The U.S. Pacific Command Response to Super Typhoon Haiyan
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Sailors load supplies into MV-22 Osprey from Marine Medium Tiltroter Squadron 262 on flight deck of USS George Washington in support of Operation Damayan, November 18, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Liam Kennedy) n November 6, 2013, Haiyan The U.S. Pacific (known locally as Yolanda) O became what many described as the strongest storm on record to make landfall.1 According to the U.S. Command Response National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Haiyan had winds of up to 200 miles per hour, with gusts to Super Typhoon of up to 225 miles per hour. Haiyan affected 9 out of the 17 regions in the Philippines. With over $86 million in Haiyan total U.S. assistance, the U.S. military response efforts comprised more than 13,400 military personnel, 66 aircraft, By Thomas Parker, Sean P. Carroll, Gregg Sanders, Jason E. King, and Imes Chiu and 12 naval vessels, which delivered over 2,495 tons of relief supplies and evacuated more than 21,000 people. More than 1,300 flights were completed Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Parker, USMC, is the J35 Crisis Response Branch Chief in the Directorate in support of the relief effort, delivering of Operations at U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). Lieutenant Colonel Sean P. Carroll, USMC, served as a Ground/Special Operations Forces Planner in the Operations Directorate (J3) at Headquarters goods and services to approximately 450 (HQ) USPACOM and was part of the USPACOM Deployable Joint Force Augmentation Cell. Colonel sites.2 As of July 2014, the U.S. Agency Gregg Sanders, USAF (Ret.), serves as a Joint Training Specialist in the Operations Directorate at for International Development (USAID) HQ USPACOM. Lieutenant Colonel Jason E. King, Canadian Army, is the Canadian Liaison Officer to USPACOM and is the International Coordination Team Lead in the J35 Crisis Response Branch. Dr. estimated that a total of 16 million Imes Chiu is an Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. people were affected by Haiyan.3 54 Commentary / U.S. Pacific Command and Super Typhoon Haiyan JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Many humanitarian aid experts and typhoon were used, providing alternate When Haiyan slammed into the Philip- military leaders noted that civil-military means to coordinate operations while pines, many prepositioned stocks were coordination was some of the best they the major communication infrastructures simply depleted. had seen during the response to Super were down. Mainstream media, social As of April 3, 2014, authorities from Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines from media, and citizen journalism played the Philippine National Disaster Risk November to December 2013. In total, a significant role as well in informing Reduction and Management Council the United States participated in relief responders of the appropriate courses (NDRRMC)—a working group of efforts together with 57 other nations of action for the employment of U.S. various governmental agencies, nongov- and 29 foreign militaries. Specifically, resources. ernmental organizations, and civil and the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Many noted the impressive demon- private-sector groups that use the UN Assistance (OFDA), U.S. Pacific stration of Haiyan lessons learned put Cluster Approach in disaster manage- Command (USPACOM), and the into action in the more recent response ment administered by the Office of U.S. Embassy in Manila demonstrated to Typhoon Hagupit, which began as a Civil Defense under the Department clear understanding of their roles and Category 5 storm before weakening to of National Defense—estimated the responsibilities as evidenced by their Category 3 when it hit the Philippines typhoon had left 6,293 people dead and effective coordination. Moreover, U.S. in December 2014. The resiliency of 28,689 injured, with more than 4 mil- Government entities provided assistance the Filipino spirit continues to impress lion individuals displaced. The number that reflected their unique capabilities domestic and foreign media. The of houses damaged by Haiyan totaled appropriately scaled throughout the re- commitment of foreign humanitarian as- 1,140,332, of which more than half sponse phase. sistance actors who came to the aid of the (550,928) were completely destroyed.5 The USAID/OFDA Disaster Philippines after Haiyan clearly demon- Assessment Response Team coordinated strates the increasingly globalized nature Relief Efforts with the humanitarian community and of disaster response. In the coming years, The Philippines is a collection of more validated and transmitted requests for the challenge to find more innovative than 7,000 islands separated into 81 military assistance to Department of ways to increase investment in disaster provinces in three main geographi- Defense (DOD) responders on the preparedness and to better integrate and cal divisions: Luzon (north), Visayas ground. With the exception of a few days leverage local capabilities and capacities (mid), and Mindanao (south). Haiyan of water production in Tacloban, DOD with international response will remain. traversed the Visayas region, where focused mostly on large-scale operations, most of the affected areas were located, using its unique capabilities to deliver Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) for nearly a full day. Tacloban, located “wholesale” transportation and logistics Haiyan entered the West Philippine Sea on the island of Leyte, Cebu City on support. USAID/OFDA was one of the at 4:40 A.M. on November 8, maintain- Cebu Island, and Roxas City on Panay first donors to the World Food Program, ing its strength throughout the day as Island were the three other major areas enabling its role as the lead coordinator it moved across the central part of the affected by the typhoon that served of the United Nations (UN) logistics country, weakening only late in the as principal centers of regional relief and emergency telecommunications afternoon the following day.4 The storm efforts. Cebu, located in the central clusters and as the co-lead of the food tracked from the east directly across the Visayas, was the primary logistics hub security cluster with the UN Food and eastern, central, and western Visayas for the Philippines and other interna- Agriculture Organization. regions, destroying large swathes of tional relief efforts. International dona- Key lessons learned from previous territory spread across a number of dif- tions were processed in the one-stop disasters improved the speed and quality ferent islands. Leyte and Samar were shop inside Cebu’s Mactan-Benito of overall U.S. interagency coordination. hardest hit, with 90 percent of the Ebuen Air Base and then distributed Most notably, personnel with previous infrastructure destroyed in Tacloban to affected areas. Manila, located in disaster response experience who had City, Leyte’s largest urban center. The Luzon, was the focal point for central personal connections with other major typhoon overwhelmed regional capacity coordination among the major respond- players in the relief efforts considerably at a time when the national government ing organizations, with cluster coordi- expedited interagency and transnational had just faced two major calamities that nation meetings taking place in each relief efforts. The informal professional had drained its resources and signifi- of the major cities in areas affected by networks among relief workers that were cantly stressed the in-country supply Haiyan. The United States established built during common training and exer- chain: the civil conflict in Zamboanga its command operations center (COC) cises greatly facilitated the trust needed and Basilan on the southern island of at Manila’s Villamor Air Base, home of for effective and efficient cooperation, Mindanao in September 2013, and the the Philippine air force. This air base particularly in the early response phase. magnitude 7.2 earthquake in Bohol in shares runways with the Ninoy Aquino Several communication avenues for the the central Visayas region, which lay International Airport. responders and for those affected by the along the path of Haiyan, in October. JFQ 82, 3rd Quarter 2016 Parker et al. 55 Sailor carries relief supplies to guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens (CG 63) during Operation Damayan, November 16, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Ricardo R. Guzman) Within the U.S. Strategic Response the AFP. The MNCC provided common The Philippine government issued Framework, USAID/OFDA was as- situational awareness between the AFP a request for humanitarian assistance to signed as lead Federal agency (LFA) and assisting foreign militaries, facilitated the U.S. Government on November 9 for providing foreign humanitarian as- information sharing, and ensured the ef- (Washington, DC, time). USPACOM sistance (FHA) and coordinating U.S. ficient use of military support locations, directed Marine Corps Forces Pacific responses internationally. USAID/ capabilities, and coordination.6 to lead military relief operations OFDA has numerous response options in the Philippines, with 3rd Marine outside of DOD to provide immediate Lesson 1: Immediate Request Expeditionary Brigade (3rd MEB) serving support, including money, resources, for Assistance and Forward as the tactical mission commander on the commodities, and deployment-ready Deployed Assets Saved Lives ground, and ordered deployment of the humanitarian experts and advisors across Haiyan destroyed critical infrastructure USS George Washington and elements of the U.S. Government. The catastrophic that was essential to support relief Carrier Strike Group 5 (CSG 5) to the impact