Supplementary Content for "Design and Evolution in Institutional Development: The Insignificance of the English Bill of Rights", by Peter Murrell
This file of Supplementary Content contains four elements:
1. An extended version of "Table 1: Precedent and Survival in the Clauses of the Bill of Rights " 2. An extended version of "Table 2: Precedent and Survival in the Clauses of the Act of Settlement". 3. An extended version of "Table 3: Data series: definitions, sources and summary statistics" 4. The "Methodological Appendix: Estimating structural breaks in growth rates"
Full Version of Table 1: Precedent and Survival in the Clauses of the Bill of Rights
Selection? Repealed, General comments, including on limited, or in force the relevance to property rights Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"William and Mary…be declared king and There was a Parliamentary role in the replacement Act of Settlement, 1701, queen of England…" of Monarchs in 1327, 1399, 1483, 1485, reaffirmed Parliamentary 1649/1660.2 The Divine Right of Kings had fallen role in determining with Charles I's head.3 William was effectively succession. King well before this measure was passed, as a result of successful invasion, popular support, and the flight of James II. Parliament's role in successions was already assumed by all, using the precedents of 1399 and 1660.4
1 'William and Mary, 1688: An Act declareing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Setleing the Succession of the Crowne. [Chapter II. Rot. Parl. pt. 3. nu. 1.]', Statutes of the Realm: volume 6: 1685-94 (1819), pp. 142-145. URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=46322 Date accessed: 11 July 2009. 2 1327: Parliament forces Edward II to abdictate the throne; 1399: Richard II forced to resign by Henry IV and Parliament declares a vacancy and legislates on the successor; 1483: Parliament plays a role in declaring Edward V to be illegitimate and endorsing Richard III; 1485: Henry VII calls on Parliament to endorse his accession formally; 1649: Parliament removes Charles I; 1660: Parliament's role fundamental in the restoration. 3 McIlwain (1910, p.109, p.352) 4 Horwitz (1977, pp. 6-8). The precedent of 1399 was important in the parliamentary debates, since Richard II was viewed has having resigned the crown and government and thus allowed Parliament to declare a vacancy, in a situation with rough parallels to 1689. (Cherry 1956, p. 399) Selection? Repealed, General comments, including on limited, or in force the relevance to property rights Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"all and every person and persons that is, are Acts of 1673 and 1678 established this condition Act of Settlement, 1701, The most innovative of all the measures or shall be reconciled to or shall hold for Parliament and monarch's servants.5 The Act reinforced Parliament's in the Bill.12 The converse of the communion with the see or Church of Rome, of 1673 caused the resignation from government of right to use religion to set doctrine of cuius regio, eius religio,13 or shall profess the popish religion, or shall James Duke of York, later James II, and so set the line of succession.9 dominant in Europe until that time, but marry a papist, shall be excluded and be for precedent for this clause of the Bill of Rights,6 This clause has survived effectively not applicable in England by ever incapable to inherit, possess or enjoy which extended that Act to monarch. The until today, with attempts 1688. Three previous elections (1679- the crown and government of this declaration by the monarch was that he/she was not at change only arising in 1681) had each led to a Commons realm…that every king and queen of this a Catholic and was to be understood (using the the twentieth century.10 majority that favored such a law.14 The realm [shall] make, subscribe and audibly phrasing from the 1678 Act) in the "plain and Repeal of marriage bar act mentioned in this clause is "An Act repeat the declaration mentioned in the ordinary sens of the words…as they are commonly suggested in 2009.11 for the more effectual preserving the statute made in [1678]" understood by English protestants…"7 This king's person and government by declaration originates in measures of the Long disabling papists from sitting in either Parliament in 1643.8 House of Parliament" of 1678.15
5 Test Acts (1673, 1678); Maer, (2009, p. 9). 6 Carruthers, (1996, p. 44) 7 Maer (2009, p. 4) 8 Maer (2009, p. 9) 9 Maer (2009) 10 Maer (2008); Maer (2009) 11 See Royal Marriages and Succession of the Crown (Prevention of Discrimination) Bill, 2009-08 12 Jones (1992, p.29) ; Horwitz,(1977); Morris (1998 p. 25) 13 Jones (1992, p. 29) 14 Miller (1992, p.60) 15 Refers to Test Act of 1678; see Statutes of the Realm (1819b)
Table 1, page 2 Selection? Repealed, General comments, including on limited, or in force the relevance to property rights Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That the pretended power of suspending the As early as 1392, the Commons rejected Richard Unquestioned acceptance. Suspending never viewed as above laws or the execution of laws by regal II's use of suspension.16 Controversial uses in the common law property rights; it could not authority without consent of Parliament is Stuart period focused only on religious issues. be used in dispute between two citizens; illegal." Judges in 1662, 1673, and 1688 questioned the it could not be used to raise revenues.22 legality of the suspending power even in religious "..neither Charles nor James revived the matters.17 In 1673 Charles II accepted that he had prerogative devices used by their father no right to suspend laws affecting property, rights, to raise money without Parliament's or liberties.18 In 1663 and 1673 the Commons consent."23 By the time of the asserted that statutes could only be suspended by Restoration settlement, 1660, "The king statute, and Charles did not challenge this and did could now raise money only in ways not try to suspend again after 1673.19 At that time, approved by Parliament and Englishmen Charles acknowledged that his attempt to suspend would possess all the rights accorded by was illegal.20 James II did not claim that he had a the common law."24 "Charles II and right to the suspending power.21 James II, in turn, repeatedly gave assurances that they would never invade their subjects' property."25
16 Maitland (1931, p. 306). 17 Kenyon (1966, p. 40, p. 402, p. 424) , Edie (1985, p. 217, p. 222) 18 Jones (1992, p. 15); Kenyon (1966, p. 409) 19 Kenyon (1966, p. 402); Miller (2000, p. 165) 20 Maitland (1931 p. 305). 21 Schwoerer (1981, p. 64) ; Miller (2000, p. 165) 22 Edie (1985, p.199), Maitland (1931 p. 180). 23 Jones (1992, p. 15) 24 Miller (1992, p. 56) 25 Nenner (1992, p. 92) .
Table 1, page 3 Selection? Repealed, General comments, including on limited, or in force the relevance to property rights Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That the pretended power of dispensing Pragmatic tool developed to solve practical Some uncontroverial Since the dispensing power only allowed with laws or the execution of laws by regal problems quickly when Parliaments met violations. A controversial the King to forgo penalties assigned in authority, as it hath been assumed and irregularly. 1584 case: King could not dispense one occurred in 1766, statutes specifically to the King's exercised of late, is illegal; Common Law.26 1602 Case of Monopolies: when George III dispensed discretion,35 the dispensing power was [late additions to the Bill] no dispensation by dispensing could not negate intent of statute.27 a law while Parliament was not relevant to taxing, spending, and non obstante of or to any statute or any part 1662: Parliament refused to give Charles II general out of session in order to property rights. Common law property thereof shall be allowed...except a dispensing power, even on religious issues.28 In lessen civil disorder over rights could not be dispensed.36 dispensation be allowed of in such statute... 1662, Parliament prevented dispensing by naming grain prices. When Dispensing could not be used in dispute Provided that no charter or grant or pardon an act as a public nuisance in a statute, thus Parliament was next in between two citizens.37 King could not granted before the three and twentieth day of invoking old law, since a nuisance is a malum in session, it continued dispense statutes for the public good, and October in the year of our Lord one se. 29 1674 case: Courts confirmed that Parliament George's measures while could not license activities specifically thousand six hundred eighty-nine shall be can stop dispensing by declaring something a declaring dispensing defined as harms by a statute.38 Charles any ways impeached or invalidated by this malum in se.30 1674 case: courts confirmed that illegal. This was no more II and James II used dispensing only to Act" dispensing could not take away a private right.31 than a restatement of the pardon punishments for religious acts.39 1686 case: dispensing power ruled legal for Bill of Rights.34 Notably, Parliament used its funding religious penal laws.32 Widespread agreement that power to block attempts of Elizabeth I, the King had right to dispense occasionally on James I, Charles I, and Charles II to religious matters.33 dispense.40
26 Edie (1985, p. 202) 27 Edie (1985, p.207) 28 Kenyon (1966, p. 402); Edie (1985, p. 217) 29 Edie (1985, p. 218) 30 Edie (1985, p. 225) 31 Edie (1985, p. 226) 32 Schwoerer (1981, p. 62 – 63); Edie (1985, p. 227) 33 Kenyon (1966, p. 402) 34 Lawson (1986, p. 33). 35 Edie (1985, p. 199) 36 Schwoerer (1981, p. 60); Edie (1985, p. 199) 37 Schwoerer (1981, p. 60) 38 Edie (1985, p. 199)
Table 1, page 4 Selection? Repealed, General comments, including on limited, or in force the relevance to property rights Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That the commission for erecting the late Clause refers to a Commission of James II, whose The only effect of the James' Commission was purely relevant Court of Commissioners for Ecclesiastical authority rested on statutes of 1559, 1641, and clause was to stop the use to religious issues and was not a "court." Causes, and all other commissions and 1661.41 There was no basis in previous law to stop of special commissions as It issued only ecclesiastical penalties courts of like nature, are illegal and the monarch from administering religious matters. constructed by James. The and acted within existing law, if not pernicious" In fact, this clause did not change the legal overall authority of the existing accepted practice.45 authority of the monarch.42 Constraints on the monarch in religious authority of the Commissions were stated in an Act matters has lasted into of 1641 and confirmed in an Act of 1661 and this modern times.44 clause did not change the constraints.43
"That levying money for or to the use of the Sovereignty over taxation was an undoubted Unquestioned acceptance. In debates on the Declaration of Rights, Crown by pretence of prerogative, without ancient right of Parliament.46 Established for an argument against making the grant of Parliament, for longer time, or in extra-ordinary taxation in 1297.47 "…before the Declaration more ambitious was that other manner than the same is or shall be middle of the fourteenth century it was definitely Parliament could at a later date use its granted, is illegal" illegal for the king to impose a direct tax without ultimate control over revenues to obtain the consent of parliament…before the end of the what it needed.51 fourteenth century the contest [on indirect taxation] was at an end."48 Neither Charles II or James II challenged this right of Parliament.49 In the reign of Charles II, the Commons jealously protected its sole powers by rejecting Lords' attempts to amend money bills.50
39 Schwoerer (1981, p 59) 40 Schwoerer (1981, p. 61-62) 41 Act of Supremacy (1559), Act Abolishing the Court of High Commission (1641), Ecclesiastical Commission Act (1661). See Stephenson and Marcham (1937). 42 Schwoerer (1981, p. 65) 43 Stephenson and Marcham (1937). 44 The pertinent elements of the Act of Supremacy are still in force. See UK Statute Law Database (2009a) 45 Schwoerer (1981, p. 65) 46 Prestwich, (1990, p. 5-6) 47 Roseveare (1969, p. 30-31) 48 Maitland (1931, p. 180)
Table 1, page 5 Selection? Repealed, General comments, including on limited, or in force the relevance to property rights Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That it is the right of the subjects to petition A right that dated back to Magna Carta.52 Unquestioned acceptance. the king, and all commitments and Petitioning was a major element of politics from prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal" the middle ages to Stuart times, and was encouraged by the monarch.53 Petitions were so common under Charles II that legislation was passed to organize the process.54 The pivotal Seven Bishops Trial of 1688 was partially concerned with the right to petition and that right was upheld. 55
49 Schwoerer (1981, p. 66-69). 50 Kenyon (1966, p. 413) 51 Horwitz (1977, p. 86 ) 52 Clause 61. Medievil Sourcebook (2009) 53 Hoyle (2002). The UK National Archives (2009) retains images of 17,000 petitions presented between the reigns of Henry III and James I. 54 Schwoerer (1981, p. 70) 55 Schwoerer (1981, p. 69-70) ; Nenner (1992, p. 114)
Table 1, page 6 Selection? Repealed, General comments, including on limited, or in force the relevance to property rights Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That the raising or keeping a standing army Standing Army unknown until 1645.56 Charles II This clause did not restrict In the crisis of 1697-9, William could within the kingdom in time of peace, unless obtained limited permission early in the armies outside the have vetoed a bill for disbanding the it be with consent of Parliament, is against Restoration Parliament to keep a standing army—it kingdom or in times of army, could have dissolved parliament, law" had to be paid from his own resources.57 war. The monarch still had or could have enlisted the support of the Nevertheless, one of the articles of impeachment of the right to declare war.62 Lords to defeat the bill.67 It was Clarendon in 1667 was that he counseled the William had his own Commons control over the purse that raising of a standing army.58 During the late Dutch guard 1689-1699.63 was the critical factor in enforcing this 1670's, Parliament objected even to Charles' small In 1697, he defied a provision, not the legal position created army and passed the Disbanding Act, which Parliament vote to reduce by the Bill of Rights, per se. 68 "It should reduced it to a very small force, with a size the army's size.64 In 1698 be noted that what hampered the King's determined by Parliament.59 Parliament exerted he defied parliament and subterfuge was his inability to pay."69 extremely detailed control over the disbanding kept many more troops The mechanism of controlling the size of process.60 James II built a larger standing army. than they had voted. 65 The the army was, therefore, exactly the Parliament refused James funding for his standing crisis of 1697-9 resulted in same as under Charles II and James II, army, which led him to prorogue Parliament, a standing army monitored notwithstanding this clause. which did not meet again in his reign.61 by Parliament.66
56 Schwoerer (1974, p. 2 ) 57 Miller (1992, p. 57); Schwoerer (1974, p. 72) 58 Hallam (1827, p. 441) 59 Schwoerer (1974, p. 121-132 ) 60 Kenyon (1986, p. 363) 61 Schwoerer (1974, p. 143-45); Horwitz (1977, p. 4) 62 Horwitz (1977, p. 87) 63 Schwoerer (1966, p. 91-3) 64 Schwoerer (1966, p. 86-7) 65 Schwoerer (1966, p. 87) 66 Dickinson (2002, p .473-474) 67 Jones (1992, p. 33 ) 68 Macaulay (1915. p. 287-9) "No good would have been done by rejecting the bill for disbanding the troops, unless the King could have been furnished with the means of maintaining them; and with such means he could be furnished only by the House of Commons." 69 Schwoerer (1966, pp. 88) Table 1, page 7 Selection? Repealed, General comments, including on limited, or in force the relevance to property rights Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That the subjects which are Protestants may Essentially restates existing law as a right, but in In debates on the Game have arms for their defence suitable to their restricting to Protestants, lessened existing rights. Act of 1693, Parliament conditions and as allowed by law" 70 The wording "as allowed by law" connects the decisively rejected a clause measure to previous legislation.71 For example, that would have allowed "suitable to their conditions" implies a restriction all Protestants to keep to certain classes, as embodied in the Game Act of muskets.73 Blackstone 1671.72 interprets the right as only existing when law fails to control an oppressive government.74 Protests throughout the 18th century on restrictions on guns make it clear that the right was not general.75
"That election of members of Parliament The Statute of Westminster of 1275 stated The Statute of Westminster ought to be free" "…because elections ought to be free, the King is still in force.79 commandeth…that no Man…shall disturb any to make free Election."76 1604 case: Commons was in charge of its own elections.77 Held as an undoubted right in the reign of Charles II.78
70 Schwoerer (1981, p. 74) 71 Schwoerer (1981, p.74) 72 Schwoerer (1981, p.78) 73 Schwoerer (1981, p.78) 74 Blackstone (1769, Book 1 Chapter 1) 75 Schwoerer (2000, p. 51-55) 76 Statute of Westminster, The First (1275). UK Statute Law Database (2009d) 77 Fritze and Robison (p. 212-213) 78 Jones (1992, p.14), Schwoerer (1981, p.79-82) 79 Statute of Westminster, The First (1275). UK Statute Law Database (2009d)
Table 1, page 8 Selection? Repealed, General comments, including on limited, or in force the relevance to property rights Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That the freedom of speech and debates or Right recognized by Henry VI in 1455.80 1512 act still in force.84 proceedings in Parliament ought not to be Legislated in 1512, including immunity against "In 1624 James I had impeached or questioned in any court or suit and protection against punishment. 81 Fully permitted the House of place out of Parliament" recognized in Elizabethan times and confirmed by Commons free speech on James I.82 Reaffirmed by Parliament in 1661 and all subjects. Since then the courts in 1668, the latter pronouncing that every attempt at direct "words spoken in Parliament cannot be dealt with interference had failed."85 out of Parliament".83
"That excessive bail ought not to be "Excessive bail" fills gaps left by the Habeas Bills of Attainder still required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor Corpus Act of 1679,86 which itself reflected possible. Suspension of cruel and unusual punishments inflicted" elements of Magna Carta.87 Right to bail Habeas Corpus only one historically established, but left to judges' month after the adoption of discretion.88 Restrictions on punishment date from the Declaration of Right.90 time of Magna Carta and were embodied in Suspended again twice in statutes in 1553 and 1641.89 Culmination of 1689, and then in 1696, centuries of legal developments. Best viewed as 1708, 1715, 1722, 1745, correcting defects in existing law 1794, 1798-1801, and 1817.91
80 See Stephenson and Marcham (1937) on the petition of Thomas Young. 81 Privilege of Parliament Act 1512. UK Statute Law Database (2009b) 82 Elton (1989) pp 341-342; Hulme (1956, p. 853). 83 The Act referred to is the Treason and Seditious Practices Act (Schwoerer, 1981, p. 82-83). Mummery (1978 p. 281) 84 Privilege of Parliament Act 1512. UK Statute Law Database (2009b) 85 Hulme (1956, p. 853). 86 The full text of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 can be found online at Statutes of the Realm (1819a) 87 Schwoerer (1981, pp. 87-92) , Clauses 36, 38, 39, and 40 of the Magna Carta are relevant for Habeas Corpus. Clause 36: Nothing in future shall be given or taken for a writ of inquisition of life or limbs, but freely it shall be granted, and never denied. Clause 38. No bailiff for the future shall, upon his own unsupported complaint, put any one to his "law," without credible witnesses brought for this purpose. Clause 39. No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. Clause 40. To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice. Medievil Sourcebook (2009) 88 Schwoerer (1981, p. 88) 89 Schwoerer (1981, p. 91-92) Table 1, page 9 Selection? Repealed, General comments, including on limited, or in force the relevance to property rights Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That jurors ought to be duly impanelled and Only element that was not an ancient right was the Unquestioned acceptance. The Treason Act of 1695 was vastly returned, and jurors which pass upon men in insistence on freeholder juries for treason cases.92 more important in constraining the trials for high treason ought to be government's use of treason trials. freeholders"
"That all grants and promises of fines and Such grants and promises were "… condemned by Did not prevent the Issue was solely whether the King could forfeitures of particular persons before medieval statutes and denounced as illegal by monarch (or his agents) grant the pre-conviction seizure right in conviction are illegal and void" distinguished lawyers."93 A restatement of existing from seizing property treason cases to others. Outlawed law, settled in the early seventeenth century, before conviction. At best, 'farming' of pre-trial property seizures. although there had been violations.94 made seizures less efficient and less attractive.
"And that for redress of all grievances, and Ordinances of 1311 said that Parliament should Parliaments have met "Frequently" makes this more vague for the amending, strengthening and meet yearly.95 Yearly parliaments legislated in every year since 1689, than the Triennial Parliaments Act of preserving of the laws, Parliaments ought to 1330—legislation that has never been repealed, more often than envisaged 1664, which was superseded by the be held frequently." meaning that yearly meetings of parliaments were by Parliament in 1689.98 Triennial Act of 1694. in fact legally required.96 The Triennial Act of With the Septennial Act of 1642 dictated parliaments meet every three years. 1715, a recently elected Re-affirmed by Triennial Parliaments Act of parliament extended its life 1664.97 (Violated by Charles II in 1684 and James to seven years.99 Reduced II in 1688.) to five years in 1911.100
90 Horwitz (1977, p. 21); Crawford, (1915) 91 Crawford (1915, p. 615). Emsley (1985, p. 825) 92 Schwoerer (1981, p. 94) 93 Miller (1992, p. 82) 94 Schwoerer (1981, p. 96) 95 McIlwain (1910) 96 Maitland (1931, p. 177-8) 97 Kenyon (1966, p. 361) 98Horwitz (1977, p. 88) 99 UK Statute Law Database (2009c) 100 UK Statute Law Database (2009c)
Table 1, page 10 References to works cited in this table but not cited in the text of "Design and Evolution"
Blackstone, William (1769) Commentaries on the Law of England, Vol. 4 Of Public Wrongs (1769) facsimile edition with introductions by Thomas A. Green (1979). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Carruthers, Bruce G. (1996) City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cherry, George. 1956. "The Role of the Convention Parliament (1688-89) in Parliamentary Sovereignty", Journal of the History of Ideas, 17(3): 390-406.
Dickinson, H. T. 2002 . A Companion to Eighteenth-Century Britain. Blackwell Publishing.
Edie, Carolyn A. (1985) "Tactics and Strategies: Parliament's Attack upon the Royal Dispensing Power 1597-1689", The American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 29, No. 3 July, pp. 197-234
Elton, Geoffrey Rudolph (1989). The Parliament of England, 1559-1581. New York: Columbia University Press.
Firth C. H. and , R.S. Rait (eds) 1911 Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-1660. London.
Fritze, Ronald H. and William B. Robison. (1996) Historical dictionary of Stuart England, 1603-1689. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Hallam, Henry, (1827) The Constitutional History of England. Volume III. From the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George II. Paris : L Baudry.
Horwitz, Henry (1977) Parliament, Policy and Politics in the Reign of William III. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
Hoyle, R. W. (2002). "Petitioning as Popular Politics in Early Sixteenth–Century England" Historical Research. 75(190): 365 – 389.
Hulme, Harold (1956). “The Winning of Freedom of Speech by the House of Commons” The American Historical Review, 61(4) : 825-853
Jones, J. R. (1992) "Revolution in Context" In Liberty Secured? Britain Before And After 1688. ed. J. R. Jones. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Table 1, page 11 Kenyon, John Phillips. (1966). The Stuart Constitution, 1603-1688: documents and commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lawson, Phillip. (1986). “Parliament, the Constitutions and Corn: The Embargo Crisis of 1766” Parliamentary History, 5(1): 17 – 37.
Macaulay, Thomas Babington (1915). The History of England. London: MacMillan
Maer, Lucinda. (2009) “The Act of Settlement and the Protestant Succession.” House of Commons Library. http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-00683.pdf
Maer, Lucinda (2008) “Royal Marriages – Constitutional Issues” House of Commons Library. http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-03417.pdf
Maitland, F. W. (1931) The Constitutional History of England - A Course of Lectures Delivered By F. W. Maitland. Cambridge: University Press
McIlwain, C. H. (1910) The High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Medievil Sourcebook, (2009) “Magna Carta” http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/mcarta.html (Accessed July 7 2009).
Miller, John. (1992) “Crown, Parliament, and People" In Liberty Secured?: Britain Before And After 1688. ed. J. R. Jones. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Morris, Marilyn (1998). The British Monarchy and the French Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press
Mummery, D. (1978) 'The Privilege of Freedom of Speech in Parliament' Law Quarterly Review 94.
Prestwich, M. (1990). English Politics in the Thirteenth Century. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Roseveare, Henry. (1969). The Treasury: The Evolution of the British Constitution. New York: Columbia University Press.
Royal Marriages and Succession of the Crown (Prevention of Discrimination) Bill. (2009) Parliament Bill 29, 2009-08 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmbills/029/2009029.pdf (Accessed July 14, 2009).
Table 1, page 12 Schwoerer, Lois G. (1966) "The Role of King William III of England in the Standing Army Controversy - 1697-1699" The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 74-94
Schwoerer, Lois G. (1974). No Standing Armies: the Anti-Army Ideology In Seventeenth Century England. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Schwoerer, Lois G., (1981) The Declaration of Rights, 1689 Johns Hopkins University Press..
Schwoerer, Lois. (2000) “To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 76: 27- 60
Statutes of the Realm: volume 5: 1628-80 (1819a) : 935-938. 'Charles II, 1679: An Act for the better secureing the Liberty of the Subject and for Prevention of Imprisonments beyond the Seas.', http://www.british- history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=47484&strquery=habeas corpus act 1679 (Accessed July 9, 2009.)
Statutes of the Realm: volume 5: 1628-80 (1819b): 894-896. Charles II, 1678: (Stat. 2.) An Act for the more effectuall preserving the Kings Person and Government by disableing Papists from sitting in either House of Parlyament.', http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=47482 (Accessed July 9, 2009)
Stephenson, Carl and Frederick George Marcham (1937). Sources of English Constitutional History: A Selection of Documents From A.D. 600 to the Present. New York: Harper & Row.
UK National Archives (2009) "Ancient Petitions, Henry III-James II" http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documentsonline/petitions.asp. (Accessed July 10, 2009).
UK Statute Law Database (2009a) “Act of Supremacy (c.1)” http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?LegType=All+Legislation&title=act+of+supremacy&searchEnacted=0&extentMatchOnly =0&confersPower=0&blanketAmendment=0&sortAlpha=0&TYPE=QS&PageNumber=1&NavFrom=0&parentActiveTextDocId=15 18143&ActiveTextDocId=1518143&filesize=25866 (Accessed July 11, 2009)
UK Statute Law Database (2009b) “Privilege of Parliament Act 1512 (c.8)” ohttp://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?LegType=All+Legislation&title=Privilege+of+Parliament+Act&searchEnacted=0&exten tMatchOnly=0&confersPower=0&blanketAmendment=0&sortAlpha=0&TYPE=QS&PageNumber=1&NavFrom=0&parentActiveTe xtDocId=1517759&ActiveTextDocId=1517759&filesize=17141 (Accessed July 11, 2009)
Table 1, page 13 UK Statute Law Database (2009c) “Septennial Act 1715 (c.38)” http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?LegType=All+Legislation&searchEnacted=0&extentMatchOnly=0&confersPower=0&bla nketAmendment=0&sortAlpha=0&PageNumber=0&NavFrom=0&activeTextDocId=1516478&parentActiveTextDocId=1516478&sh owAllAttributes=1&showProsp=0&suppressWarning=0&hideCommentary=1 (Accessed July 7 2009)
UK Statute Law Database (2009d). “Statute of Westminster, The First (1275) (c.5)” http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?LegType=Act+(Old+English+Parliament)&Year=1275&searchEnacted=0&extentMatchO nly=0&confersPower=0&blanketAmendment=0&sortAlpha=0&TYPE=QS&PageNumber=1&NavFrom=0&parentActiveTextDocId= 1517436&ActiveTextDocId=1517436&filesize=6634 (Accessed July 11, 2009)
Table 1, page 14 Full Version of Table 2: Precedent and Survival in the Clauses of the Act of Settlement
Selection? Repealed, General comments, limited, or in force including on the Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? relevance to property rights and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"…Princess Sophia, Electress and Reinforced Parliament's use of religious Sophia's son became George I Duchess Dowager of Hanover,…is criteria to set the line of succession. in 1714, from whom all hereby declared to be the next in subsequent English monarchs succession…after His Majesty, and the are descended. Princess Anne of Denmark, and in default of issue of the said Princess Anne, and of His Majesty respectively…[and then to] the heirs of her body, being Protestants"
1 The official name of the act is "An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown and better securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject" Source for clauses is the Statutes of the Realm: Volume 7, 1695-1701 (1820) http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=46986, Date accessed: 09 July 2009 Selection? Repealed, General comments, limited, or in force including on the Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? relevance to property rights and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That whosoever shall hereafter come A further increment in the exclusion of William was a dissenter, and to the possession of this Crown, shall Catholics from power. The Bill of Rights George I had not been raised as join in communion with the Church of of 1689 extended to the monarchy previous an Anglican.4 Effective in England, as by law established" legislation that had excluded Catholics 1714; implementation not from office, but the Bill did not mention certain until then.5 communion, which had been a stipulation for all office holders in the Test Act of 1673.2 This clause extends that provision of that Test Act to the monarchy. The Coronation Oath Act 1688 had already stipulated that all future monarchs should swear an oath to "maintaine the laws of God the true profession of the Gospell and the Protestant reformed religion established by law".3
2 Maer (2009 p. 8) 3 Maer and Gay (2008 p. 3). See 'William and Mary, 1688: An Act for Establishing the Coronation Oath. [Chapter VI. Rot. Parl. pt. 5. nu. 3.]', Statutes of the Realm: volume 6: 1685- 94 (1819), pp. 56-57. URL: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=46292&strquery=Coronation Oath Act 1688 Date accessed: 09 July 2009. 4 Morris (1998, p. 105) 5 Applies to most clauses of the Act of Settlement, which states that a limitation of many aspects of its application is "after the death of His Majesty and the Princess Anne of Denmark, and in default of issue of the body of the said Princess, and of His Majesty respectively", which ex post meant 1714, but at the time was uncertain.
Table 2, page 2 Selection? Repealed, General comments, limited, or in force including on the Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? relevance to property rights and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That in case the Crown...shall A reaction to William's European wars in Effective in 1714; Power over taxation was hereafter come to any person, not being protection of the Dutch nation.6 The implementation not certain until the way in which a native of this Kingdom of England, Commons used the precedent of the Act for then. Relevant only from 1714 Parliaments could enforce this nation be not obliged to engage in the Marriage of Queen Mary to Philip of to 1760.8 By defending their this clause. This was any war for the defence of any Spain of 1554.7 own interests in Hanover, needed because it was dominions or territories which do not George I and George II were simply not clear what was belong to the Crown of England, widely considered to be acting a breach of this clause.10 without the consent of Parliament." unconstitutionally, especially during 1717-18 and 1742-45.9
"That no person who shall hereafter A reaction to William's absences. A Effective in 1714; George I requested repeal come to the possession of this Crown, similar clause was in the Ordinances of implementation not certain until and then abused the shall go out of the dominions of 1311, which were repealed in 1322.11 then. Repealed in 1716.12 freedom that it gave him, England, Scotland, or Ireland, without being absent for half of the consent of Parliament" 1716, and again in 1719, 1720, 1723, 1725–6, and 1727.13
6 Tarkow (1943 p. 546); Horwitz (1977 p. 283) 7 Horwitz (1977 p. 283); for the relevant portion of the Act, see Adams and Stephens (1916 p. 287). 8 George III and all subsequent monarchs were born in Britain. 9 Harris (2007) 10 Harris (2007) 11 Prestwich (2005 p.178-184) 12 Harris (2007 p. 203) 13 Hatton (1978 p. 158)
Table 2, page 3 Selection? Repealed, General comments, limited, or in force including on the Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? relevance to property rights and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"...all matters and things relating to the Parliament's attempt to exert greater control To be effective in 1714, but A failed attempt to solve a well governing of this Kingdom, which over the King's ministers.14 repealed in 1705, before it problem, which was are properly cognizable in the Privy became effective.15 Had this solved later through a Council by the laws and customs of this provision not been repealed the Hayekian process. "…A Realm, shall be translated there, and all development of government in later age discovered a resolutions taken thereupon shall be England would have been remedy for these evils, signed by such of the Privy Council as radically different, given the through transferring to shall advise and consent to the same" implied inhibitions on Cabinet Parliament, by a very government.16 circuitous process, the nomination of Ministers. This remedy was brought about by indirect means, and through a combination of circumstances which no wisdom could have foreseen."17
14 Tarkow (1943 p. 547-551) 15 Townsend (1877 p. 12) 16 Dicey (1877 p. 138) 17 Dicey (1877 p. 138)
Table 2, page 4 Selection? Repealed, General comments, limited, or in force including on the Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? relevance to property rights and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"...no person born out of the Kingdoms A reaction against William's Dutch Effective in 1714; Restricted property rights of England, Scotland, or Ireland... advisers and of his land grants in Ireland to implementation not certain until of non-citizens. (although he be naturalized or made a his followers. The Commons used the then. Clause strengthened in denizen, except such as are born of precedent of the Act for the Marriage of 1714 by a law specifying that English parents) shall be capable to be Queen Mary to Philip of Spain of 1554.18 naturalization had to be of the Privy Council, or a member of Some restrictions on aliens already in accompanied with a condition either House of Parliament, or to enjoy Common Law. This clause broadened that the new citizen could not any office or place of trust, either civil restrictions and removed the possibility that sit in Parliament.20 or military, or to have any grant of these restrictions could be circumvented by lands, tenements or hereditaments from naturalization.19 the Crown, to himself or to any other or others in trust for him"
18 Horwitz (1977 p. 283); for the relevant portion of the Act, see Adams and Stephens (1916 p. 286). 19 Tarkow (1943 p. 551-553) 20 Tarkow (1943 p. 553)
Table 2, page 5 Selection? Repealed, General comments, limited, or in force including on the Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? relevance to property rights and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That no person who has an office or Commons' reaction against William's Greatly weakened by statute in By the nineteenth century, place of profit under the King, or attempts to heavily influence the workings 1705-1707, so that the crown relevant rules were spread receives a pension from the Crown, of the House.21 had ample scope to give over 116 statutes.26 "Had shall be capable of serving as a member appointments to those in the [this clause] ever come of the House of Commons" Commons.22 Holders of offices into play it must have created before 1705 could altered the whole history resign from Parliament and of the House of then be re-elected.23 Later, Commons; no minister of some holders of newly created the king would ever have offices were exempted from been able to sit there."27 this provision.24 The re- election stipulation was removed in 1926.25
21 Horwitz (1977 p. 283) 22 Townsend (1877 p. 12) 23 Pugh (2002 p. 351) 24 Maitland (1931 p. 292) 25 Rosevare (1969) p. 73; Pugh (2002 p. 352) 26 Townsend (1877 p. 12) 27 Maitland (1931 p. 292)
Table 2, page 6 Selection? Repealed, General comments, limited, or in force including on the Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? relevance to property rights and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"...judges commissions be made James I dismissed only one judge, Coke, Effective in 1714; Most significant clause of quamdiu se bene gesserint [during good for political reasons.28 Charles I accepted implementation not certain until the Act that directly behavior], and their salaries ascertained quamdiu se bene gesserint in 1641 and then. Appointments could be relates to property rights, and established; but upon the address of abided by it.29 Cromwell accepted all ended on accession of a new government finance, and both Houses of Parliament it may be sitting judges and appointed judges monarch until 1761.35 On death religion. Clause not lawful to remove them" quamdiu se bene gesserint.30 Charles II of William III, all judges applicable to Lord accepted quamdiu se bene gesserint from resigned, all but two being Chancellor, who was the 1660-1672.31 James II did not. A stronger reappointed.36 Judicial chief judge of the version of this clause was omitted from the appointments were also Chancery Court, which Bill of Rights even though it was in the terminated in 1714 (3), and handled a majority of first draft of the Declaration of Rights,32 1727 (1).37 Monarch paid part property cases. Since the but William abided by quamdiu se bene of the salaries of judges until Lords had a veto over the gesserint. William vetoed a bill in 1692 to 1761.38 After 1714, judges still removal of judges, the establish mandatory quamdiu se bene receive much pay from disciplining effect of the gesserint because the bill charged the litigants.39 Clause interpreted Commons on judges was judges' salaries to his hereditary revenues.33 as applying to superior court constrained. An act of 1696 made all appointments last judges and not to lower level for six months while a new monarch courts.40 Clause not applicable replaced an old one.34 to Lord Chancellor, the minister in charge of the legal system.
28 Johnson (1837 p. 334) 29 Haynes (1944 p. 63) 30 Black (1976). Firth and Rait (1911 pp. 1226-1227) 31 McIlwain (1913 p. 223); Haynes (1944 p. 72) 32 Horwitz (1977 p. 366-7) 33 Horwitz (1977 p. 75-76), Prest (1991 p. 85)
Table 2, page 7
34 McIlwain (1913 p. 224) ; 7 & 8 W.III. c. 27. § 20 35 Prest (1991 p. 82) 36 Jay (1997 p. 20-21); Klerman and Mahoney (2005 p. 11) 37 Klerman and Mahoney (2005 p. 11-12); Haynes (1944 p. 79) 38 May (1896 p. 243) 39 Prest (1991 p. 87) 40 Jennings (1933 p. 216-217)
Table 2, page 8 Selection? Repealed, General comments, limited, or in force including on the Clause1 Inheritance or novelty? unconditionally? relevance to property rights and government finance or to religion and foreign policy.
"That no pardon under the Great Seal of Impeachment of the King's ministers Some later debate over whether England be pleadable to an occurred many times in the seventeenth the restriction was solely during impeachment by the Commons in century without intervention by the the impeachment process. Parliament." monarch.41 In 1678, the Commons voted to George I issued pardons after impeach Danby, a minister of Charles II. an impeachment in 1715,49 Charles dissolved Parliament in order to which Whigs thought save Danby from the trial. The new inconsistent with his powers Parliament resumed the case and after under their interpretation of this Charles issued a pardon to stop the trial the clause of the Act. Blackstone Commons declared in April 1679 "that provides an interpretation there was no precedent that ever any inconsistent with that of the pardon was granted to any person Whigs and consistent with pre- impeached by the commons of high 1701 practice.50 treason, or other high crimes, depending the impeachment"42 a claim that seems to have been valid.43 Charles dismissed Danby, but this did not appease Parliament: Danby was eventually imprisoned.44 This clause was included in the first draft, but not the final version, of the Declaration of Rights.45 On 6 June 1689, the Commons restated their previous claim: "that a pardon is not pleadable in bar of an impeachment."46 William III did not attempt to pardon any impeachments.47 Before 1701 there was no claim that a king was prevented from issuing a pardon after the trial in the Lords.48
Table 2, page 9
41 For example Mompesson, Michell and Bacon (1621), Middlesex (1624), Buckingham (1626), Strafford (1641), Laud (1645), and Clarendon (1667). See Tarkow (1943 p. 559). 42 Blackstone (1769 p. 392) 43 Harris (2006 p. 177) 44 Lodge (1910 p 158-160), Tarkow (1943 p. 559-560) 45 Horwitz (1977 p. 366-7) 46 Blackstone (1769 p.392) 47 Horwitz (1977) passim. 48 Hallam (1827 p. 466-7). Blackstone (1769 p.392) 49 Blackstone (1769 p.392) 50 Blackstone (1769 p. 392-393)
Table 2, page 10 References to works cited in this table but not cited in the text of "Design and Evolution"
Adams, George Burton and Henry Morse Stephens. (1916) Select Documents of English Constitutional History. New York: MacMillan.
Black, Stephen (1976) "Coram Protectore: The judges of Westminster Hall under the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell," The American Journal of Legal History: 32-64.
Blackstone, William (1769) Commentaries on the Law of England, Vol. 4 Of Public Wrongs (1769) facsimile edition with introductions by Thomas A. Green (1979). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dicey, Albert Venn (1887) The Privy Council London: MacMillan.
Hallam, Henry, (1827) The Constitutional History of England. Volume III. From the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George II. Paris : L Baudry.
Harris, Bob. 2007. "Hanover and the Public Sphere", in Brenda Simms and Torsten Riotte. (2007). The Hanoverian dimension in British History, 1714-1837. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 183-212.
Harris, Tim (2006) Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy 1685-1720 Allen Lane.
Hatton, Ragnhild (1978). George I. London: Thames and Hudson.
Haynes, Evan (1944) The Selection And Tenure Of Judges. Newark, N.J. : National Conference of Judicial Councils.
Horwitz, Henry (1977) Parliament, Policy and Politics in the Reign of William III. Newark: University of Delaware Press.
Jay, Stuart. (1997). Most Humble Servants: The Advisory Role of Early Judges. New Haven: Yale University Press
Jennings, W. I. (1933) The Law and the Constitution. London: University of London Press.
Johnson, Cuthbert William. (1837) The Life of Sir Edward Coke. London: Henry Colburn, Publisher.
Klerman, Daniel and Paul Mahoney. (2005) “The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England” American Law and Economics Review 7(1) : 1-27.
Lodge, Richard (1910) The History of England: From the Restoration to the Death of William II. London: Longmans, Green and Co. Maer, Lucinda. (2009) “The Act of Settlement and the Protestant Succession.” House of Commons Library. http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-00683.pdf
Maer, Lucinda and Oonagh Gay (2008) "The Coronation Oath" http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc- 00435.pdf.
Maitland, F. W. (1931) The Constitutional History of England - A Course of Lectures Delivered By F. W. Maitland. Cambridge: University Press
May, Thomas Erskine (1896) Constitutional History of England since the Accession of George the Third. Boston: Crosby Nichols.
McIlwain, C. H. (1913). “The Tenure of English Judges” The American Political Science Review, 7( 2) : 217-229
Morris, Marilyn (1998). The British Monarchy and the French Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press
Prest, Wilfrid. (1991). “Judicial Corruption in Early Modern England” Past and Present, 133 : 67-95
Prestwich, M. (1990). English Politics in the Thirteenth Century. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Prestwich, M. (2005). Plantagenet England: 1225–1360. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pugh, Martin (2002) ’Queen Anne is dead’: The Abolition of Ministerial By-Elections, 1867-1926” Parliamentary History 21(3) : 351-366
Roseveare, Henry. (1969). The Treasury: The Evolution of the British Constitution. New York: Columbia University Press.
Schwoerer, Lois. (2000) “To Hold and Bear Arms: The English Perspective” Chicago-Kent Law Review, 76: 27- 60
Tarkow, Naamani (1943). “The Significance of the Act of Settlement in the Evolution of English Democracy” Political Science Quarterly, 58(4) : 537-561
Townsend, George H. (1877) The Manual of Dates. London: Frederick Warne & Co.
Table 2, page 12 Fuller version of Table 3: Data series: definitions, sources and summary statistics
Std. Variable Description Source Years Obs. Mean Dev.
Property offenses as Percentage of all crimes reported in The Proceedings of Old Bailey 1674- 50 0.699 0.114 % of all crime* the Old Bailey that fall in the area of property (arson, Proceedings Online 1726 fraud, forgery, theft, burglary, embezzlement, game (2009) offences, housebreaking, larceny, receiving stolen goods, shoplifting, robbery and piracy.)
Severity of Percentage of punishments for property crimes that Old Bailey 1674- 49 0.443 0.200 punishment for include death, transportation, and imprisonment. Proceedings Online 1726 property offenses* (2009)
Level of consumer An index of the prices of cereals, animal products, Schumpeter (1938) 1661- 80 105.8 13.14 prices (Schumpeter) beverages and condiments, candles and coal, and 1740 clothing. 1701 = 100
Growth of consumer Percentage growth of above index Schumpeter (1938) 1662- 79 -0.1 6.7 prices (Schumpeter) 1740
Level of producer An index of the prices of bricks, coal, copper, glue, Schumpeter (1938) 1661- 80 95.58 9.483 prices (Schumpeter) hemp, lead, leather backs, lime, pan-tiles, plain tiles, 1740 tallow and train oil. 1701=100
Growth of producer Percentage growth of above index Schumpeter (1938) 1662- 79 -0.2 4.6 prices (Schumpeter) 1740
Level of bread prices Average price of wheaten or household bread in Mitchell (1988), ch. 1640- 118 5.659 1.250 (Mitchell) London in pence per pound 14, table 22 1757
Growth of bread Percentage growth of above index Mitchell (1988) 1641- 117 0.015 0.171 prices (Mitchell) 1757 Std. Variable Description Source Years Obs. Mean Dev.
Level of Wheat Average of the price of wheat in Exeter, Eton, and Mitchell (1988), ch. 1640- 121 35.82 9.769 Prices (Mitchell) Winchester Colleges in shillings per Winchester 14, table 16 1760 quarter
Growth of wheat Percentage growth of above index Mitchell (1988) 1641- 120 2.5 24.3 prices (Mitchell) 1760
Level of beer Volume of beer charged with duty in England and Mitchell (1988), ch. 8, 1684- 43 2979 342 production Wales. Average of strong beer and small beer. table 3a 1726
Growth of beer Percentage growth of above index Mitchell (1988), ch. 8, 1685- 42 -0.1 4.9 production table 3a 1726
Level of spirits Volume of home produced spirits charged with duty for Mitchell (1988), ch. 8 1684- 43 1692 1010 production consumption in England and Wales. table 5 1726
Growth of spirits Percentage growth of above index Mitchell (1988), ch. 8 1685- 42 0.058 0.134 production table 5 1726
% unfunded Unfunded debt as a percentage of total debt. Funded Mitchell (1988), ch. 1691- 36 49.6 32.2 government debt debt is that for which Parliament has specified a 11 table 7 1726 (Mitchell) particular revenue stream for debt service.
% unfunded Mitchell's series amended to include stocks and Quinn (2006) 1691- 36 0.392 0.278 government debt irredeemable annuities. 1726 (Quinn)
Works in 'Early Number of works in each year included in Early Early English Prose 1660- 41 1.683 1.650 English Prose English Prose Fiction, a ‘balanced and representative Fiction (2009) 1700 Fiction' survey of fictional prose in English from the period 1500–1700, comprising more than 200 works.’
Table 3, page 2 Std. Variable Description Source Years Obs. Mean Dev.
English publications Number of English publications each year included in English Short Title 1640- 121 1615 540.8 in British Library the English Short Title Catalogue of the British library. Catalogue (2009) 1760
English publications Number of English publications in each year included Early English Books 1660- 41 1146 477.2 in EEBO in Early English Books Online. Online (2009) 1700
Exchange rate, Average of monthly exchange rate data, expressed in Mitchell(1988), ch. 1640- 99 34.19 1.257 Hamburg, schillings per pound sterling 12, table 22 1760 schilling/£*
Exchange rate, Paris, Average of monthly exchange data, in ecu per pound Mitchell (1988), ch. 1640- 97 0.025 0.008 ecu/£ * sterling. 12, table 22 1760
Real GDP Index of real GDP, using data constructed from the Broadberry and van 1640- 121 98.92 14.57 output side. 1700= 100. Leeuwen (2010); 1760 Apostilides et al. (2008)
Growth in real GDP Percentage growth in the above index. as above 1640- 121 0.6 5.1 1760
Number of estate acts Number of acts passed by Parliament that restructured Bogart and 1640- 107 13.05 10.71 ** rights to real and equitable estates for years when Richardson (2010) 1760 Parliament in session
Level of arable prices Index of prices of wheat, rye, barley, oats, peas, beans, Clark (2003) 1640- 121 57.70 10.34 (Clark) potatoes, hops, straw, mustard seed, and saffron. 1760
Growth of arable Percentage growth of arable prices, as defined above. Clark (2003) 1640- 121 0.8 13.8 prices (Clark) 1760
Level of pasture Index of prices of hay, cheese, butter, milk, beef, Clark (2003) 1640- 121 48.55 4.446 prices (Clark) mutton, pork, bacon, tallow, wool, and eggs. 1760
Table 3, page 3 Std. Variable Description Source Years Obs. Mean Dev.
Growth of pasture Percentage growth of pasture prices, as defined above. Clark (2003) 1640- 121 0.1 6.8 prices (Clark) 1760
Level of wood prices Index of prices of firewood and timber, Clark (2003) 1640- 121 88.26 8.435 (Clark) 1760
Growth of wood Percentage growth in the above index. Clark (2003) 1640- 121 4.49 10.5 prices (Clark) 1760
Level of farm prices Index of prices of farm output, which include arable, Clark (2003) 1640- 121 54.53 6.902 (Clark) pasture, wood, and cider/honey prices. 1760
Growth of farm Percentage growth in the above index. Clark (2003) 1640- 121 0.3 8.9 prices (Clark) 1760
Nominal farm wages Wages for all farm work carried out between October Clark (2001) 1670- 61 10.30 0.437 (Clark) and May, and for regular farm operations carried out in 1730 the summer months.
Growth of nominal Percentage growth in the above index Clark (2001) 1671- 60 0.2 5.0 farm wages (Clark) 1730
Real agricultural Index of real output estimated from capital employed in Clark(2002) 1600- 21 54.83 5.955 output (Clark)** farming per acre, adjusted using a price index. 1800
Growth of real Percentage growth in the above index. Clark(2002) 1610- 20 1.3 7.3 agricultural output 1800 (Clark)**
Real agricultural Above real output index divided by number of males Clark(2002) 1600- 21 77.45 7.23 output per farm involved in farming. 1800 worker (Clark)**
Table 3, page 4 Std. Variable Description Source Years Obs. Mean Dev.
Growth of real Percentage growth in the above index. Clark(2002) 1610- 20 0.2 8.0 agricultural output 1800 per farm worker (Clark)**
Real wages of Average wage of building laborers in London, deflated Allen (2001) 1640- 121 7.28 0.96 laborers using the consumer price index defined below 1760
Growth of real wages Percentage growth in the above index Allen (2001) 1640- 121 0.6 9.1 of laborers 1760
Real wages of Average wage of craftsmen in London deflated using Allen (2001) 1640- 121 10.7 1.41 craftsmen the consumer price index defined below 1760
Growth of real wages Percentage growth in the above index. Allen (2001) 1640- 121 0.4 8.9 of craftsmen 1760
Level of real wages Level of wages deflated using the consumer price index Allen (1992) 1640- 121 13.76 1.32 (Allen) defined below. 1760
Growth of real wages Percentage growth in the above index. Allen (1992) 1640- 121 0.2 4.1 (Allen) 1760
Level of consumer An index of the prices of goods consumed by those at Allen (1992) 1640- 121 0.880 0.087 prices (Allen) the poverty line. 1760
Growth of consumer Percentage growth in the above index. Allen (1992) 1640- 121 0.049 4.7 prices (Allen) 1760
Level of real rent per Average per acre of land rents in shillings Allen(1992) 1640- 121 11.14 2.110 acre 1760
Growth of real rent Percentage growth in rent per acre Allen(1992) 1640- 121 0.5 4.7 per acre 1760
Table 3, page 5 Std. Variable Description Source Years Obs. Mean Dev.
Number of Patents Number of patents issued in a given year Sullivan (1989) 1661- 80 5.550 4.48 1740
Growth of Number Percentage growth in number of patents issued Sullivan (1989) 1662- 75 22.5 112.2 of Patents* 1740
Number of Patents, Index of economic significance of number of patents Sullivan (1989) 1661- 80 9.400 8.32 Weighted by issued by weighting each patent by number of 1740 Significance industries to which it might be applied.
Growth of Number Percentage growth in the above index. Sullivan (1989) 1662- 75 4.61 185.8 of Patents, Weighted 1740 by Significance*
Level of direct tax Total collected from direct taxes (thousands of £ O'Brien and Hunt 1655- 90 1225 680.1 revenues sterling in constant prices) (1993) 1745
Growth of direct tax Percentage growth of total collections of direct taxes O'Brien and Hunt 1656- 89 15.0 75.6 revenues (1993) 1745
Level of indirect tax Total revenues from indirect taxes (thousands of £ O'Brien and Hunt 1655- 90 2623 1531 revenues sterling in constant prices) (1993) 1745
Growth of indirect Percentage growth of total collections of indirect taxes O'Brien and Hunt 1656- 89 4.1 21.6 tax revenues (1993) 1745
Level of government Total government revenues from all sources (thousands O'Brien and Hunt 1655- 90 3997 1995 revenues of £ sterling in constant prices) (1993) 1745
Growth of Percentage growth of total government revenues from O'Brien and Hunt 1656- 89 4.2 24.2 government revenues all sources (1993) 1745
Notes: *Some years missing in the data series; **observations are decadal, not yearly
Table 3, page 6 Methodological Appendix: Estimating structural breaks in growth rates
A change in growth rates is the most likely scenario for the beginning of development.
However, seventeenth and eighteenth century English growth-rate data are very noisy and lead to tests of low power. Given close-to-zero growth either before or after structural breaks and given levels that change slowly and are therefore much less noisy, analysis of levels could provide valuable information. This appendix reflects upon the information content of estimated breaks in levels when the data generating process is one of a break in growth rates.
Several theoretical papers have relevance. If there is a non-zero growth rate and levels variables are integrated of degree one, the theory of Andrews (1993), Bai (1997), and Bai and
Perron (1998) does not necessarily apply to estimates of breaks in levels. This does not mean that estimates following their methods are meaningless, but rather that the only theoretical underpinning is by analogy with the case where the theoretical results do apply. Nunes, Kuan, and Newbold (1995) suggest that an estimate of a break in a process that is integrated of degree one is biased toward the middle of the sample. Bai (1998) provides a proof of this observation.
Hence, some of this paper's results could reflect biases that make estimated breaks closer to
1700, which is usually the midpoint of the data. Since the design hypothesis predicts structural breaks that cluster close to 1700 and the evolution hypothesis does not, there is a bias toward supporting the former. This bias merely serves to strengthen the conclusion that this paper ultimately draws.
To explore this issue further, simulations were conducted. The simulations use Section 4's model to generate artificial data, but assume that the design hypothesis is correct:
y α ε t 1640,1641,...,1699 tt1 yttα2 ε t 1700,1701,...,1760, α 2 α 1 .
Methodological Appendix page 1 with yt a growth rate. The objective is to examine whether there is a bias against acceptance of
the design hypothesis when using levels data generated by a process reflecting that hypothesis.
Two separate simulations reflect the properties of the two types of economic data that are
predominant in Section 4—production and price variables. A typical scenario for inflation
during 1640-1760 has rates of 2% or 3% before the break and declines in inflation of 0 to 3
percentage points thereafter. Similarly, real growth has rates of -1% or 0% before the break and
increases in growth of 0 to 3 percentage points after. The standard deviation of the error term is
chosen to correspond to the typical scenario, equal to 10 percentage points. Each data point in
the figures below reflects a mean of 100 simulations.
Figures A.1(a) and A.1(b) present estimates of breakdates assuming an unknown break in
growth rates. Estimates are close to 1700, as expected. As in Section 4, very few of the
estimates are significant at conventional levels.
Figure A.1(a): Estimates of the year of a structural break in inflation given a structural break in inflation in 1700, by initial inflation rate and decrease in inflation rate
Initial inflation rate is 2% Initial inflation rate is 3%
1740 1740
1720 1720
1700 1700
1680 1680
Estimated year of structural break structural of year Estimated 1660 1660 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 Decrease in inflation rate
Methodological Appendix page 2 Figure A.1(b): Estimates of the year of a structural break in growth given a structural break in growth in 1700, by initial growth rate and increase in growth rate
Initial growth rate is -1% Initial growth rate is zero
1740 1740
1720 1720
1700 1700
1680 1680
Estimated year of structural break in inflation in break structural of year Estimated 1660 1660 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 Increase in growth rate
Figures A.2(a) and A.2(b) show estimates of breakdates assuming an unknown break in
levels. (That is, the data has a growth-break, but the estimating procedures assume a levels
break.) For inflation, all estimates are after or close to 1700. There is no bias whatsoever toward
rejection of design and acceptance of evolution. For real growth, two-thirds of estimates are
after or close to 1700. Notably, all estimates that reflect an assumed positive growth rate after
1700—the very essence of development—are close to or after 1700. Again, there is no
suggestion of a bias toward rejection of the timing hypothesized by the design approach.
Methodological Appendix page 3 Figure A.2(a): Estimates of the year of a structural break in price level given a structural break in inflation in 1700, by initial inflation rate and decrease in inflation rate
Initial inflation rate is 2% Initial inflation rate is 3%
1740 1740
1720 1720
1700 1700
1680 1680
Estimated year of structural break in level price in break structural of year Estimated 1660 1660 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 Decrease in inflation rate
Figure A.2(b): Estimates of the year of a structural break in level given a structural break in growth in 1700, by initial growth rate and increase in growth rate
Initial growth rate is -1% Initial growth rate is zero
1740 1740
1720 1720
1700 1700
1680 1680
Estimated year of structural break in level in break structural of year Estimated 1660 1660 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 Increase in growth rate
Notably, as in Section 4, most estimates of structural breaks in Figures A.2(a) and A.2(b) are
statistically significant at conventional levels. This suggests that the scenario captured in the
simulations matches the reality of the seventeenth century as reflected in the data of Section 4.
Methodological Appendix page 4 Figures A.3(a) and A.3(b) show the differences between the two sets of estimates of
structural breaks. Although A.3(a) and A.3(b) simply reflect the previous two sets of Figures,
they exhibit a crucial point. Estimates of growth breakdates, which are unbiased, are earlier in
time than the corresponding estimates of levels breaks in over 75% of cases. This is similar to
the patterns appearing in estimates presented in the text, suggesting, again, that the results from
the levels variables in the text are not biased against acceptance of the design hypothesis.
Figure A.3(a): Differences betweeen estimated years of breaks in price levels and in inflation given a break in inflation in 1700, by initial inflation rate and decrease in inflation rate
Initial inflation rate is 2% Initial inflation rate is 3%
40 40
20 20
0 0
-20 -20
-40 -40 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 Decrease in inflation rate Estimated break-year for price levels minus estimated for break-year inflation
Methodological Appendix page 5 Figure A.3(b): Differences betweeen estimated years of breaks in levels and in growth given a break in growth in 1700, by initial growth rate and increase in growth rate
Initial growth rate is -1% Initial growth rate is zero
40 40
20 20
0 0
-20 -20
-40 -40
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 Estimated break-year for levels minus estimated break-year for growth Increase in growth rate
To show this in a straightforward way, Figures A.4(a)-A.4(b) separate the results reported in
the text into those for growth and those for levels. These figures clearly show that if the process
is one of an increase in growth, estimations of breakdates using data on levels biases the findings
toward later estimates of change. Of the 24 series for which both levels and growth rates are
examined, 16 have the break in growth appearing before the break in the level with the mean
values of both series changing in the same direction. This pattern is the one to be expected when
a slowly growing economy undergoes change, as the above clearly shows. Of those 16 cases, 8
are measures of production, factor returns, or inventive activity and 7 increase after the breaks.
(The exception is beer production, which decreases in the 1690's probably due to the imposition
of a new tax). Eight are price measures, 7 of which decrease. (The exception is for wood, a
commodity in inelastic supply whose relative price would increase if there were general
improvements in economic activity.)
Methodological Appendix page 6 Figures A.4(a): Estimated breakdates for growth variable
Figures A.4(b): Estimated breakdates for levels variables
Methodological Appendix page 7
This exercise, an examination of biases in estimates of levels breakdates when there is a break in the growth process, serves to validate the empirical approach of Section 4 and support the interpretation of the results given there. Estimates of growth breakdates are unbiased.
Estimates of levels breakdates are generally biased upwards (i.e., later in time than they should be), that is biased toward acceptance of the design hypothesis and against acceptance of the evolution hypothesis. Growth estimates are usually insignificant, reflecting noise in the data, while levels estimates are significant, reflecting the lower amount of noise in levels. These patterns of results in the simulations match the patterns of results in the empirical exercises of
Section 4.
References to works cited in this Methodological Appendix but not cited in the text of "Design and Evolution"
Bai, Jushan. (1998). "A Note On Spurious Break." Econometric Theory, 14, 663-669.
Nunes, Luis, Chung-Ming Kuan, and Paul Newbold. 1995. "Spurious Break" Econometric Theory, 11, 736-749.
Methodological Appendix page 8