PP 2021/0138

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BRANCH OF THE COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION

REPORT ON A BENCHMARKS SELF-ASSESSMENT

2020/21

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ISLE OF MAN BRANCH OF THE COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION: REPORT ON A BENCHMARKS SELF-ASSESSMENT

Laid before Tynwald under Standing Order 10.11(2)(e) at the request of Mr Speaker with the approval of Mr President.

Committee Membership

The Hon J P Watterson SHK (Chairman) The Hon S C Rodan OBE MLC Hon R H Quayle MHK T M August-Hanson MLC R E Callister MHK C M Christian OBE C A Corlett MHK M J Perkins MHK W C Shimmins MHK

Copies of this Report may be obtained from the Tynwald Library, Legislative Buildings, Finch Road, Douglas, IM1 3PW (Tel: 01624 685520) or may be consulted at www.tynwald.org.im.

All correspondence with regard to this Report should be addressed to the Clerk of Tynwald, Legislative Buildings, Finch Road, Douglas, Isle of Man, IM1 3PW.

Table of Contents

REPORT ...... 1

APPENDIX: PANEL REPORT ...... 3

To: The Hon Stephen C Rodan OBE MLC, President of Tynwald,

and the Hon Council and Keys in Tynwald assembled

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ISLE OF MAN BRANCH OF THE COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION: REPORT ON A BENCHMARKS SELF-ASSESSMENT

REPORT

1. In October 2019 we appointed a Panel to assess the Manx legislature in light of the CPA Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures, which had been revised in 2018. The Panel reported to us in April 2021. We are grateful to the members of the Panel for their work.

2. In May 2021 we agreed that the report of the Panel should be laid before Tynwald, Mr Shimmins dissenting.

3. The Report of the Panel is appended to this Report.

J P Watterson (chair) S C Rodan R H Quayle T M August-Hanson R E Callister C M Christian C A Corlett M J Perkins W C Shimmins

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Appendix: Panel Report

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COMMONWEALTH PARLIAMENTARY ASSOCIATION

ISLE OF MAN BRANCH

BENCHMARKS FOR DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATURES SELF-ASSESSMENT

REPORT OF A PANEL APPOINTED BY THE BRANCH EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

2020/21

Panel Membership

The Hon. Juan P Watterson SHK (Chairman) Mrs Clare Christian OBE (former President of Tynwald) Prof Peter W Edge (Professor of Law at Oxford Brookes University) Hon Ray K Harmer MHK, nominee of the Chief Minister Mr Lawrie L Hooper MHK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Background ...... 1 II. Tricameralism: The parliamentary system of the Isle of Man ...... 1 Functions and procedures of the Chambers ...... 2 The Executive ...... 3 III. Areas of particular focus ...... 3 Political balance ...... 3 Financial scrutiny ...... 5 Natural justice ...... 7 Equality and diversity ...... 8 IV. Conclusion ...... 9 Annex: Point-by-point assessment ...... 10 General ...... 10 Procedure and sessions ...... 13 Committees ...... 15 Political parties ...... 16 Parliamentary staff ...... 17 Legislative function ...... 18 Oversight function ...... 19 Representational function...... 21 Parliamentary assistance, networking and diplomacy ...... 21 Accessibility, openness and engagement ...... 21 Ethical governance ...... 22 Appendix: Submissions from women Members of Tynwald ...... 23 Submission dated 29th July 2020 from Mrs Caine ...... 25 Submission dated 30th July 2020 from Mrs Barber ...... 27 Submission dated 19th August 2020 from Mrs Poole-Wilson ...... 29

I. BACKGROUND 1. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association’s Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures were originally developed by a study group of CPA parliamentarians in 2006. In 2011 a panel appointed by the Executive Committee of the Isle of Man Branch of the CPA undertook a self- assessment of the Manx legislature in relation to the original 2006 Benchmarks. The 2011 panel report was published on the Tynwald website.1

2. In 2018 the Benchmarks were revised and updated by a study group organised by the CPA and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. We were appointed in 2019 to conduct a follow-up self-assessment in relation to the revised Benchmarks.

3. Following the example of the 2011 panel, the point-by-point assessment annexed to this Report labels the Manx political system as either being compliant (C), partially compliant (P) or not compliant (N) with each Benchmark; or as not applicable (N/A) to our system.

4. In noting the rarity of certain aspects of the Manx parliamentary system, a brief explanation of it has been included in this Report. This background is necessary to understand why some of the Benchmarks are not applicable to the Manx system. This Report includes a discussion of some areas of particular concern which we considered as part of the assessment process.

II. TRICAMERALISM: THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF THE ISLE OF MAN 5. Tynwald is not constrained by an entrenched constitution.2 Any of the features of the Manx legislature referred to in the CPA Benchmarks could be changed by amendments to primary or secondary legislation, or to Standing Orders, any of which could be made by that legislature itself. Some Benchmarks require that certain features should be provided for in the Constitution. We have assessed ourselves as compliant with such Benchmarks if they are provided for in legislation or Standing Orders, despite that fact that in theory the legislature could easily alter those features at some time in the future without the protections associated with a written constitution.

6. The vast majority of Commonwealth parliaments are either bicameral or unicameral in nature. The Benchmarks have been drafted assuming this model. They have also been written assuming that most members of a parliament will also be members of political parties and governments will be formed from elected members of a majority party or from a coalition of parties. The Isle of Man political system, the heart of which has developed over a thousand years, does not always conform comfortably to this model and some explanation of the Island’s system is required as an introduction to this self-assessment.

7. The Manx legislature consists of three chambers, each with its own functions and responsibilities: Tynwald Court and its two legislative branches, the and the Legislative Council.

1 https://www.tynwald.org.im/business/committee/CPAexec/Documents/Final_Benchmarks_Report.pdf 2 For a fuller discussion of what it means to have an ‘entrenched constitution’, please see N.W. Barber, “Why entrench?” (2016) International Journal of Constitutional Law 14(2), 325

1 8. The popularly elected Chamber, the House of Keys, consists of 24 Members elected from 12 constituencies returning two Members each. Members serve for a five year term and the House elects its own Speaker.

9. The Legislative Council comprises the President of Tynwald as presiding officer, the Bishop and the (non-voting) Attorney General (both ex officio) and eight members elected by the House of Keys using an open ballot system. These eight serve for five year terms and retire in rotation in two groups of four.

10. Tynwald Court comprises the House of Keys and Legislative Council sitting together. The President of Tynwald is elected for the five year term of the succeeding House of Keys by Tynwald Court shortly before a Keys General Election.

Functions and procedures of the Chambers 11. The House of Keys and Legislative Council meet weekly during the legislative session (October to June) and their principal purpose is to consider primary legislation. Such legislation requires the approval of both Chambers and must, ultimately, be signed by a majority in Tynwald Court before proceeding for the Royal Assent.

12. In the House of Keys, Bills are given a formal First Reading without debate, a Second Reading which is debated and voted on where the Bill is discussed in principle, a Clauses Stage where the Bill may be amended and where each clause is examined in detail, (there is no formal committee stage such as is seen in larger legislatures) and a Third Reading Stage where the Bill is given a short final debate and then, if it receives at least thirteen votes, the Bill is sent to the Legislative Council. It is possible that a Committee on a Bill may be appointed to take evidence in relation to one or more clauses in the Bill, or indeed in relation to the Bill as a whole. Such a Committee would not amend the Bill but would report back with recommendations. Broadly similar processes are followed in the Legislative Council, except that the First Reading stage is debated and voted on. It is possible, though rare, for a Bill to be introduced into the Legislative Council first and then, if approved, go the House of Keys for consideration.

13. Tynwald Court normally meets monthly during the legislative session and considers secondary legislation, budgets, money votes and general policy. Usually, matters voted on in Tynwald require the approval of a majority of both the House of Keys and Legislative Council voting separately. There is a facility to call an extraordinary sitting of Tynwald outside of its usual calendar, as was done frequently during the coronavirus emergency in 2020.

14. The Government does not control the Order Paper for any of the Chambers. All Members are entitled to put down motions for debate or amendments to Bills at any time. They may also seek their colleagues’ approval to introduce a Bill in the House of Keys or Legislative Council. There are no formal time limits on speaking and Members are entitled to expect that any matters which they put down for debate will be taken at the appropriate time and given as much time as the Members collectively feel is necessary. Although unusual, any business not dealt with by the time that any Chamber rises is deferred until the following sitting.

15. Individual Members have considerable scope and freedom in performing their parliamentary duties and, collectively, they exercise a largely unfettered authority. All submitted questions

2 receive an answer, and all motions for debate (including leave to introduce and all amendments) are debated.

The executive 16. The Chief Minister is appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, as representative on the Island of Her Majesty the Queen, on the nomination of the House of Keys. Up to nine Ministers may be appointed by the Lieutenant Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister and the Ministers form the Council of Ministers and they are responsible for the running of the various Government Departments.

17. Other Members of Tynwald may be appointed as ‘Members of Departments’, or to serve on the Statutory Boards which supplement the Departments in providing public services. By convention, every Member of Tynwald who wishes to serve in this way is normally offered some opportunity to contribute to the work of Government through at least one Department or Statutory Board. At present Members receive extra remuneration for taking on some of these roles, although Tynwald has voted to simplify this system and significantly reduce the size of additional remuneration for Government posts (see paragraph 25).

III. AREAS OF PARTICULAR FOCUS Political balance 18. Political parties have in the past had an important role in Manx politics, although no party has ever held a majority in the Keys. Manx law provides for and regulates the participation of parties in elections. At present, however, only one Tynwald Member sits as a member of a party, while the vast majority sit as independents. There are no procedural rules relating to parties in any of the three Chambers, neither are there any administrative rules as to the allocation of resources to political parties. Consequently, most of the Benchmarks relating to party politics have been judged to be not applicable to the Manx political system.

19. Tynwald, in common with some other small jurisdictions’ legislatures, is not the site for extensive party politics, with the overwhelming majority of Tynwald sitting as independents – in the 2016 General Election to the House of Keys, for instance, independents won 21 of the 24 seats, with the Liberal Vannin Party securing the other three. The norm of the independent Member of Tynwald has implications for party discipline even for the small parties that do exist. Liberal Vannin, for instance, had two candidates elected in 2006, one of whom resigned to sit as an independent, while in the 2016 Election, three Liberal Vannin candidates were returned, but one resigned to sit as an independent. Whips are absent from the Manx political system.

20. The primary divide in Manx politics is not between political parties, but between members of the Council of Ministers and others. Those others are generally referred to as ‘backbenchers’ whether or not they serve as Members of one or more Government Departments.

21. Ministers are bound by collective responsibility and are required, with only limited exceptions, to vote in favour of all Government motions. While the maximum size of the Council of Ministers is limited by statute and does not constitute a majority in any of the three Chambers, Ministers constitute a considerably larger proportion of the legislature than in many jurisdictions. So while the Manx parliamentary system does comply with Benchmark

3 7.1.1, that the ‘Legislature shall have legislation, a constitutional provision or practice that ensures the size of the Cabinet is in proportion to the size of the Legislature’, the Panel recognises that it is large when compared to some jurisdictions.

22. A footnote explaining the 2018 Study Group’s reasoning for this benchmark notes this is a ‘particular concern in small Legislatures’ given the effect this can have on ‘a Parliament’s oversight function’. It cites the Government of Wales Act 2006 and its limiting of the size of the Welsh Government to a total of 14 members in an Assembly of 60. In the Island’s case, the Council of Ministers can have up to 10 members. All of these are normally Members of the House of Keys, which only has 24 Members overall.

23. Collective responsibility applies in a limited way to backbenchers who are members of Government Departments and Statutory Boards, who are expected to vote in favour of any parliamentary business put forward by their Department or Statutory Board. When the combined voting power of the Council of Ministers and the Members of a particular Department are taken into account, the possibility arises of an automatic majority for that Department’s business. This is particularly feasible in the House of Keys where a combination of nine Ministers and four Departmental Members would constitute an automatic majority. Recognising this possibility, Tynwald sought to mitigate it by resolving on 21st November 2017 that –

The Government must not automatically have a majority in Tynwald or the House of Keys, as a result of the number of Ministers and Departmental Members present there. 24. Most Members of Tynwald serve either as Ministers or Departmental Members. The extent to which this hinders Members’ ability to fully scrutinise the work of Government is an area of some controversy. In his Review of the Functioning of Tynwald, Lord Lisvane recommended that this system should end and at most only one other Member should sit in a Department other than a Minister. He concluded –

I do not believe that the system of Departmental Members is remotely sustainable. The issue of patronage, and the perception or reality that Members are receiving significant salary enhancements for a role that at worst may be unnecessary, is a reputational liability.3 While recommending the resolution referred to above, the Tynwald Select Committee formed to consider Lord Lisvane’s Report did not agree that our system of Departmental Members was unsustainable –

It is an acknowledged strength of our system that it allows criticism of the Government without fear of the loss of a job in a Department (and therefore pay). The apparent lack of formal separation of powers conceals a strong tradition of independence among Members of Tynwald that was not sufficiently reflected in Lord Lisvane’s Report …4

3 Lord Lisvane KCB DL, Review of the Functioning of Tynwald, GD2016/0047, (2016), p. 45 4 Second Report of the Select Committee on the Functioning of Tynwald, PP 2017/0139, p. 4

4 25. The Panel notes that this is an area of continuing political concern. Tynwald voted on 17th November 2020 to remove the pay increase previously given to Departmental Members, as part of a wider package of reforms to Member remuneration, an increase sometimes criticised as discouraging effective scrutiny and encouraging a system of executive patronage. This is an area that involves balancing our tradition of having a more collective form of government than exists in more partisan political systems, with the need for there to be sufficient independence and resources for parliamentarians wishing to challenge/scrutinise the Government.

26. Various Benchmarks relate to the provision of resources and representation to all parliamentarians and committees, including those who are members of opposition parties. These include Benchmarks 3.1.2, 3.2.1, 3.24, 4.2.2 and 6.1.4. Some of these Benchmarks are not pertinent given how small a proportion of Tynwald Members sit as members of political parties. However, the fluidity of politics is such that while these mechanisms may not have been necessary in the past, it is worth considering the changes which may need to be made along the lines recommended in the Benchmarks in case this situation were to change. The currently weaker role of political parties in our politics has not been taken as a cause not to regulate them in law; it may be worth considering whether this is also true of the Standing Orders of the three Chambers.

27. While some of these Benchmarks are less pertinent to our system, given the dominance of independents in Tynwald Court, issues around the offering of resources to non-Executive parliamentarians are. For a jurisdiction of our size, the Manx parliamentary system is well- resourced for undertaking important scrutiny work. There are several subject-related Standing Committees who between them are responsible for scrutinising all Government Departments, Boards and Offices; and ad hoc Select Committees can be formed on matters of interest, should Tynwald resolve to do so. Standing Committees have significant freedom to pursue investigations on topics of interest to them on matters they judge as important.

28. The Clerk of Tynwald’s Office also provides support for Tynwald Members through its Chamber and Information Service, Hansard Department and Administration Office, as well as through their Clerks.

29. However, the Executive branch is advantaged over non-executive Members in significant ways. Expert resources within Departments can be more readily accessed, as can legal advice. Backbenchers in the Isle of Man do have successes in moving Private Member’s Bills and every seconded amendment brought to a Chamber will have the chance to be debated. However, this freedom for backbenchers does take up drafting resources that can often be strained, which risks putting the Manx legislature at odds with Benchmark 6.1.4: ‘The Legislature shall provide adequate resources for legislators to draft legislation or amendments to any legislation.’ While problems such as these usually do not arise, in a system such as ours it is important that we remain conscious of these potential disparities.

Financial scrutiny 30. Numerous Benchmarks deal with the capacity of parliamentarians to provide effective financial oversight and scrutiny. In the Island’s parliamentary system there are various provisions for the oversight of public finances, including a six-member Public Accounts Committee. The Panel does however note that the ability of the legislature to scrutinise the

5 Government’s budget is an area of controversy, and that the parliamentary system does not fully comply with some Benchmarks relating to financial scrutiny.

31. The national budget is central to the work of any government; proper scrutiny and oversight of the process by which it is produced is rightly acknowledged by the CPA as being central to a democratic system. This should not, of course, limit the ability of the executive to form clear and effective policy for the good of the Manx public.

32. Under our current system, Tynwald Members receive confidential copies of the National Budget 13 days before the February sitting of Tynwald Court. In those 13 days, they are not permitted to seek expert advice of any sort, except from Treasury officials. The contents are unknown to the public outside Tynwald, some members of the Press, and the Treasury. The day its contents are publicly released is also the day it is debated and voted upon. It cannot be amended. The Panel believes this process means the Manx system is not in full compliance with certain Benchmarks.

33. In considering the budget process in the future, the Panel would encourage Members to keep in mind the Benchmarks discussed below as providing the principles for how to consider the process: scrutiny should be resourced; the public must have the ability to contribute; the amount of time given for scrutiny and debate matters; and independent advice is valuable.

34. Benchmark 6.3.1: ‘Opportunities shall be given for public input into the legislative and Committee process, including the budget process’; at present the rules around confidentiality inhibit this.

35. Benchmark 7.2.2: ‘The Legislature shall have a reasonable period of time in which to adequately scrutinize and debate the proposed national budget’; we would note that what is a ‘reasonable’ amount of time is the subject of some controversy. Indeed, since the last self- assessment of the Branch in 2011, the amount of time given to Members to scrutinise the budget has increased from a week to 13 days.

36. Benchmark 7.2.6: ‘The Legislature shall have access to sufficient financial scrutiny resources and/or independent budget and financial expertise to ensure that financial oversight is conducted effectively’. The present inability to consult financial expertise independent of the Treasury raises questions as to the Island’s compliance with this Benchmark. However, it is expected that, once appointed, Members will be able to seek advice from the Tynwald Auditor General.

37. Benchmarks 7.2.7, 7.2.8 and 7.2.9 assume the existence of an ‘independent, non-partisan Supreme or National Audit Office whose reports are tabled in the Legislature in a timely manner’, which is adequately resourced, has legal authority, and refers its reports to a ‘Public Accounts Committee, or a designated Committee’. Such an institution has been legislated for through the Tynwald Auditor General Act 2011. The Panel notes that while the Island does not have an appointed Auditor General at the time of writing, Tynwald voted on 18th November 2020 to establish a Tynwald Auditor General under the 2011 Act and the process of recruiting to the post is now under way. This will also help the Island in complying with Benchmark 7.2.6.

6 Natural justice 38. Among the additional Benchmarks are those found under ‘1.8 Natural Justice’. While we consider that punishments for Members who act inappropriately are proportionate and fair, as required by Benchmark 1.8.3, we are less clear as to whether natural justice principles should be in the rules and procedures of the legislature, and should be applied rigorously when serious allegations are made against persons named or identified in the course of proceedings in the Legislature or in its Committees (Benchmark 1.8.1). We do not think that natural justice principles can always be applied when Members, or others, are subject to serious charges of contempt of, and offences against, the Legislature.

39. Natural justice is a concept for a judicial context. What makes for fair and unbiased legal proceedings is established by law and precedent, and is disputed on those terms, as is the obligation not to be a judge in one’s own case. While Members may serve in a quasi-judicial capacity in certain posts (as in the case of the Chair of the Planning Committee) in which natural justice principles may apply, Tynwald is a legislative body, and the principles of natural justice cannot be applied in the same manner in which they are applied in a courtroom.

40. Should the conduct of a Member be called into question, their case can be referred to the Tynwald Standards and Members’ Interests Committee. Should any Member of the Committee have a conflict of interest in the case, or be a witness to any of the matters under question, they will be expected not to participate in the deliberations of the Committee. However, should the Committee report to Tynwald thereafter, all Members, including a Member who may have been subject to the investigation, have the right to speak to and vote on whether to support the recommendations of the Committee. While this may be seen as that Member acting as a judge in their own case, this is appropriate, as the disciplining of Members is not a legal matter, but one of ensuring the good conduct necessary to ensure the proper functioning of parliament. Parliamentarians are in the best place to decide this.

41. There are various features of the Manx parliamentary system in place to encourage proceedings to be conducted in a fair manner and to avoid potential conflicts of interest: Members have a right to make an intervention when they feel they have been misrepresented; oral declarations of interest should be made where relevant to a Member’s personal and peculiar pecuniary interest on any given matter; eligibility criteria exist for committees on the basis of personal connections to, or interests regarding, matters under deliberation, including political membership of Departments, to name but a few. However, to apply the principles of natural justice in the manner in which they may be applied in a legal context could potentially severely hamper the operation of the ordinary, and entirely appropriate, work of the Legislature. We would note and concur the conclusion of a document published on the topic by the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives of New Zealand –

When considering the application of natural justice principles to Parliament, the political context in which they are to be applied must always be uppermost.5

5 Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, ‘Natural Justice Before Select Committees’, (2010), p. 4

7 Equality and diversity 42. The Panel sought to consult with current women parliamentarians on Benchmark 8.1.1: ‘The Legislature shall be organised in such a way as to enable the substantive representation of women in its work’. It received three responses, which are appended to this Report.

43. A common area of concern was how the current working patterns of Tynwald are difficult for caregivers to accommodate. Sittings often go on into the evenings, and maternity and paternity leave is impossible given the need for Members to be present in parliament to participate fully in proceedings. While this affects caregivers of any gender, this may have a greater impact upon women given that they remain the primary caregivers in many households.

44. We do however note that the number of women Tynwald Members has been increasing recently. Efforts have been made to attract a more diverse range of candidates since the 2018 Legislative Council Elections, with Tynwald having resolved on 21st November 2017 that –

The President of Tynwald should be tasked with encouraging a wide variety of candidates and to improve the accessibility of membership of Legislative Council. Today five of the eight elected Members of the Legislative Council are women. This helps brings the Island’s system into compliance with Benchmark 1.2.2. However, the slight overrepresentation of women among the elected Members of the Legislative Council raises questions as to source of their underrepresentation by population in the House of Keys, currently constituting only five of the 24 Keys Members.

45. Female candidates for the Keys were approximately as likely as their male counterparts to be elected at the 2016 General Election. However, there were far fewer of them. The significantly higher proportion of female candidates standing in elections to the Legislative Council implies that something about the role of Keys Member, or the method of their election, is less attractive to prospective female candidates. A potential problem, should this persist, is that the Chambers would begin to have gendered identities, with a more prestigious and powerful ‘male’ Keys paired with a subordinate ‘female’ Council.

46. Ultimately the gender balance of the Keys will be determined by the decisions of the electorate. While the dominance of independent Members makes action that could be taken within political parties to increase the proportion of female candidates less effective, our system has very low barriers to entry. For example, we have no election deposits. There is possibly evidence to suggest that an absence of female candidates, rather than voter preferences, is what accounts for fewer female parliamentarians. Increasing the number of women in parliament may therefore be a wider question than how the Legislature is organised.

47. The 2018 and 2020 elections to the Legislative Council produced an apparent severance of a historic link between the Keys and the Council. Whereas from 1919 to 1988 the Members elected to the Council by the Keys were exclusively former MHKs, today only one of the eight elected MLCs is a former MHK, with the majority having been brought into the Council from outside Tynwald. If this pattern persists it may become important from the point of view of gender diversity because a number of women have begun their political career in Council and may seek to stand for election to the Keys in the future.

8 48. Benchmark 10.1.2 says that legislatures must be ‘accessible and open to persons with disabilities’. Legislative Buildings is equipped with multiple disabled toilets and wheelchair access for the Legislative Council and the House of Keys. A viewing platform is available for Tynwald Court, equipped with microphones playing audio of the proceedings. While great strides have been made, there is still room for improvement, acknowledging the physical limits of an older building and the financial resources available to the Legislature.

49. Benchmark 6.1.5 calls for legislatures to ‘encourage the process of equality impact assessment with respect to the development of legislation, policies and budgets.’ The Equality Act 2017 introduced a public service equality duty, under which public authorities have an obligation to exercise their functions with a mind to promote equality (with a few specified exceptions). Equality impact assessments are one means of helping ensure this, and it may be worth considering if there is a more formal means of ensuring they are used, such as their becoming an assumed feature of a piece of legislation’s explanatory memorandum.

50. Benchmark 10.1.6 calls for legislatures to ‘identify demographic groups whose perspectives are not well represented in parliamentary decision-making and make efforts to increase their participation.’ The Manx parliamentary system has made no direct provision for this.

IV. CONCLUSION 51. We are pleased to report that the Isle of Man’s parliamentary system complies substantially with the Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures as updated and revised in 2018. This includes improved compliance with certain Benchmarks thanks to legislative and procedural changes since 2011.

52. The Panel would invite the Standing Orders Committees of the relevant Chambers to consider those Benchmarks where it is concluded that the Manx legislature is either not in compliance or only in partial compliance, unless otherwise specified. Conversely, where we have concluded that the Manx system is in compliance with a given Benchmark, or that a Benchmark is considered not applicable to the Manx parliamentary system, it need not be considered by any Standing Orders Committee, unless otherwise specified.

J P Watterson (Chairman) C M Christian OBE P W Edge R K Harmer L L Hooper

27th April 2021

9 ANNEX: POINT-BY-POINT ASSESSMENT Label Comment 1. General 1.1 Elections 1.1.1 Members of the popularly elected or only The Manx parliamentary system now house shall be elected by direct universal and fully complies with this benchmark. equal suffrage in a free and secret ballot. When the initial self-assessment was C conducted in 2011, the Island’s constituencies had different numbers of Members, and consequently suffrage was unequal. 1.1.2 Legislative elections shall meet international This has been further updated in standards for genuine and transparent C 2020. elections. 1.1.3 Term lengths for Members of the popular General elections are held on the house shall reflect the need for accountability Island every five years. C through regular and periodic legislative elections. 1.1.4 There shall be legislation to ensure campaign This has been further updated in finance laws are in place to regulate the 2020. manner and extent to which political parties C and candidates may receive monetary contributions from individuals and corporations. 1.1.5 An independent Electoral Commission or Manx elections are not currently similar authority shall be established for the managed and monitored by an management of the conduct of elections and its Electoral Commission, but by the tasks shall include monitoring the election Chief Secretary who under the expenses of parliamentary candidates and Elections (Keys and Local Authorities) political parties. P Bill will act as the Returning Officer. Although politically impartial, the Chief Secretary is a single individual rather than a Panel and in respect of his other responsibilities does work closely with the Council of Ministers. 1.2 Candidate Eligibility 1.2.1 Restrictions on candidate eligibility shall not be based on religion, gender, ethnicity, race or C disability. 1.2.2 Measures to encourage the representative This has been partly met in respect of political participation of marginalized groups the Legislative Council only, in the P shall be drawn to accomplish precisely defined absence of political parties; for further objectives. information, please see paras 42-50. 1.3 Incompatibility of Office 1.3.1 No elected Member shall be required to take a religious oath against his or her conscience in C order to take his or her seat in the Legislature. 1.3.2 In a bicameral Legislature, a legislator may not We agree with the conclusion of the be a Member of both houses. 2011 Panel Report: ‘The legislature is C tricameral; no Member serves in both Branches but all serve in one of the Branches and Tynwald.’ 1.3.3 A legislator may not simultaneously serve in the The conclusion of the 2011 Panel judicial branch or as a civil servant of the P remains relevant in assessing our Executive branch. compliance with this benchmark: ‘The

10 Label Comment only query in relation to this benchmark is the position of the Attorney General. He is a member of the Legislative Council and is in part a servant of the Executive in that he takes instructions from the Executive branch in the preparation and drafting of legislation. However he is not a civil servant and in Legislative Council and Tynwald he has no vote and may thus be seen as an advisor rather than a legislator.’ We recognise a continuing tension with respect to the role of HM Attorney General. We note that oral evidence on the role of HM Attorney General has been heard in public on three occasions by the Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs and Justice, most recently on 22nd September 2020. 1.4 Freedom of Speech Immunity 1.4.1 The Legislature is protected by the freedom of This has been put beyond doubt by speech immunity. The immunity shall protect the Tynwald Proceedings persons from legal liability for words spoken (Amendment) Act 2020, which and acts done while participating in or directly amended the Tynwald Proceedings facilitating the Legislature’s proceedings, and Act 1876: ‘to make provision about shall restrict the judicial branch’s use of such C compulsion to give evidence, produce words and acts as evidence in judicial documents or supply information proceedings. relating to proceedings in Tynwald and about the competence of witnesses in respect of those matters; and for connected purposes.’ 1.4.2 The freedom of speech immunity shall operate Similarly to Benchmark 1.4.1, to enable the Legislature to carry out its provision for this was strengthened by constitutional functions effectively, free from the Tynwald Proceedings C interference or impediment. This includes the (Amendment) Act 2020. Legislature having access to all the information it needs to carry out its functions. 1.4.3 The Legislature shall have protection against Questions, motions and general potential misuse of the freedom of speech debates cannot make reference to any immunity. References to judicially suppressed matter which is sub judice. The or protected information, or to matters definition of sub judice is provided for awaiting judicial decision, shall be made only in in the Standing Orders of the exceptional circumstances and with due regard Chambers, and the application of the to the separation of powers between the C sub judice rule is decided at the Legislature and the judiciary. discretion of the Chamber’s Presiding Officer. The Presiding Officers also have a role in preventing abuse of the freedom of speech immunity regarding other matters, such as commercial sensitivity. 1.4.4 The Legislature shall have mechanisms for While such responses can be persons to respond to adverse references made P published as evidence presented to a committee, there is no publicised,

11 Label Comment to them in the course of the Legislature’s formal mechanism dedicated proceedings. specifically for this purpose. 1.4.5 The freedom of speech immunity shall continue to apply to former Legislators after they have left office, in respect of words spoken and acts C done while holding office and participating in or directly facilitating the Legislature’s proceedings. 1.5 Remuneration and Benefits 1.5.1 Fair remuneration and reimbursement of We note the conclusion of the 2011 parliamentary expenses shall be provided to panel, that: ‘“Proper remuneration” legislators for their service, to ensure that they involves a subjective judgment. give priority to parliamentary duties. All forms However the amounts are determined of compensation shall be allocated on a non- by the unfettered democratic partisan basis. decisions of the legislators themselves and they are allocated on a non partisan basis. This arrangement C cannot be faulted in terms of the benchmark’. The only question we would add to this response, is whether the definition of a partisan divide could be taken to include the division between members of the Council of Ministers and other Members. 1.5.2 An independent body or mechanism should The formula for Members’ determine the remuneration, benefits and remuneration is in secondary other statutory entitlements of legislators. legislation. It is based on civil service C pay, which is determined independently of any direct input from Tynwald Members as a group. 1.6 Professional Development 1.6.1 The Legislature shall take measures to ensure The Members’ induction process has that newly elected Members are assisted in been continually enhanced since 2006 understanding how the Legislature works and to cover a wide range of procedure C its rules of procedure. and practise, and is supplemented by an ongoing Continuous Professional Development (CPD) Programme 1.6.2 The Legislature shall take measures to assist The Members’ induction process has legislators increase their knowledge and skills in been continually enhanced since 2006 the performance of their parliamentary duties. C to cover a wide range of procedure and practise, and is supplemented by an ongoing CPD Programme 1.7 Resignation 1.7.1 Legislators shall have the right to resign from Parliament in accordance with clearly defined C procedures in the rules of procedure, the Constitution or any other related law. 1.8 Natural Justice 1.8.1 The Legislature shall incorporate principles of Please see paras 38-41 for further natural justice into its rules and procedures, information. and these shall be applied rigorously to all N/A situations where serious allegations are made against named or identifiable persons during

12 Label Comment the course of proceedings, either in the Legislature or in its Committees. 1.8.2 Members, or others, who are subject to serious Please see paras 38-41 for further charges of contempt of, and offences against, information. the Legislature are accorded natural justice N/A during the whole process of consideration, and the charges are decided on the basis of all properly admissible evidence. 1.8.3 Punishments imposed by the Legislature on This has been legislated for. Members or other people (for example, fines, or suspensions from attending or participating C in further sittings of the Legislature and its Committees) are proportionate and fair. 1.9 Infrastructure 1.9.1 The Legislature shall have adequate physical infrastructure to enable Members and staff to C fulfil their responsibilities. 2. Procedure and sessions 2.1 Rules of Procedure 2.1.1 The Legislature’s rules of procedure reflect and support the actual practice and culture of the C Legislature. 2.1.2 Only the Legislature may adopt and amend its C rules of procedure. 2.1.3 The Legislature’s rules, procedures and practice Each Chamber has its own Standing shall be reviewed regularly to enhance Orders Committee. There have been parliamentary effectiveness and relevance. amendments to the Standing Orders of the various Chambers from time to C time, but the last comprehensive reviews were in 1995 (Tynwald Court), 2006 (House of Keys) and 2008 (Legislative Council). 2.1.4 Changes to the Legislature’s rules of procedure Only a quorum of Members is needed shall be adopted with near unanimity. to amend the Standing Orders of a given Chamber. In the absence of dominant political parties, suspension N of Standing Orders requires a 2/3 majority. The current procedures of Tynwald are judged not to be an area of concern for the Panel. 2.1.5 The Legislature’s rules of procedure shall allow Members to raise genuine and succinct points C of order for the Presiding Officer to consider and decide. 2.1.6 The Legislature’s rules, procedures and practice These are published on the website. shall be accessible to Members and to the C public. 2.2 Presiding Officers 2.2.1 The Legislature shall select or elect Presiding Officers pursuant to criteria and procedures C clearly defined in the Constitution and/or rules of procedure. 2.2.2 The Presiding Officer maintains order so that the Legislature carries out its functions C effectively and Members have full

13 Label Comment opportunities to participate and be heard in accordance with the Legislature’s rules, procedures and practice. 2.2.3 The Presiding Officer decides all questions of Although there has traditionally been procedure, and in doing so is guided by good institutional memory, the previous decisions and practice. C documenting of previous decisions and practise could potentially be improved. 2.2.4 Punishments (such as orders to leave the This is a very rare occurrence and has chamber) are imposed on Members during happened less than a handful of times proceedings only to the extent necessary to C in the last 15 years. uphold the Presiding Officer’s proper authority and ability to chair proceedings. 2.3 Convening Sessions 2.3.1 The Legislature shall meet regularly, at intervals C sufficient to fulfil its responsibilities. 2.3.2 The Legislature shall have procedures for C calling itself into regular session. 2.3.3 The Legislature shall have procedures for The procedures were shown to be calling itself into extraordinary or special effective during the coronavirus session. C emergency, when multiple extraordinary sittings of Tynwald were called. 2.3.4 Provisions and qualifying requirements for the While the ability of the Council of Executive branch to convene a special session Ministers to convene a sitting is of the Legislature shall be clearly specified. assured in the House of Keys, the Council of Ministers does not P automatically have the number of Members necessary to convene a sitting of Tynwald Court or the Legislative Council. 2.4 Agenda 2.4.1 Legislators shall have the right to vote to amend the proposed agenda for debate in C accordance with the rules of procedure. 2.4.2 Legislators in the lower or only house shall have the right to initiate legislation and to offer C amendments to proposed legislation. 2.4.3 A substantial proportion of the Legislature’s time is set aside for it to consider business C proposed by non-Government Members. 2.4.4 There shall be an annual parliamentary C calendar to promote transparency. 2.5 Debate 2.5.1 The Legislature shall establish and follow clear procedures for structuring debate and C determining the order of precedence of motions tabled by Members. 2.5.2 The Legislature shall provide adequate There is no time limit on speeches. opportunity for legislators to debate Bills prior C to a vote. 2.6 Voting 2.6.1 Plenary debates and votes in the Legislature C shall be public.

14 Label Comment 2.6.2 Members in a minority on a vote shall be able Any Member can demand a recorded C to demand a recorded vote. vote. 2.6.3 Only legislators may vote on issues before the In 2017 Tynwald reaffirmed the Legislature. Bishop’s position as a legislator, and therefore bound to vote, despite the fact he is not elected to sit in the C Legislative Council. The obligation to attend sittings (except when given leave of absence by the presiding officer) and to vote applies to all voting Members of the Branches. 2.7 Petitions 2.7.1 The Legislature shall have procedures to allow C for the meaningful consideration of petitions. 2.8 Records 2.8.1 The Legislature shall maintain and publish The Isle of Man has a very high quality readily accessible records of its proceedings, in C Hansard service that provides its a standard and consistent format. services to other small jurisdictions. 3. Committees 3.1 Organisation 3.1.1 The Legislature shall have the right and sufficient resources to form permanent and C temporary Committees. 3.1.2 The Legislature’s assignment of Committee Please see paras 18-29 for further Members on each Committee shall include information on the lack of party both majority and minority party Members and N/A politics in Manx politics. reflect the political composition of the Legislature. 3.1.3 The Legislature shall establish and follow a High profile scrutiny committee transparent method for selecting or electing chairmanships are elected by the Chairs of Committees. C Tynwald. Select committee chairmanships are elected by the members of that committee. 3.1.4 Once established, Committees shall meet Committees regulate their own regularly in a timely and effective manner. calendar and vary from fortnightly to C ‘when required’ depending on the nature of the work. 3.1.5 All Committee votes and substantive decisions, The provision exists for any and the Committee’s reasons for them, are committee member to produce a made public in an accessible and timely memorandum of dissent laying out manner. where they may have disputed a decision of the committee regarding a report the committee has published. C Other decisions and reasoning are not necessarily published, other than anything the committee chooses to make public as part of a report. These would of course also be subject to debate and questions alongside any report. 3.2 Powers 3.2.1 Committees shall have the power to summon The Tynwald Proceedings Acts provide persons, papers and records, and this power a legislative basis for this. C shall extend to witnesses and evidence from the Executive branch, including officials.

15 Label Comment 3.2.2 There shall be a presumption that the While Bills can be referred to Legislature will refer legislation to a Committee, Committees of the whole House or and any exceptions must be transparent, Council, this is not presumed. narrowly-defined, and extraordinary in nature. N/A However, because of scale, the procedures of the Branches are similar to committee procedures in larger legislatures. 3.2.3 Committees shall scrutinize legislation referred to them and have the power to recommend C amendments or amend the legislation. 3.2.4 Committees shall have the right and sufficient C resources to consult and/or employ experts. 3.2.5 Committees shall seek and receive submissions from the public about the business before them C and provide reasonable time for written submissions to be prepared. 3.2.6 Committees hear evidence from people who wish to be heard, if practicable, or at least C ensure that hearings cover the diverse perspectives of submitters. 3.2.7 Committees hear evidence in public unless there is good reason to hear particular C submissions in closed session. 3.2.8 Legislatures shall protect informants such as whistleblowers or public servants and witnesses presenting relevant information to C Committees about corruption or unlawful activity. 3.2.9 Only Legislators appointed to the Committee, or authorised substitutes, shall have the right C to vote in Committee. 4. Political parties, party groups, cross party groups and the opposition 4.1 Political parties 4.1.1 Any restrictions on the legality of political parties shall be narrowly drawn in law and shall C be consistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 4.1.2 The public and private funding of political parties and candidates shall be transparent and C accountable. 4.2 Party Groups 4.2.1 Criteria for the formation of parliamentary Please see paras 18-29 for further party groups, and their rights and information. C responsibilities in the Legislature, shall be clearly stated in the Rules. 4.2.2 The Legislature shall provide adequate Please see paras 18-29 for further resources and facilities for party groups information. pursuant to a clear and transparent formula N/A that does not unduly advantage the majority party. 4.3 Cross Party Groups 4.3.1 Legislators shall have the right to form interest This is not prohibited but there is no caucuses around issues of common concern. N/A automatic access to additional resources over and above those

16 Label Comment provided to individual Members as a result. 4.4 The Opposition 4.4.1 The Legislature shall ensure adequate facilities There is no official opposition in the and allocation of resources for the Opposition, Manx parliamentary system. including the leader. Consequently there is no leader of the opposition. In terms of the Legislature, all Members have access to facilities and allocated resources. Accordingly, the question is the extent N/A to which Members are able to fulfil the functions of an opposition. All Members, including those not involved in government, have access to research facilities, office space etc. Please see paras 18-29 for further information. 5. Parliamentary staff 5.1 General 5.1.1 The Legislature shall have an adequate non- partisan professional staff to support its C operations including the operations of its Committees. 5.1.2 The Legislature, rather than the Executive The terms of employment of branch, shall control the parliamentary service parliamentary staff are independently and determine the terms of employment. P determined by the Legislature. As to There shall be adequate safeguards to ensure budgetary control, please see non-interference from the Executive. comment at Benchmark 6.2.5. 5.1.3 The Legislature shall draw and maintain a clear No partisan staff are employed by the distinction between partisan and non-partisan C Clerk of Tynwald’s Office. staff. 5.1.4 Members and staff of the Legislature shall have access to sufficient research, library, and ICT C facilities. 5.1.5 The Legislature shall take measures to ensure We believe this is covered by our that women are represented at all levels of C adherence to the Equality Act in spirit administration. as well as letter. 5.2 Recruitment 5.2.1 The Legislature shall have adequate resources Although staff resources are to recruit staff sufficient to fulfil its sufficient at present, the Panel notes responsibilities. The rates of pay shall be C that this is subject to the wider broadly comparable to those in the public national budget process. Please see service. comment at Benchmark 6.2.5. 5.2.2 The Legislature shall have transparent and We believe this covered by our objective recruitment procedures that shall not adherence to the Equality Act in spirit discriminate in its recruitment of staff on the as well as letter. C basis of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, disability, or, in the case of non-partisan staff, party affiliation. 5.3 Promotion 5.3.1 Recruitment and promotion of non-partisan staff shall be on the basis of merit and equal C opportunity. 5.4 Organisation and Management

17 Label Comment 5.4.1 The head of the parliamentary service shall The Clerk of Tynwald serves at the have a form of protected status defined in pleasure of Tynwald and as Secretary legislation or in the Constitution to prevent to the House of Keys at the pleasure C undue political pressure. of the Keys. Only they can remove him. This constitutes a form of protected status. 5.4.2 The remuneration of the head of the parliamentary service shall be set by an C independent body or mechanism. 5.4.3 The Legislature should, either by legislation or resolution, establish a corporate body responsible for providing services and funding C entitlements for parliamentary purposes and providing for governance of the parliamentary service. 5.4.4 All staff shall be subject to a code of conduct. C 6. Legislative function 6.1 General 6.1.1 The approval of the Legislature is required for C the passage of all legislation, including budgets. 6.1.2 The Legislature shall have the power to enact resolutions or other non-binding expressions of C its will. 6.1.3 The Legislature shall scrutinize secondary, delegated or subordinate legislation including C its authority and scope. 6.1.4 The Legislature shall provide adequate Please refer to paras 28-29 for further resources for legislators to draft legislation or C information. amendments to any legislation. 6.1.5 The Legislature shall encourage the process of Please refer to para 49 for further equality impact assessment with respect to the information. C development of legislation, policies and budgets. 6.2 Legislative Procedure 6.2.1 In a bicameral Legislature, there shall be clearly The chambers of the Manx legislature defined roles for each chamber in the passage have clearly defined roles, but also of legislation. C operate in a tricameral system. Please refer to paras 5-15 for further information. 6.2.2 The Legislature shall have the right to override There is no Executive veto within the an Executive veto. Isle of Man. However, under the terms of the Royal Assent to N/A Legislation (Isle of Man) Order 1981, the Government of the has a veto over Manx primary legislation. 6.2.3 The Executive shall transmit Bills and other Three working days under Standing documents for parliamentary action for timely C Order 4.1. distribution to Members. 6.2.4 The Legislature shall establish procedures for This is undertaken by scrutiny systematic monitoring of the effective committees. C implementation and consequences of legislation.

18 Label Comment 6.2.5 Only the Legislature shall be empowered to The budget for the Legislature is determine and approve the budget of the approved by the Legislature, but not Legislature. as a separate item. It forms a small N part of the wider national budget. Please refer to paras 30-37 for further information. 6.3 The Public and Legislation 6.3.1 Opportunities shall be given for public input This is true for all legislative and into the legislative and Committee process, committee processes, excluding those P including the budget process. around the budget. Please refer to paras 30-37 for further information. 6.3.2 Information shall be provided to the public in a timely manner regarding matters under C consideration by the Legislature. 7. Oversight function 7.1 General 7.1.1 The Legislature shall have legislation, a Whilst large, this is capped at 10 constitutional provision or practice that under the Council of Minister Act. C ensures the size of the Cabinet is in proportion Please see paras 18-29 for further to the size of the Legislature. information. 7.1.2 The Legislature shall have mechanisms to obtain information from the Executive branch sufficient to exercise its oversight function in a meaningful and timely manner. There shall be C clear and effective procedures requiring the Executive to provide timely responses to oral and written questions and Parliamentary Committee reports and recommendations. 7.1.3 The oversight authority of the Legislature shall The conclusion of the 2011 Panel still include effective oversight of the military, applies: ‘As a Crown Dependency, security and intelligence services. responsibility for our military, security and intelligence services lies with the N/A United Kingdom.’ There is limited oversight of surveillance, and an independent commissioner provides an annual report which is laid before Tynwald. 7.1.4 The oversight authority of the Legislature shall include effective oversight of state-owned C enterprises. 7.1.5 The oversight authority of the national While this is something which the Legislature shall include effective oversight of Legislature has the capacity to do, it compliance with international treaties and does not always in practice. The Panel obligations, including international human right would recommend that this matter be instruments and the Sustainable Development referred to the Standing Orders Goals (SDGs). Committee of Tynwald for further consideration. There has been a C notable increase in the 21stcentury of the Manx Government being empowered to enter into international treaties by letters of entrustment. One international treaty was made on this basis in the 20th century; while 36 had been made by 2015.

19 Label Comment 7.1.6 The Legislature shall establish a position of The Tynwald Commissioner for independent ombudsman, or similar office. Administration Act 2011 established C the office of Tynwald Commissioner for Administration. The service has been in operation since January 2018. 7.1.7 The Legislature shall establish a Human Rights Commission, or similar office, with the N mandate to protect against human rights violations. 7.1.8 The Legislature shall receive annual reports and scrutinize the activities of all independent constitutional bodies, such as human rights C commissions, anti-corruption bodies and ombudsmen and, where feasible, follow-up on issues arising from their reports. 7.1.9 The Legislature shall ensure that independent There is no way of ensuring this. constitutional bodies receive adequate Please see paras 30-37 for further resources and the work of such institutions are N information regarding the budget not subject to political pressure from the process. Executive. 7.2 Financial and Budget Oversight 7.2.1 Budget approval and scrutiny procedures shall be clearly specified in the rules of procedure, C the Constitution or relevant legislation 7.2.2 The Legislature shall have a reasonable period Please see paras 30-37 for further of time in which to adequately scrutinize and N information. debate the proposed national budget. 7.2.3 Oversight Committees shall provide meaningful On minority or opposition parties, opportunities for minority or opposition parties please see paras 18- 29 for further and independent MPs to engage in effective P information. On oversight of oversight of government expenditures. government expenditures, please see paras 30-37 for further information. 7.2.4 In addition to the draft annual budget, the Please see paras 30-37 for further Legislature shall receive and assess medium- information. term and annual budget strategies and be N informed of the main assumptions that underlie the annual budget’s revenue and expenditure projections. 7.2.5 The Legislature shall receive regular in-year budget reports and an audited annual financial C statement from the government within 12 months after the end of the fiscal year. 7.2.6 The Legislature shall have access to sufficient Please see paras 30-37 for further financial scrutiny resources and/or information. independent budget and financial expertise to N ensure that financial oversight is conducted effectively. 7.2.7 There shall be an independent, non-partisan Please see para 37 for further Supreme or National Audit Office whose information. P reports are tabled in the Legislature in a timely manner. 7.2.8 The Supreme or National Audit Office shall be Please see para 37 for further provided with adequate resources and legal P information. authority to conduct audits in a timely manner.

20 Label Comment 7.2.9 All reports of the Supreme or National Audit Please see para 37 for further Office shall stand referred to the Public information. C Accounts Committee, or a designated Committee, for further report. 7.3 No Confidence and Impeachment 7.3.1 In bicameral systems, only a popularly elected The Council of Ministers house shall have the power to bring down the (Amendment) Act 2017 moved this C government. function from Tynwald Court to the House of Keys. 7.3.2 The Legislature shall have mechanisms to impeach or censure the Executive branch, or C express no-confidence in the government. 7.3.3 If the Legislature expresses no confidence in the government, the government is obliged to offer its resignation. If the head of state agrees that no other alternative government can be C formed, a general election should be held in an appropriate time frame that is clearly specified in the Constitution or in any other related law. 8. Representational function 8.1.1 The Legislature shall be organised in such a way Please see paras 42-47 for further as to enable the substantive representation of C information. women in its work. 8.1.2 The Legislature shall provide all legislators with adequate and appropriate resources to enable C them to fulfil their constituency responsibilities. 9. Parliamentary assistance, networking and diplomacy 9.1.1 The Legislature shall have the right to seek and As the legislature of a highly receive development assistance to strengthen developed country, Tynwald has not the institution of Parliament. sought and would not seek N/A development assistance. Tynwald can, and does, seek to exchange best practice through international parliamentary networks. 9.1.2 The type of assistance, budget and the use of Please see comment at Benchmark development assistance received by the 9.1.1. Legislature shall be determined by the N/A Legislature in a transparent and accountable manner. 9.1.3 Members and the staff of Parliament shall have the right to receive technical and advisory assistance, as well as to network and exchange C experience with individuals from other Legislatures. 10. Accessibility, openness and engagement 10.1 Citizens and the Press 10.1.1 The Legislature shall be accessible and open to citizens and the media, subject only to C demonstrable public safety and work requirements. 10.1.2 The Legislature shall be accessible and open to Please see para 48 for further C persons with disabilities. comment. 10.1.3 The Legislature should ensure that the media C are given appropriate access to the proceedings

21 Label Comment of the Legislature without compromising the proper functioning of the Legislature and its rules of procedure. 10.1.4 The Legislature shall have a non-partisan media C relations facility. 10.1.5 The Legislature shall promote the public’s C understanding of the work of the Legislature. 10.1.6 The Legislature shall identify demographic groups whose perspectives are not well N represented in parliamentary decision-making and make efforts to increase their participation. 10.1.7 The Legislature shall have a regularly updated and accessible website to enhance and C promote information sharing and interaction with citizens and the outside world. 10.2 Languages 10.2.1 Where the Constitution or parliamentary rules Proceedings in the Legislature are in provide for the use of multiple working English. Should a Member wish to languages, the Legislature shall make every speak in Manx or another non-English N/A reasonable effort to provide for simultaneous language, the Presiding Officer may interpretation of debates and translation of call upon the Member to provide a records. translation of their remarks. 11. Ethical governance 11.1 Transparency and Integrity 11.1.1 Legislators should maintain high standards of accountability, transparency, responsibility and propriety in the conduct of all public and C parliamentary matters including strict adherence to codes of conduct, and interest disclosure rules. 11.1.2 The Legislature shall approve and enforce codes of conduct, including rules on conflicts of C interest and the acceptance of gifts. 11.1.3 Legislatures shall require legislators to periodically, fully and publicly disclose their C financial and other relevant interests. 11.1.4 There shall be mechanisms to prevent, detect, and bring to justice legislators and staff C engaged in corrupt practices. 11.2 Freedom of Information (FOI) 11.2.1 There shall be an effective FOI regime to give Established by the Freedom of the public access to information held by public C Information Act 2015. authorities.

22 APPENDIX: SUBMISSIONS FROM WOMEN MEMBERS OF TYNWALD Submission dated 29th July 2020 from Mrs Caine Submission dated 30th July 2020 from Mrs Barber Submission dated 19th August 2020 from Mrs Poole-Wilson

23 24 From: Caine, Daphne (MHK) Sent: 29 July 2020 17:32 To: Jack Gibney Subject: RE: CPA Benchmarks - Self Assessment Panel

Dear Jack

Many thanks for the invitation. Please find below a few brief thoughts on the subject, which I would appreciate your circulating to the Panel.

Kind regards

Daphne

1 Are male Members of Tynwald being invited to express their views on this subject? I hope so. Some may wish to contribute.

2 Ref benchmark: 8.1.1 (‘The Legislature shall be organised in such a way as to enable the substantive representation of women in its work.’). I am not of the opinion that positive discrimination should be attempted in the IoM, although perhaps political parties may be able to strengthen the drive to diversity by fielding diverse candidates and equal numbers male/female.

3 I feel the boundary review that led to 12 two-seat constituencies in 2016 encouraged the largest number of female condidates to stand. I hope this will increase in 2021.

4 I am firmly of the opinion that changes to the parliamentary calendar and sitting hours would encourage more working mothers to stand (acknowledging that the major burden of childcare arrangements falls on mothers). I am aware that I coud not have stood, or managed late sittings/parliamentary workload, without substantial support from friends and family in terms of my children being able to continue to attend clubs/after school activities.

5 Aligning the parliamentary calendar with the school calendar would still be desirable in my view: I would welcome commencing Keys/legislative sittings in September (not Tynwald, unless required), breaking for one week in October and February around half term; also reviewing the sitting hours – generally stopping at 6pm would be preferable even if additional sitting days are needed. I believe such changes would attract more women to stand.

6 I feel it might be worthwhile the Panel reviewing the motion brought by Mr Shimmins to the Keys sitting on 24 October 2017: https://www.tynwald.org.im/business/OPHansardIndex1618/1320.pdf

The Hon Member for (Mr Shimmins) to move: That in Session 2018-2019 the House shall sit on 11th and 25th September and 2nd and 9th October in addition to the normal sitting dates, but that the House shall not sit on 30th October and 28th May but shall sit on 11th June; and that the Standing Orders Committee shall report on provision for the dates for annual Sessions thereafter to start on the second Tuesday of September and to provide for breaks in the sittings to coincide with half-term breaks and the TT fortnight. Mr Harmer’s amendment was supported: To leave out all the words after ‘That’ and to add the words ‘the House of Keys Standing Orders Committee shall investigate options for changes to sitting dates; and that the House of Keys Standing Orders Committee shall investigate options for further changes to sitting dates and times to encourage diversity; and that the Standing Orders Committee of Tynwald be requested to examine the need for questions to be tabled and answered over the months of August and September.’

1 25 Part of my contribution: I think, in answer to the Hon. Member for ’s comments about diversity, I can say that I know three working mums who were deterred from putting their names forward to stand in the election because of the length of the sitting of Tynwald and the problems for them with having no childcare and with having no support network of friends and family –I am very lucky to have a huge network of friends and family who will step up when needed. These working mums decided that they could not consider standing for another five, maybe ten years, and I think that that will be the loss to this parliament and perhaps future ones.

What has resulted from the motion?

7 General thoughts: there is a noticeable reluctance among older voters to vote for a woman MHK; men are considered superior. Several times during my campaign, I or my team heard constituents comment: ‘oh I couldn’t vote for a woman’. Many enquired if I had children and shouldn’t I put them first. Also, people asked why my husband was allowing me to stand.

8 In my department work I have been present when a Member commented: ‘A woman actually made a valid point’. I feel a better gender balance/diversity in Comin is much needed and hopefully may be achieved if more women are returned at the next election/ depending upon diverse candidates standing.

ENDS

Daphne Caine MHK for Garff Member of the Department for Enterprise

Legislative Buildings Finch Road Douglas Isle of Man IM1 3PW British Isles [Contact details redacted]

26 From: Barber, Clare (MHK) Sent: 30 July 2020 15:34 To: Jack Gibney Cc: Clare Barber Subject: RE: CPA Benchmarks - Self Assessment Panel

Dear Jack,

I would make only the following observations as I do not believe that on the whole many of the things that inadvertently bias in favour of men are anything more than personality driven.

My key point would pertain to school holidays. While there are exceptions, it remains the case that many women are primary caregivers. Invariably February half-term coincides with budget Tynwald – 3 long days slap bang in the middle of school holidays is incredibly difficult to manage for us as a 2 parent family and would be even harder for a single parent family (of either gender). I believe we should revisit the discussion around our scheduled sittings aligning with school holidays if we are to seek to be truly inclusive. I would also seek assurance that a breastfeeding mother could sit in parliament with her baby, and breastfeed as needed. As an elected member cannot vote in absence, as a mother I would feel obliged to attend all HoK and Tynwald sittings at a minimum, and if that meant bringing my baby in with me, then that would be what I would seek to do. This should be formally recognised within Standing Orders (if it isn’t already).

My other point would be around the placement of members during the Covid ‘distancing’. I would not suggest it was anything more than coincidence, but I think it would be best if in any future shuffling of members, the seating be decided either by ballot, or with due consideration to the visual impact of all female members being placed upstairs in the public gallery.

I am not sure if this is the sort of feedback you are looking for, but I hope it is of some help?

Many thanks,

Clare

27 28 From: Poole-Wilson, Jane (MLC) Sent: 19 August 2020 11:30 To: Jack Gibney Cc: Jane Poole-Wilson Subject: Re: CPA Benchmarks - Self Assessment Panel

Dear Jack

Thank you for the opportunity to input to the Panel reviewing the Manx Parliamentary system in the light of the CPA Benchmarks.

Paragraph 8.1.1 Specifically with regard to paragraph 8.1.1, I would suggest consideration of the following, (which I think are relevant for any Member of Tynwald with child or other caring responsibilities, and would enable better balance between caring and Parliamentary /Government work, be in line with the approach being developed by employers to facilitate better work life balance, and enable the full participation of all those with caring responsibilities (who are still, in large part, women)):-

1. Arrangements for maternity, paternity and adoption leave for Tynwald members; 2. Review of sitting dates taking into account the timing of recess periods as compared to school holidays; 3. Review of sitting times - perhaps an earlier start time than 10.30am for Tynwald sittings, enabling an earlier finish time in the evening; 4. Formalisation of leave from sittings for matters such as child or other dependent care and for occasional matters such significant school or child performance/sporting events that overlap with sitting times; 5. Continuation of facilitating remote access to sittings for Members when they are unable to physically attend due to a permitted period of leave, but could still participate fully remotely; 6. Including, as part of Tynwald development programme, training on fostering inclusion.

Paragraph 10.1.2 In relation to paragraph 10.1.2 (The Legislature shall be accessible and open to persons with disabilities), I understand there was a rolling programme to address accessibility within Legislative Buildings (including provision of effective hearing loops in all Chambers and the Barrool Suite and improving the disabled toilet access on the top floor). I think it would be worthwhile for the Panel to obtain an update on progress and arrange for disability groups to be consulted on any aspects of accessibility that still need to be addressed so a forward programme of improvements can be planned.

Paragraph 10.1.6 In relation to paragraph 10.1.6, an option for the Panel to consider is engagement with representative groups of people of minority races and ethnic backgrounds. Perhaps, in conjunction with the officers responsible for the Government Consultation hub, it might be possible to maintain a list of relevant groups.

Paragraph 3.2.2 This benchmark is I think one for the Panel to look at how we best implement. Rather than relying on the power of each Branch to vote to refer legislation to a Select Committee, I think it would be beneficial, prior to certain legislation beginning its passage through the Branches, to be able to refer it to a Committee of both branches. The type of legislation that might benefit most from a Committee process includes reforming, social legislation and /or complex legislation that crosses the remit of several Departments.

Paragraph 6.1.5 The Government Equality Adviser has advised Government Departments, Offices and Boards to undertake an equality impact assessment (EIA) in relation to development of policy and legislation. The Panel could consider how Tynwald and its Branches can embed this, such as by recommending an EIA is required to be included in Explanatory Memoranda for legislation and Policy motions.

Paragraph 6.2.4 1 29 Post legislative scrutiny is an important area for Tynwald and its Branches to develop, both to assess the effectiveness of new areas of legislation (such as Domestic Abuse) and to monitor the adequacy of legislative provision on an ongoing basis and input into the Council of Ministers Legislative sub-committee. An option might be a dedicated standing post legislative scrutiny Committee (comprising members of both Branches) that could run its own programme of work and have items of legislation referred to it for review by Members. This might prove more effective than the Policy Review Committees being able to find the time to include post-legislative scrutiny in their programmes. Although any such new Commitee could be included in existing mechanisms for resolving questions of overlap between Committees. In addition such a new Committee could include in its remit oversight of compliance with international treaties and obligations etc as set out in paragraph 7.1.5.

Paragraph 7.2.7 The recommendation for an independent National Audit Office or Auditor General is one which Tynwald has previously legislated for and which should now be put in place.

Best wishes

Jane

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