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Scottish Independence Referendum Bill [AS PASSED]

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Scottish Independence Referendum Bill [AS PASSED] Scottish Independence Referendum Bill [AS PASSED] CONTENTS Section Referendum 1 Referendum on Scottish independence Franchise 2 Those who are entitled to vote 2A Declarations of local connection and service declarations: further provision Voting etc. 3 Provision about voting etc. Conduct 4 Chief Counting Officer 5 Other counting officers 6 Functions of the Chief Counting Officer and other counting officers 7 Correction of procedural errors 8 Expenses of counting officers 9 Conduct rules Campaign 10 Campaign rules 11 Monitoring and securing compliance with the campaign rules 12 Inspection of Electoral Commission’s registers etc. 13 Campaign rules: general offences 14 Campaign offences: summary proceedings 15 Duty of court to report convictions to the Electoral Commission Referendum agents 16 Referendum agents Observers 17 Attendance of Electoral Commission at proceedings and observation of working practices 18 Accredited observers: individuals 19 Accredited observers: organisations 20 Attendance and conduct of accredited observers 20A Code of practice on attendance of observers Information, guidance, advice and encouragement 21 Information for voters SP Bill 25B Session 4 (2013) ii Scottish Independence Referendum Bill 22 Guidance 23 Advice 23A Encouraging participation Report on referendum 24 Report on the conduct of the referendum Electoral Commission: administrative provision 25 Reimbursement of Commission’s costs 26 Estimates of expenditure 27 Maladministration Offences 28 Offences 29 Offences by bodies corporate etc. Power to make supplementary etc. provision and modifications 30 Power to make supplementary etc. provision and modifications Legal proceedings 31 Restriction on legal challenge to referendum result Final provisions 32 Interpretation 33 Commencement 34 Short title __________ Schedule 1 —Form of ballot paper Schedule 2 —Further provision about voting in the referendum Part 1 —Manner of voting Part 2 —Registration Part 3 —Postal voting: issue and receipt of ballot papers Part 4 —Supply of Polling List etc. Part 5 —Supply of marked Polling List etc. Schedule 3 —Conduct rules Schedule 4 —Campaign rules Part 1 —Interpretation Part 2 —Permitted participants and designated organisations Part 3 —Referendum expenses Part 4 —Publications Part 5 —Control of donations Part 6 —Control of loans and credit Schedule 5 —Campaign rules: investigatory powers of the Electoral Commission Schedule 6 —Campaign rules: civil sanctions Part 1 —Fixed monetary penalties Part 2 —Discretionary requirements Part 3 —Stop notices Part 4 —Enforcement undertakings Part 6 —General and supplemental Scottish Independence Referendum Bill iii Part 7 —Interpretation Part 8 —Listed campaign offences Schedule 7 —Offences Schedule 8 —Interpretation Scottish Independence Referendum Bill 1 Amendments to the Bill since the previous version are indicated by sidelining in the right margin. Wherever possible, provisions that were in the Bill as introduced retain the original numbering. Scottish Independence Referendum Bill [AS PASSED] An Act of the Scottish Parliament to make provision, in accordance with paragraph 5A of Part 1 of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998, for the holding of a referendum in Scotland on a question about the independence of Scotland. Referendum 5 1 Referendum on Scottish independence (1) A referendum is to be held in Scotland on a question about the independence of Scotland. (2) The question is— ―Should Scotland be an independent country?‖. 10 (3) The ballot paper to be used for the purpose of the referendum is to be printed— (a) in the form set out in schedule 1, and (b) according to the directions set out in that schedule. (4) The date on which the poll at the referendum is to be held is 18 September 2014, unless before then an order is made under subsection (6). 15 (5) Subsection (6) applies if the Scottish Ministers are satisfied— (a) that it is impossible or impracticable for the poll at the referendum to be held on 18 September 2014, or (b) that it cannot be conducted properly if held on that date. (6) The Scottish Ministers may by order appoint a later day (being no later than 31 20 December 2014) as the day on which the poll at the referendum is to be held. (7) An order under subsection (6)— (a) may include supplementary or consequential provision, (b) may modify any enactment (including this Act), and (c) is subject to the affirmative procedure. SP Bill 25B Session 4 (2013) 2 Scottish Independence Referendum Bill Franchise 2 Those who are entitled to vote Provision about who is entitled to vote in the referendum is made by the Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013. 5 2A Declarations of local connection and service declarations: further provision (1) The Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013 is amended as follows. (2) In section 7 (declaration of local connection: additional ground for young people), after subsection (5) insert— ―(6) For the purposes of section 5(1)(b), a declaration of local connection made by 10 virtue of this section is to be treated as having effect also for the purpose of meeting any residence requirement for registration in a register of local government electors.‖. (3) After section 7 insert— ―7A Children etc. of people with a service qualification 15 (1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 14 to 17 of the 1983 Act (service declarations), as applied by this Act in relation to registration in the register of young voters. (2) An eligible child has a service qualification for those purposes. (3) Accordingly, any reference in an applied enactment to a person having a 20 service qualification is to be read as including an eligible child. (4) An ―eligible child‖ is a person— (a) who will be aged 16 or 17 on the date on which the poll at an independence referendum is to be held, (b) a parent or guardian of whom has a service qualification under any of 25 paragraphs (a) to (e) of section 14(1) of the 1983 Act, and (c) who is residing at a particular place in order to be with that parent or guardian. (5) Section 16 of the 1983 Act (contents of service declaration), as applied by this Act, has effect for the purposes of a service declaration by an eligible child 30 subject to the following modifications— (a) the references in paragraphs (b) and (d) to the United Kingdom are to be read as references to Scotland, (b) the words from ―and (except where‖ to the end of the section are omitted. 35 (6) Regulation 15 of the Representation of the People (Scotland) Regulations 2001 (contents of service declaration), as applied by this Act, has effect for the purposes of a service declaration by an eligible child as if the references in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) to the spouse or civil partner of a person included references to— 40 (a) a child of the person, (b) a child for whom the person acts as guardian, Scottish Independence Referendum Bill 3 (c) a child of the spouse or civil partner of the person, (d) a child for whom the spouse or civil partner of the person acts as guardian. (7) For the purposes of section 5(1)(b), a service declaration made by virtue of this 5 section is to be treated as having effect also for the purpose of meeting any residence requirement for registration in a register of local government electors.‖. (4) In Part 2 of schedule 1 (application of provisions of the 1983 Act), for the entry relating to section 16 of the 1983 Act, substitute— 10 ―Section 16 (contents of service For paragraph (f) substitute— declaration) ―(f) the declarant’s date of birth.‖‖. Voting etc. 3 Provision about voting etc. 15 Schedule 2 makes provision about voting in the referendum, including— (a) provision about the manner of voting (including provision for absent voting), (b) provision about the register of electors, (c) provision about postal voting, and (d) provision about the supply of certain documents. 20 Conduct 4 Chief Counting Officer (1) The Scottish Ministers must, in writing, appoint a Chief Counting Officer for the referendum. (2) The Chief Counting Officer is to be the person who, immediately before this section 25 comes into force, is the person appointed as the convener of the Electoral Management Board for Scotland by virtue of section 2 of the Local Electoral Administration (Scotland) Act 2011. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if— (a) there is no person appointed as convener at that time, or 30 (b) that person is unable or unwilling to be appointed as the Chief Counting Officer. (4) The Chief Counting Officer may resign by giving notice in writing to the Scottish Ministers. (5) The Scottish Ministers may, by notice in writing, remove the Chief Counting Officer from office if— 35 (a) the Chief Counting Officer is convicted of any criminal offence, or (b) they are satisfied that the Chief Counting Officer is unable to perform the Chief Counting Officer’s functions by reason of any physical or mental illness or disability. 4 Scottish Independence Referendum Bill (6) If the Chief Counting Officer dies, resigns or is removed from office, the Scottish Ministers must appoint another person to be the Chief Counting Officer. (7) The Chief Counting Officer may, in writing, appoint deputies to carry out some or all of the officer’s functions and, so far as necessary for the purposes of carrying out those 5 functions, any reference in this Act to the Chief Counting Officer is to be read as including a deputy. (8) A person may be appointed to be— (a) the Chief Counting Officer, (b) a deputy of the Chief Counting Officer, 10 only if the person is or has been a returning officer appointed under section 41(1) of the 1983 Act. 5 Other counting officers (1) The Chief Counting Officer must, in writing, appoint a counting officer for each local government area.
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