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The Behavior Analyst 2003, 26, 215-231 No. 2 (Fall) Behavior Analysis and Social Constructionism: Some Points of Contact and Departure Bryan Roche and Dermot Barnes-Holmes National University of Ireland, Maynooth Social constructionists occasionally single out behavior analysis as the field of psychology that most closely resembles the natural sciences in its commitment to empiricism, and accuses it of suffering from many of the limitations to science identified by the postmodernist movement (e.g., K. J. Gergen, 1985a; Soyland, 1994). Indeed, behavior analysis is a natural science in many respects. However, it also shares with social constructionism important epistemological features such as a rejection of mentalism, a functional-analytic approach to language, the use of interpretive method- ologies, and a reflexive stance on analysis. The current paper outlines briefly the key tenets of the behavior-analytic and social constructionist perspectives before examining a number of common- alties between these approaches. The paper aims to show that far from being a nemesis to social constructionism, behavior analysis may in fact be its close ally. Key words: contextualism, social constructionism, behavioral hermeneutics, behavior analysis, discursive psychology, postmodemism Social constructionism represents a radical brands as metaphysical social powerful intellectual movement within constructionism, and he sharply distin- psychology and related fields. Its influ- guished these varieties from more ence can be traced to the earliest re- moderate empirical varieties, such as search in the field of psychophysics that espoused by K. J. Gergen (1973, (see Zuriff, 1998) and it continues to 1982, 1985a, 1989). In any form, how- influence several domains within psy- ever, social constructionism can be chology today, perhaps most notably, seen as attempting to undermine di- social psychology (e.g., K. J. Gergen, rectly the scientific and empirical char- 1985a). Social constructionism is, to acter of psychology and, in particular, say the least, a difficult movement to the experimental analysis of behavior define. Indeed, the field appears to es- (e.g., K. J. Gergen, 1985a; see also chew self-consciously any definition as Soyland, 1994). part of its overarching concern with the In what follows, we will provide an prevalence of empiricism, positivism, outline of the behavior-analytic and so- and reductionism within psychology. cial constructionist stances. We will In its most extreme form, social con- then consider several important distinc- structionism appears to deny altogether tions between these two approaches to the possibility of an empirical psy- psychology, as well as many important chology and the accumulative approx- points of contact, that suggest shared imation of effective knowledge philosophical strands. An open explo- through experimentation (e.g., Bohan, ration of these issues should serve to 1992; Potter, 1988; Prilleltensky, raise the level of discourse within our 1989). Zuriff (1998) identified such field regarding social constructionism as a matter of increasing concern to a An early version of this paper was presented wide variety of psychologists. Such at the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour Group conference, London, 1998. We thank two discussion is of particular importance anonymous reviewers for their constructive to behavior analysts insofar as we are comments. often isolated as a field within psy- Requests for reprints may be sent to Bryan chology and have been explicitly tar- Roche, Department of Psychology, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Co. geted as a primary nemesis of social Kildare, Ireland (e-mail: Bryan.T.Roche@ constructionism (e.g., K. J. Gergen, may.ie). 1985a). 215 216 BRYAN ROCHE & DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES The current exercise in conceptual ertheless, we feel that the relation be- bridge building and the attendant clar- tween social constructionism and the ification of a range of relevant episte- broad palette of activities we call be- mological issues may be of particular havior analysis deserves serious con- use to many readers who come into sideration. Indeed, behavior analysts regular professional contact with social who would likely not define them- constructionists, perhaps in a universi- selves as contextualists have echoed ty setting. Although many or most so- the same sentiment (e.g., Shimp, 2001; cial constructionists feel antithetical to Zuriff, 1998). Thus, although the cur- the behaviorist stance, there are solid rent examination of social construc- epistemological grounds for greater co- tionism has arisen from a contextualis- operation between the two fields. An tic perspective on behavior analysis, awareness and understanding of these we feel that the issues under consid- issues, therefore, may be of great ser- eration are relevant to behavior ana- vice to the behavior-analytic commu- lysts of all philosophical persuasions. nity in fostering communication and Before we examine the several cooperation with mainstream psychol- points of contact and departure be- ogists and promoting the behavioral tween social constructionism and be- approach. In addition, the reflective havior analysis, we will first briefly process of exploring behavioral defi- outline our domains of analysis. What nitions and considering the application follows is a brief description of Skin- and extension of our field is worth- ner's radical behaviorism followed by while, insofar as it prepares us for con- an introduction to the worldview of tact with those outside the field and contextualism (Pepper, 1942). Subse- provides us with responses to common quently an outline of the main tenets criticisms (Leigland, 1997). of social constructionism, as defined by K. J. Gergen (1985a), will be present- BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS ed. Before outlining briefly the behav- Radical Behaviorism ior-analytic stance on psychological events, it is important to remember that The three-term contingency is the behavior analysis is to be distinguished predominant behavior-analytic unit from the philosophy of radical behav- with which psychological events are iorism and that many behavior analysts understood. This unit renders psycho- adhere to different epistemological logical sense for the behavior analyst views. Thus, like social construction- when it is applied to any event with a ism, behavior analysis does not repre- reliable and identifiable antecedent and sent a single coherent conceptual consequence, typically the activity of stance. For instance, in recent years an organism (see Roche & Barnes, there have been extended debates on 1997a). The three-term contingency mechanism and contextualism in terms treats all behavioral sequences in terms of their suitability as worldviews for of antecedents to action, the action it- behavior analysis (see Barnes & self, and the consequences of action Roche, 1994; Hayes, 1993; Hayes & (e.g., feeling cold, putting on a warm Brownstein, 1986; Hayes, Hayes, & overcoat, feeling warm). In effect, be- Reese, 1998; Jacobson, 1997; Leig- havior analysis understands events land, 1999; Marr, 1993a, 1993b; Mor- with respect to the context in which ris, 1991, 1993, 1997, 1998a, 1998b; they occur. Sarbin, 1993; Shull, 1993; Staddon, The three-term contingency is a dy- 1993). Thus, some readers may not be namic spatiotemporal contextual unit. entirely comfortable with the contex- It is spatio-temporal in the sense that tualistic stance that the current authors very large temporal or spatial distances adopt towards behavior analysis. Nev- between stimuli, responses, and con- BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 217 sequences are incorporated into the acts through coherence is not objective analysis (at the level of a molar anal- but personal. ysis). It is dynamic in the sense that Functional contextualism, on the none of its terms (stimulus, response, other hand, has an intensely practical consequence) can be defined indepen- purpose for analysis, namely the pre- dently of the others. diction-and-influence (hyphenated to With regard to the truth criteria of a indicate their inseparability) of events. radical behavioral account, Skinner Variability and change in all phenom- (1974) said the following: ena are taken as givens. Thus, influ- ence, rather than control, is sought over [Scientific knowledge] is a corpus of rules for phenomena of interest and patterns of effective action, and there is a special sense in which it could be "true" if it yields the most interaction, rather than the elimination effective action possible. ... A proposition is of variability, become of interest. "true" to the extent that with its help the listener The functional contextualist takes a responds effectively to the situation it describes. scientific interest in discourse about the (p. 235) physical world and relies on it in the Thus, the radical behaviorist strives to course of scientific behavior. Discourse develop modes of scientific conduct must, however, lead directly to practi- (including discourse) for predicting cal influence. To the functional contex- and influencing specified events (see tualist, practical ends are sought also Guerin, 1992). Moreover, the rad- through verbal rules that have been ical behaviorist readily admits that the generated across time through the con- scientist cannot stand apart from the sequences of their use. The use of prin- historical and current (social and cul- ciples in functional contextualistic sci- tural) context in which analyses take ence, then, is a practical