Cognitive Grammar: a Basic Introduction

[Re v i e w ] Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction

By Ronald W. Langacker, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, x+562pp.

Ch i e Fu k a d a St. Thomas University*

Keywords: content requirement, symbolic view, naturalness, unification, dis- embodied cognition

1. Introduction In Ronald W. Langacker’s ongoing investigation of the grammar of language, he questions the dominant trends in linguistic theory and con- templates the nature of language as well as the most appropriate scope of linguistic theory.1 Having demonstrated the inadequacy of mainstream theories, he has been working to formulate an alternative theory known as CG (Cognitive Grammar), which is intuitively natural, insightful, and comprehensive. An overall picture of his basic ideas first took concrete shape in the two-volume FCG (Foundations of Cognitive Grammar) (Langacker (1987, 1991)). In these volumes, he proposes the symbolic nature of language as one through which we achieve an important conceptual unification of linguistic organization. The volumes deal with a vast range of topics from lexicon to grammar, clarifying the correlations between human cognition and linguistic structures. The essence is found in Langacker (1988) and his articles written in those days are published in the book Concept, Image and Symbol (Langacker (1990)). The continued development of the theory and its application to diverse linguistic phenomena can be seen in his

* I would like to thank Masahiko Ohnuma, Kathleen Yamane, and two anonymous re- viewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are, of course, my own. 1 One of the dominant trends describes grammar as a purely formal system based on abstract principles unrelated to other aspects of human cognition. An immediate consequence of this view is that linguistic research should deal only with syntax (or grammar, in a narrow sense) and fixed (lexical) meanings, both of which have been considered as autonomous, logical, and absolute (see Lakoff and Johnson (1980)).

English Linguistics 27: 1 (2010) 159–171 －159－ © 2010 by the English Linguistic Society of Japan 160 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOL. 27, NO. 1 (2010) second collection of articles, Grammar and Conceptualization (Langacker (1999)). The last chapter of this book offers “dynamic conceptualization,” i.e. the cognitive mechanism which accommodates the dynamics of discourse emerging from contextually grounded social interaction. CG has thus been gradually evolving in its own direction, accommodating the wealth of findings and insights from various studies of cognitive linguistics. The book CGBI (Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction) presents compactly and accessibly the overall framework of CG. Although it is subtitled “a basic introduction,” the depth of discussion far surpasses that of any other introductory textbook in cognitive linguistics. CGBI, in correct- ing misconceptions about CG and clarifying its ideas and targets, delineates the nature of language as a reflection of both cognition and social interaction. The book comprises four parts, which collectively afford a real understanding of CG. The first two parts, i.e. Part I (Preliminaries) and Part II (Fundamentals), give a basic introduction to the theory. The next two parts, Part III (Structures) and Part IV (Frontiers), are more challenging, de- veloping the theory as applied to discourse and elucidating the interrelation- ship between grammar, cognition, and social interaction. From the outset, CG has emphasized the contextual and interactive basis of language (Langacker (1999: 261)), but the scope of the investigations on discourse prior to CGBI was very limited and did not seem to be fully integrated in the overall framework of CG. CGBI endeavors to clarify the role of discourse in the emergence of grammar, demonstrating that grounding reflects a basic connection between the interlocutors and linguistic con- tents (esp., Ch. 9 in Part III) and illustrating that linguistic structures reside in the processing activity that occurs in usage events (see Ch. 13 in Part IV for details).2 CGBI, therefore, patiently attempts to explicate the nature of grammar in relation to cognition and social interaction. Chapter 14 is the outcome of this effort, synthesizing the basic tenets and recent findings of cognitive science and suggesting that language reflects our disengaged cognition, i.e. the process of simulation. The central idea of CG is that grammar is meaningful. In order to sub- stantiate this claim more clearly, CGBI provides a great amount of relevant discussion on the basis of the content requirement: “the only elements as- cribable to a linguistic system are (i) semantic, phonological, and symbolic

2 When quoting from the book under review, only pagination or chapter number are given. REVIEWS 161 structures that actually occur as parts of expressions; (ii) schematizations of permitted structures; and (iii) categorizing relationships between permitted structures” (p. 25). Since this is established as a strong working hypoth- esis, all discussions in CGBI are subsumed under this requirement.3 Con- sequently, CGBI succeeds in motivating the theory with empirical evidence, disputing critiques of CG in a coherent manner. The basic tenet of CG is that “nothing beyond symbolic structures need be invoked for the proper characterization of complex expressions and patterns they instantiate” (p. 5). An immediate consequence of this idea is that linguistic structures from lexicon to grammar to discourse form a gradation which consists solely of assemblies of symbolic structures, i.e. the pairing between a semantic structure and a phonological structure. This is quite different from the prevailing idea which takes for granted the “objective” representations of language structure and recognizes the sharp boundaries between lexicon, grammar, and discourse. Unlike such orthodox linguistic theories, CG can explore the global organization of linguistic systems by as- signing a symbolic view to any linguistic structure at any level. In this review, I will mainly discuss the fundamental ideas of CG focusing on the following notions: naturalness, unification, and disengaged cognition. The discussions concerning these notions can be seen in Langcker’s earlier writings, but CGBI more explicitly describes the close connection between CG’s ideas/research and these notions. In doing so, CGBI provides sufficient evidence for the plausibility of the viewpoint adopted by CG. The research has great potential for further development.

2. Naturalness One of the noteworthy properties of CG is that it proposes a framework which is intuitively “natural,” the embryo of which is detectable as early as Langacker (1972).4 In this review, he repeatedly articulates the importance of naturalness in linguistic theory and/or research, claiming that the semanti- cally based approach to language structure is intuitively natural and invites great progress in linguistic research.

3 The content requirement is rooted in his position that research on language should be “natural” and motivated. Langacker’s claim about “naturalness” is summarized in section 2. 4 Most of the basic ideas of CG are shown in this review. It appears that the direction of CG was determined at about this time. 162 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOL. 27, NO. 1 (2010)

This position has since been maintained in all of his subsequent works. On “naturalness,” for example, FCG1 (p. 13) cites: “I regard a description as natural to the extent that it deals with data in their own terms, with full range for the richness, subtlety, and complexity characteristic of linguistic phenomena.” CG therefore defines “natural” linguistic research as that which investigates linguistic structures from a cognitive point of view without employing any theoretical constructs that are not based on empirical evidence.5 The position has been unshakable, though it is seen as being quite radical by linguists who adopt the “objectivist” approach to language.

2.1. Symbolic View of Grammar CGBI crystallizes the “subjectivist” and “experientialist” view with a con- siderable amount of evidence.6, 7 It argues that the framework of CG “offers a comprehensive yet coherent view of language structure, with the further advantages (I would argue) of being intuitively natural, psychologically plausible, and empirically viable” (p. 3). This attitude stems from the philosophical principle of “naturalness”: “language—when properly analyzed—is by and large reasonable and understandable in view of its semiological and interactive functions, as well as its biological, cognitive, and sociocultural grounding” (p. 14). Language is grounded in social interaction between cognizing interlocutors who apprehend their interaction and employ a certain linguistic expression in accordance with what they believe their interlocutors know. The constructs posited for grammatical description in CG are therefore all linked to our cognitive capacities. Given this view of language, CG claims that grammar “resides in sche- matized patterns of conceptual structuring and symbolization” (p. 27) and analyzes linguistic structures at any level as a symbolic association between a semantic and a phonological structure (p. 15). The term “phonological

5 Simplicity is another significant property of the framework of CG. It holds that language should be investigated by employing simple (or basic) and unified notions concerning general human cognition (see Ch. 2 and FCG1 (pp. 40–42)). 6 Subjectivism in a narrow sense accepts only our feelings and intuitions (see Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 188–189) for further details). What Langacker emphasizes through his use of the word “subjectivist” is, however, his basic idea that linguistic meaning is subjective in nature, i.e. grounded in our cognitive processing. 7 Ungerer and Schmid (1996: xi) claims that cognitive linguistics is represented by three approaches: the experiential view, the prominence view, and the attentional view. CGBI demonstrates that CG encompasses all of these views in its unified theoretical framework. REVIEWS 163 structure” refers to any kind of overtly manifested structure employed to fulfill a symbolic role (e.g. sounds, gestures, and orthographical representations). Semantic structures are not objective entities in the physical world, but conceptualizations exploited for linguistic purposes. CGBI (Ch. 2 and Ch. 14) discusses in detail what meanings are made of and in what ways conventional linguistic units emerge from usage events. Through this discussion, CGBI characterizes linguistic meaning at both the prototype and schema levels (pp. 34, 506). The prototypical value of an expression is an experientially grounded conceptual archetype that reflects basic aspects of everyday experience (e.g. a physical object in the case of nouns). The schematic meaning consists in basic cognitive abilities that are initially manifested in the archetypes and later extended to other domains of experience (e.g. reification and grouping in the case of nouns). This idea might seem to be quite radical. However, assuming that meaning resides in the conceptualizing activity of individual speakers who participate in social interaction, CG succeeds in dealing with various dimensions relevant to linguistic meaning and in illustrating their interactions.

2.2. Conceptual Substrate A linguistic expression receives a specific interpretation only in the context of an actual usage event. CGBI therefore posits a conceptual substrate as one which subsumes all the aspects concerning an expression’s meaning (e.g. the ground, CDS (the Current Discourse Space), social interaction, the speaker’s knowledge of familiar scenarios, and so forth) and functions to support and shape it and render it coherent. The facets include: (i) the conceptions evoked or created through the previous discourse; (ii) (as part of interlocutors’ social interaction) engagement in the speech event itself; (iii) apprehension of the physical, social, and cultural context; (iv) domains of knowledge that might prove relevant (p. 42). The speaker, i.e. the primary conceptualizer, is part of the conceptual substrate, though he/she is usually unconscious of his/her own conceptualizing activity. Since the term “conceptualizer” refers to any person who appre- hends and construes a situation with a greater or lesser degree of objectivity from his/her own vantage point and adjudicates its status with respect to his/her own conception of reality (p. 445), the conceptualizer relevant to a linguistic expression is not necessarily limited to the speaker. For instance, the sentence Peter told Jane that Henry agreed invokes at least six conceptualizers: Peter, Jane, Henry, the speaker, the hearer, and the person Henry agreed with. The speaker, however, functions without exception as part of 164 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOL. 27, NO. 1 (2010) the conceptual substrate and employs a particular expression in recognizing other conceptualizers’ knowledge or epistemic stance towards what is pro- filed.

2.3. Natural Paths The research on linguistic structures in relation to conceptualization proves that every linguistic structure is shaped by a natural path of mental access, i.e. an ordering which is considered as cognitively natural and established on such nonlinguistic grounds as temporal sequence, causal relation, standard scenario, etc. (p. 490). As shown in (1) and (2), word order correlates with such natural paths: example (a) is more natural than (b) and facilitates our mental processing. (1) a. The article is in today’s paper, in the sports section, on the last page, near the bottom. b.?? The article is in the sports section, near the bottom, in today’s paper, on the last page. (2) a. The rainy season begins in January and ends in March. b.?? The rainy season ends in March and begins in January. (p. 502) Natural paths at the conceptual level are: (i) the flow of energy along the action chain; (ii) the sequence of access based on conceptual autonomy, which starts with accessing the cognitively consistent whole (like a thematic process); (iii) the sequence of access determined by relative prominence; (iv) the temporal sequence of events or event components; (v) the sequence of causation; (vi) the core-to-periphery sequence, or the sequence of whole-part relations, etc. (see pp. 372–373 and 501, and FCG2 (p. 293)).8 The natural paths of (i) and (ii) in particular are crucial in providing a unified account of cross-linguistic and intra-linguistic differences in clause structure: some languages like English adopt agent orientation as the default alignment, while others like Dyirbal adopt theme orientation, and still others have a combination of both. Each language employs different strategies and different combinations of strategies in regard to clausal organization, though all strategies are “natural” in the sense that they are motivated in our cogni-

8 Natural paths at the linguistic level are the order of presentation of words, elaborative relationships, etc. (p. 501) and those at the discourse level, the path from given to new, a natural path to search from setting to location to target, etc. (p. 493). REVIEWS 165 tively natural paths.9 The discussion concerning natural paths alludes to the existence of two canonical processes of construing occurrences (i.e. events or situations). One way is to describe them as conforming to mental access along the flow of energy or the temporal/causal relationship, focusing on particular participants in that occurrence. The other is to describe occurrences by first placing the cognitively consistent whole in the foreground of attention and then extending or narrowing its scope (i.e. “zooming-out” or “zooming-in”). These processes evoke the comparison between participant (or object)-based “analytic” and event-based “holistic” views proposed by Nisbett (2003). The former way of construal reflects the analytic view with a dynamic shift in viewpoint, and the latter, the holistic view from a fixed viewpoint. The research pertaining to these natural paths illuminates our cognitive process of focusing. Through this process, we can apprehend and construe a given occurrence from a particular vantage point. Focusing (or foreground/background distinction) is manifest in such phenomena as figure/ ground organization in perception, the distinction of given/new information in discourse, the initial selection of conceptual content for linguistic presentation, profiling, the setting/participant distinction, and trajector/ landmark alignment, etc. (see pp. 57–73 and Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 200)).10 Natural paths are thus grounded in this fundamental cognitive process which operates at every level of linguistic organization.

3. Unification As seen in the discussions of the symbolic view of grammar and focusing, the framework of CG enables us to grasp all levels of linguistic orga-

9 Talmy (1996) also investigates clause structure in relation to what he calls “the windowing of attention.” The windowing of attention, which in Talmy’s (1988) study is referred to as “the distribution of attention,” is a cognitive system to “select particular portions out of an event-frame and to direct greatest attention to those portions while placing the remainder of the event-frame in the background of attention” (Talmy (1996: 285)). The paper examines a variety of linguistic structures in connection with this cognitive process and clarifies their correlations. It seems to me that most of Langacker’s ideas on cognitive abilities and their relation to grammar are significantly influenced by Talmy’s works and insights on grammar and cognition. 10 Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 200) summarizes major instances of the figure/ground segregation proposed in CG. 166 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOL. 27, NO. 1 (2010) nization in a unified fashion. CG has been attempting to propose a unified but comprehensive framework of language in revealing that all the boundaries suggested in the traditional theories are fuzzy. This attitude is guided by the philosophical principle of integration, which requires inclusiveness and unification within the theory, emphasizing “the importance of consider- ing and reconciling information from multiple sources (within a language, across languages, and across disciplines)” (p. 14).

3.1. Usage-based Model CG adopts the usage-based approach to adequately capture the inherent dynamicity and variability of linguistic structure. This approach presup- poses only a small set of basic psychological phenomena which operate in all domains and give rise to patterns exhibiting any degree of regularity (see Langacker (1999: 91)). Among such psychological phenomena are: automatization (or entrenchment), schematization, categorization, and comparison (see Ch. 1).11 Automatization is the process whereby a particular structure is used automatically or unconsciously through progressive entrenchment. Schematization is the process of extracting commonality inherent in multiple phenomena to reach a conception at a higher level of abstraction. Categorization is our capacity of interpreting something with respect to previously existing structures. Comparison is our ability to compare two structures and detect any discrepancy between them. Through repeated ap- plications of these cognitive processes, linguistic structure is organized ac- cording to the degree of entrenchment. Language is dynamically changed, forming a large network of potential categorizing structures. The usage-based model, together with the symbolic view of grammar, provides a systematic treatment of all structures in all languages. It specifies conventional units (which function as a template in constructing and interpreting a new expression) and presents their ranges of possibility with the degree of prototypicality (and universality). In CG, therefore, “rules” in the standard theories take the form of “patterns” and “regularities” in schematic units which are abstracted from occurring expressions, and “restrictions” on expressions are viewed as emerging from the interactions or competitions between schematic units (see Ch. 8 for details).

11 Association, i.e. our capacity to establish psychological connections, is also one of the psychological phenomena proposed in the usage-based model. One type of manifes- tation of this capacity is the association between a semantic and a phonological structure (p. 16). REVIEWS 167

3.2. Fractal Organization When used in a certain context, an expression encompasses the following levels of organization: [Usage Event [Scenario (e.g. Statement, Order, Question) [Grounding [Objective Content]]]]. Although an expression can be analyzed at any level of organization in this way, CG goes beyond such analyses and proposes a “fractal” organization of linguistic structure whereby the same structural feature recurs at successively higher levels (p. 483). Subjectivity, for instance, correlates with three levels of conceptual organization: (i) the effective level which pertains to occurrences, (ii) the epistemic level (i.e. the level of knowledge of occurrences), and (iii) the intersubjective discursive level in which occurrences are connected to the discursive situation itself. These can be illustrated by the different uses of then in (3): (3) a. He finished his beer, then he asked for scotch. [Effective] b. If his alibi stands up, then he’s clearly innocent. [Epistemic] c. As I was saying, then, you need to get more rest. [Discursive] (p. 485) Profiling is also identified successively in every composite structure constructed in a constituency hierarchy. Both nominals and finite clauses exhibit their own trajector/landmark alignments and these features extend to complex sentences. The topic/comment relationship at the discourse level can be viewed as being analogous to the clausal trajector/landmark relationship. The essential content of a passage and the main story line of a text are both possible analogs of profiling. The existence of these fractal orga- nizations seems to indicate that only a small set of cognitive abilities moti- vates the overall organization of linguistic structure.

3.3. Nouns and Verbs Nouns and verbs are two major grammatical categories which can be distinguished in some conceptual respects. First, a noun, based on our fundamental cognitive abilities for grouping and reification, profiles a thing.12, 13 Prototypically, a noun expresses a physical object which is con- ceptualized independently of its participation in any event. Verbs, however,

12 The factors triggering grouping are: (i) the recognition of contiguity or similarity and (ii) the identification of familiar configurations (pp. 104–105). 13 It seems to me that the ontological metaphors presented in Lakoff and Johnson (1980: Ch. 6) are grounded in the capacity for conceptual reification and the process of conceptual integration. 168 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOL. 27, NO. 1 (2010) profile a process (i.e. a temporal relationship) and presuppose our capacity for apprehending relationships and for tracking them through time. The archetype of verbs stands for an energetic interaction which is conceptually dependent on its participants. However, when analyzing them in relation to scope and profiling, some parallelism can be observed between them (see Ch. 5). Both nouns and verbs are divisible into two subclasses, i.e. count/mass nouns and perfective/ imperfective verbs. The count/mass and perfective/imperfective distinctions are essentially the same with respect to bounding, homogeneity, contract- ibility, and replicability. Both count-nouns and perfectives exhibit the same characteristics of “bounded,” “heterogeneous,” “uncontractible,” and “repli- cable,” while mass-nouns and imperfectives have in common the properties of “unbounded,” “homogeneous,” “contractible,” and “nonreplicable.” The discussion of grounding (Ch. 9) also illustrates the similarity between nouns and verbs. Although a noun and a verb are both lexical units which designate a thing type and a process type respectively, both are “grounded” in the actual speech situation. Through the process of grounding, they are specified in relation to the ground, i.e. the referent of a noun is identified and the process expressed by a verb is construed with respect to time and reality.

4. Disengaged Cognition The final chapter of CGBI (Ch. 14) is the most challenging. This chapter integrates the discussions and claims in previous chapters and provides an overall picture of the interrelations between language, cognition, social interaction, and everyday experience, in pursuing the topic of how our mental life transcends immediate experience. Although our cognition is embodied, i.e. grounded in our everyday sen- sory and motor interactions, a large portion of our cognitive activity is disengaged from immediate bodily experience. The prevalence of fictivity in language (e.g. the products of metaphor and blending, an imagined vantage point, fictive invocation of a particular scenario, etc.) also suggests that fictivity is a basic feature of cognition and plays a fundamental role in language structure. Three fundamental means of transcending direct experience are proposed in CGBI: abstraction, conceptual integration, and subjectification. Abstraction operates in linguistic structures of any size at any level. Since this process serves to establish conventional units as patterns extracted from multiple uses of linguistic expressions, any concep- REVIEWS 169 tion, which is immanent in a conventional unit, is schematic and virtual in nature. Conceptual integration, the ability to integrate conceptions through correspondences between their elements, often gives rise to a new conception substantially different from the one previously entertained.14 Through this ability, we are able to deal with ever-changing circumstances of real life and conceive fictive situations in connecting them with our actual life. A third means of transcending immediate experience is subjectification, whereby mental operations inherent in basic experience are applied to situations with respect to which their occurrence is extrinsic (p. 528). This cognitive process figures in a variety of linguistic expressions like fictive motion. The relation between the prototype and the schema discussed in 2.1 can be seen as a kind of subjectification. It is a cognitive process whereby mental operations immanent in the archetype conception come to be used in abstraction from its content and extended to a broad range of other circumstances (p. 539). This view suggests that the more abstracted or schema- tized a meaning is, the closer it is to our basic cognitive abilities or conceptual operations. Grammar thus reflects an essential feature of our cognition. The mental process involving no actual interaction with the world is called “simulation.” Simulation, employing the experientially grounded conceptual archetypes (i.e. basic aspects of everyday experience, such as a physical object, object moving through space, a whole and its parts, see- ing something, intending something, etc.), lets us apprehend an expression’s meaning and recognize other conceptualizers’ mental experiences. Since conceptual archetypes in simulation are always less elaborate, they are applied to many fictive situations and give rise to disengaged cognition. Although the discussion is as yet not entirely sufficient, this chapter clarifies the significant role of our mental processes in disengaging us from direct experience. Simulation or our disengaged cognition is a source of our creativity and a means for us to negotiate the world.

5. Conclusion By adopting a “cognitively natural” approach to language, CG succeeds in providing a systematic account of language structure. CGBI, as a clos- ing volume of the initial phase of CG, proves convincingly that linguistic structures can be explored in a unified fashion within the framework of

14 For details on conceptual integration, see Fauconnier and Turner (2002). 170 ENGLISH LINGUISTICS, VOL. 27, NO. 1 (2010)

CG. Moreover, the book challenges us to explore the nature of our cognition on the basis of the findings in CG, claiming that “grammar is not only an integral part of cognition but also a key to understanding it” (p. 4). Al- though the arguments in Ch. 14 are still not sufficiently convincing, CGBI suggests fruitful directions and great possibilities for future research in CG and cognitive linguistics. CG is to be a genuine and motivated alternative to the current orthodox linguistic theories.

REFERENCES Fauconnier, Gilles and Mark Turner (2002) The Way We Think, Basic Books, New York. Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson (1980) Metaphors We Live By, University of Chi- cago Press, Chicago. Langacker, Ronald W. (1972) “Review: Meaning and the Structure of Language, by Wallace L. Chafe, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970,” Language 48, 134–161. Langacker, Ronald W. (1987) Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Vol. 1, Theoretical Prerequisites, Stanford University Press, Stanford. Langacker, Ronald W. (1988) “An Overview of Cognitive Grammar,” Topics in Cognitive Linguistics, ed. by Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn, 3–48, John Benjamins, Amsterdam. Langacker, Ronald W. (1990) Concept, Image, and Symbol, Mouton de Gruyter, Ber- lin. Langacker, Ronald W. (1991) Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Vol. 2, Descrip- tive Application, Stanford University Press, Stanford. Langacker, Ronald W. (1999) Grammar and Conceptualization, Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin. Nisbett, Richard E. (2003) The Geography of Thought, Free Press, New York. Talmy, Leonard (1988) “The Relation of Grammar to Cognition,” Topics in Cogni- tive Linguistics, ed. by Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn, 165–205, John Benjamins, Am- sterdam. Talmy, Leonard (1996) “The Windowing of Attention in Language,” Grammatical Constructions, ed. by Masayoshi Shibatani and Sandra A. Thompson, 235–287, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Ungerer, Friedrich and Hans-Jörg Schmid (1996) An Introduction to Cognitive Lin- guistics, Longman, London.

[received July 20 2009, revised and accepted November 20 2009] REVIEWS 171

Department of Human Development St. Thomas University 2–18–1 Nakoji, Amagasaki, Hyogo, 661–8530 e-mail: [email protected]