Sovereignty, Internationalism, and the Chinese In-Between

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Sovereignty, Internationalism, and the Chinese In-Between The U.S. Congress established the East-West Center in 1960 to foster mutual understanding and coopera- tion among the governments and peoples of the Asia Pacific region including the United States. Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. govern- ment with additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, corporations, and Asian and Pacific governments. East-West Center Working Papers are circulated for comment and to inform interested colleagues about work in progress at the Center. For more information about the Center or to order publications, contact: Publication Sales Office East-West Center 1601 East-West Road Honolulu, Hawaii 96848-1601 Telephone: 808-944-7145 Facsimile: 808-944-7376 Email: [email protected] Website: www.EastWestCenter.org EAST-WEST CENTER WORKING PAPERS International Graduate Student Conference Series No. 2, 2004 Sovereignty, Internationalism, and the Chinese In-Between Matthew Erie Matthew Erie is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Anthropology, Cornell University. He can be reached at [email protected]. This paper was presented at the 3rd East-West Center International Graduate Student Conference, February 19-21, 2004 in Honolulu, Hawaii. East-West Center Working Papers: International Graduate Student Conference Series publishes graduate students' research in progress. This paper has been peer-reviewed. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Center. Please direct orders and requests to the East-West Center's Publication Sales Office. The price for Working Papers is $3.00 each plus shipping and handling. Sovereignty, Internationalism, and the Chinese In-Between Matthew S. Erie Abstract This paper is premised on the idea that in order for such development projects as the UN Millennium Development Goals, and especially development in Asia, to take root in both the policies of national governments and in the national imaginary of the citizenry, there must be an existing viable notion of the “global community.” Arguing mainly from anthropological theory, but also drawing on political science, history, and legal studies, this paper considers the various institutional as well as the affective mechanisms that allow individuals to transcend allegiance to the nation-state to access transnational civil society. The case of the People’s Republic of China is analyzed to demonstrate the ways in which sovereignty, as cornerstone of Chinese nationalism and linchpin of the state system itself, is being challenged by various forces of economic, legal, political, and cultural globalization. The paper concludes that it is the changing ontological terrain of the concept of sovereignty which engenders a new calculus of political power.† † Paper was presented on 20 February, 2004, at the Third East-West Center International Graduate Student Conference in Honolulu, Hawaii. The author would like to thank Viranjini Munasinghe for her comments on an earlier draft. 1 Introduction Writing in 1957, Edward Shils contended that contemporary society exhibited manifold personal attachments, whether civil, professional, or primordial, and that these bonds knitted society together. Shils further remarked that these attachments were characterized by immediate, familiar, and proximal relations. This paper takes as its point of departure a revision of Shils. Nearly a half-century after the publication of “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties,” we can see that in today’s increasingly shrinking world, what is now considered proximal or personal often originates half a world away. While globalization has intensified religious fundamentalism, ethnic strife, and wars, both holy and unholy, it has also increased contact and understanding across cultural divides. This latter phenomenon, the possibility for an international solidarity and particularly the ways in which the individual accesses the global community, are considered here from a multi-disciplinary perspective that incorporates social anthropology, political science, and legal studies. The central premise of this argument is that for such development programs as the UN Millennium Goals1 to take root in both the policies of national governments and in the national imaginary of its citizenry, there must be a pre-existing sense of a viable international community. The theorization of an international community proceeds through a consideration of the interplay between individual and social structure, specifically, the individual’s relationship to the nation- state as the foundational unit of the international system. A consideration of structural changes occurring at the level of the nation-state finds that it is the changing ontology of sovereignty itself which facilitates individual access to civil society and “the global.” Lastly, the paper turns to the most unlikely of places to examine a case study of emergent forms of sovereignty – the People’s Republic of China, a nation-state known for its non-participation in the international community. Nevertheless, the study of China shows that the diffusion of sovereignty engenders new spaces for individuals to access global civil society and provides the framework for a new calculus of political power. 1 The UN Millennium Development Goals as stated in the Millennium Declaration (8 September 2000) focus on the “collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. The goals are: the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, universal primary education gender equality, reduction of child mortality, improvement of maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing global partnerships for development. The latter includes open trading and financial systems with a particular concentration on the special needs of developing countries (quota-free access for exports, debt relief or sustainable debt, youth programs, pharmaceutical partnerships, and improved access to information and communication technologies) (UN Millennium Declaration). 2 I. “We are the World” To conceptualize the relationships between the individual person and larger social collectivities such as the nation and beyond, it is helpful to invoke Kenneth Waltz’s tripartite division of the individual, the nation-state, and the international system developed in his Man, the State, and War (1959). Waltz argues that second order images can be ignored and posits the systemic level as origin for the distribution of capabilities, the aggregations of distinct national powers such as the economic resources of subsidiaries of multinational corporations that are mobilized by states for various purposes (Caporaso 2000: 2). Although Waltz may have ultimately dismissed the level of the nation-state as primary actor in international relations and both producer and recipient of affective ties with individuals, nevertheless, the nation-state and its emotive corollaries of nationalism and patriotism has been a mainstay in the literature of political scientists and social historians. A cursory overview of some of the highlights of this literature shows that the question “why do people form attachments to their country?” has elicited, broadly speaking, a gradual agreement towards a constructivist perspective that see ties to the nation (“nationalism”) as a distinctly modern phenomenon which are generated by political elites (Geertz 1973; Gellner 1983; Hayes 1926; Hobsbawm 1992; Renan 1990; Weber 1994). It would seem, then, as for the attachment of the individual to the nation-state, that this is an affect of cultural construction often appropriated by political and intellectual elites. Nationalism, then, is not an organic, natural, or primordial sentiment, but rather a cultural construct. Internationalism, the attachment to the global community, also emerges as a result of social production.2 Individual identification with the international community can take two forms. The first occurs in terms of access to transnational forms of authority as nodes of international political power; this association occurs often when the nation-state itself has somehow infringed upon individual liberty and international authorities are perceived as superordinate adjudicators. The second form consists of the development of an actual community, a sense of cohesion or “we-ness” fostered by common goals and practices. This identification can take place vis-à-vis the nation-state (through, for instance, activist groups that seek to influence policy formation) or through involvement in activities that are not necessarily antithetical to states’ interests, and may be conducive to them, but which nevertheless transcend state territorial boundaries; international business communities and academic affiliations would be examples of this type. In 2 As will be shown below, these are not mutually exclusive attachments. 3 sum, both forms of identification with the international community comprise “global civil society.”3 Theorization of internationalism must take into consideration both the actions and attitudes of individual subjects and their social, political, and economic contexts within which they are situated. Although there are many vehicles of individual association with global civil society, two will be considered here: one that is roughly “subjective” and another which is instrumental. First, anthropologists and social historians have noted that people cultivate “multiple identities” in regards to their association with larger
Recommended publications
  • Democracy in the United States
    Democracy in the United States The United States is a representative democracy. This means that our government is elected by citizens. Here, citizens vote for their government officials. These officials represent the citizens’ ideas and concerns in government. Voting is one way to participate in our democracy. Citizens can also contact their officials when they want to support or change a law. Voting in an election and contacting our elected officials are two ways that Americans can participate in their democracy. Voting booth in Atascadero, California, in 2008. Photo by Ace Armstrong. Courtesy of the Polling Place Photo Project. Your Government and You H www.uscis.gov/citizenship 1 Becoming a U.S. Citizen Taking the Oath of Allegiance at a naturalization ceremony in Washington, D.C. Courtesy of USCIS. The process required to become a citizen is called naturalization. To become a U.S. citizen, you must meet legal requirements. You must complete an interview with a USCIS officer. You must also pass an English and Civics test. Then, you take the Oath of Allegiance. This means that you promise loyalty to the United States. When you become a U.S. citizen, you also make these promises: ★ give up loyalty to other countries ★ defend the Constitution and laws of the United States ★ obey the laws of the United States ★ serve in the U.S. military (if needed) ★ do important work for the nation (if needed) After you take the Oath of Allegiance, you are a U.S. citizen. 2 Your Government and You H www.uscis.gov/citizenship Rights and Responsibilities of Citizens Voting is one important right and responsibility of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Jingjiao Under the Lenses of Chinese Political Theology
    religions Article Jingjiao under the Lenses of Chinese Political Theology Chin Ken-pa Department of Philosophy, Fu Jen Catholic University, New Taipei City 24205, Taiwan; [email protected] Received: 28 May 2019; Accepted: 16 September 2019; Published: 26 September 2019 Abstract: Conflict between religion and state politics is a persistent phenomenon in human history. Hence it is not surprising that the propagation of Christianity often faces the challenge of “political theology”. When the Church of the East monk Aluoben reached China in 635 during the reign of Emperor Tang Taizong, he received the favorable invitation of the emperor to translate Christian sacred texts for the collections of Tang Imperial Library. This marks the beginning of Jingjiao (oY) mission in China. In historiographical sense, China has always been a political domineering society where the role of religion is subservient and secondary. A school of scholarship in Jingjiao studies holds that the fall of Jingjiao in China is the obvious result of its over-involvement in local politics. The flaw of such an assumption is the overlooking of the fact that in the Tang context, it is impossible for any religious establishments to avoid getting in touch with the Tang government. In the light of this notion, this article attempts to approach this issue from the perspective of “political theology” and argues that instead of over-involvement, it is rather the clashing of “ideologies” between the Jingjiao establishment and the ever-changing Tang court’s policies towards foreigners and religious bodies that caused the downfall of Jingjiao Christianity in China. This article will posit its argument based on the analysis of the Chinese Jingjiao canonical texts, especially the Xian Stele, and takes this as a point of departure to observe the political dynamics between Jingjiao and Tang court.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles
    The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles The Chinese Navy Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles Saunders, EDITED BY Yung, Swaine, PhILLIP C. SAUNderS, ChrISToPher YUNG, and Yang MIChAeL Swaine, ANd ANdreW NIeN-dzU YANG CeNTer For The STUdY oF ChINeSe MilitarY AffairS INSTITUTe For NATIoNAL STrATeGIC STUdIeS NatioNAL deFeNSe UNIverSITY COVER 4 SPINE 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY COVER.indd 3 COVER 1 11/29/11 12:35 PM The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 1 11/29/11 12:37 PM 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 2 11/29/11 12:37 PM The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles Edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies Washington, D.C. 2011 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 3 11/29/11 12:37 PM Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Chapter 5 was originally published as an article of the same title in Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009), 144–169. Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. Used by permission. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Chinese Navy : expanding capabilities, evolving roles / edited by Phillip C. Saunders ... [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.
    [Show full text]
  • The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers Michael C
    Roger Williams University Law Review Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 3 Fall 1998 The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers Michael C. Dorf Columbia University Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR Recommended Citation Dorf, Michael C. (1998) "The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 3. Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol4/iss1/3 This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers Michael C. Dorf* INTRODUCTION Of the American Constitution's three most distinctive fea- tures-federalism, judicial protection of individual rights and sep- aration of powers'-only the last has been held inapplicable to the states. First, federalism is, by its terms, a doctrine of power-shar- ing between the national and state governments. The distribution of authority between nation and states was the chief point of con- tention during the period of the Constitution's framing and ratifi- cation, and in recent years, the United States Supreme Court has vigorously enforced federalism norms. 2 Second, although the origi- nal Constitution contained relatively few individual rights provi- sions applicable to the states,3 during the last half-century, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process and Equal Protec- tion Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendments as providing exten- sive protection for individual rights against state interference.
    [Show full text]
  • THE RISE of COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM Steven Levitsky and Lucan A
    Elections Without Democracy THE RISE OF COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way Steven Levitsky is assistant professor of government and social studies at Harvard University. His Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. Lucan A. Way is assistant professor of political science at Temple University and an academy scholar at the Academy for International and Area Studies at Harvard University. He is currently writing a book on the obstacles to authoritarian consolidation in the former Soviet Union. The post–Cold War world has been marked by the proliferation of hy- brid political regimes. In different ways, and to varying degrees, polities across much of Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbab- we), postcommunist Eurasia (Albania, Croatia, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine), Asia (Malaysia, Taiwan), and Latin America (Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru) combined democratic rules with authoritarian governance during the 1990s. Scholars often treated these regimes as incomplete or transi- tional forms of democracy. Yet in many cases these expectations (or hopes) proved overly optimistic. Particularly in Africa and the former Soviet Union, many regimes have either remained hybrid or moved in an authoritarian direction. It may therefore be time to stop thinking of these cases in terms of transitions to democracy and to begin thinking about the specific types of regimes they actually are. In recent years, many scholars have pointed to the importance of hybrid regimes. Indeed, recent academic writings have produced a vari- ety of labels for mixed cases, including not only “hybrid regime” but also “semidemocracy,” “virtual democracy,” “electoral democracy,” “pseudodemocracy,” “illiberal democracy,” “semi-authoritarianism,” “soft authoritarianism,” “electoral authoritarianism,” and Freedom House’s “Partly Free.”1 Yet much of this literature suffers from two important weaknesses.
    [Show full text]
  • The Democracy Principle in State Constitutions
    Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2021 The Democracy Principle in State Constitutions Jessica Bulman-Pozen Columbia Law School, [email protected] Miriam Seifter University of Wisconsin Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Election Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Legislation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons Recommended Citation Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Miriam Seifter, The Democracy Principle in State Constitutions, 119 MICH. L. REV. 859 (2021). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2654 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE DEMOCRACY PRINCIPLE IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS Jessica Bulman-Pozen*& Miriam Seifter** In recent years, antidemocratic behavior has rippled across the nation. Lame- duck state legislatures have stripped popularly elected governors of their pow- ers; extreme partisan gerrymanders have warped representative institutions; state officials have nullified popularly adopted initiatives. The federal Consti- tution offers few resources to address these problems, and ballot-box solutions cannot work when antidemocratic actions undermine elections themselves. Commentators increasingly decry the rule of the many by the few. This Article argues that a vital response has been neglected. State constitu- tions embody a deep commitment to democracy. Unlike the federal Constitu- tion, they were drafted—and have been repeatedly rewritten and amended— to empower popular majorities.
    [Show full text]
  • Rethinking Anarchy and the State in IR Theory: the Contributions of Classical Anarchism*
    Rethinking Anarchy and the State in IR Theory: The Contributions of Classical Anarchism* Alex Prichard University of Bristol © Alex Prichard School of Sociology, Politics, and International Studies, University of Bristol Working Paper No. 03-10 Dr Alex Prichard gained his PhD from Loughborough University in 2008. His research brings to light the international political theory of the anarchist Pierre- Joseph Proudhon, and will be published by Routledge in 2011 in the 'New International Relations' series as The International Political Theory of Pierre- Joseph Proudhon: A World Without Sovereigns. He is founder and convenor of the PSA Anarchist Studies Network and is co-editor of 'Contemporary Anarchist Studies', a new book series to be published by Continuum from 2010. Dr Prichard was a teaching fellow and research officer at the University of Bath (2008-2009) and is currently an ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Bristol. He will be a teaching fellow in International Political Theory at the LSE from September 2010. *Please do not cite without the author’s permission. Comments welcome to [email protected] Rethinking Anarchy and the State in IR Theory: The Contributions of Classical Anarchism Abstract: In this paper I intervene in an ongoing debate between Colin Wight and Alex Wendt regarding the nature of the state. The current debate revolves around whether the state is an agent or a structure and seems to have become stuck as regards to the ontological status of groups. For Wendt the state is a person; for Wight the state is a structure that constrains and enables individuals.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Foundational Thought and Ancient Philosophers
    International Journal of Liberal Arts and Social Science Vol. 2 No. 2 March, 2014 China’s Foundational Thought and Ancient Philosophers Xiangshu Fang Deakin University 221 Burwood Highway BURWOOD 3125, VIC Australia Email: [email protected] Abstract China’s Spring and Autumn (770 BC–403 BC) and Warring States (403 BC–221 BC) periods, though marked by disunity and constant warring, witnessed an unprecedented era of cultural prosperity and intellectual activities. This paper takes this political context and intellectual background into consideration when examining the main schools of thought in that era, and argues that the atmosphere of reform and new ideas was attributed to the struggle for survival among warring regional lords, who needed an ever- increasing number of well-educated officials. Key words: Chinese history; ancient Chinese philosophers; the Mandate of Heaven; yin-yang theory 1. Introduction In the Spring and Autumn (770 BC–403 BC) and Warring States (403 BC–221 BC) periods, warring regional lords competed in building strong and loyal armies and in increasing economic production to ensure a broader base for tax collection. To achieve these economic, military, and cultural developments, the regional lords needed an ever-increasing number of skilled literate officials and advisers. Recruitment for these positions was based on merit. Roaming philosophers offered their counsel to any ruler who would listen to them, and besides teaching their disciples, were employed as advisers to various state rulers on the methods of government, war and diplomacy. These wandering scholars proposed widely ranging remedies to social, political, economic and military problems. Their solutions covered extensive spectrums from total authoritarianism to anarchistic individualism, from blatant militarism to radical pacifism, and from support of a relaxed economy to the advocacy of state monopoly.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophical Anarchism: the View That There Is No Duty to Obey the State, and That the State Is Not Morally Legitimate
    Philosophical anarchism: The view that there is no duty to obey the state, and that the State is not morally legitimate We should be careful, first and foremost, to distinguish this view from other views that might be called “anarchist”. The philosophical anarchist position does not endorse overthrowing the state, nor does it say anything about any particular response that we ought to have to the existence of certain states. Contemporary philosophical anarchist John Simmons claims that “Philosophical anarchists hold that there are good reasons not to oppose or disrupt at least some kinds of illegitimate states, reasons that outweigh any right or obligation of opposition. The practical stance with respect to the state, the philosophical anarchist maintains, should be one of careful consideration and thoughtful weighing of all the reasons that bear on action in a particular set of circumstances.” Cited in Wetman, Cristopher Heath. Is There a Duty to Obey the Law? Cambridge University Press. 2005. pp. 24-25. We’ll be looking at some arguments for the main PA position a little later on, but for now it will be of interest to say what advocates of PA might have to say about the State of Nature. Why exactly is the state of nature to be avoided, according to the views we’ve seen so far? -War of all against all (Hobbes) -Disagreements about how to exercise the “Executive Power” that we all have to punish the wrongdoings of others will lead to unrest between people. (Locke) -Our drive for self-improvement will eventually lead us to a situation in which we are not well-suited to survive without political arrangements (Rousseau) But is the state of nature really that bad? Anarchist suggestion: The problems that we encounter in civilized society are generally caused by the existence of government, and not solved by it Let’s take this claim at face value.
    [Show full text]
  • Separation of Powers Between County Executive and County Fiscal Body
    Separation of Powers Between County Executive and County Fiscal Body Karen Arland Ice Miller LLP September 27, 2017 Ice on Fire Separation of Powers Division of governmental authority into three branches – legislative, executive and judicial, each with specified duties on which neither of the other branches can encroach A constitutional doctrine of checks and balances designed to protect the people against tyranny 1 Ice on Fire Historical Background The phrase “separation of powers” is traditionally ascribed to French Enlightenment political philosopher Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the Laws, in 1748. Also known as “Montesquieu’s tri-partite system,” the theory was the division of political power between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary as the best method to promote liberty. 2 Ice on Fire Constitution of the United States Article I – Legislative Section 1 – All legislative Powers granted herein shall be vested in a Congress of the United States. Article II – Executive Section 1 – The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. Article III – Judicial The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. 3 Ice on Fire Indiana Constitution of 1816 Article II - The powers of the Government of Indiana shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confided to a separate body of Magistracy, to wit: those which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judiciary to another: And no person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.
    [Show full text]
  • The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933
    The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933 The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Schluessel, Eric T. 2016. The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493602 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933 A dissertation presented by Eric Tanner Schluessel to The Committee on History and East Asian Languages in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of History and East Asian Languages Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts April, 2016 © 2016 – Eric Schluessel All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Mark C. Elliott Eric Tanner Schluessel The Muslim Emperor of China: Everyday Politics in Colonial Xinjiang, 1877-1933 Abstract This dissertation concerns the ways in which a Chinese civilizing project intervened powerfully in cultural and social change in the Muslim-majority region of Xinjiang from the 1870s through the 1930s. I demonstrate that the efforts of officials following an ideology of domination and transformation rooted in the Chinese Classics changed the ways that people associated with each other and defined themselves and how Muslims understood their place in history and in global space.
    [Show full text]
  • A Theory of Democracy for the Administrative State
    DRAFT: Please do not cite without author’s permission A THEORY OF DEMOCRACY FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE Edward L. Rubin I. Defining Democracy A discussion of democracy should begin with a definition of the term so that the scope of the discussion is clear. Because democracy, whatever else it may be, is certainly a type of state, or government, it would seem that it will be necessary to move backward and define “state” before proceeding. This does not move back quite for enough, however. Before defining either state or democracy, it is necessary to define “define.” The point may seem abstruse, but it bears directly on any discussion of the subject. One of the many ways in which we no longer inhabit Aristotle’s world is that we do not engage in his discussion about whether the rule of the one, the few or the many is the best form of governance. Instead, virtually everyone agrees that the rule of the many is the best, or indeed the only proper form of government, and that we will refer to that form as a democracy. While there is a great deal of insightful scholarship dealing with autocracy and aristocracy these days, normative debate about government is generally limited to determining the preferable type of democracy. In other words, the debate proceeds within the boundaries of this single term, and we therefore need to understand the process by which the meaning of this horizon-setting term is established. Wittgenstein argues convincingly that language is neither logical nor precise, but rather “part of an activity, or a form of life.”1 His well-known example is the word “game.” What is the definition of a game, he asks, the characteristic that everything we call a game must possess.
    [Show full text]