henry Eawlinson announcing that Her Majesty's Government had determinedto lose no time in organisinga suitable expedition; the two objects being the explorationof the regionround the NorthPole, and the en? couragementof maritimeenterprise. 34. The furthermeasures connectedwith the equipment,and the instruc? tions, then passed into the hands of the Admiralty. Two vessels were selectedand preparedfor ice-navigation, and officersand men were appointed betweenNovember 1874 and February1875. 35. It is importantthat the objects of the GeographicalSociety, and the rules based on experiencewhich guided us in our recommendations,should be kept in mind. The Council, in all its memoranda,discarded the attainment of the highestpossible northern latitude and the attempt to reach the North Pole as useful objects. Such aims, by themselves,were considered to be devoid of interestas of utility. Our objects were to explorethe largest area possibleof the unknownregion from a fixedbase of operations,in order to secure useful scientificresults. The Council,also, since 1872, by the unani- mous advice of its Arctic Committees,discarded the Spitzbergen route, includingan attemptto push into the Polar pack away from the land. The courseadvocated was to navigate along a coast line, to include the passingof at least one Arctic winterin the scheme,and to look to sledge-travellingas the main instrumentof discoveryand exploration. Consequentlythe Smith Sound routewas, forthe attainmentof the above objects in accordancewith these rules,the best that could be selected. 36. Such were the objectsof the Eoyal GeographicalSociety, and therewas everyprospect that they would be secured. The Expeditionwas to proceed by the routerecommended by its Council,the advanced ship was, if possible, to crossthe thresholdof the unknownregion, and winterin a positionbeyond any point reachedby formerdiscoverers, and explorationwas to be conducted over the unknownarea fromthis base of operations,with a view to securing those valuable scientificresults enumeratedin our Memoranda,though only as a secondaryobject. 37. Thus the ArcticExpedition was an enterpriseoriginated by the Geo? graphicalSociety, and, on the whole,conducted in accordancewith the rules and for the objects consistentlyand perseveringlyadvocated by its Council. These factswere fullyand cordiallyrecognised by Captain Nares beforehe started. The officersof the Expedition were entertainedat dinner by the GeographicalClub, and they receiveda heartyGod-speed from the President,

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Council, and Fellows of the Royal Geographical Society,before they sailed from Portsmouth on the 29th of May, 1875. But the great work of ex? ploringthe North Polar Region could only be accomplishedgradually, and it was never expected fromthe Smith Sound Expedition that it would do more than explore as large a portion of that regionas was accessible from its base of operationswith the means at its disposal.

II.?Successful Results of the Arctic Expedition of 1875-76. 38. The Arctic Expedition returnedin October 1876, after having suc? ceeded in crossingthe thresholdof the unknownregion by the Smith Sound route,established a base of operationsbeyond it, and explored the unknown area fromthe base to the utmostextent possible with the means at theirdis? posal. As far as the main object of the Admiraltywas concerned(that of attainingthe highest northernlatitude possible),the Alert had reached the highest north latitude ever attainedby any ship; she had wint6redfarther north than any ship had ever winteredbefore, and Captain Markham had reached83? 20' 26" N., a point nearerthe North Pole than any human being had ever been before. 39. As regardsthe objects of the GeographicalSociety, namely geographical discoveryand research,the results of the Arctic Expedition are recordedin the Report of Sir GeorgeNares, in the two papers he has read at meetings of the Society, on December 12th, 1876, and March 26th, 1877, and in the Sledging Journals presentedto Parliament. It is necessary to pass these- results in review,before proceeding to considerthe next step in advance that should be advocated,now that the work by the Smith Sound Route is com? pleted. 40. It was foundthat the coast lines beyond RobesonChannel trendedaway to west and north-east,forming the shoresof a frozenPolar Sea, and fromthe base of operationsformed by the Alert in 82? 27' n. the membersof the Expedition examined the coasts fora distance of 300 miles. Along the whole of this distance the ice of the Polar Sea was of the same character. Its existencewas an unexpectedand importantdiscovery. 41. This ice was found to be from80 to 100 feet in thickness,formed by continualadditions from above (due to the annual snowfalls),which, by the increasing superincumbentweight, is gradually converted into snow-ice. Completesections of the huge masses forced upon the shore were carefully taken, and they show the way in which the whole is formed,as well as its greatage. These masses had been brokenoff from the large floes of ice, and were groundedin fromfour to ten fathomsalong the whole coast. The pro? cess of formationof the ancient floes resembles that of glaciers, and the masses thus grounded had been chipped offfrom them. They in no way resemble the mere piles of broken-up hummocks that are often found on otherArctic shores. They are, in fact,icebergs broken off Irom fragmentsof floatingglaciers, and have, therefore,received the appropriatename of floe- bergs. 42. The Alert,in September 1875, had thus reached an impenetrable sea of ancient ice interveningbetween those lonely shoresand the North Pole. It is not, however,one vast congealed mass never in motion, which would have been the case if it had been formedin a stagnantand confinedsea. On the contrary,it is subjected to annual disruption,and to violentcommotion during the summer months. Early in July the whole mass is in motion, drivingback wards and forwardswith the winds and currents,its main course being towardsthe east. The floesgrind against each otherand are brokenin fragments,while, whenever the angular cornersof any of the fields meet, there pools of water are formed. In September the frostsets in, and these vol. xxi. 2 s

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.178 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:42:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 544 ADDITIONAL NOTICES. pools and narrowlanes are frozenover with ice that becomes about six feet thick duringthe winter; but motionstill continues,and ridgesof hummocks are thrownup betweenthe floes. The stillness of the Polar winter does not prevailuntil late in Octoberor November. Then a new formationof ice com? mences,and goes on forseven months,which far more than counterbalances the decay duringthe summer. 43. Captain Markham'smemorable journey away fromthe land fromApril to June 1876, directlyacross the frozenPolar Sea, gave furtheropportunities of studyingits character. It was foundto consist of verysmall and rugged floes,separated by rangesof ice hummocksfrom 30 to 50 feethigh, and some? times a quarterof a mile wide, while the occasional streams of young ice at the footof the hummockswere narrowand of small extent. The hummock ridgesconsisted of a vast collectionof debrisof the previoussummer's broken- up pack ice, which had heen refrozenduring the winter into one chaotic rugged mass of angular blocks of every possible shape. The intermediate floesof ancient ice were very rugged,and, on Captain Markham'sroute, never as much as a mile wide. The largest floe that was seen was fartherto the eastward,blocking up the openingof Eobeson Channel,and was several miles in extent. The surfacesof the floeswere studded over with rounded,blue- topped ice humps from 10 to 20 feet high, the depressionsbetween them being filledwith snow deeply scoredinto ridgesby the prevailingwind. 44. Such is the natureof the greatPolar Sea beyonclthe channels leading fromSmith Sound, whichwas discoveredby the ArcticExpedition of 1875-76. It is so totallydifferent from the Polar pack met with north of Spitzbergen, that,with a view to that precisionwithout which Physical Geographycannot make progressas a science,it was necessarythat some distinctiveterm should be applied to it. This portion of the Polar Ocean was, therefore,named the PALiEOCRYSTicSea, or seaof ancient ice : a name whichhas now beenadopted by geographersboth in England and on the Continent. 45. Carefuland diligentobservation furnished some data by which a judg? ment mightbe formedof the probableextent of the PalaeocrysticSea. It is certainthat land was not near to the north,because hills were ascended to a heightof 2500 feetand upwards on clear days, and therewas not a sign of land. But thereare otherconsiderations all tending to the same conclusion. There are no flightsof birds to the north,which certainlywould be the case if therewas land ; and the only living thingthat was seen on the Palaeocrystic Sea, by the northerndivision of sledges,was a little snow hunting that had strayedfrom the nearestshore. Furtherevidence is furnishedby the factthat animal marinelife almost ceases to exist in the ice-coveredPolar Sea. The cold currentsdestroy whales* food, and thereare no cetaceans. Except one or two stragglers,no seals were seen, consequentlythere were no bears ; and no humanbeings have everbefore trodden the shoresof the PakeocrysticSea. For the Eskimos, like the bears, depend on seals for their means of subsistence, and all traces of them, therefore,cease with the seals and bears, where the palseocrystiefloes commenee. The falcons,which prey on marine life,also entireiycease. 46. It is remarkable,however, that the Arcticland animals,both mammals and birds,are foundup to the most northernpoint in 83? N., thoughin much smallernumbers than at Melville Island, and in otherlocalities in the Arctic Eegions farthersouth. Musk-oxenwere found,and the wolves which always followthem. Foxes and many littlelemmings, followed by the great snowy owls that preyupon them ; the musk-oxenand lemmingsboth living on the purple saxifrage. There were also hares,ptarmigan, brent geese, knots,turn- stones,and the fewbirds living on the small fresh-waterlakes. But here they all ended,and no birds took their tlightsto the northward. The Palaeo? crysticSea is a sea of solitude.

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47. The greatextent of this Polar Ocean is assumed on the above grounds. There is also evidence that it is a comparativelyshallow sea. The northern division of sledges,at a distanceof fortymiles fromthe land, foundbottom in only 72 fathoms; and betweenthat point and the shore several huge floe- bergs were observed, apparently rising out of the centres of floes which were probably aground. Another indication of the present shallowness of the Polar Sea is the general recentupheaval of the adjacent land. Driftwood was foundfar above any point to which it could have been carriedby ice or water. 48. The shoreof the PalaaocrysticSea to the westward,after culminating at Cape Colombia,trends away south of west; and it was deduced, fromsimi? larityof tides,direction of prevailingwinds, and movements of the ice, that this trendcontinued south-westward towards Prince Patrick Island. Similar evidence as regards the drift of the ice, and the comparisonof winds with those experienced by the Germania on the east coast of Greenland,led to the belief that the north coast, fromthe farthestpoint discoveredby Com? manderBeaumont, also trendedsouth to Cape Bismarck. A study of tides by ProfessorHaughton confirmsthis view. 49. As regardsthe distributionof land and sea within the unknownarea, and its generalhydrography, the discoveriesof the Expedition are important. And it usually happens that when a new geographicalfact is revealed,through the labours of scientificexpiorers, it is found that it harmoniseswith other isolated pieces of knowledgewhich previouslystood alone,as it were,and were not intelligibiewithout it. Thus the value of discoveriesis scarcelyever con? finedto the workitself; but they throwlight upon the truebearings of former work,and help towards the elucidation of far larger questions. As regards the PaiasocrysticSea discovered by the late Arctic Expedition,this is emi- nentlythe case. 50. Referringto the informationgathered by formerexpiorers, we findthat Captain Collinson,in coastingalong the Arctic shore of North America,dis? coveredthat similarancient ice composedthe pack boundingthe lane of open water along whichhe was able to pass to-thewestward in the Enterprise in 1851. When he winteredin Camden Bay in 1853-54, he made an attempt to examine this ancient ice by sledging,but he was stoppedon the second day by masses of broken-up hummocks and heavy uneven floes; in short, by obstaclessimilar to those which were encounteredby the northerndivision of sledges in 1876. In 1850 Captain M'Clure, in the Investigator,actually ran up a lane of water leading into this pack, and had gone some distance beforehe ascertainedthe fearfulnature of the ice on eitherside of him. He then made all haste to escape fromit. The same ancient ice extends along the whole westernside of Banks Island ; and the Investigator, in daily and hourlyperil of destruction,passed along betweenit and the cliffs,in the navi? gating season of 1851. The surfacesof the floes are describedas resembling rolling some of them a hundred feet from base to summit. Sherard hills, " Osborndescribes this pack as aged sea-ice,which may be centuries old, and it seems, from the want of outlets,likely to increase yet in thicknessto an unlimiteddegree; the accumulated action of repeatedthaws, and the almost consrantfall of snow on the upper surface,giving it a peculiar hill and dale appearance." M'Clure, in one of his notices,warned those who might findit that if his vessel got into this pack she would never be heard of again, and should not be followed. 51. Mecham foundthe same ancient ice the westernshore of Prince "along Patrick Island in 1853. He describesit as tremendous,"and he came to the conclusionthat the sea on which it floatswas of great extent. He adds that "the character and appearance of the pack driven against the land, and in every directionto seaward,thoroughly convinced him of the impossibiiityof 2s2

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.178 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:42:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 546 ADDITIONAL NOTICES. penetratingwith ships to the southward and westward,against such impedi- ments." Here then was again the PalasocrysticSea. 52. Standing by itself,as an isolated geographicalfact, the heavy ice seen by Collinson,M'Clure, and Mecham, failedto reveal the whole truth. With the above data alone beforehim, Sherard Osbornsaw at once that no one who had penetratedelsewhere into the Arctic Eegions had ever met with similar oceanic ice. He describedit as a vast floatingglacier-like mass, surging to and fro in an enclosed area, bounded on the south by the shores of North America, on the west by Wrangell Land, and on the east by Banks and Prince Patrick Islands. But wherewas the boundaryto the north? Here Sherard Osborn needed the data furnishedby the recentdiscoveries to guide him. In theirabsenee he came to the conclusion,which was perfectlyjustified by the materials actually beforehim, that the ancient ice was formedin a land-lockedsea, and that it was boundedto the northby land continuingwest fromPrince Patrick'sIsland.* 53. The discoveriesof the ArcticExpedition of 1875-76 have thrownlight upon and explained all these interestingquestions. We now know that the PakeocrysticSea extendsfrom the shoresof North America to the northcoast of Greenland,a distanceof 1200 miles : forthe gap of 400 miles which is still unexploredbetween Prince Patrick Island and the most westernpoint reached by the Expedition,is a continuationof coast line or island, as is deduced from coincidencesof winds, tide,and drift. The sea is also shown to be of great width,in short,a Polar ocean of vast extent. 54. Dr. Peterrnannf has recentlyendeavoured to explain these factson the same principleas that adopted by Admiral Sherard Osborn,namely, that the PalaeocrysticSea is practically stagnant,and confinedon all sides by land. Osborn fromthe data then before him, supposed the frozensea off Banks- Island to be of comparativelysmall extent,and that it was bounded to the northby a continuationof the Parry Islands. Dr. Peterrnann,in the light of the new discoveries,recognises the existenceof a vast PalasocrysticSea of far greaterextent than Osborn supposed; but he also would confineit by hypo- theticalland extendingfrom Greenland across the Pole to Siberia. But Osborn had groundsfor his theory,which Peterrnannhad not. The formerauthority had gatheredfrom the officersof the Investigatorthat the ice was compara? tively motionless,that it neverwent morethan a fewmiles offthe American coast, leaving a narrowbelt of water,and that, directlythe gale ceased, it surgedback again with its edge groundedin 100 feetof water. We now know that this is only partiallycorrect, and that in portionsof the PakeocrysticSea thereis a driftto the east, although little of the ancientice findsa means of escape. But Dr. Petermann'stheory is dependent upon the stagnancyof & vast ocean, and militates against the deductionsrespecting the insularityof Greenland,based on a study of the tides. 55. The knowledge of the existence of the PalseocrysticSea, due to the discoveriesof the late Expedition,added to the discoveryof Franz JosefLand by the Austrians,and to the Germanobservations on the east coast of Green? land, enable us to comprehend,with a nearerapproach to accuracy,the general relationsof the Polar area to the rest of the world as regardsthe circulationof water and the distributionof land and sea. The drift eastward of the ice northof GrantLand seems to be due to the great flowof warmerwater into the Polar area, which, as a cold current,seeks an outlet southwardat every opening,owing to the Polar area itself being surcharged. The warmerwater, flowing up between Greenland and Spitzbergen as a submarine current, appears to come to the surfacealong the Siberian coast, and, aided by the * See ' Thresholdof the Unknown pp. 188-195. ' Region' (4th ed.), t Macmillan'sMagazine/

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dischargedvolume fromthe rivers,it causes a currentround the area fromleft to right,and also across fromthe easternto the westernhemisphere. Hence, probably, the tremendouspressure on Grant Land and the north shore of Oreenland, as well as the drifteastward. But thereis much yet to learn. 56. The geographicaland hydrographicalresults of the Arctic Expedition are the most important,because they have a practical bearing on the general system of oceanic currentsand of meteorology,and consequentlyform an essential part of a vast whole. Without a knowledgeof the hydrographyof the Polar Region,all the generaltheories of oceanic currentsmust be incom- plete; and Arctic research is, therefore,necessary to a science which is of practical utility. But the Expedition broughthome otherresults which are oertainlynot less interestingthan those discoverieswhich immediatelyconcern the Geographical Society. Among these may be mentionedthe examination into the geological formationof the whole coast line on the west side of the Smith Sound channels fromCape Isabella to Cape Union, as well as of the shoresof the PalseocrysticSea on eitherside of Robeson Channel. Collections of rocks and fossils were made at every point, inciuding a very complete Upper Silurian series,and the mountain limestoneshells and corals of Cape Joseph Henry. But by farthe most importantgeological discoverywas that relatingto the existenceof tertiarycoal in 82? N., and the formerextension of miocenevegetation to that parallel. The Expedition also made an exhaustive oollection of the biologyof a region previouslyalmost entirelyunknown to science: the regionnorth of the 82nd parallel,as distinguishedfrom the Arctic ?countriesto the southward. The whole flora of the new region has been broughthome; and it mustbe rememberedthat meagrethough this flora cer? tainly is, Dr. Hooker has shown that it possesses special interest,in connection with the remarkabledistribution of American and Scandinavian plants. The zoology of the newly-discoveredregion has also been exhaustivelyexamined, and verycomplete collections made as regardsmammalia, birds, fishes, insects, molluscs, crustacea, echinoderms,and a vast number of microscopicforms. In physics a complete series of meteorological,magnetic, tidal and other observations,covering a year,has been taken at two stations. 57. I now turn to the conduct and managementof the Expedition which secured these valuable results. Consistingof two steamersadmirably officered and manned,it had an advantage over formerexpeditions composed of sailing vessels towed by steam tenders. But, on the other hand, it sufferedfrom several disadvantages; as comparedwith the last two expeditionsemployed in the search forFranklin. The sledge-equipmentsand the clothingwere iden- tical, and the provisions were equally good; but it appears to have been impracticableto get a steamerwith the warmingapparatus which was so con- ducive to health and comfortin formervoyages. Anotherserious disadvan- tage in 1876 was the numericalweakness of the late, as comparedwith the two previousexpeditions under Austin and Belcher. While the latterhad an effectiveforce of one hundredand eightymen, the work of the late Expedition was necessarilymore restricted,owing to its being seriouslyunder-manned in comparison. It only had one hundredand twentymen, inciudingchaplains. 58. The most essential object in the conductof an Arctic Expedition, and the crucial test of its success, is the crossingof the thresholdof the unknown region,and the attainmentof a position as a base of operationsbeyond any hithertodiscovered. If this is achieved,success is certain. It may be slight or important; but some measureof success is certain,if a base of operationsis established within the unknown region. The navigation of the channels leading north from Smith Sound is the most difficultof any that has been experiencedin Arctic coast waters,and as soon as the Palaeocrysticfloes are met with north of the 82nd parallel,there is greatand constantdanger. To have broughta ship throughall this, and to have foundwinter quarters on the

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.178 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:42:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 548 ADDITIONAL NOTICES. open and exposed coast of the PakeocrysticSea, protectedonly by grounded floe-bergswhich mightat any time be drivenhigher up or swept away, was in itselfa greatsuccess. No otherArctic navigator ever forcedhis ships through such obstacles,and broughtthem safelyback again; and this establishmentof a base of operationswithin the unknown region called forthall the highest qualities of a commander?incessantwatchfulness, great presence of mind, rapid yet cautious decision,and consummateseamanship. 59. The next service to be performedwas the laying-outof dep6ts by autumn sledge-travelling;and in this the late Expedition excelled all that precededit, whetherthe amountof work done, the dnrationof absenee from the ship, or the special difficultiesand hardshipsbe considered. 60. Next to the establishmentof a base of operatioi.sbeyond any point pre? viously reached,the most importantpreparation for exploration and discovery by sledges is the managementof the Expedition duringthe long darkness of an Arctic winter,and the maintenanceof the health and spiritsof the men. The difficulties,in this respect,of the Expedition of 1875-76 were greater than any that had previouslybeen encountered,because the winterwas the longestand the most severe,and the continuousdarkness was the most pro- longed that had ever been endured in the Arctic Eegions. Moreover,the absenee of the warmingapparatus supplied to formerexpeditions increased the difficultyof preservinghealth. When these special disadvantagesare con? sidered,the effortsof the commandingofficers of the late Expedition to pre? serve the health and keep up the spiritsof the men are deservingof high praise. Extemporisedarrangements of various kinds provided forventilation and washing,the greatestcare was taken that the daily rations of lime-juice were actually drunk, special attentionwas devoted to the enf'orcementof regular exercise and to diet, and the recreationand amusementof the men were kept up with a zest and energywhich was never surpassedin any former expedition. The managementduring an Arctic winterof unparalleled length and severitywas admirablein all respects. 61. When the sun returned,the scheme for exploration by sledges was matured: and earlyin April 1876, under difficultiesand exposed to an ex? tremityof cold beyond anythingthat had been experiencedin formerexpedi? tions,the sledging-partiesleft the ships. 62. In accordancewith' the AdmiraltyInstructions, it was incumbentupon Captain Nares to push his principal party due northover the Palasocrystic Sea, with the object of attainingthe highestpossible northernlatitude. As there was no land, it was not possible to lay out depots, and all supplies, togetherwith boats,had to be dragged on the sledges. The Admiraltyhad impressedupon Captain Nares (para. 15 of Instructions)that, in the absenee of continuousland, sledge-travellingfor any considerabledistance has never been found practicable. Yet in order to attain the main object of the Admiralty,the attempthad to be made. The farthestnorth hithertoreached was on July 23rd, 1827, when Parry got to 82? 45' N. But this was during the summer,and the work was done withoutthe enduranceof serious hard? ships, although the weights to be dragged per man were very great,namely,. 268 lbs. Captain Markham won the palm fromParry after he had held it for nearly forty-nineyears. On May 12th, 1876, he reached 83? 20' 26" n., in, the face of hardshipsand difficultieswithout a parallel in the annals of Arctic- sledge-travelling. Thus gallantly and successfullywere the Admiralty In? structionscomplied with by reachingthe highestnorthern point ever attained by man. 63. Three otherextended sledge-parties were organised to secure the true objects of the Expedition fromthe point of view of the GeographicalSociety, namely,the extension of geographicalknowledge. One was to explore the unknownregion to the westwardof the base of operationsto the farthestpoint

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attainable; the second was to press eastward along the northerncoast of Greenland; and the third was to examine the deep inlet named after Lady Franklin, which was believed to be a strait. Ali did theirwork admirahly, and extendedtheir explorations to the utmostlimit, in two sad cases beyond the utmost limit of human endurance. They fully, completely,and with heroic self-devotion,fulfilled the objects of the Geographical Society, by exploringthat portionof the unknownregion accessibleby the Smith Sound route to the farthestextent possible with the means at theirdisposal. 64. The only competentjudges of theirwork, from the point of view of actual experiencein sledge-travelling,are the officerswho served in former expeditions; and it is, therefore,desirable to quote here the opinion of Captain R. V. Hamilton, r.n., c.b., who served in the Arctic Expeditions of 1850-51 and 1852-54, and commandedsledges during three seasons. His evidenceis as follows:??" I have no hesitationin expressingmy admiration forthe zeal, energy,and brave determinationof CommanderMarkham and Lieutenant Beaumont and their crews to overcome the unprecedentedob- stacles they encountered?in my opinionvery far greaterthan any previous sledge-partieshave experienced. The journeyswere extended to the utmost limits of safety?prudencewould have dictatedan earlierreturn, not doing so is the only fault (if a fault) committed. No officercould have pushed on so farunless thoroughlysupported by his crew; no crew would have supported their officerhad he not shown he exacted nothingfrom them he did not perform. Lieutenant Aldrich does not appear to have encountered,except from soft snow, greater obstacles than previous parties of the Assistance and Besolute. Had his men been in as good health as ours were,I believe his average distancewould have been. little less than my own in 1853 after a previous spring's experience of travelling. When the prostrated most of the crew,they displayed equal courage and patience under trial as the otherparties. Till I read these journals, I had an impressionon my mind we would have done better; but no unbiassed person can read these modest, unassuming narratives and retain that I cannot impression."*' refrainfrom adding the verdict of an able writer in the QuarterlyReview,' which the of true on this " expresses opinion every Englishman subject. Surely nothingfiner was ever recordedthan this advance of three sledges, one to the north,another to the east, a third to the west, laden down with sick and dying men,in obedienceto an orderto do theirbest in theirseparate directions. And nothingmore touchingwas ever pennedthan the narratives, full of tendernessand simplicity,in which the sailor-writerstell their story. These gallant seamen have failed to reach the Pole, but they have won a proud place in theircountry's annals. They have done Englishmengood." f 65. The unprecedentedand most unexpected outbreak of scurvy, both among the men and officerswho remainedon board,and among the sledge- travellers,was a calamity,which enhances our admirationof the amount of useful work actually accomplished by the Arctic Expedition of 1875-76. The excitingcause of scurvyis very generallybelieved to be the absence of freshvegetables, and this excitingcause existed in all previousArctic Expe? ditionsexactly in the same measureas in that of 1875-76. The predisposing causes are all conditionsinimieal to health which exist during an Arctic winter, inciuding intense cold, long darkness, absence of fresh provisions, damp and confinedair. These also existedin formerexpeditions when scurvy did not appear, but never duringanything like the same length of time. It was undoubtedlythe prolonged dnration of these predisposingcauses which producedthe outbreak. * Evidence beforethe * ScurvyCommittee; Question No. 3091. t QuarterlyReview,' January 1877 ; Art. v. p. 185.

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66. But this could not possibly have been foreseen. At the end of the winterthe medical officersbelieved all the sledge-travellersto be in perfect health; and consequently,in arrangingtheir dietary, Captain Nares was fully justified in the assumption that the conditions wrereidentical with those existingin previousexpeditions, and in followingthe best formerprecedents. Accordinglyhe adopted the scale of diet,including preservedpotatoes as an antiscorbutic,but not includinglime juice, which long experiencehad shown to be the best. It was exactly the same scale as had been used in former expeditionsand as was recommendedby Sir Leopold McClintock,except that the allowance of rum was decreasedby one-half,and that of tea proportionally increased. No sledge-partieshad ever beforebeen disabled by scurvy,and none had ever taken lime juice as a daily ration. Hence thereis no mention of scurvy,and no allusion to precautionsagainst it, in the instructionsdrawn up forthe guidanceof formersledge-travellers, by the Arctic medical officers. The lime juice was supplied in jars and bottles,and the contents of each bottle became solid masses in an ArcticApril, which cannot be used until thoroughlythawed and re-mixed.* This would entail the use of additional fuel,and a serious increaseof the weightto be dragged on the sledges. But the greatobjeetion to the daily thawingof rations of lime juice is the addi? tional hardship and miseryit would cause. No one who has not travelled during April in the Arctic Eegions can have any idea of the sufferingsit entails,especially upon the cook, and of the importanceof doing nothing to increase that suffering,after a long day of intensetoil. 67. These were the reasonswhy daily rations of lime juice were not in- cluded in the sledge-dietaryby Captain Nares; and, fromthe point of view of the experienceand informationbefore him, and fromwhich he had to form his decision, he was undoubtedly right. It is, I believe, the unanimous opinion of all Arcticsledge-travellers that Captain Nares did not commit an errorof judgment on this point, and that he had no reason to deviate from the lessons of formerexperience. 68. It has been alleged that he received instructionsto issue daily rations of lime juice to the sledge-travellers,from the Medical Director-General, Sir A. Armstrong. This is not the case. He was furnishedwith a memo? randum of hints and suggestionsby the Director-Generalsimply for his in? formation,but not forhis guidance,and they were not instructions. He was also furnishedwith similar hints by another equally high Arctic medical authority,in which no such advice was given. The decisionwas properly leftentireiy to his own discretion. The suggestionof Dr. Armstrongwas in opposition to all formerpractice and experience,and consequently,if its adoptionwas consideredindispensable by that official,he ought to have given Captain Nares some reasonfor deviating from former precedents. Above all, he ought to have suggestedmeans of using the lime juice while travellingin April; for unless this was done, the mereadvice to drag it on the sledges was useless. It now appears that lime juice can be taken in lozenges,in biscuit, or in the pemican ; but this ought to have been thoughtof by thosewho con? sideredits use indispensableto sledging-parties,before the Expedition sailed. 69. The unexpectedoutbreak of scurvy was the one single calamity in an otherwisesuccessful expedition. As soon as it was known,every precaution was taken to cheek its progress,and, thanks to the skill and untiringwatchful care of the seniormedical officer,there was not a single man on the sick list * In an experimentat Netley the limejuice is reportedto have frozenhomo- geneously.^In the ArcticRegions this* is not the case. The componentparts are separatedin the freezingprocess, owing probablyto its muchgreater rapidity; and the whole volume must consequentlybe thawedand re-mixedevery time it is used.

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.178 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:42:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ADDITIONAL NOTICES. 551 when the ships arrivedat Portsmouth. All sledge-partieswhich went away in the warmermonths were of coursesupplied with daily rationsof lime juice, and the fact that scurvynevertheless broke out, seems to be a conclusive proof that the originaloutbreak was not due to the want of lime juice on the sledges,but to causes which were in operation,though undetected, before the sledges started,causes due to the unparalleledduration of winterdarkness. 70. The outbreakof scurvy,however, was not an unmixed evil. It has taught lessons which will be of great value hereafter,and the elaboratein? vestigationsof the Scurvy Committee ought to produce resultswhich will be usefulin the conduct of futureArctic Expeditions. Nor should the ex? amples of heroismcalled forthby the terriblesufferings of the sledge-travellers be overlooked. have added to the of our and will have They ' prestige Navy, " an enduringvalue. The Quarterly' reviewer says most truly they have done Englishmengood." 71. At the conclusion of the sledging-season,in August 1876, Captain Nares was able to reviewthe work that had been accomplished. The outbreak of scurvyhad made it his imperativeduty to returnto England, in order to avoid a certain and serious loss of life which would have been utterlyun- justifiable. But even if perfecthealth had been happily maintained,it would have been his duty to return. For the work was done, and done thoroughly. As regardsthe objects of the Admiralty,the highest northernlatitude ever attained by any human being had been reached,and it had been found im? practicableto advance farthertowards the Pole by the Smith Sound route. The exploringwork desired by the Royal GeographicalSociety was satisfactorily completed. A pointhad been reachedto the westwardbeyond which explora? tion would be betterconducted by another route. To the eastward a point was attainedbeyond which furtherdiscovery must be made by the route on the east coast of Greenland. The true objects of the Expedition,namely, to explore that portion of the unknown Polar Region which was accessible by the Smith Sound route,were fully secured. The nature of the ice in the PalaeocrysticSea, and of the newly-discoveredcoast-lines, showed that this part of the Polar Ocean was not navigable; and the officersof the late Expedi? tion were forcedto the same conclusions on this point as had formerlybeen arrivedat by M'Clure and Mecham. Consequentlyit was the duty of Captain Nares to obey the order contained in the 18th of the " paragraph Admiralty Instructions,namely, to use his best endeavours to rejoin his consort in 1876, and to returnto England, providedthat the springexploration has been reasonablysuccessful." After overcomingthe same difficultiesand dangers in the returnvoyage as had been encounteredin 1875, the Expedition re? turned to England in October 1876, and received that cordial and hearty receptionwhich its great success, its valuable geographicaland other results, and the admirable conduct of officersand men, had so fullyearned for it. The numeroustestimonies to its success fromthe highest English authorities might be open to a suspicion of partiality,and I thereforeprefer to quote the calm and impartialverdict of Chief Justice the President of the " Daly, AmericanGeographical Society. It is that by the geographerand man of science the voyage will be pronounceda most importantand successfulone." 72. There is one resultof the late Expeditionwhich, though mentioned last, is not the least important. It was one which I know was very near to the heart of Admiral Sherard Osborn,the originatorand chief promoterof the Expedition. I allude to the creationof a new generationof Arctic experts. The older generationis fastpassing away, and if it had not been replaced,the traditionsof the work would have died out. Now we once more have a supply of experiencedice-navigators and sledge-travellers,trained in the best school, wherethey have done theirwork rightwell, and who are willing and ready to face new dangers,and to win new laurels in the Polar Seas.

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73. Thus the firstgreat step has been accomplishedby the Eoyal Geogra? phical Society. Arctic discoveryhas been revived,an Expedition has been despatched,has completedits work,and has returnedwith a valuable increase to geographicalknowledge. It remains for the Society to considerthe next step, and to take care that this one success shall not be a spasmodiceffort, but the commencementof continuouswork in the same direction,to be persevered in until it is complete.

III.?Eotjtes for Future Arctic Expeditions.

74. The argumentsfor the continuanceand completionof Polar discoveryare the same as those for its renewal. If Her Majesty's Governmentconsidered that the encouragementof maritimeenterprise and the exploration of the Polar Eegion were objects ot sufficientimportance to justif}Tthedespatch of an Expedition to commenee that workin 1875, those objects still exist,and the argumentsfor continuing and completingthe work are quite as strongin 1877 as they were in 1875. Indeed, the success of the Expeditionof 1875-76, and the experiencegained by it, give new strengthto those arguments; while the recentdiscoveries add freshinterest to Arcticresearch, and give additional scientificimportance to its completion. 75. The discoveryof the Pal^ocrystic Sea, and of 300 miles of its desolate shores,has entireiyaltered preconceivedideas, and added materiallyto our knowledgeof thePolar area. But this increasedknowledge is stillvery partial, and one of the most interestingobjects of futureresearch will be to ascertain the extentof the sea of ancientice, and the laws which regulateits formation. 76. The knowledgeacquired in 1875-76 fullyconfirms the accuracy of the rules based on long experience,arid formulatedby Sherard Osborn in 1865. The necessityfor navigating along a coast line in orderto cross the threshold of the unknown region,has received additional confirmation;the valuable resultsbrought home by Captain Nares could not have been securedwithout winteringin the ice, and the use of sledges for exploringand making dis? coverieshas again been shownto be indispensable. It is, therefore,established that the rules which guided the Council of the Eoyal GeographicalSociety in selectingSmith Sound as the best route and in recommendingthe course to be pursued,must still be consideredin full forceas guides for the selectionof the next best route,and forlaying down the principleson which Polar research should be continued. 77. It is now more certainthan ever that the courseadvocated in Dr. Peter? mann's lettersof 1865, namely,that of attemptingto enterthe driftingpack northof Spitzbergenin a steamer,in the hope of reachinga veryhigh latitude, must be finallydiscarded. In the firstplace the object is insufficient.None of the resultsdesired from Arctic explorationwould be obtainedby a summer cruiseof this kind, away fromland, even if it was successful. In the second place all practicalnavigators who have undertakenscientific investigations in the Spitzbergenseas since 1865, including Nordenskiold,Koldewey, Payer, and Lamont, have declaredthat it will not be successful; and the opinionsof Dr. Peterrnannhimself appear to have been modifiedsince that date. I have already quoted the views, based on great local experience,of ProfessorNor? denskiold.* Those of Lieutenant Payer entireiy coincide. He holds that navigationin the frozenseas remotefrom the land is far more dangerousthan navigationalong a coast line, that it is entireiydependent on accident,exposed to and without definite " All the unsuccessful grave catastrophes," any goal. attempts,"he adds, to penetratenorthward from Spitzbergen, were made by expeditions whose course and terminationresemble each other as one egg * See page 540.

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.178 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:42:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ADDITIONAL NOTICES. 553 resembles another." Payer repeats what Sherard Osborn had urged since 1865, and what now to be as an incontrovertiblecanon of ice- ought accepted " navigation. In the wordsof Sir Edward Parry, experiencehas clearlyshown that the navigationof the Polar Seas can neverbe performedwith any degree of certaintywithout a continuity of land. It was only by watching the openingsbetween the ice and the shorethat our late progressto the westward was effected(in 1819), and had the land continuedin the desired direction, therecan be no question that we should have continuedto advance, however slowly, towardsthe completionof our enterprise." 78. We must, therefore,continue to be guided by those canons of Arctic explorationwhich Sherard Osborn has formulated. But it must be remem? bered that the Smith Sound routewas the best by which the thresholdof the unknown region could be approached. The work in that direction is now completed,and the next best routecannot of course offerthe same chances of success and equal advantages. The difficultieswill increase as the work approachescompletion ; but so will the gloryof surmountingthem. 79. Four routes now remain forfuture expeditions. I. The Jones Sound route, the work of which will be to connect North Lincoln with Aldrich's farthest,and to ascertainthe limitsof the PalasocrystieSea in that direction. II. The East Greenland route,to connect Cape Bismarck with Beaumont's farthest,and so complete the discoveryof Greenland. III. The route of Franz Josef Land, to explorethe northernside of the countrydiscovered by Payer; and IV. The North-east Passage, by which a knowledge of the sea northof Siberia will be completed,and Wrangell Land will be explored. 80. The two latterroutes wall probablybe found the most difficult,and it is not likely that all the work in eitherof those directionscould be completed by one expedition. Payer and Weyprechtonly reached the land discovered by themin 1873 by dint of a long and invoiuntarydrift in the ice. It might be reached by a fortunateand skilful attempt either by the north coast of Spitzbergenor fcothe eastward,according to the season. If a winter harbour could be reached on the western shore of Franz Josef Land, discoveries of great interestwould be made by sledging-parties,and annual communication mightbe secured by formingdepots on Gilies Land and otherislands probably interveningbetween North-eastLand and Zichy Island. Franz Josef Land seems to be a part of the Spitzbergengroup, rising out of the same shallow sea, with deeperwater to the north. But the explorationof its northernface will be very interesting,and will throwmuch light on the physical geography of the still unknownportion of the Polar area. 81. The North-eastPassage is surroundedwith a halo of romance. It was the firstachievement attemptedby our earliest Arctic worthiesand by the Dutch, and is connectedwith the names of Willoughbyand Chancellor,of Pet and Jackman,of Barents and Linschoten. In later times the labours of Lutke, Nordenskiold,Gardiner, Wiggins, and the Norwegianwalrus-hunters have given fresh interest to its approaches; the journeys of Anjou and Wrangell have shown the great geographicalinterest which attaches to the sea northof Siberia; while the admission of an indicationof Wrangell Land on the charts has made its complete explorationa necessarywork for the future. 82. Since 1869 the voyages of Norwegian fishershave overcomethe obsta- cles on the thresholdof the North-eastPassage, which were insuperableto the early navigators. They have sailed round Novaya Zemlya, and have tra? versed the Kara Sea. The point is to select the righttime in the season for an attemptto crossthe Sea of Kara. It has now been establishedby M. Nor? denskiold and Captain Wiggins that a steamer may always calculate upon being able to reach the rnouthof the Yenisei River in August. It remainsto be seen whethernavigation can be extendedround Capes Taimyr and Cheiy-

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.178 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:42:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 554 ADDITIONAL NOTICES. uskin to the northernshores of the New Siberian Islands. Eussian vessels have neverbeen able to get beyondthe mouth of the Pyasina. But in 1843 Middendorfsaw extensive open waterfrom Cape Taimyr duringthe summer, and the observationsof both Anjou and Wrangell tend to the conclusionthat, if Cape Chelyuskincould be rounded,the Polar Sea northof Siberia mightbe navigatedas faras Wrangell Land. The difficultiesof crossingthe threshold of the unknownregion, and reachingnew ground by this route,will doubtless be formidable. Nevertheless,important discoveries will reward the future explorerwho boldly and successfullyadvances northwardson this line. He will be in the rear of the ice-laden Polar Sea discoveredby the Expedition of Captain Nares, and will thus complete the solution of the questions in Physical Geographyconnected with it. 83. It is, however,the firsttwo routesthat I have mentionedwhich offer the greatest advantages, and most nearly comply with the conditionsthat have been laid down; namely,those by Jones Sound and by the east coast of Greenland. By both the navigationwould be along coast lines, and by both thereis a reasonableexpectation of being able to establisha base of operations beyond the thresholdof the unknownregion. Discovered by Baffinin 1616, Jones Sound is said to have been penetratedby Captain Lee in the Prince of Wales whaler in 1848, for a distance of 150 miles. In August 1851, Sherard Osbornwent a short distance up Jones Sound in the Pioneer, but was stopped by floes stretchingacross the strait; and it was also entered by Inglefield in the Phcenix in 1853. In the spring of 1853, Sir exploredthe northcoast of GrinneliLand, which formsthe southern side of Belcher Channel leading fromJones Sound. He found open water streakedwith sailing ice, and the northerncoast or islands trendingto n.e. The floes were acted upon by a strong tide, and had evidently been in motion during the previous autumn. Early in June the fiights of birds indicatedwater-holes to the north,probably caused by the passage of a strong tidal wave in an east and west direction. The geographicalresults of an expedition up Jones Sound and BelcherChannel would be the completionof discoveriesthence to Aldrich'sfarthest, including the distributionof land and sea towards Prince Patrick Island, and the characterof the region north of the Parry group. The attainmentof a suitable base of operations for the eledging-joumeysis almost certain,so that some measure of success by the Jones Sound route may be reliedupon. 84. But, with equal advantages as regardsthe chances of success,the East Greenlandroute offersgeographical results of greaterimportance, namely, the completionof the discoveryof that vast mass of glacier-bearingland. The northernknown of East Greenlandwas discovered on part " by " June 13th, 1607, who called it Hold with Hope," and reportedthat, for aught we could it is like to be a land and worththe This see, good " seeing." " was in latitude 73? n. Van Keulen, on his chart,has Land van Edam in 77? 10' N., discoveredin 1655; and anotherpart of the coast, seen in 1670, marked "Land van Lambert." In June 1822, Scoresby forced his ship throughthe ice-floeswhich encumberthe east coast, and surveyed it from Gale Hamke's Bay in 75? southwardsto 69? s., findinglittle difficultyin sailing along the channel close inshore. In the followingyear, also during the month of June, Captain Clavering in the Griper,with Captain Sabine on board, attemptedto press throughthe ice to the east coast of Greenland in 77? 90' n., but was stopped by an unbrokenfield sixty miles long. On August 2nd, he again enteredthe ice in 75? 30' N., and passed throughsailing ice, along the margin of solid fields,to the south-west,at last succeeding in reaching the land. He laid down the coast line from72? to 76? n., while Captain Sabine took his observationson Pendulum Island. 85. The German Expedition sailed from Bremenon June 15th, 1869, con-

This content downloaded from 188.72.127.178 on Tue, 17 Jun 2014 03:42:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ADDITIONAL NOTICES. 555 sisting of the Germania, a little steamer of 140 tons, and with a crew of seventeen men, and the Hansa storeship. The crew of the Hansa demon? stratedthe existenceof a southerlydrift along the east coast duringthe winter-T while the Germania, followingin Captain Clavering's footsteps,reached a latitude of 75? 30' N., and winteredat the Pendulum Islands in 74? 30' n. By the 5th of August the Germania reached open water inshore, but tho ice appeared to be firm and without sign of breaking up, to the north of Shannon Island (74? 56' to 75? 26' n.). To the south therewas much open water. From August 17th to September13th an attemptwas made to go farthernorth, but withoutsuccess, the fieldsbeing closely packed against the land-ice. In 1870 a sledging-journey(two sledges and ten men) was under? taken to the northward,between March 8th and April 27th, the firsttwenty- three days outwards taking the party to 77? N., the most northerlypoint ever reachedon the east coast. Nothing but want of provisions(for they had no systemof depots) preventeda much furtherextension of the journeyto the northward. 86. The opinion of the Germanexpiorers is unfavourableto the possibility of pushingmuch farthernorth along the east coast, But all depends on the season, and on vigilance in watchingfor and takingadvantage of a lead. In 1872, Captain David Gray, of Peterhead, in the whaler Hope, saw a wide extentof open water,with a watersky to the northward,on thiseast coast; and in 1874 he reporteda great and unusual driftof the ice in the SpitzbergenSea. 87. On the whole, the East Greenlandroute ranks next to Smith Sound, as a promisingdirection to take with a view to exploringan importantsection of the unknownPolar area. It complieswith all the conditionsof success?navi? gation along a coast line, possibilityof findingwinter quarters beyond the thresholdof the unknownregion, and the meansof exploringby sledge-parties. A depot ship would be establishedat or near the Pendulum Islands, while the advanced vessel would only have to reach about the 78th parallel in order to be withinthe unknownarea, and so to make some measureof success certain* The recent investigationought to ensureimmunity from scurvy, and with a healthy crew the sledging-operationsover such ice as is described by the Germans could be extended four degrees farthernorth at least, to the 82nd parallel. This would bring them within a short distance of Beaumont** farthest,and the discoveryof Greenlandwould thus be completed?one of the most importantgeographical achievements that remainsto be accomplishedby this generation. The east coast is reportedto be frequentedby musk-oxen, and its ice-floesby bears and seals; so that the expiorerswould be able to obtain freshprovisions, while the winterdarkness would be much shorter,and the climate less rigorousthan that to which the late Expedition was exposed. The magnificentmountains and fjords of this east coast present featuresof peculiar interestin several branches of science,and it is probable that the various discoveriesmade by expiorerswho will completethe circuitof Green? land will be of greatvalue. 88. On the whole, then,the East Greenlandroute is the best that can be selectedfor a new Expedition; because it offersgreater facilitiesand better chances of success, and also because by it the importantdiscoveries of the Expedition of 1875-76 will best be followedup and made continuous. But there are at least four routes fromwhich to select,namely those of Jones- Sound, East Greenland,and Franz Josef Land, and the North-eastPassage. The reasonsfor continuing the work are as strongas those forcommencing it;. and I would earnestlysubmit that the Council of the Royal Geographical Societyought not to relax its effortsafter one success,but that thereshould be continuityin its measures,and that, throughgood reportand evil report,it should steadily persevereuntil the exploration of the unknownregion round the North Pole is completed.

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