Sailors load supplies into MV-22 Osprey from Marine Medium Tiltroter Squadron 262 on flight deck of USS George Washington in support of Operation Damayan, November 18, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Liam Kennedy)
n November 6, 2013, Haiyan The U.S. Pacific (known locally as Yolanda) O became what many described as the strongest storm on record to make landfall.1 According to the U.S. Command Response National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Haiyan had winds of up to 200 miles per hour, with gusts to Super Typhoon of up to 225 miles per hour. Haiyan affected 9 out of the 17 regions in the Philippines. With over $86 million in Haiyan total U.S. assistance, the U.S. military response efforts comprised more than 13,400 military personnel, 66 aircraft, By Thomas Parker, Sean P. Carroll, Gregg Sanders, Jason E. King, and Imes Chiu and 12 naval vessels, which delivered over 2,495 tons of relief supplies and evacuated more than 21,000 people. More than 1,300 flights were completed Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Parker, USMC, is the J35 Crisis Response Branch Chief in the Directorate in support of the relief effort, delivering of Operations at U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Carroll, USMC, served as a Ground/Special Operations Forces Planner in the Operations Directorate (J3) at Headquarters goods and services to approximately 450 (HQ) USPACOM and was part of the USPACOM Deployable Joint Force Augmentation Cell. Colonel sites.2 As of July 2014, the U.S. Agency Gregg Sanders, USAF (Ret.), serves as a Joint Training Specialist in the Operations Directorate at for International Development (USAID) HQ USPACOM. Lieutenant Colonel Jason E. King, Canadian Army, is the Canadian Liaison Officer to USPACOM and is the International Coordination Team Lead in the J35 Crisis Response Branch. Dr. estimated that a total of 16 million Imes Chiu is an Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. people were affected by Haiyan.3
54 Commentary / U.S. Pacific Command and Super Typhoon Haiyan JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Many humanitarian aid experts and typhoon were used, providing alternate When Haiyan slammed into the Philip- military leaders noted that civil-military means to coordinate operations while pines, many prepositioned stocks were coordination was some of the best they the major communication infrastructures simply depleted. had seen during the response to Super were down. Mainstream media, social As of April 3, 2014, authorities from Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines from media, and citizen journalism played the Philippine National Disaster Risk November to December 2013. In total, a significant role as well in informing Reduction and Management Council the United States participated in relief responders of the appropriate courses (NDRRMC)—a working group of efforts together with 57 other nations of action for the employment of U.S. various governmental agencies, nongov- and 29 foreign militaries. Specifically, resources. ernmental organizations, and civil and the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Many noted the impressive demon- private-sector groups that use the UN Assistance (OFDA), U.S. Pacific stration of Haiyan lessons learned put Cluster Approach in disaster manage- Command (USPACOM), and the into action in the more recent response ment administered by the Office of U.S. Embassy in Manila demonstrated to Typhoon Hagupit, which began as a Civil Defense under the Department clear understanding of their roles and Category 5 storm before weakening to of National Defense—estimated the responsibilities as evidenced by their Category 3 when it hit the Philippines typhoon had left 6,293 people dead and effective coordination. Moreover, U.S. in December 2014. The resiliency of 28,689 injured, with more than 4 mil- Government entities provided assistance the Filipino spirit continues to impress lion individuals displaced. The number that reflected their unique capabilities domestic and foreign media. The of houses damaged by Haiyan totaled appropriately scaled throughout the re- commitment of foreign humanitarian as- 1,140,332, of which more than half sponse phase. sistance actors who came to the aid of the (550,928) were completely destroyed.5 The USAID/OFDA Disaster Philippines after Haiyan clearly demon- Assessment Response Team coordinated strates the increasingly globalized nature Relief Efforts with the humanitarian community and of disaster response. In the coming years, The Philippines is a collection of more validated and transmitted requests for the challenge to find more innovative than 7,000 islands separated into 81 military assistance to Department of ways to increase investment in disaster provinces in three main geographi- Defense (DOD) responders on the preparedness and to better integrate and cal divisions: Luzon (north), Visayas ground. With the exception of a few days leverage local capabilities and capacities (mid), and Mindanao (south). Haiyan of water production in Tacloban, DOD with international response will remain. traversed the Visayas region, where focused mostly on large-scale operations, most of the affected areas were located, using its unique capabilities to deliver Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) for nearly a full day. Tacloban, located “wholesale” transportation and logistics Haiyan entered the West Philippine Sea on the island of Leyte, Cebu City on support. USAID/OFDA was one of the at 4:40 a.m. on November 8, maintain- Cebu Island, and Roxas City on Panay first donors to the World Food Program, ing its strength throughout the day as Island were the three other major areas enabling its role as the lead coordinator it moved across the central part of the affected by the typhoon that served of the United Nations (UN) logistics country, weakening only late in the as principal centers of regional relief and emergency telecommunications afternoon the following day.4 The storm efforts. Cebu, located in the central clusters and as the co-lead of the food tracked from the east directly across the Visayas, was the primary logistics hub security cluster with the UN Food and eastern, central, and western Visayas for the Philippines and other interna- Agriculture Organization. regions, destroying large swathes of tional relief efforts. International dona- Key lessons learned from previous territory spread across a number of dif- tions were processed in the one-stop disasters improved the speed and quality ferent islands. Leyte and Samar were shop inside Cebu’s Mactan-Benito of overall U.S. interagency coordination. hardest hit, with 90 percent of the Ebuen Air Base and then distributed Most notably, personnel with previous infrastructure destroyed in Tacloban to affected areas. Manila, located in disaster response experience who had City, Leyte’s largest urban center. The Luzon, was the focal point for central personal connections with other major typhoon overwhelmed regional capacity coordination among the major respond- players in the relief efforts considerably at a time when the national government ing organizations, with cluster coordi- expedited interagency and transnational had just faced two major calamities that nation meetings taking place in each relief efforts. The informal professional had drained its resources and signifi- of the major cities in areas affected by networks among relief workers that were cantly stressed the in-country supply Haiyan. The United States established built during common training and exer- chain: the civil conflict in Zamboanga its command operations center (COC) cises greatly facilitated the trust needed and Basilan on the southern island of at Manila’s Villamor Air Base, home of for effective and efficient cooperation, Mindanao in September 2013, and the the Philippine air force. This air base particularly in the early response phase. magnitude 7.2 earthquake in Bohol in shares runways with the Ninoy Aquino Several communication avenues for the the central Visayas region, which lay International Airport. responders and for those affected by the along the path of Haiyan, in October.
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Parker et al. 55 Sailor carries relief supplies to guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens (CG 63) during Operation Damayan, November 16, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Ricardo R. Guzman)
Within the U.S. Strategic Response the AFP. The MNCC provided common The Philippine government issued Framework, USAID/OFDA was as- situational awareness between the AFP a request for humanitarian assistance to signed as lead Federal agency (LFA) and assisting foreign militaries, facilitated the U.S. Government on November 9 for providing foreign humanitarian as- information sharing, and ensured the ef- (Washington, DC, time). USPACOM sistance (FHA) and coordinating U.S. ficient use of military support locations, directed Marine Corps Forces Pacific responses internationally. USAID/ capabilities, and coordination.6 to lead military relief operations OFDA has numerous response options in the Philippines, with 3rd Marine outside of DOD to provide immediate Lesson 1: Immediate Request Expeditionary Brigade (3rd MEB) serving support, including money, resources, for Assistance and Forward as the tactical mission commander on the commodities, and deployment-ready Deployed Assets Saved Lives ground, and ordered deployment of the humanitarian experts and advisors across Haiyan destroyed critical infrastructure USS George Washington and elements of the U.S. Government. The catastrophic that was essential to support relief Carrier Strike Group 5 (CSG 5) to the impact of Haiyan, however, required far operations, including airports, seaports, Philippines. greater capacity and capability than these roads, communications systems, power On November 10, within 6 hours response options could provide. Unique distribution networks (electrical and of authorization from USPACOM, 3rd DOD airlift capabilities in particular fuel), and other key resources. Though MEB “suitcase staff,” consisting of the became a key enabler for the entire re- difficult to calculate with precision, it commanding general, G3, sergeant sponse operation. is likely that the immediate steps taken major, public affairs officer, and two Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo by the Philippine government and communications Marines, deployed (popularly known as Camp Aguinaldo), corresponding USAID-USPACOM to the Philippines. Upon arrival, the the military headquarters of the Armed decisive actions in the early hours of the MEB established the COC at Villamor Forces of the Philippines (AFP) located response kept morbidity and mortality Air Base and began coordination with in Quezon City, Manila, also hosts relatively low, despite the catastrophic the AFP, Joint U.S. Military Assistance the NDRRMC and the Multinational impact of the storm and the millions of Group–Philippines, and USAID/OFDA Coordination Center (MNCC) led by people displaced. personnel who had arrived several days
56 Commentary / U.S. Pacific Command and Super Typhoon Haiyan JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 before Haiyan hit. The immediate de- interagency task force, while comprised when host-nation prepositioned goods ployment of the 3rd MEB and the rapid of less than 100 individuals, “clawed their were exhausted by recent disasters. These civil-military coordination that followed way back to the airport inch by inch” forward-deployed assets and capabilities meant humanitarian aid missions could to assess the conditions for the entry allowed for the immediate civil-military begin promptly upon the declaration of a of the responders and relief supplies in coordination needed to establish and national calamity by Philippine President Tacloban. Colonel Padilla recounted: execute a rapid response plan with the Benigno Aquino the next day. Philippine government. The USPACOM Deployable Upon reaching the airport hours after Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell being drenched, tired, hungry and with Lesson 2: Centralized Planning (DJTFAC) deployed and played a [a] minimum of equipment salvaged from and Decentralized Execution critical role in setting up an operational the devastation, the AFP and interagency Facilitated Coordination joint headquarters, aligning operational [task force] mustered the remaining per- A hub-and-spoke concept of operations design and assessment plans, establish- sonnel in the airport and linked up with was stood up 18 hours after approval ing an operational rhythm with the AFP, the surviving Philippine Air Force Tactical from USPACOM to deliver USAID OFDA, and UN, and implementing the Operations Group (PAF TOG) contingent humanitarian supplies from the primary USPACOM FHA concept of operations (whose camp at the airport grounds was to- hub at Villamor Air Base to Tacloban, (CONOPS). DJTFAC provided joint tally destroyed) and began to painstakingly Guiuan, Borongan, and Ormoc in expertise, regional and local expertise, clear the runway. Leyte and Samar. U.S. military aircraft and detailed knowledge of USPACOM enabled USAID/OFDA to conduct the organization and processes. It provided This effort paved the way for the first PAF needs and damage assessments required rapid stand-up and execution to establish C-130 flights that brought the initial inter- for relief planning and coordination Joint Task Force (JTF) 505. Although agency and NDRRMC assessment team, without delay. DOD civil-military coor- some geographic combatant commands medical teams from the AFP and limited dination focused primarily on airlifting do not have a DJTFAC, it proved an in- medical supplies to the city of Tacloban. supplies to affected areas for onward dispensable capability for the USPACOM Their efforts too became the enablers that distribution. response to Haiyan. allowed for the first group of U.S. forces to The first shipment of USAID/ On the same day, November 10, arrive there the following day. If not for OFDA relief commodities arrived in the the Joint Special Operations Task these men and women whose sacrifices got Philippines on November 12, and U.S. Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P),7 located lost when more prominent responders ar- military forces began regular distribution in Mindanao, about 600 miles south of rived, none of the follow-on and similarly of these commodities on November 13, 5 the affected region, began conducting critical activities could have happened.9 days after the storm made landfall. Assets aerial surveillance to assess airfields, ports, from the aircraft carrier USS George routes, and distress signals, and obtain- The combined Philippine-U.S. ef- Washington and CSG 5 commenced relief ing information critical for search and forts resulted in a capability that allowed operations on November 14. rescue operations in the affected areas of tactical military forces to provide im- Determining the allocation of re- Leyte, Samar, and the Western Visayas.8 mediate relief, while the government and sources and the use of DOD assets was JSOTF-P, which performs an advise- humanitarian aid community organized critical to the relief efforts. Satisfying and-assist role to Philippine security and prepared capabilities to deploy. On requests for assistance was based primar- forces throughout the southern part of November 11, President Aquino issued ily on field assessments. Manila served as the country, sent the first U.S. military Presidential Proclamation No. 682 de- the main aerial port of debarkation for personnel to respond. It also provided claring a state of national calamity—the U.S. efforts due to its focus on wholesale critical needs and damage assessment to same day USAID humanitarian relief support of operations, while the govern- the operational plans of the responders. supplies started arriving into Tacloban, ment and humanitarian actors focused According to witnesses on the 535 miles south of the COC at Villamor on performing humanitarian assess- ground, the AFP and the interagency task Air Base. ments, administering medical care, and force, despite having lost family members, In the initial hours of Typhoon engaging in direct distribution of relief extricated themselves from the rubble Haiyan, the U.S. military, working commodities. to clear the initial runway, providing alongside AFP counterparts, was able The decision to use Manila as a hub the “initial main door” that allowed the to respond quickly due to the many avoided burdening the affected areas in entry of the first group of U.S. forces into prepositioned U.S. assets throughout the the Visayas with internal logistics needs Tacloban airport. According to Colonel region. Military assets based in locations and freed up space for humanitarian Restituto Padilla, Jr., the AFP liaison near the Philippines enabled responders actors to operate in the affected areas. officer to USPACOM, the AFP Vice to provide rapid provision of lifesaving Personnel in Manila, comprised of U.S., Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Allan assistance in the immediate aftermath Filipino, and international humanitar- Luga, recounted how the AFP and the of the storm, made particularly critical ian personnel, made frequent visits to
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Parker et al. 57 affected areas. Responding organizations Tacloban residents had access to clean been established sooner, but rather that and coordination mechanisms in the drinking water by this time, and hygiene the right course of action was planned for affected areas were somewhat slow in kits began reaching various municipali- and decided upon at the outset to ensure setting up due to the magnitude of the ties. In Cebu, less cargo was arriving daily that the appropriate C2 is employed. devastation, necessitating coordination in and fewer people were requesting trans- Manila. port. After MITAM requirements were Lesson 4: International Missions were cleared in Manila satisfied, the U.S. military response to Coordination Team by the OFDA mission tasking matrix this disaster was nearly complete. Synchronized Effective (MITAM). Forces and assets returned JTF and USAID/OFDA leaders International Support to base in Luzon at the end of each day recognized that the emergency phase The International Coordination Team to receive orders for the following day. of relief operations terminated on or (ICT) serves as an enabling mechanism President Aquino assumed direct control about November 26. While there was a for the effective and speedy provision of the relief operations (at one point significant multinational military effort, of military capabilities and resources based directly out of Tacloban for several U.S. forces limited their efforts to the to support international efforts in the days), but they largely operated out of emergency phase, with U.S. command USPACOM area of operation. Operat- Manila for the duration of the response and control (C2) conducted largely out ing from the headquarters at Camp efforts. of Manila. Other foreign militaries arrived Smith, Hawaii, the ICT meets regu- later and focused a large amount of effort larly (Phase 0: bi-annually) and on an Lesson 3: Direct Planning on what could be considered the recovery ongoing basis during a crisis situation to Ensure Command and and rehabilitation stages of the operation, (Phase 1–5: minimum daily) for the Control Are Part of Course with a major focus on all activities in the purpose of joint planning, sharing infor- of Action Analysis mission area. mation, and creating a synchronized USPACOM ordered the activation By the time JTF 505 fully activated holistic awareness of the theater among of JTF 505 on November 16 to lead for this crisis, almost all USAID/OFDA- USPACOM international military the tactical mission, replacing the 3rd requested U.S. military assistance had liaison officers (LNOs). MEB. Lieutenant General John E. been delivered. The JTF supported While the ICT meetings are open Wissler, commander of III Marine requirements established in one final to all staff and strive to be as inclusive Expeditionary Force (III MEF), OFDA MITAM to deliver relief com- as possible, the core structure dur- assumed command of JTF 505, which modities. Key considerations in the JTF ing Operation Damayan included the established operations in the Philip- 505 after action report included sug- USPACOM DJ3 (Chair); a Canadian pines on November 18 and reached full gestions on ways to improve agility and LNO (Deputy-Chair); a Japanese operational capability on November 20. effectiveness in manning, equipping, LNO; the Philippine LNO and Deputy (III MEF is the parent command of 3rd training, and readiness. LNO; an Australian LNO; a British MEB.) JTF 505 led U.S. military relief Through the employment of the LNO; representatives from USPACOM operations until it was disestablished on most appropriate C2 option for the com- directorates, including training, plans, December 1, 2013. mander and staff, in conjunction with logistics, information technology, finance, After 6 days of full operational ca- component input, unnecessary transition and operations; the OFDA representa- pability, JTF 505 presented a transition delay during execution was minimized. tive; the Foreign Policy Advisor; and an confirmation briefing to the USPACOM USPACOM opted initially to command All Partners Access Network (APAN) commander on November 26. It stated its relief operations through its Marine representative. that “unique DOD capabilities [were] Service component (U.S. Marine Pacific) Originally stood up in November no longer required” and recommended instead of directly activating a JTF. 2013 in support of Operation Damayan, mission transition through first observ- Once the establishment of a JTF had the ICT serves as a one-stop shop for ing relief operations with U.S. Navy and been decided, it took several days before international LNOs to clarify their roles, Marine Corps amphibious forces in an adequate command, control, and com- help posture international military sup- “operational reserve” role, able to react munications were set up between the JTF port appropriately before the urgent to any sudden emergent requirements, and HQ USPACOM. formal host-nation request for assistance, and, second, by disestablishing the JTF While the various C2 arrangements and avoid potential confusion with the and releasing all major U.S. forces for and the shift between them did not nega- MNCC team during crisis situations. redeployment by December 1. tively affect operations, it did not enable Intended to provide a proactive, strategic, According to OCHA Situation a more rapid response. In mega-disaster and high-level operational perspective, Report No. 13, relief operations scaled scenarios in which it is not always clear the ICT paves the way for the smooth es- up substantially, especially in Tacloban how long the response phase will last, a tablishment of the MNCC by alleviating City, with access and logistics dramati- key consideration from the Haiyan expe- the initial burden of the affected nation cally improving by November 19.10 All rience is not whether a JTF should have to collect, organize, and identify overlaps,
58 Commentary / U.S. Pacific Command and Super Typhoon Haiyan JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Marines carry injured Filipino woman on stretcher for medical attention at Villamor Air Base, Philippines, November 11, 2013 (DOD/Caleb Hoover)
gaps, and potential opportunities across practices across all partner nations to pro- staff processes, event flow and decision the full spectrum of response operations mote alignment with USPACOM allies point descriptions, operational plan- during the critical lifesaving rapid re- and partner militaries, particularly before ning team processes, transition assess- sponse phase. a crisis makes landfall. The ICT also as- ment templates, and other supporting To be effective, the ICT core mem- sists in the creation, review, and revision documents.11 bers collect and monitor five main aspects of military response plans, CONOPs, The USPACOM FHA CONOPS of international military-related contribu- the dissemination of relevant operational is the authoritative reference for tions during a crisis: information, and the coordination of USPACOM FHA operations, actions, sourcing additional military support of and activities. This document builds initial government and military •• strategic theater military requirements. the strategic and operational construct intents vis-à-vis projected support for planning, preparing, executing, and current capabilities in the region, •• Lesson 5: Preplanned Scalable assessing FHA operations, and will be their locations, and their projected Force Packages Optimize applied in situations when U.S. agencies duration(s) of stay Humanitarian Assistance/ request DOD assistance (for example, determining where, when, and •• Disaster Relief Support foreign disaster relief, pandemic and for how long capabilities will be Based on lessons learned from Opera- emerging infectious diseases, and chemi- deployed tion Damayan, the newly revised and cal, biological, radiological, and nuclear information requirements to better •• comprehensive USPACOM FHA accidents). This CONOPS provides: enable deployments and support CONOPS discusses in detail the stra- any support required to facilitate prescriptive USPACOM guidance •• tegic framework, strategy and policy •• movement into theater. to military commanders performing considerations, mission statement, com- FHA operations In addition, the ICT provides a plat- mander’s intent, lines of effort (LOE), form for sharing lessons learned and best various frameworks for each LOE,
JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Parker et al. 59 •• a framework to inform partner requests, especially during the initial first landfall. This allowed JTF 505 to nations on USPACOM support state of operations, to better identify begin disestablishment. Remaining true during FHA operations which Service components will fulfill to the United Nations Office for the •• a baseline for the development which requirements. Ensure that the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and conduct of training to prepare MITAM is accessible and can handle Guidelines on the Use of Military and USPACOM commanders and forces the high volume of use from all Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief to execute FHA operations. constituents. (Oslo Guidelines), DOD assets provided •• USPACOM had the appropriate unique capability in the Haiyan response Lesson 6: Other Tactical interagency advisors collocated with efforts when it was clear that no compa- Considerations the HQ USPACOM staff, and this rable civilian alternative existed. greatly enhanced the command’s When this unique capability was no Operational insights captured in the unified action during Operation longer required, DOD began to phase after action reports include lessons Damayan. Combatant commands out its operations in coordination with learned and best practices in major should ensure their own person- the affected nation. The timeliness of the disaster response operations. Respond- nel are appropriately staffed with DOD response as the last-in and first-out ers across different service components interagency advisors pertinent to resort speaks to the importance of mutual reported the following lessons that their area of operations. They should training and readiness, such as the an- could be adapted to other geographic also initiate the situational aware- nual bilateral Philippine-U.S. Balikatan combatant command operational envi- ness group at the earliest point after military exercise, to allow for combined ronment and disaster scenarios: the identification of a major storm planning, interoperability, and a speedy •• Coordination and correspondence system and establish the operational and smooth transition of operations. during an FHA response should be planning team at least 24 hours prior More than a year had passed since unclassified as much as possible to to landfall for greater mission analysis Haiyan made first landfall on November maximize information-sharing. If and course of action selection. 8, 2013, in Eastern Samar, when we cannot communicate, we cannot •• Units and organizations must iden- Typhoon Hagupit (known locally as coordinate. Operating in the Secret tify stakeholders and LNO locations Ruby), the second most intense tropical Internet Protocol Router Network at the onset of a crisis. LNOs should storm in 2014, threatened the same area. resulted in wasted time and effort, be emplaced immediately to ensure Hagupit intensified to Category 5 on delaying shared situational awareness situational awareness, coordinate December 4, 2014, before weakening with partners. operations, and ensure mutual to Category 3 when it made landfall in •• Ensure communications are in place support. Eastern Samar. This time, the Philippines prior to major transition. Prioritize •• Develop a simple checklist to deter- applied lessons learned from Haiyan. the deployment of equipment as mine the capabilities of airfields in While a total of 4,149,484 persons necessary to ensure sufficient com- the affected area(s). This checklist were affected, only 18 deaths were munication capability is available to could be used to calibrate the reported.12 More than 1 million people support the anticipated growth of C2 required U.S. footprint. evacuated to 3,640 shelters in advance requirements. of the storm’s landfall, an impressive feat •• Ensure that the J5 rapidly establishes Conclusion in any country. The preparation activities joint planning groups at the onset of of the local and national governments, Within 2 weeks, the emergency operations to provide timely return including the prepositioning of road response phase of the humanitarian to Phase 0. clearance teams, were applauded by nu- crisis was essentially over. While the An assessment framework needs to merous international governmental and •• U.S. military ceased major operations be extant at the onset of operations. nongovernmental experts and officials. on November 26, some contributing- The incorporation of an assessment In suggesting best practices in the country military assets continued to stay framework into the FHA CONOPS Haiyan response, this article aims to on the ground in the affected areas sup- will help to ensure assessments are provide insights into the effectiveness of porting Philippine government efforts. possible at the onset of an event. the U.S. response to a mega-disaster such The commitment of assisting actors Ensure proper procedures to as Haiyan. It hopes to inspire other geo- •• who came to the aid of the Philippines determine the supported valid graphic combatant commands to adapt clearly demonstrated the increasingly requirements by USAID/OFDA. some of the organizational models and globalized nature of mega-disaster Confirmation of OFDA requests tactical approaches suggested herein for response. down to the Service components their particular environments. It also aims Despite the magnitude of the damage was initially difficult to obtain. There to start a dialogue on ways to achieve and its wide reach across multiple islands, is a need for a real-time formal- unity of effort in a complex catastrophic recovery began 2 weeks after Haiyan’s ized reporting process of all OFDA scenario. As a testament to U.S. partners
60 Commentary / U.S. Pacific Command and Super Typhoon Haiyan JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Marines with Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 offload KC-130J Super Hercules at Clark Air Force Base, Philippines, during Operation Damayan, November 22, 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Caleb Hoover) and allies, the commitment of the United attachments/article/1329/Effects_of_Ty- phoon Haiyan (Yolanda), Echo Crisis Flash No. States to assist, advise, and stand ready to phoon_YOLANDA_(HAIYAN)_SitRep_ 8, November 20, 2013, available at JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Parker et al. 61