Handbook of Behaviorism

Home , Functional contextualism

HANDBOOK

BEHAVIORISM

EDITED BY

WILLIAM O'DONOHUE University of Nevada Reno, Nevada

RICHARD KITCHENER Colorado State University Ft. Collins, Colorado

ACADEMIC PRESS San Diego London Boston New York Sydney Tokyo Toronto CONTENTS

CONTRIBUTORS

PREFACE XIX

INTRODUCTION: THE BEHAVIORISMS

WILLIAM O'DONOHUE AND RICHARD F. KITCHENER

I. The Behaviorisms 1 A. Exegetical Problems 8 B. Emotional Reactions 9 C. Philosophy of Science, Scientific Theory, Methodology, Empirical Findings, and Clinical Implications 10 D. Behaviorism and the Effectiveness of Practical Problem Solving 10 E. American Character 11 F. Relationship Between Philosophical and Psychological Behaviorisms 12 G. QuoVadis? 12 References 13

WATSONIAN BEHAVIORISM EDWARD K. MORRIS AND JAMES T. TODD

I. Introduction 16 II. Intellectual, Cultural, and Individual Context 18

VII VII I CONTENTS A. Intellectual Context: Philosophy, Science, and Psychology 18 B. Cultural and Individual Context 22 III. Before Watsonian Behaviorism 25 A. Watson's Research Programs 26 B. Watson and Psychology in 1913 29 IV. Watsonian Behaviorism 30 A. Watson: 1913-1920 30 B. The Behaviorist Manifesto 32 C. "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It" 32 D. A Science of Behavior 45 V. After Watsonian Behaviorism 49 A. Watson: 1920-1936 49 B. Heredity and Environment 50 C. Applications to Child Rearing and Advertising 53 D. Watson: 1936-1958 56 VI. Conclusion 57 References 59

INTERBEHAVIORISM AND INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY

LINDA J. HAYES AND DEBRA W. FREDERICKS

I. Historical Background 73 A. Biography 73 B. The Evolution of Organismic Psychology 76 II. Ziggurat of Science and Civilization 77 A. Cultural Matrix 77 B. Protopostulates of Scientific Philosophy 78 C. Metasystem of the Sciences 80 D. Postulates of the Individual Sciences 81 III. Postulational System of Interbehavioral Psychology 81 A. Interbehavioral Fields as Subject Matter 81 B. Factors Participating in Interbehavioral Fields 81 IV. Psychological Events 83 A. General Classes of Interbehavior 83 B. Varieties of Psychological Events 85 V. Interbehaviorism and Radical Behaviorism 86 A. Similarities 86 B. Differences 87 VI. Relation to Empirical Evidence 89 CONTENTS IX A. Kantor's Contributions to Empirical Research 90 B. Others'Assessment of Kantor's Contributions 91 C. Sphere of Influence 91 D. Domains of Influence 91 VII. Current Status and Future Directions 92 VIII. Epilogue 93 References 93

EDWARD C. TOLMAN'S PURPOSIVE BEHAVIORISM

NANCY K. INNIS

I. Purposive Behaviorism 99 'A. A New Formula for Behaviorism 99 B Purposive Behavior in Amimals and Men 101 II. Operational Behaviorism 103 III. Performance Vectors 106 A. The Schematic Sowbug 106 B. Failure of the Schematic Sowbug 109 IV. From Rats and Sowbugs to Man 109 V. A Field Theory of Learning 110 A. Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men 111 B. Tolman 's Map Analogy 112 VI. The Psychology of Social Learning 113 VII. Edward Tolman: Purposive Behaviorist 115 Acknowledgments 115 References 116

CLARK L. HULL'S BEHAVIORISM

MICHAEL E. RASHOTTE AND ABRAM AMSEL

Introduction 120 Brief Biographical Sketch 120 I. Theoretical Style 122 A. Influence of Machines 122 X "CONTENTS B. Plan for Developing a Behavior Theory 123 C. Perspective on Hull's Attempt to Make a Formal Behavior Theory 126 D. Physiology and Hull—Spence Theory 127 II. S - R Analysis of Cognitive Processes 129 A. Knowledge, Foresight, Directing Ideas, and Purpose 129 B. Gestalt Phenomena 136 C. Habit-Family Hierarchies (Networks of Associations) 136 D.-Kenneth Spence's Analysis of Transposition 138 E. Application to Psychotherapy and Symbolic Processes 141 III. Conceptualizations of Reinforcement and Reward: Evolution of Hull's 1943 Theory 142 A. "Reinforcement" in Hull's 1943 Theory 143 B. Difficulties Recognized by Hull in 1943 144 C. The Elliott- Crespi—Zeaman Experiment 145 D. Spence's Contributions to Reward—Incentive Theory 147 E. Amsel's Frustration Theory: A Conditioning Model of Effects of Rewards and Nonreward 150 Concluding Comments 153 Acknowledgments 154 References 154

RADICAL BEHAVIORISM: B.F. SKINNER'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

JON RINGEN

I. Radical Behaviorism as Philosophy of Science 160 II. Radical Behaviorism: The Basic Issues 161 III. Radical Behaviorism and Mentalism 162 A. Privacy 162 B. Intentionality 164 IV. Radical Behaviorism and Knowledge 170 A. "Thinking" "Impossible" "Thoughts"? 171 B. Naturalism and "Knowledge?" 175 V. Summary 176 References 177 CONTENTS XI

EMPIRICAL BEHAVIORISM

SIDNEY W. BIJOU

I. Freud and Psychoanalysis 180 II. Watson and Behaviorism 180 III. Lewin and Field Theory 181 IV. Hull-Spence and Learning Theory 182 V. Skinner and ther Experimental Analysis of Behavior 184 VI. Empirical Behaviorism: Radical Behaviorism and Interbehaviorism 187 VII. The Influence of Empirical Behaviorism 189 VIII. Summary and Conclusion 190 References 190

TELEOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM

HOWARD RACHLIN

I. Final Causes 196 A. The Relation of Final Causes to Their Effects 197 B. Sensation and Imagination in De Anima 198 II. Causation in Physics 200 III. Causation in Classical and Modern Psychology 201 IV. Causation in Skinnerian Psychology 203 V. Teleological Behaviorism 208 A. Teleological Behaviorism and Modern Philosophy of Psychology 210 B. Utility Functions as Final Causes 212 Acknowledgments 213 References 213 XII CONTENTS

THEORETICAL BEHAVIORISM

J. E. R. STADDON

I. Cognitive Psychology 219 j A. Philosophical Objections to Cognitive Psychology 221 B. AI Objections to Cognitivism 223 II. Theoretical Behaviorism 224 A. The Model is the Behavior 224 B. Consciousness 229 III. Conclusion 238 Acknowledgments 239 References 239

BIOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM

WILLIAM TIMBERLAKE

I. Introduction 244 A. The Waning Hegonomy of Traditional Behaviorism 244 B. Biological Behaviorism: An Inclusive Approach 245 C. Chapter Preview 245 II. A Brief History of the Study of Behavior 246 A. Observation and Anthropomorphism 246 B. Training and Implicit Causal Models 247 C. Experimental Tests of Causation 248 III. Strengths and Limitations of Manipulation-Centered Behaviorism 249 A. Strengths of the Manipulation-Centered Approach 250 B. Limitations of the Manipulation-Centered Approach 251 IV. An Animal-Centered Biological Behaviorism 253 A. Animal-Centered Versus Anthropomorphic Observation 254 B. Animal-Centered Manipulations 257 C. An Animal-Centered Approach to Traditional Experimentation 258 D. Constructing an Animal-Centered Causal System Model 261 V. The Feeding Behavior System in Rats: A Causal System Model 263 A. Structure of the Feeding System 264 B. Regulation of a Behavior System 267 C. Characteristics of Animal-Centered Causal System Models of Behavior 268 XIII VI. Biological Behaviorism and Nonperipheral Causation 268 A. Evolution and Development 269 B. Physiology 270 C. Intervening Concepts 271 D. Mental Life 273 VII. Summary 276 References 277

1 1

FUNCTIONAL CONTEXTUALISM: A PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY , FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE

ELIZABETH V. GIFFORD AND STEVEN C. HAYES

I. Mechanism and Pragmatism: Basic Definitions 287 A. Mechanism- 287 B. Historical Traditions in Behaviorism 287 C. The Core of Pragmatism 288 D. A Pragmatic Approach to Philosophy of Science 290 II. Philosophical Inconsistency in Skinner's Writing 291 A. Dewey's Functional Definition of the Stimulus and Response 292 B. The Evolution of the Concept of the Stimulus 293 III. Contextualistic Behaviorism 294 A. An Interactive, Holistic Unit of Analysis 294 B. Flexible Units 295 C. Dynamic Change versus Static Structure 296 D. Causality and Utility 297 E. Functional Epistemology 299 F. Pragmatic Goals of Analysis 300 G. The Limits of James's Pragmatism 301 H. Summary 302 IV. Goals and Contextual Schools 303 A. Descriptive Contextualism 304 B. Strengths and Weaknesses 305 V. Functional Contextualism 306 A. Strengths 307 B. Scientific Theory 307 C. Behavior Analytic Rules for Action 308 D. Integrating Basic and Applied Research 309 E. Weakness 310 F. Contextualism and Relativism 310 XIV CONTENTS G. Verbal and Nonverbal Justification 311 H. Summary: Descriptive and Functional Contextualism 313 VI. Implications of Functional Contextualism: Expanding the Analysis of Private Events 313 A. Public/Private versus Physical/Mental 314 B. The Scientific Analysis of Private Events 314 VII. Criticisms of Functional Contextualism 316 A. Contextualism's Fidelity to its Assumptions and Promiscuity at Other Levels 317 B. Recent Criticism within Behavior Analysis 318 C. Functional Contextualism or Pragmatism? 321 VIII. Conclusion 321 References 322

WITTGENSTEIN'S BEHAVIORISM

DAVID BLOOR

I. Introduction 329 II. Behaviorism as a Family-Resemblance Concept 330 III. The Case for Behaviorism 332 IV. Sensations 335 V. Diaries and Manometers 339 VI. The Behaviorist Reading 341 VII. A Problem 343 VIII. The Institution of Use 344 IX. The Institution of Pain 348 X. The Private Diary as an Institution 350 XI. Assimilating Wittgenstein 353 XII. Figure and Ground 356 XIII. Conclusion 358 References 359

RYLE'S BEHAVIORISM

ULLIN T. PLACE

I. Gilbert Ryle 362 II. OUR-Behaviorism versus OR-Behaviorism 362 CONTENTS XV HI. Ryle's Debt to Wittgenstein 364 A. Philosophy as Linguistic Clarification 365 B. Logical Grammar 365 C. Ordinary Language 366 D. Dispositions 366 E. Aspect and Ontology 367 F. Reasons and Causes 368 IV. What is in Wittgenstein, But Not in Ryle 369 A. Language Games 369 , B. Linguistic Rules 369 V. Ryle's Innovations: The Failures 370 A. "The Ghost in the Machine " 370 B. Categories, Category Differences, and Category Mistakes 371 C. "Knowing How" and "Knowing That" 373 VI. Ryle's Innovations: The Achievements 374 A. Restricting Conceptual Analysis to On-Duty Sentences 374 B. The Method of Verification as a Clue to Meaning 376 C. The Hypothetical Analysis of Dispositional Statements 378 D. A Comprehensive Survey of Commonsense Psychology 379 E. Most, But Not All, Ordinary Psychological Concepts are Dispositional 379 VII. Ryle's Critics 380 A. Place (1954) 381 B. Geach(1957) 383 C. Medlin(1967) 386 D. Armstrong (1968) 391 E. Martin (1994) 393 VIII. Conclusion 395 References 397

LOGICAL BEHAVIORISM

RICHARD F. KITCHENER

I. Introduction 399 II. The Varieties of Philosophical Behaviorism 400 III. Logical Behaviorism and Psychological Behaviorism 402 IV. Logical Behaviorism and Semantic Behaviorism: Physicalism 403 V. Is Logical Behaviorism a Behaviorism at All? 405 VI. The Semantics of Logical Behaviorism 407 VII. Carnaps's "Naturalistic" Semantics 409 XVI CONTENTS VIII. Conclusion 415 References 416

QUINE'S BEHAVIORISM

ROGER E. GIBSON

I. Introduction 419 II. Stage Setting 420 III. Quine's Behaviorism/Empiricism 422 IV. Behaviorism and Philosophy of Language 424 A. Meaning, Synonymy, and Analyticity 424 B. Language-Learning 427 C. Translation and Indeterminacy 429 V. Philosophy of Mind 432 VI. Conclusion 434 References 435

SUBJECT INDEX 437