L . Introduction
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The Grand Design by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow Review by Ian Kluge l . Introduction Stephen Hawking’s and Leonard Mlodinow’s The Grand Design begins with a grand or rather, grandiose claim that “philosophy is dead” and goes on from there. The book proceeds to tell us that an infinite stack of multiverses – instead of turtles – explains our allegedly ‘fine-tuned’ existence on earth. For good measure, the authors throw in what they think is a new philosophy of science, model-dependent realism, and demolish free will. They also add elaborate faith- statements about M-Theory, which, as Nobel-Laureate Steven Weinberg points out, is not nearly so well established or useful as Hawking would have us believe. The book ends by asserting that gravity not God is the reason why there is something rather than nothing. Hawking’s claim that “philosophy is dead” (5) is such a sweeping over-generalization that it is hard to know what it actually means. He thinks, “Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics” (5). Does he mean philosophy of science? Or ontology? Or medical ethics? Philosophy of physics? Postmodernism? If so, then it is pretty clear he is one who is just catching up with philosophy. He needs to read a little more broadly in modern books on all these subjects. Given his claim, it is ironic that his supposedly ‘new’ model- dependent realism is a hash of warmed-over Kuhn (The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962), postmodernist epistemology and, above all, 18th Century Kantian idealism. As we shall see below, this model makes science impossible. The problems begin early in the book. (We’ll pass over the history of science howlers, like the claim that Aristotle, the father of biology, rejected observation.) In trying to answer the question about the origin of natural law, Hawking conflates and confuses two issues: (1) the existence of God as the ground of being or origin of all that exists and (2) God’s relationship to creation, such as making exceptions to the natural laws He established. In other words, Hawking confuses the question of God’s existence as the source of natural law with the question about God’s interference in His laws. These are two fundamentally different questions and can be answered independently of one another. It is quite possible – as deists like Hume did – to say that God exists as the author of all, including natural law, without subscribing to divine interference, or ‘miracles’ as understood by Hawking. Claiming that we cannot believe in God without believing in miracles is logical nonsense. There is no absolutely necessary connection between the two ideas. The Baha’i Writings recognize this fact: they do not deny the possibility of miracles but do not make belief in God dependent on them, and, indeed, de-emphasize them. According to Hawking, if we distinguish God’s existence from His miraculous deeds, God becomes “no more than a definition of God as the embodiment of the laws of nature” (29). Even if this were true, why would it be a problem? Saying that the laws of nature are divine keeps divinity in our world-picture as surely as saying a transcendent God created all natural laws. Such a world-picture differs significantly from a purely naturalistic world-picture which denies the divine altogether and ascribes everything to chance or quantum fluctuations. The presence of divinity in whatever form – even as a pantheistic God Who embodies natural law –influences not only science vis-à-vis our understanding of causality, but also fundamental issues of ontic, social, legal and spiritual value. In one view, we are the ‘children’ of the divine, in the other a by- product of chance combinations of matter. On the other hand, if Hawking means more than a pantheistic God, i.e. God as the author of the laws, then it is clear that as creator, God transcends the laws He makes, just as any artist transcends his own work. Here, too, as the maker of laws that allow the formation of life God becomes a source of value as well as understanding vis-à-vis causality and cosmic order. Contrary to Hawking’s claim, the subject of miracles has nothing to do with the differences in these two world-pictures. Hawkin and Mlodinow follow the Humean view, that a miracle is necessarily an exception to the laws of nature. God breaks the rules He made. Hawking shows how this view is irrational. But this is not the only possible explanation. First, there is the explanation by secondary causes. In other words, God works through the laws of nature to achieve effects that contradict our expectations and usual experience. He uses natural laws in ways we have not yet discovered. Consequently, no break with natural law is required. Theoretically, if scientists could get enough knowledge, they might even be able to understand how some miracles ‘work’ – i.e. miracles could become quite ‘scientific.’ Furthermore, contrary to what Hawking claims, scientific determinism would not “exclude the possibility of miracles or an active role for God” (30) because God acts through not against natural laws. Such a conclusion fits in well with the Baha’i Writings which state “No thing have I perceived, except that I perceived God within it, God before it, or God after it.” (Gleanings from the Writings of Baha'u'llah, p. 178). Since God is “in” things, S/he may act through or by means of them. A second possible take on miracles comes from quantum physics. This view defines a miracle as an event of an extremely low order of probability. Quantum physics has established that in the last analysis, all laws are probabilistic i.e. do not operate with 100% guaranteed results in all cases (72). A genuine miracle then, is a highly unlikely – but not impossible – event. Coins can land on their edge. Not often. But they can. Philosophically speaking, this lets us doubt that miracles have occurred but does not allow us to prove they cannot – which is what Hawking seeks (unsuccessfully) to do. In both of these theories about miracles, God can interfere in nature without breaking any physical laws though He can use them in ways we do not expect. In this case, however, the problem is with our knowledge and expectations and not with God even if Hawking would have it the other way around. Of course, this does not mean we must believe all miracle stories in all religions – indeed, we may choose to believe none – but it does mean that we cannot logically rule out the possibility of miracles a priori. Multiverses are another source of logical difficulties for Hawking. The Grand Design claims that the existence of multiverses can explain why the universe we inhabit is fine-tuned for life without resorting to God as an explanation. In an infinite array of possible universes, one that contains life is likely or even inevitably bound to appear. Saying that a universe fit for humankind is likely to show up is, in fact, a covert appeal to the laws of probability – which raises the question of the origin of the law of probability. Are they ‘just there’? If so, Hawking has resurrected God – the only totally independent entity – under another name. Did these laws develop through the interaction of particles? If so, how did the particles get the capacity to develop natural laws? How did the particles develop the capacity to interact with one another? And how could we answer such questions by means of the scientific method which requires prediction and observation? Clearly, Hawking’s multiverse suggestion leaves science behind. If, on the other hand, the appearance of multiverses were truly random, then we could not determine that any result was likely, unlikely, inevitable or impossible. This negates Hawking’s claim that countless multiverses can explain the origin of this fine-tuned universe. An explanation must tell us why something happened, must happen or is likely to happen – and if the appearance of universes is purely random, we cannot know any of these things. Simply claiming that because there are so many of these multiverses a world like ours must appear is like saying that sand-castles must appear on the beach because there are trillions of trillions of grains of sand. Well, no . For building sand-castles, sand-grains are necessary but not sufficient causes. Clearly, multiverses by themselves are not sufficient for explaining the existence of a fine-tuned universe. II. Model-Dependent Realism One of Hawking’s and Mlodinow’s main contributions in The Grand Design is their theory of “model-dependent realism” (42) according to which a physical theory or world-picture is a model (generally of a mathematical nature) and a set of rules that connect the elements of the model to observations. This provides a framework with which to interpret modern science. (43) In their view “to model-dependent realism it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation” (46); moreover, if two different models agree with observations, we cannot know which one is “more real than another” (46). This is inane wordplay – saying that a “model is real” means precisely that it agrees with observation. What else could it mean? How can a model “agree with observation” of nature and not be “real” i.e. not correspond to the reality it models? If a model makes testable predictions which are validated, the very fact of validation means something about the model is correct, i.e. corresponds to reality and, therefore, provides real information about nature.