Emergence in Science and Philosophy Edited by Antonella
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The Myth of Supervenient Microphysicalism
The myth of supervenient microphysicalism Juan Diego Morales1 (Universidad de Cartagena) So my aim is only to establish conditional claims of the form: even if certain facts are emergent vis‑à‑vis the microphysical realm, Physicalism can still be true. Papineau, 2008: 132 1. What physicalism is Let us begin with the idea that physicalism is the ontological theory which claims that the entities that constitute our world are physical enti‑ ties, phenomena which the physical sciences must discover and articulate in their theories.2 Following the naturalistic trend of philosophy in recent times, con‑ temporary philosophers have considered that physicalism is both an a pos‑ teriori and contingent thesis. Its a posteriori sense derives from the fact of being a position that tries to overcome the problems of its direct predeces‑ 1 [email protected]. My thanks to Alejandro Rosas, Brian McLaughlin, Reinaldo Bernal, and Larry Shapiro, for helpful and clarifying comments on drafts of this paper. 2 Here I will use the general sense of “entity” and “phenomenon” for including both particulars (as objects, events, processes, and so on) and what many theorists take as universals (as properties, relations, and laws). Philosophica, 48, Lisboa, 2016, pp. 47-61. Philosophica 48.indd 47 22/11/2016 9:26:50 PM 48 Juan Diego Morales sor, materialism. The latter was established as a metaphysical doctrine that attempted to specify the entities of our world in an a priori way, in terms of a specific set of features that supposedly defined the material; features such as conservation, deterministic and on contact interaction, impenetrability, inertia, and solidity.3 But this a priori specification proved to be wrong. -
Linguistics As a “Special Science”: a Comparison of Sapir and Fodor Els Elffers
Chapter 4 Linguistics as a “special science”: A comparison of Sapir and Fodor Els Elffers Independently of each other, the linguist-anthropologist Edward Sapir (1884–1939) and the philosopher of mind Jerry Fodor (1935–2017) developed a similar typol- ogy of scientific disciplines. “Basic” (Fodor) or “conceptual” (Sapir) sciences (e.g. physics) are distinguished from “special” (Fodor) or “historical” (Sapir) sciences (e.g. linguistics). Ontologically, the latter sciences are reducible to the former, but they keep their autonomy as intellectual enterprises, because their “natural kinds” are unlike those of the basic sciences. Fodor labelled this view “token physicalism”. Although Sapir’s and Fodor’s ideas were presented in very different periods of intel- lectual history (in 1917 and 1974) and in very different intellectual contexts (roughly: Geisteswissenschaften and logical positivism), the similarity between them is strik- ing. When compared in detail, some substantial differences can also be observed, which are mainly related to contextual differences. When applied to linguistics, Sapir’s and Fodor’s views offer a perspective of autonomy, albeit in different ways: for Fodor, but not for Sapir, linguistics is a subfield of psychology. 1 Introduction In 1974, Jerry Fodor (1935–2017) introduced “token physicalism”, a non-reductive variety of physicalism, which applies to “special sciences”.1 According to Fodor, special sciences, such as economics, psychology and linguistics cannot be en- tirely reduced to physics, which is a “basic science”. Such a reduction would im- ply that special sciences actually disappear as autonomous sciences. According to Fodor, special sciences retain their autonomy, because reduc- tion is possible only with respect to the events they describe (“tokens”), not with 1Token physicalism belongs to a larger class of non-reductive types of physicalism. -
On Interpreting Strong Supervenience
Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College 12-1996 On Interpreting Strong Supervenience Zachary J. Ernst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Ernst, Zachary J., "On Interpreting Strong Supervenience" (1996). Master's Theses. 3475. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/3475 This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ON INTERPRETING STRONG SUPERVENIENCE by Zachary J. Ernst A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The Graduate College in partial fulfillmentof the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of Philosophy Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan December 1996 Copyright by Zachary J. Ernst 1996 ON INTERPRETING STRONG SUPERVENIENCE Zachary J. Ernst, M.A. WesternMichigan University,_ 1996 J aegwon Kim's definitionof strong supervenience has found application in such areas as the mind-body problem, aesthetics, morality, and the relationship between physics and the special sciences. The main reason forthe popularity of supervenience is that it purportedly has a long laundry list of virtues. For instance, it has been claimed that supervenience accounts are non-reductive, capable of empirical verification, simple with respect to ontology, and explanatorily powerful. In this paper, I examine Kim's definition of strong supervenience, arguing that a fundamental ambiguity in the definition makes it impossible for strong supervenience to possess all of these virtues simultaneously. -
Philosophy of Science Reading List
Philosophy of Science Area Comprehensive Exam Reading List Revised September 2011 Exam Format: Students will have four hours to write answers to four questions, chosen from a list of approximately 20-30 questions organized according to topic: I. General Philosophy of Science II. History of Philosophy of Science III. Special Topics a. Philosophy of Physics b. Philosophy of Biology c. Philosophy of Mind / Cognitive Science d. Logic and Foundations of Mathematics Students are required to answer a total of three questions from sections I and II (at least one from each section), and one question from section III. For each section, we have provided a list of core readings—mostly journal articles and book chapters—that are representative of the material with which we expect you to be familiar. Many of these readings will already be familiar to you from your coursework and other reading. Use this as a guide to filling in areas in which you are less well- prepared. Please note, however, that these readings do not constitute necessary or sufficient background to pass the comp. The Philosophy of Science area committee assumes that anyone who plans to write this exam has a good general background in the area acquired through previous coursework and independent reading. Some anthologies There are several good anthologies of Philosophy of Science that will be useful for further background (many of the articles listed below are anthologized; references included in the list below). Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J.D. Trout, eds., The Philosophy of Science (MIT Press, 991). Martin Curd and J. -
Meaning and Self-Organisation in Visual Cognition and Thought
SEEING, THINKING AND KNOWING THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY General Editors: W. Leinfellner (Vienna) and G. Eberlein (Munich) Series A: Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences Series B: Mathematical and Statistical Methods Series C: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research SERIES A: PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES VOLUME 38 Series Editor: W. Leinfellner (Technical University of Vienna), G. Eberlein (Technical University of Munich); Editorial Board: R. Boudon (Paris), M. Bunge (Montreal), J. S. Coleman (Chicago), J. Götschl (Graz), L. Kern (Pullach), I. Levi (New York), R. Mattessich (Vancouver), B. Munier (Cachan), J. Nida-Rümelin (Göttingen), A. Rapoport (Toronto), A. Sen (Cambridge, U.S.A.), R. Tuomela (Helsinki), A. Tversky (Stanford). Scope: This series deals with the foundations, the general methodology and the criteria, goals and purpose of the social sciences. The emphasis in the Series A will be on well-argued, thoroughly ana- lytical rather than advanced mathematical treatments. In this context, particular attention will be paid to game and decision theory and general philosophical topics from mathematics, psychology and economics, such as game theory, voting and welfare theory, with applications to political science, sociology, law and ethics. The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume. SEEING, THINKING AND KNOWING Meaning and Self-Organisation in Visual Cognition and Thought Edited by Arturo Carsetti University of Rome “Tor Vergata”, Rome, Italy KLUWER -
International Congress
Copertina_Copertina.qxd 29/10/15 16:17 Pagina 1 THE PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS CONGRESS SOCIETÀ Christian Humanism INTERNAZIONALE TOMMASO in the Third Millennium: I N T D’AQUINO The Perspective of Thomas Aquinas E R N A T I O N Rome, 21-25 September 2003 A L C O N G R E S …we are thereby taught how great is man’s digni - S ty , lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. XVI ): ‘God has C h r i proved to us how high a place human nature s t i a holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He n H appeared to men as a true man’. And Pope Leo u m says in a sermon on the Nativity ( XXI ): ‘Learn, O a n i Christian, thy worth; and being made a partici - s m i pant of the divine nature (2 Pt 1,4) , refuse to return n t by evil deeds to your former worthlessness’ h e T h i r d M i St. Thomas Aquinas l l e n Summa Theologiae III, q.1, a.2 n i u m : T h e P e r s p e c t i v e o f T h o m a SANCT s IA I T A M H q E O u D M i A n C A a E A s A A I Q C U I F I I N T A T N I O S P • PALAZZO DELLA CANCELLERIA – A NGELICUM The Pontifical Academy of Saint Thomas Aquinas (PAST) Società Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino (SITA) Tel: +39 0669883195 / 0669883451 – Fax: +39 0669885218 E-mail: [email protected] – Website: http://e-aquinas.net/2003 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS Christian Humanism in the Third Millennium: The Perspective of Thomas Aquinas Rome, 21-25 September 2003 PRESENTATION Since the beginning of 2002, the Pontifical Academy of Saint Thomas and the Thomas Aquinas International Society, have been jointly preparing an International Congress which will take place in Rome, from 21 to 25 September 2003. -
Demystifying Emergence
AN OPEN ACCESS Ergo JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Demystifying emergence David YateS Centro de Filosofia, Universidade de Lisboa Are the special sciences autonomous from physics? Those who say they are need to explain how dependent special science properties could feature in irreducible causal explanations, but that’s no easy task. The demands of a broadly physicalist world- view require that such properties are not only dependent on the physical, but also physically realized. Realized properties are derivative, so it’s natural to suppose that they have derivative causal powers. Correspondingly, philosophical orthodoxy has it that if we want special science properties to bestow genuinely new causal powers, we must reject physical realization and embrace a form of emergentism, in which such properties arise from the physical by mysterious brute determination. In this paper, I argue that contrary to this orthodoxy, there are physically realized prop- erties that bestow new causal powers in relation to their realizers. The key to my proposal is to reject causal- functional accounts of realization and embrace a broad- er account that allows for the realization of shapes and patterns. Unlike functional properties, such properties are defined by qualitative, non-causal specifications, so realizing them does not consist in bestowing causal powers. This, I argue, allows for causal novelty of the strongest kind. I argue that the molecular geometry of H2O— a qualitative, multiply realizable property— plays an irreducible role in explaining its dipole moment, and thereby bestows novel powers. On my proposal, special science properties can have the kind of causal novelty traditionally associated with strong emergence, without any of the mystery. -
Metabiology and the Complexity of Natural Evolution
Arturo Carsetti Biology ︱ system being studied. In addition, he The tree-like branching of evolution is investigated the boundaries of semantic programmed by natural selection. information in order to outline the principles of an adequate intentional information theory. LuckyStep/Shutterstock.com Metabiology and SELF-ORGANISATION Professor Carsetti quotes Henri Atlan – “the function self-organises together with its meaning” – to highlight the prerequisite of both a conceptual the complexity of theory of complexity and a theory of self-organisation. Self-organisation refers to the process whereby complex systems develop order via internal processes, also in the absence of natural evolution external intended constraints or forces. It can be described in terms of network In his study of metabiology, rturo Carsetti is Professor Vittorio Somenzi, Ilya Prigogine, Heinz properties such as connectivity, making Arturo Carsetti, from the of Philosophy of Science von Foerster and Henri Atlan, Arturo it an ideal subject for complexity theory University of Rome Tor Vergata, A at the University of Carsetti became interested in applying and artificial life research. In accordance new mathematics. This is a mathematics Chaitin’s insight into biological reviews existing theories Rome Tor Vergata and Editor Cybernetics and Information Theory with Carsetti’s main thesis, we have that necessarily moulds coder’s activity. evolution led him to view “life as and explores novel concepts of the Italian Journal for to living systems. Subsequently, to recognise that, at the level of a Hence the importance of articulating evolving software”. He employed regarding the complexity the Philosophy of Science during his stay in Trieste he worked biological cognitive system, sensibility and inventing each time a mathematics algorithmic information theory to of biological systems while La Nuova Critica. -
Elements of Neurogeometry Functional Architectures of Vision Lecture Notes in Morphogenesis
Lecture Notes in Morphogenesis Series Editor: Alessandro Sarti Jean Petitot Elements of Neurogeometry Functional Architectures of Vision Lecture Notes in Morphogenesis Series editor Alessandro Sarti, CAMS Center for Mathematics, CNRS-EHESS, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11247 Jean Petitot Elements of Neurogeometry Functional Architectures of Vision 123 Jean Petitot CAMS, EHESS Paris France Translated by Stephen Lyle ISSN 2195-1934 ISSN 2195-1942 (electronic) Lecture Notes in Morphogenesis ISBN 978-3-319-65589-5 ISBN 978-3-319-65591-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-65591-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2017950247 Translation from the French language edition: Neurogéométrie de la vision by Jean Petitot, © Les Éditions de l’École Polytechnique 2008. All Rights Reserved © Springer International Publishing AG 2017 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. -
MBR04 Schedule
Model-Based Reasoning in Science and Engineering Abduction, Visualization, Simulation Pavia, Italy, December 16-18, 2004, Collegio Ghislieri, University of Pavia, Piazza Ghislieri MBR’04 Invited presentations, Symposia, and Special Sessions Full presentations Short presentations Session I: Modeling: visual, analogical, simulative Session II: Computational processes and logical models Session III: Creative inference and abduction Session IV: Case studies MBR’04 is sponsored by Thursday 16 December 04 Morning Location: Collegio Ghislieri, Aula Goldoniana 8.00-9:00 Registration Sala del Camino Location: Aula Goldoniana 9.00-9.10 Welcome - Inaugurazione 9.10-9.15 Welcome by Prof. Lorenzo MAGNANI Chair of the Conference 9.15-10.10 Invited Lecture Location: Aula Goldoniana Chair: Lorenzo Magnani B. CHANDRASEKARAN Diagrams as Models: An Architecture for Diagrammatic Representation and Reasoning -based values in scie ntific models 10.10-10.30 Coffee Break, Refettorio Location: Aula Goldoniana Location: Aula Sandra Bruni Session III Session II Creative inferences and abduction Computational processes and logical models Chair: L. Magnani Chair: T. Addis 10.30-11.10 Bonny Banerjee Helmut Pape Using Abduction for Diagramming Group Motions The Pragmatic Logic of Ordered Representations 11.10-11.50 P.D. Bruza, R.J. Cole, D. Song, Z. Abdul Bari Albrecht Heefner Towards Operational Abduction from a Cognitive Per- The emergence of symbolic algebra as a shift in pre- spective dominant models 11.50-12.10 Luca Pezzullo Irobi Ijeoma Sandra Environmental Mental Models: Applying Repertory Grids Correctness criteria for models’ validation – a philosophi- to Cognitive Geoscience and Risk Perception Studies cal perspective (Session IV Case studies (Session IV Case studies ) Invited Lecture Location (Symposium: Tracking the Real): Aula Goldoniana Chair: B. -
Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back Author(S): Ned Block Source: Philosophical Perspectives , 1997, Vol
Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back Author(s): Ned Block Source: Philosophical Perspectives , 1997, Vol. 11, Mind, Causation, and World (1997), pp. 107-132 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2216126 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Philosophical Perspectives This content downloaded from 128.122.149.96 on Wed, 07 Apr 2021 20:45:57 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Philosophical Perspectives, 11, Mind, Causation, and World, 1997 ANTI-REDUCTIONISM SLAPS BACK Ned Block New York University For nearly thirty years, there has been a consensus (at least in English- speaking countries) that reductionism is a mistake and that there are autonomous special sciences. This consensus has been based on an argument from multiple realizability. But Jaegwon Kim has argued persuasively that the multiple realiz- ability argument is flawed.' I will sketch the recent history of the debate, arguing that much-but not all-of the anti-reductionist consensus survives Kim's cri- tique. This paper was originally titled "Anti-Reductionism Strikes Back", but in the course of writing the paper, I came to think that the concepts used in the debate would not serve either position very well. -
Why Is There Anything Except Physics? Author(S): Barry Loewer Source: Synthese, Vol
Why Is There Anything Except Physics? Author(s): Barry Loewer Source: Synthese, Vol. 170, No. 2 (Sep., 2009), pp. 217-233 Published by: Springer Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40271331 Accessed: 12-06-2019 12:51 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese This content downloaded from 128.6.218.72 on Wed, 12 Jun 2019 12:51:49 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Synthese (2009) 170:217-233 DOI 10.1007/sl 1229-009-9580-2 Why is there anything except physics? Barry Loewer Received: 2 June 2009 / Accepted: 2 June 2009 / Published online: 4 August 2009 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 Abstract In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim's objections Jerry Fodor asks "So then, why is there anything except physics?" By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences.