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The Behavior Analyst 2003, 26, 215-231 No. 2 (Fall) Behavior Analysis and Social Constructionism: Some Points of Contact and Departure Bryan Roche and Dermot Barnes-Holmes National University of Ireland, Maynooth

Social constructionists occasionally single out behavior analysis as the field of psychology that most closely resembles the natural sciences in its commitment to empiricism, and accuses it of suffering from many of the limitations to science identified by the postmodernist movement (e.g., K. J. Gergen, 1985a; Soyland, 1994). Indeed, behavior analysis is a natural science in many respects. However, it also shares with social constructionism important epistemological features such as a rejection of mentalism, a functional-analytic approach to language, the use of interpretive methodologies, and a reflexive stance on analysis. The current paper outlines briefly the key tenets of the behavior-analytic and social constructionist perspectives before examining a number of common- alties between these approaches. The paper aims to show that far from being a nemesis to social constructionism, behavior analysis may in fact be its close ally. Key words: contextualism, social constructionism, behavioral hermeneutics, behavior analysis, discursive psychology, postmodemism

Social constructionism represents a radical brands as metaphysical social powerful intellectual movement within constructionism, and he sharply distin- psychology and related fields. Its influ- guished these varieties from more ence can be traced to the earliest re- moderate empirical varieties, such as search in the field of psychophysics that espoused by K. J. Gergen (1973, (see Zuriff, 1998) and it continues to 1982, 1985a, 1989). In any form, how- influence several domains within psy- ever, social constructionism can be chology today, perhaps most notably, seen as attempting to undermine di- social psychology (e.g., K. J. Gergen, rectly the scientific and empirical char- 1985a). Social constructionism is, to acter of psychology and, in particular, say the least, a difficult movement to the experimental analysis of behavior define. Indeed, the field appears to es- (e.g., K. J. Gergen, 1985a; see also chew self-consciously any definition as Soyland, 1994). part of its overarching concern with the In what follows, we will provide an prevalence of empiricism, positivism, outline of the behavior-analytic and so- and reductionism within psychology. cial constructionist stances. We will In its most extreme form, social con- then consider several important distinc- structionism appears to deny altogether tions between these two approaches to the possibility of an empirical psy- psychology, as well as many important chology and the accumulative approx- points of contact, that suggest shared imation of effective knowledge philosophical strands. An open explo- through experimentation (e.g., Bohan, ration of these issues should serve to 1992; Potter, 1988; Prilleltensky, raise the level of discourse within our 1989). Zuriff (1998) identified such field regarding social constructionism as a matter of increasing concern to a An early version of this paper was presented wide variety of psychologists. Such at the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group conference, London, 1998. We thank two discussion is of particular importance anonymous reviewers for their constructive to behavior analysts insofar as we are comments. often isolated as a field within psy- Requests for reprints may be sent to Bryan chology and have been explicitly tar- Roche, Department of Psychology, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Co. geted as a primary nemesis of social Kildare, Ireland (e-mail: Bryan.T.Roche@ constructionism (e.g., K. J. Gergen, may.ie). 1985a). 215 216 BRYAN ROCHE & DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES

The current exercise in conceptual ertheless, we feel that the relation be- bridge building and the attendant clar- tween social constructionism and the ification of a range of relevant episte- broad palette of activities we call be- mological issues may be of particular havior analysis deserves serious con- use to many readers who come into sideration. Indeed, behavior analysts regular professional contact with social who would likely not define them- constructionists, perhaps in a universi- selves as contextualists have echoed ty setting. Although many or most so- the same sentiment (e.g., Shimp, 2001; cial constructionists feel antithetical to Zuriff, 1998). Thus, although the cur- the behaviorist stance, there are solid rent examination of social construc- epistemological grounds for greater co- tionism has arisen from a contextualis- operation between the two fields. An tic perspective on behavior analysis, awareness and understanding of these we feel that the issues under consid- issues, therefore, may be of great ser- eration are relevant to behavior ana- vice to the behavior-analytic commu- lysts of all philosophical persuasions. nity in fostering communication and Before we examine the several cooperation with mainstream psychol- points of contact and departure be- ogists and promoting the behavioral tween social constructionism and be- approach. In addition, the reflective havior analysis, we will first briefly process of exploring behavioral defi- outline our domains of analysis. What nitions and considering the application follows is a brief description of Skin- and extension of our field is worth- ner's radical behaviorism followed by while, insofar as it prepares us for con- an introduction to the worldview of tact with those outside the field and contextualism (Pepper, 1942). Subse- provides us with responses to common quently an outline of the main tenets criticisms (Leigland, 1997). of social constructionism, as defined by K. J. Gergen (1985a), will be present- BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS ed. Before outlining briefly the behav- Radical Behaviorism ior-analytic stance on psychological events, it is important to remember that The three-term contingency is the behavior analysis is to be distinguished predominant behavior-analytic unit from the philosophy of radical behav- with which psychological events are iorism and that many behavior analysts understood. This unit renders psycho- adhere to different epistemological logical sense for the behavior analyst views. Thus, like social construction- when it is applied to any event with a ism, behavior analysis does not repre- reliable and identifiable antecedent and sent a single coherent conceptual consequence, typically the activity of stance. For instance, in recent years an organism (see Roche & Barnes, there have been extended debates on 1997a). The three-term contingency mechanism and contextualism in terms treats all behavioral sequences in terms of their suitability as worldviews for of antecedents to action, the action it- behavior analysis (see Barnes & self, and the consequences of action Roche, 1994; Hayes, 1993; Hayes & (e.g., feeling cold, putting on a warm Brownstein, 1986; Hayes, Hayes, & overcoat, feeling warm). In effect, be- Reese, 1998; Jacobson, 1997; Leig- havior analysis understands events land, 1999; Marr, 1993a, 1993b; Mor- with respect to the context in which ris, 1991, 1993, 1997, 1998a, 1998b; they occur. Sarbin, 1993; Shull, 1993; Staddon, The three-term contingency is a dy- 1993). Thus, some readers may not be namic spatiotemporal contextual unit. entirely comfortable with the contex- It is spatio-temporal in the sense that tualistic stance that the current authors very large temporal or spatial distances adopt towards behavior analysis. Nev- between stimuli, responses, and con- BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 217 sequences are incorporated into the acts through coherence is not objective analysis (at the level of a molar anal- but personal. ysis). It is dynamic in the sense that Functional contextualism, on the none of its terms (stimulus, response, other hand, has an intensely practical consequence) can be defined indepen- purpose for analysis, namely the pre- dently of the others. diction-and-influence (hyphenated to With regard to the truth criteria of a indicate their inseparability) of events. radical behavioral account, Skinner Variability and change in all phenom- (1974) said the following: ena are taken as givens. Thus, influence, rather than control, is sought over [Scientific knowledge] is a corpus of rules for phenomena of interest and patterns of effective action, and there is a special sense in which it could be "true" if it yields the most interaction, rather than the elimination effective action possible. ... A proposition is of variability, become of interest. "true" to the extent that with its help the listener The functional contextualist takes a responds effectively to the situation it describes. scientific interest in discourse about the (p. 235) physical world and relies on it in the Thus, the radical behaviorist strives to course of scientific behavior. Discourse develop modes of scientific conduct must, however, lead directly to practi- (including discourse) for predicting cal influence. To the functional contex- and influencing specified events (see tualist, practical ends are sought also Guerin, 1992). Moreover, the rad- through verbal rules that have been ical behaviorist readily admits that the generated across time through the con- scientist cannot stand apart from the sequences of their use. The use of prin- historical and current (social and cul- ciples in functional contextualistic sci- tural) context in which analyses take ence, then, is a practical issue, not an place, thereby generating completely ontological one. Thus, the contextualist objective knowledge (e.g., Skinner, can adopt an infinite variety of tools 1953; see also K. J. Gergen, 1985a). and concepts as long as they move towards the valued end of prediction- Contextualism and-influence. According to Hayes (1993), there SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM are currently two broad varieties of contextualism-descriptive and func- Traditional social psychology has tional. The descriptive contextualist undergone somewhat of a revolution has a personal purpose of analysis. He over the past two decades, leading to or she seeks an appreciation of the what has become known as the new whole through the examination of its paradigm for social psychology (see K. participants. The purpose of such an J. Gergen, 1982, 1989; Potter & Weth- analysis is coherence. Coherence can erell, 2001). According to proponents be defined as the discriminated corre- of the new paradigm, mainstream so- spondence between the meanings of cial psychology lacks a unified and co- various statements; if the descriptive herent philosophical approach to its contextualist arrives at two statements subject matter. The lack of a well-de- that mean the same thing, these state- fined conceptual framework for tradi- ments can be said to cohere. Contex- tional social psychology and a growing tualists do not assume, however, that belief that unity and coherence can there can be any ultimate analysis or only be achieved through rhetoric have that analytic conclusions may be gen- led a body of social psychologists to eralized to different domains. More- abandon their traditional research ques- over, the descriptive contextualist is tions and to turn their attention instead patently aware that every analysis it- to the social construction of knowledge self represents yet another act-in-con- (see K. J. Gergen, 1989). text and that the satisfaction of analytic Socially constructed knowledge is 218 BRYAN ROCHE & DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES knowledge that has arisen out of inter- logical phenomena, although some are actions among people in a community more radical than others in this regard rather than interactions with the non- (see Zuriff, 1998). They also share, to social environment (cf. Mead, 1934; a greater or lesser extent, the methods see also Guerin, 1992). Scientific of traditional science, but in more rad- knowledge represents one such form of ical forms adopt an antirealist stance knowledge. For instance, from a social (e.g., Bohan, 1992; Hare-Mustin & constructionist perspective, scientific Marecek, 1988; Howard, 1985; see conclusions emerge from the vicissi- also Hogg & Vaughan, 1995, p. 25). tudes of social conventions and inter- Psychological research in the context actions rather than from ontologically of the social constructionist approaches real states of affairs (see Bohan, 1992; involves the critical analysis of narra- Collins, 1982; K. J. Gergen, 1985a, tives, conducted in vivo or post hoc. 1989; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; How- The social constructionist stance on ard, 1985; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; psychological phenomena is difficult to Potter, 1992). From this perspective, define by its very nature. Social con- scientific accounts are permeated structionists eschew definition because heavily by metaphor; their power to in- even their own position is, at least in fluence audiences lies not in their em- principle, open to critique and change. pirical validity but in their use of rhet- Rather than attempt to pigeonhole this oric. In effect, scientific knowledge rather amorphous and constantly trans- claims are not literally referential of mogrifying movement, we will refer "facts," despite any ability to seduce specifically to a paper by K. J. Gergen an audience to this effect. The role of (1985a) for our exposition of the social the social constructionist is to explicate constructionist stance. Gergen's text the processes by which people come to undoubtedly fails to represent the so- describe, explain, or otherwise account cial constructionist movement ade- for the world in which they live and to quately, as all texts necessarily do, articulate the role played by metaphor from a social constructionist perspec- and rhetoric in the production of tive. Moreover, his account is relatively "truths" (K. J. Gergen, 1985a). conservative as postmodernist ap- Social constructionism was the ear- proaches go. Nevertheless, we have liest of the postmodemist or literary chosen this particular text because Ger- criticisms of psychology. Much of the gen is a seminal character in the social intellectual impetus for this movement psychological revolution, and this par- was provided by the work of such phi- ticular text represents what we under- losophers as Heidegger, Kant, Wittgen- stand to be an authoritative exposition stein, and Rorty. These philosophers of the social constructionist position argued that knowledge is not a direct adhered to, more or less, by the main- mirror of reality but is instead a prod- stream of social constructionists. uct of social interaction and language K. J. Gergen (1985a) outlined four convention. More humanistic (Shotter, philosophical assumptions typically 1984) and ethnogenic (Harre, 1979) made by the social constructionist. We versions of the constructionist position will summarize each of these here in emerged later. Discourse analysis is the an attempt to develop a broad under- modem, and perhaps most popular, in- standing of a generally adopted social carnation of the social constructionist constructionist epistemology. In what movement (see Potter & Wetherell, follows, Gergen's original wording is 2001). Other related views might be used to as great an extent as possible. summarized under the rubric of the 1. What we take to be experience of poststructuralist perspectives. All of the world does not itself dictate the these approaches within psychology terms by which the world is under- share a broad emphasis on the con- stood. What we take to be knowledge struction of understandings of psycho- of the world is not a product of induc- BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 219 tion, or of the building and testing of the perspective in question, but on the general hypotheses. The mounting crit- vicissitudes of social processes. Obser- icism of the positivist-empirical con- vations of persons is questionable as a ception of knowledge has severely corrective or guide to persons. Rather, damaged the traditional view that sci- the rules for "what counts as what" are entific theory serves to reflect or map inherently ambiguous, continuously reality in any decontextualized manner. evolving, and free to vary with the pre- Social constructionism begins with dilections of those who use them. On radical doubt in the taken-for-granted these grounds, one is even led to query world-whether in the sciences or in the concept of truth. Is the major de- daily life-and in a specialized way ployment of the term truth primarily a acts as a form of social criticism. Con- means for warranting one's own posi- structionism asks one to suspend belief tion and claims to intelligibility? The that commonly accepted categories or move is from an experiential to a social understandings receive their warrant epistemology. through observation. Thus, it invites 4. Forms of negotiated understand- one to challenge the objective basis of ing are of critical significance in social conventional knowledge. life, because they are integrally con- 2. The terms in which the world is nected with many other activities in understood are social artifacts, prod- which people engage. Descriptions and ucts of historically situated interchang- explanations of the world themselves es among people. From the construc- constitute forms of social action. It is tionist perspective, the process of un- in this vein that many investigators derstanding is not automatically driven have been concerned with the prevail- by the forces of nature, but is the result ing images or metaphors of human ac- of an active, cooperative enterprise of tion employed in the field of psychol- persons in relationship. Constructionist ogy. inquiry has further been directed to the In summary, the social construction- axioms or fundamental propositions ist does not typically seek prediction that underlie descriptions of persons in and control over psychological phe- present-day society. It is first asked nomena but rather an appreciation of whether the folk models of mind with- the whole through the examination of in a culture necessarily determine or parts. Put simply, social construction- constrain the conclusions reached with- ists aim to make sense of the world, or in the profession. How can the psy- generate greater verbal coherence, chologist step outside cultural under- through post hoc analyses of texts and standings and continue to "make narratives. To the social construction- sense"? Further, it is asked, are there ist, truths are constantly changing; an generic rules governing accounts of analysis that works for one individual human action from which common (e.g., achieves greater coherence, per- conventions are derived? Such work is suades many readers, etc.) may not of special interest, because it begins to work for another. The coherence outline the possible constraints over sought is intensely personal. Further- what psychological research can say. If more, the ever-changing truths that it is possible to isolate propositions or emerge from social constructionist assumptions grounding discourse about analyses and their close tie to the per- persons, then we are furnished with a sonal history of the analyst appear to basis for understanding what psycho- bring the progressivity of social con- logical theory must say if it is to be structionist knowledge into question reasonable or communicable. from a behavior-analytic perspective 3. The degree to which a given form (see Zuriff, 1998). Surprisingly, how- of understanding prevails or is sus- ever, there are several areas of overlap tained across time is not fundamentally between the constructionist and behav- dependent on the empirical validity of iorist positions on psychological events 220 BRYAN ROCHE & DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES that are worth considering. It is to these alytic perspective, the social interac- matters that we will now turn our at- tions that constitute behavior-analytic tention. activity are controlled by the contingency of successful working. This con- POINTS OF CONTACT tingency does not lead directly to ab- AND DEPARTURE solutely truthful scientific conclusions. The Nature of Knowledge However, it does select for a variety of scientific discourse that ensures effec- Perhaps the most immediately strik- tive action (i.e., behavior-analytic ing area of overlap between behavior truth) within our scientific community. analysis and social constructionism re- Methods and practices that produce lates to their respective views on sci- precise stimulus control over verbal re- entific knowledge. Specifically, both sponses in the scientific domain are se- approaches take the view that scientific lected and strengthened compared to knowledge is social in origin and that practices that yield weak idiosyncratic it can be understood in terms of control over verbal behavior. The for- evolved practices within the verbal mer practices will ensure objectivity, community (e.g., K. J. Gergen, 1985a; not in the ontological sense, but in a Skinner, 1974). pragmatic sense. Thus, in behavior The social constructionist idea that analysis, objectivity can be retained, scientific knowledge is social in origin not as a property of the external world, has important implications for the sta- but as a description of the effectiveness tus of scientific claims. Specifically, if of scientific activity. all knowledge emerges from the vicis- Behavior analysis extends its interest situdes of social interaction, then no in knowledge more generally to in- particular knowledge claim can de- clude forms of mand higher status over another. In- nonsocial knowledge deed, this problem holds for all forms that would be of little interest to the of knowledge, including scientific social constructionist. Nonsocial knowledge and the knowledge claims knowledge is often referred to as pro- of social constructionists. Interestingly, cedural, implicit, or "knowing how" the paradoxical nature of the social (see Hayes, 1997). Nonsocial forms of constructionist knowledge claim about knowledge are important in the exper- the limits of knowledge claims is em- imental analysis of behavior because braced by many social constructionists many sources of reinforcement are me- and is taken as evidence of conceptual diated by the nonsocial world and con- coherence rather than viewed as a tinue to shape behavior independent of problem to be surmounted (e.g., Soy- human supervision (e.g., avoiding very land, 1994). In K. J. Gergen's words, hot or sharp objects). An individual "As one moves from individual to so- whose behavior is changed by nonsocial epistemology questions of truth cial contingencies is regarded as ac- and objectivity recede into obscurity quiring nonverbal knowledge, or com- ... the concept of 'objective validity' ing to "know how." As socially me- ceases to be sacred ... rather, concepts diated reinforcers are made available of truth and objectivity may largely be for appropriate verbal behavior regard- viewed as rhetorical devices" (1989, p. ing one's own behavior and the behav- 473). ior of other systems, an individual is Given their interest in the social con- said to be acquiring social knowledge tingencies governing scientific behav- or "knowing that" (see Hayes, 1997). ior, behavior analysts can sympathize In summary, both social construc- somewhat with the idea that all knowl- tionists and behavior analysts share a edge claims are inherently limited in social epistemology of scientific terms of their absolute objectivity. knowledge and are content with the More specifically, from a behavior-an- limitations this epistemology imposes BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 221

on the absolute truthfulness of scientif- man conduct (see Chase & Danforth, ic claims. 1991; Danforth, Chase, Dolan, & Joyce, 1990; Hayes & Hayes, 1989; Language As a Key Feature of see also O'Hora & Barnes-Holmes, Human Action 2001). Perhaps more important, behavior analysts have begun to examine the One of the most persistent criticisms relation between language and other of behavior analysis has been that the aspects of human functioning, such as basic principles it has identified, large- anxiety (e.g., Friman, Hayes, & Wil- ly with nonhumans, cannot handle the son, 1998), depression (e.g., Hayes & richness and complexity of the lan- Wilson, 1993), prejudice (Hayes, Nic- guage and cognitive phenomena that colls, Masuda, & Rye, in press; Watt, appear germane to much or all of hu- Keenan, Barnes, & Cairns, 1991), self- man behavior. The authors find them- awareness (Dymond & Barnes, 1995), selves in part agreement with this crit- the development of self-concept icism. More specifically, the traditional (Barnes, Lawlor, Smeets, & Roche, research focus on nonhumans in be- 1996), sexual arousal (Barnes & havior analysis was for many research- Roche, 1997b; Roche & Barnes, ers, including Skinner, based on the 1997b, 1998), attitude formation and idea that the principles of behavior change (Roche, Barnes, & Smeets, identified with such populations would 1997), spirituality and mysticism be generally applicable to humans (Barnes & Roche, 1997a; Hayes, (Skinner, 1938, p. 47; 1953, p. 38). The 1984), and group processes (Roche, generalization in question, however, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stew- was not one of ontological process. art, & O'Hora, 2002). Indeed, it is now Rather, behavior analysts strove to de- argued by several behavior analysts velop a generality in their successful that complex human behaviors, such as working with respect to behavior those listed here, cannot be considered change. In this regard, the continuity properly without considering the role assumption served its purpose well; of language processes (see Hayes et al., most of the techniques used in modem 2001; see also Leigland, 1999). Prog- applied behavior analysis are derived, ress in the analysis of language may in large part, from basic research with not come as quickly for behavior anal- nonhumans. Nevertheless, some be- ysis as it might for social construction- havior analysts take the view that what ism. By its very nature, behavioral ex- is needed now is an extensive and co- perimentation is slow paced, laborious, herent program of basic research into and expensive. Nevertheless, many be- complex human behavior in its own havior analysts and social construction- right, and in particular into language ists now share the emphasis on lan- and cognitive phenomena (see Hayes, guage as perhaps the key feature of hu- Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). man activity. Over the last three decades, an in- In addition to a common emphasis creasing number of behavior analysts on the importance of language in hu- have been turning their attention to the man activity, behavior analysis and so- empirical and conceptual analysis of cial constructionism share a view of verbal behavior and derived stimulus language as social convention. Put relations in an effort to elucidate sci- simply, both approaches view language entifically language and cognitive pro- as a social activity or performance. In cesses. The analysis of derived stimu- behavior analysis, language is inextri- lus relations has provided important cably interwoven into a social fabric opportunities for the prediction and (see Guerin, 1992) and thus the mean- control of many aspects of verbal being of a word is to be found in its use havior (see Hayes et al., 2001; Sidman, (Skinner, 1953, 1957). In social con- 1994) and the impact of rules on hu- structionism, language is similarly 222 BRYAN ROCHE & DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES viewed as "shared activity." The pur- from a psychological perspective, had pose of language interactions is not to the surprising effect of throwing over- arrive at some inalienable "facts" but board the earlier behavioral prohibition to produce "meaning" and "shared against the analysis of private experi- understanding" (see Shotter, 1993). ence. From Watson's (1924) point of According to K. J. Gergen, view, introspection was to be avoided. However, to Skinner, direct observa- Until the sounds or markings come to be shared within a community, it is inappropriate to speak tions of thinking, imagining, feeling, of language at all. In effect, we may cease in- remembering, sensing, and other pri- quiry into the psychological basis of language vate events could be as scientifically (which account would inevitably form but a sub- valid as observations of public events, text or miniature language) and focus on the per- formative use of language in human affairs. if the contingencies controlling the ob- (1985a, p. 270) servation had maximized the importance of the observed events per se Thus, it is the process of meaning-pro- (Hayes & Toarmino, 1999). Because duction that explains all subsequent be- behavior analysis does not insist upon havior for the social constructionist. truth by agreement, it can therefore An interest in the functional ap- consider events that take place in the proach to language popularized by private world within the skin, and it Wittgenstein (1953) forms a common does not call these events unobservable foundation for both the behavioral and (Skinner, 1974, p. 16). social constructionist approaches (see Despite this explicit interest in pri- Shimp, 2001). Indeed, according to vate experience, behavior analysis does Zuriff (1998), moderate forms of social not treat mentalistic concepts as ex- constructionism are similar to Skin- planatory. Nor are thoughts and feel- ner's own conceptualization of radical ings seated in a mind or a self. Rather, behaviorism. Both approaches view psychological events that are not nor- language as a social phenomenon that mally observed by others (e.g., feel- influences our responses to the envi- ings) are of interest to the behavior an- ronment. In Zuriff's words, alyst as human activities in their own The relationship between even our most purely right. Indeed, behavior analysts have scientific speech and the world we are describing recently been developing methodolo- is filtered by the reinforcing practices of our ver- gies for the prediction and influence of bal community and our dimensions of general- private events (see Friman et al., 1998; ization, or similarity. Consequently, the role of social interaction and human psychology is built Taylor & O'Reilly, 1997). into the very core of descriptive language and In About Behaviorism, Skinner therefore of human knowledge. (1998, p. 14) (1974) argued that the use of concepts such as mind and self as explanations for behavior has emerged largely as a The Stance on Mentalism result of linguistic practices. In Skin- Skinner (1945, 1957) legitimized the ner's words, study of thoughts and feelings in be- We tend to make nouns out of adjectives and havior analysis by arguing that just as verbs and must find a place for the things the the behavior of others is to be under- nouns are said to represent. We say that a rope stood contextually, so too should the is strong, and before long we are looking for its behavior of the scientist be understood strength. We call a particular kind of strength in this way. The validity of any scien- tensile, and then explain that the rope is strong tific observation, he argued, is not to because it possesses tensile strength. (p. 177) be found in public agreement but rath- To Skinner, the mind was a culturally er in the contextual features controlling constructed metaphor that emerged as the observation. This position, which an explanation for behavior, at least in rises to the reflexive challenge set by part, from peculiar linguistic practices. social constructionists (e.g., K. J. Ger- Rather than view the mind, the self, gen, 1985a) to examine science itself and other hypothesized inner states as BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 223

entities in their own right, the behavior (p. 234). According to Skinner, in the analyst is more concerned with the very act of analyzing human behavior functions that these words and con- we are behaving. Thus, the behavior cepts serve for their users. This natu- analyst views it as absurd to contend ralistic approach to psychological lan- that he or she is in any way exempt guage is also reflected in K. J. Gergen's from a behavioral analysis. (1985a) writing, as exemplified by the Rather than revolt against reflexivi- following passage. ty, contextualistic behavior analysts have embraced it, viewing reflexivity One is forced to question the assumption that anger is a biological state of the organism and as an important part of the "language is invited to consider it as a historically contin- game" we call behavior analysis gent social performance. Sarbin (1984) extended (Barnes & Roche, 1997a). In the words this line of thinking to the entire array of emo- of Malone (1999), tional terms. Emotions are not objects "out there" to be studied, ventured Sarbin; emotion Skinner's radical behaviorism ... deals with pri- terms acquire their meaning not from real-world vate experience in a way that is compatible with referents but from their context of usage. (p. recent phenomenological views (e.g., Kvale & 267) Grenness, 1967), a feature by no means true of present or past cognitive theories. Radical be- Thus, for the social constructionist, haviorism and phenomenological views are spe- mind becomes a form of social myth cifically opposed to the subject-object distinc- (Coulter, 1979) and the self-concept is tion, Plato's division of experience into known removed from the heads of individuals and knower. (p. 116) and placed within the sphere of social discourse (K. J. Gergen, 1985a, p. 271, The important point here is that the 1985b; Shotter, 1993). contextualist who embraces scientific In summary, both the behavior ana- reflexivity can no longer view science lyst and the social constructionist view as offering insight to the fundamental mentalistic terms, such as self and processes of nature or allowing us to mind, as representing psychological re- develop increasingly accurate knowl- ifications. Moreover, both view such edge of an ontological reality (although mentalistic concepts as constantly reflexive analyses may still have mer- evolving and transforming social func- it). Rather, from that perspective sci- tions with and within a social context. entific activity itself becomes part of the subject matter of behavior analysis Reflexivity and the Subject-Object and the relation between scientific and Dichotomy nonscientific discourse becomes of interest (see also K. J. Gergen, 1985a). Behavior analysis rises to the social A concrete example will serve to il- constructionist challenge in viewing its lustrate the foregoing. To both the verbal formulations as historically and functional and descriptive contextual- culturally situated and subject to cri- ist, the output from a cumulative re- tique and transformation. Skinner corder is not viewed as a perfect rep- (1974) argued that the behavior of the resentation of what a research partici- scientist in formulating the laws of be- pant "really" did in an experimental havior must itself be considered from chamber. Rather, the cumulative record a radical behavioral perspective. Skin- is viewed as a discriminative stimulus ner was patently aware, however, of for a particular response on the part of the impossibility of achieving objec- the psychologist, such as reporting tive knowledge in this regard. From "scallop" or "break-and-run" (i.e., it Skinner's perspective, even the scien- is viewed functionally). These respons- tific activity of a behavior analyst par- es may have been differentially rein- ticipates in a behavioral stream, and forced by fellow scientists in the con- thus he or she cannot "observe behav- text of the current observations (i.e., ior from some special point of vantage, the particular pattern of data). In effect, 'perched on the epicycle of Mercury." scientific reports always form part of a 224 BRYAN ROCHE & DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES particular scientist's behavioral stream. It appears that neither the social con- Of course, the behavior analyst may structionist nor the behavior analyst sometimes speak as if his or her verbal can render universal formulations of formulations refer literally to extant the behavior of others. Not surprising- behavioral events, and, for all the con- ly, the impossibility of doing so has textualist knows, they might! Never- been echoed on many occasions in theless, the choice to view the cumu- even the earliest social constructionist lative record as a reflection of extant literature (e.g., Baron, 1971; K. J. Ger- behavioral activity or merely as a dis- gen, 1973; Kenniston, 1971; Luria, criminative stimulus for further scien- 1971). According to K. J. Gergen tific responding will be made entirely (1985a), the historically and culturally on pragmatic grounds. bound nature of scientific conduct pre- Choosing to cease a behavioral anal- cludes the formulation of universal ysis with a practical knowledge claim, laws, thereby rendering the behavior- such as "the fixed-interval schedule analytic agenda ultimately futile. Inter- produced a scallop in responding," estingly, many behavior analysts rather than pursuing a reflexive line of would concur with this position as it inquiry regarding the stimulus proper- refers to absolute truth. More specifi- ties and reinforcement history that con- cally, the universality of behavioral trolled that claim, does not render that laws refers not to invariance in univer- claim incomplete, as long as prediction sal states of affairs but to the consis- and influence have been achieved. The tency of successful working achieved social constructionist takes precisely through the use of such laws. In this the same stance. More specifically, giv- view, behavioral statements, whether en that all analyses are ultimately re- resulting from experimental or inter- flexive, the choice to end analysis must pretive analyses, are not intended as be made in accordance with criteria set statements about the world, but state- by the analyst (see Mulkay, 1985). Ac- ments about the behavior of the sci- cording to Soyland (1994), "It will al- entist. In Skinner's (1969) words, ways be possible to re-analyze the an- Scientific laws ... specify or imply responses alytical text. However, that claim was and consequences. They are not obeyed by na- made without inferring the necessity of ture but by men who deal effectively with na- always doing so (see also Potter, 1988). ture. The formula S%gt2 does not govern the be- Thus, while [the above] statement may havior of falling bodies, it governs those who look circular, it is not viciously circu- correctly predict the position of falling bodies at lar; the circularity could be highly in- given times. (p. 141) formative" (p. 31). In an almost parallel perspective on Given the social constructionists' the status of scientific knowledge fondness for explication and elabora- claims, the social constructionist takes tion, the opportunity to end analysis is the view that scientific statements often consciously ignored. In the words about the world are social artifacts of Hogg and Vaughan (1995): rather than literal truth statements. Many social psychological concepts such as at- Whether rendering the conduct of organisms in- titude, motivation, cognition, identity and so telligible or demystifying existing forms of un- forth may likewise be constituted through dis- derstanding, research methods can be used to course and therefore any discussion of them as produce "objectifications" or illustrations useful causal processes or structures is misguided. If in advancing the pragmatic consequences of accepted in its extreme form, this idea necessar- one's work. ... Although some methods may ily rejects much of social psychology.... Critics hold the allure of large samples, others can at- believe, however, that [social constructionism] tract because of their purity, their sensitivity to can be extreme in its rejection of cognitive pro- nuance, or their ability to probe in depth. Such cesses and structures (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; assets do not thereby increase the "objective va- Zajonc, 1989) and that it may be more profitable lidity" of the resulting constructions. (K. J. Ger- to retain cognition and theorise how it articulates gen, 1985a, p. 273) with language (Giles & Coupland, 1991). (p. 501) The behavior-analytic stance on the BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 225 relativity of scientific principles (i.e., psychological literature and in science their value in moving us towards pre- more generally (e.g., Skinner, 1945, p. diction and influence) does not appear 277; 1957, chap. 18; 1961, p. 392; to have been noted by our contempo- 1963). raries from other domains of psychology. K. J. Gergen (1973), for instance, The Use of Interpretive rejected the notion that reinforcement Methodologies and punishment are universals on the grounds that particular reinforcers do Along with an impressive battery of not remain stable over time (e.g., food experimental methodologies, behavior can no longer be used in a reinforce- analysts have also developed and ment contingency once a subject is sat- adopted a variety of analytic methods, ed). However, given the foregoing, it including interpretive and hermeneutic seems that Gergen has applied the con- methodologies (e.g., Day, 1969). How- cept of universality and stability in a ever, these interpretive methodologies way that is in fact alien to the behavior differ from those employed under the analyst. Gergen's observation that rein- broad umbrella of the poststructuralist forcers are of constantly changing value perspectives. Many of the latter ap- is in fact a defining feature of the op- proaches infer motivative and cogni- erant. Indeed, for this very reason be- tive states of individuals through the havior analysts avoid speaking of rein- interpretive analysis of person-as-texts forcers in isolation, preferring to speak (see Wollfolk, Sass, & Messer, 1988). of reinforcement as a process (see Ca- Behavior analysts and social construc- tania, 1998). In effect, behavior analysis tionists concur, however, on the logical embraces the transience of contingency and methodological impossibility of effects without rejecting the principles reaching consensus on inner states, of reinforcement and punishment as based primarily on the unreliability of useful constructions of behavioral pro- descriptions of inner states and the so- cesses (Lee, 1988). Finding that a par- cial origins of the language used to de- ticular contingency relation does not scribe them (Dougher, 1993; see also obtain universally, therefore, does not Skinner, 1957, 1974; Wittgenstein, negate the principle of reinforcement 1953). According to M. Gergen but rather exemplifies it. (1988), consensus about the inner Notwithstanding lapses in commu- states of an individual can only be ar- nication, behavior analysis, as con- rived at by definition-"by virtue of strued here, and social constructionism circularity rather than verification" (p. seem to share the relatively curious 39). Thus, behavior analysts and social characteristic that neither takes their constructionists inevitably reach an im- own formulations as referential of passe when they attempt to infer emo- states of affairs in an extant world. tional or cognitive states. From both of these perspectives, cur- Given the foregoing, both the social rent knowledge claims represent just constructionist and the behavior ana- one of many possible analytic out- lyst conduct interpretive analyses at the comes, each of which may achieve ve- same level at which phenomena are en- racity for different reasons and in dif- countered. From this phenomenologi- ferent research contexts (e.g., what ex- cal stance, human behavior qua behav- actly a behavior analyst is trying to ior is of interest in its own right, rather predict and control when observing a than as the expression of some other rat in an experimental chamber may psychological processes taking place at well vary across research settings). In- an ontological level (Day, 1992; deed, Skinner called for further atten- Dougher, 1993; M. Gergen, 1988; tion to be paid to the elaboration of Skinner, 1953, 1974). Both the behav- what is meant by the term knowledge ior analyst and the social construction- and the functions of the term's use in ist, then, argue that behavior is best un- 226 BRYAN ROCHE & DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES derstood if we look to the social and nomenology, behavioral hermeneutics, interpersonal context in which it oc- and the Reno methodology. The main curs. In this way, interpretation is re- goal of this method is to develop and stricted to the relation between an act refine the discriminations of the con- and its context. The relation between trolling relations between given in- behavior and its postulated underlying stances of verbal behavior and their causes is not considered. functional antecedents in a specific One behavior analyst who devel- context. The methodology of behavior- oped an interpretive methodology for al interpretation bears some striking the analysis of verbal behavior was similarities to the discursive analytic Williard F Day. Day was heavily influ- methods that have emerged from the enced by Skinner's Verbal Behavior social constructionist movement. (1957), which was itself an elaborate As Dougher (1993) explained, the exercise in interpretation. Day was im- first step of an interpretive behavioral pressed that Skinner's interpretations analysis involves the prima facie ex- were based on principles derived from amination of a text in search of occur- the experimental analysis of behavior. rences of behaviors of interest and an- Although he was of the opinion that tecedents to which this behavior ap- one of the cornerstones of radical be- pears functionally related. A second haviorism is the emphasis on behav- step involves a further functional anal- ioral control, he also advocated a focal ysis of the analyst's behavior during awareness that any scientist is him- or the inspection of the text. This serves herself a behaving organism (e.g., Day, to provide feedback to the analyst 1969). According to Day, science is at about his or her own interpretive be- heart either the behavior of scientists havior and to refine his or her discrim- or the artifacts of such activity. inations of the text. The third step of In a passage remarkable for the time the analysis involves the gathering to- at which it was written, Day (1969) gether of the identified antecedent-be- provided what might be viewed as a havior relations and grouping them social constructionist rationale for be- into classes that share common func- havioral researchers. tions. The fourth and final step involves a description of the experience The radical behaviorist faces the fact that the of the analytic process for the analyst ultimate achievement of his scientific activities is for the most part either further verbal behavior in order to elucidate the discrimination on his own part or a new set of acquired behav- process. iors which hopefully enable him to control na- Although these methods have much ture more effectively. Yet in viewing his own in common, one important difference verbal and intellectual behavior as significantly between the behavioral and social con- controlled in a number of ways, he is led in a sense not to trust it at face value. He is aware, structionist interpretive methods relates for example, that much of what he says in of- to the goals of the interpretive exercise. fering systematic psychology is likely to reflect Whereas the social constructionist psychological distinctions that are modeled after strives to achieve coherence in narra- linguistic practices uncritically acquired simply in learning to speak the lay vocabulary. He is tive accounts, the behavior analyst particularly conscious of the fact that much psy- continues to seek prediction and influ- chological talk reflects stereotyped conceptions ence over behavioral phenomena of in- both of the nature of the knowing process and terest through the identification of ma- of the relation between our knowledge of things nipulable variables. It does not pose a and the structure of whatever it is that is taken to be the object of psychological investigation. threat to the behavioral account that (p. 319) the behavioral relations rendered through an interpretive analysis are Day set about developing a rigorous themselves a product of behavior. The interpretive methodology for the anal- purpose of this style of analysis is not ysis of verbal events that became to uncover features of the world but known variously as behavioral phe- simply to increase scientific confidence BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 227 in our statements about behavior (Day, feeding of the child on a variable-ratio 1992). Despite this important differ- schedule. Given the varieties of behav- ence in the goals of psychological ioral interpretations that are possible, analysis, both the social constructionist historical narratives are judged in and the behavior analyst share an in- terms of their effectiveness in identi- terest in interpretation in research and fying manipulable variables of behav- value the construction of meaningful ior. In effect, the behavior analyst does verbal accounts of both behavior and not become overly concerned with the the interpretive process itself. nuances of historical narratives but places the burden of psychological ex- The Historical Narrative planation on the overall effectiveness of the behavioral account. An emphasis on context and history The social constructionist also pro- defines the behavior-analytic and social ceeds with analysis through the con- constructionist paradigms for the anal- struction of narratives in which events ysis of psychological events. The of interest are contextually situated. three-term contingency, for instance, Because part of the context for any act draws historical relations between re- is historical, narrative accounts of con- sponses and consequential events that textually situated acts will necessarily are brought to bear in current context. appeal to history. Thus, both social An individual does not respond appro- constructionist and behavior-analytic priately in a given context, therefore, accounts could be seen as forms of sto- because he or she remembers former rytelling (see Sarbin, 1993). consequences or "possesses" relevant In summary, both social construc- knowledge based on experience (cf. K. tionist and behavioral accounts in- J. Gergen, 1985a, p. 269). Rather, the volve, at heart, a historical narrative in individual behaves in a particular way which human action is understood because of the past consequences of through its rich participation in ongo- action. Although an individual may ing and ever-changing context. construct narratives about his or her fu- ture behavior (e.g., "I will go to the CONCLUSION supermarket because I have run out of milk"), such narratives do not literally The literature of criticism of psy- control behavior but form part of the chology has expressed uncertainty and broad palette of activities of interest to despair among psychologists concern- the observing psychologist (i.e., lan- ing the goals, methods, and achieve- guage is not a thing apart from human ments of psychology. As a discipline, performance). psychology is replete with confusion, The explanation of current activity malaise, doubt, disillusionment, and in behavior analysis, therefore, requires mutual antagonism and lacks shared the construction of historical narratives direction and enthusiasm (Lee, 1988). in terms of response-consequence re- Interestingly, despite massive criticism lations. The explanation for a current (e.g., regarding the use of statistics in aggressive outburst in a child, for in- psychology), mainstream psychology stance, might be rendered in terms of has been affected little in the past (K. the past attention-giving responses of J. Gergen, 1978). Furthermore, the caregivers towards the child during commitment to physiological reduc- such tantrums. Such an account is both tionism and a decontextualized view of technical and historical. Moreover, it is human behavior persists in many only one of many possible narrative fields. accounts of the relevant history that Because of the foregoing, K. J. Ger- might be constructed. For instance, an gen (1985a) has argued that confidence alternative account might be construct- in empiricist assumptions has been ed that relates tantrums to the parent's eroded in psychology and that there is 228 BRYAN ROCHE & DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES no obvious contender on the horizon. selves in kinship with a popular field He has called for an approach to psy- within psychology. By building on this chology that can both acknowledge the relationship and encouraging discus- social vicissitudes in scientific reports sion and debate between proponents of but also give alternative criteria for both perspectives, we can bring behav- evaluating knowledge claims with ior-analytic ideas to the mainstream of practical considerations. Gergen clear- the discipline in a form that is palatable ly states that social constructionism to many psychologists. In effect, the cannot offer such alternative truth cri- obvious philosophical partnership with teria: It can compel an audience with social constructionism may allow be- rhetoric but it cannot gain favor on the havior analysts to participate more ful- grounds of veracity (1985a, p. 273). ly in what can reasonably be called an Behavior analysis, however, appears to influential intellectual activity of our fulfill both criteria specified by Gergen. milieu (Shimp, 2001). Specifically, both the radical behavior- It is perhaps ironic that behavior ist and the contextualistic behavior an- analysis is often considered to be one alyst can provide a truth-by-successful- of the chief antagonists of social con- working criterion to evaluate psycho- structionism when in fact both per- logical knowledge claims with intense- spectives share many important philo- ly practical considerations, while at the sophical viewpoints. 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