Bregazzi, H. , & Jackson, M. (2018). Agonism, critical political geography, and the new geographies of peace. Progress in Human Geography, 42(1), 72-91. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132516666687

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Agonism, critical political geograph y, and the new geographies of peace

Journal:For Progress Peer in Human Geography Review Manuscript ID PiHG-2015-0108.R2

Manuscript Type: Submitted Paper

Keywords: Peace, Agonism, Geopolitics, Ontology, Violence, Critique

Why does critical political geography struggle to address, and research, peace? Recent efforts in geography do seek positive accounts of peace, but we argue that critical geographies remain problematically reliant on social agonism. Dominant theoretical lenses used to address critical politics reproduce dissension as the causal grammar of critical sociality and the Abstract: constitutive effect of difference. We seek an alternative account of peace and sociality. The first half of the paper diagnoses how prevailing conceptual approaches to critique privilege agonism. The second half advances a positive account of peace, without losing the critical tenor of post-foundationalist or relational political insights.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Agonism, critical political geography, and the new geographies of peace 9 10 11 Abstract 12 13 14 Why does critical political geography struggle to address, and research, peace? Recent efforts in 15 16 geography do seek positive accounts of peace, but we argue that critical geographies remain 17 18 problematically reliantFor on social agonism.Peer Dominant Review theoretical lenses used to address critical politics 19 20 reproduce dissension as the causal grammar of critical sociality and the constitutive effect of difference. 21 22 We seek an alternative account of peace and sociality. The first half of the paper diagnoses how 23 24 prevailing conceptual approaches to critique privilege agonism. The second half advances a positive 25 account of peace, without losing the critical tenor of post-foundationalist or relational political insights. 26 27 Keywords : Agonism, critique, geopolitics, ontology, peace, violence 28 29

30 31 If self is a location, so is love: 32 33 Bearings taken, markings, cardinal points, 34 35 Options, obstinacies, dug heels and distance, 36 37 Here and there and now and then, a stance. 38 39 Seamus Heaney (2006), ‘The Aerodrome’ 40 41 42 43 44 A I. Introduction 45 46 Social agonism is the stock in trade of critical geography, and, particularly, of critical political 47 48 geographies. Agonism (from the Greek agon , meaning painful struggle, conflict and competition, 49 50 dispute, or a stage in the process of dying - OED ) is seen to constitute sociality, and, in particular, politics 51 52 as inherently and unavoidably conflictual; ‘agonists assert the irreducible quality of conflict for the 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 1

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 political’ (Hirsch, 2012: 4). Further, agonism underpins the epistemic rationale and ethical justification 9 10 for critique. The focus may be global, as in the political study of nuclear, terrorist, or climate risks; or 11 12 internationalist, as in the study of uneven state development and the neoliberalisation of global 13 14 economic life. Or it may simply be, regardless of scale or flow, the theoretical or empirical basis for 15 16 understanding social difference and historical change. For an agonistic approach to sociality and politics, 17 18 being critical is aboutFor attending Peer to those persiste Reviewnt potentials for conflict, to those ‘moments of 19 20 violence…always present in our assumptions of peace’ (Darling, 2014: 244). Such an ethos of critique 21 22 defines the human capacity for thought and autonomy against unwarranted religious or political 23 24 authority (Gasché, 2007). Agonism’s attention to implicit threats to autonomy, thus, dominates critical 25 26 research agendas and teaching curricula. Violence, inequality, dispossession, and exclusion, and 27 28 crucially, the political struggles against them, therefore feature as critical discourse. 29 30 31 One result is that the study of peace, including its grounding concerns like love, compassion, empathy, 32 33 and hope, struggles, relatively speaking, to make the critical political agenda (Nussbaum, 2013). Indeed, 34 35 as Shields and Soeters (2015: 1) argue, ‘mainstream peace research has primarily become an 36 37 examination of war’. We think their claim also echoes within how mainstream critical geography 38 39 approaches peace. For a recent number of geographers (us included), the lack of engagement by critical 40 41 political geography and critical political theory with peace and its ontological correlates is both puzzling 42 43 and unsatisfactory (Inwood and Tyner, 2011; Loyd, 2012; McConnell et al., 2014; Megoran, 2010; 2011; 44 45 Morrison et al., 2013; Williams and McConnell, 2011). We concur with these authors who seek to 46 develop new geographies of peace, that, in response to the dominance of agonistic readings of sociality 47 48 and politics, critical political geography needs to ‘think more expansively and critically about what 49 50 “peace” means and what “geographies of peace” may entail’ (Williams et al., 2014: 1). 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 2

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 But there is a problem with current efforts to produce ‘positive’ accounts of peace and its correlates. 9 10 This problem is also indicative of why theorising peace repeatedly loses out to the over-whelming 11 12 geographical focus on violence, war, social agonism, and conflict. We argue that there is a deep 13 14 theoretical reason for the lack of engagement with peace in critical geography and critical geopolitics. 15 16 Dominant theoretical apparatuses predominantly employed by critical geographers, particularly critical 17 18 Marxism and variousFor poststructuralisms, Peer construct Review the social, and hence the political, as irreducibly 19 20 spaces of antagonism, violence, or, simply, confrontation. Together these constitute a ‘strong theory’ 21 22 (Gibson-Graham, 2006b: 4; 2014: 148) whose critical commitment to agonism as theoretically necessary 23 24 organises the social as irreducibly conflictual, and pregnant with violence. Concern for theorising and 25 26 negotiating difference mobilises contemporary critical analyses of social life in a manner that reads 27 28 difference as necessarily agonistic, divisive, evental, or violent. As a matter of fact, many political 29 30 theorists argue for an agonistic politics precisely because of the fractured, conflictual nature of social 31 32 relationships (see in particular Connolly, 1995; Honig, 1993; Mouffe, 2005). Mouffe, for instance, argues 33 34 that striving for anything else in politics is an ‘…anti-political vision which refuses to acknowledge the 35 36 antagonistic dimension constitutive of “the political”’ (2005: 2). Agonism, she continues, is ‘ constitutive 37 38 of human societies’ (Mouffe, 2005: 2). The consequence, which we highlight in this paper, is that by 39 40 predicating sociality and ‘the political’ agonistically, we limit the range of conceptual tools necessary for 41 42 theorising peace and its ontological correlates. Positive capacities for theorising critique more generally, 43 44 as something other than attentive suspicion, are also similarly blunted. This paper explores the 45 46 consequences for the idea of peace when politics and sociality are considered only, or unavoidably, as 47 48 spaces of contest or violence. 49 50 It is important to note that struggle (agonism) and harm (violence) are not functional equivalents. Non- 51 52 violent struggles against racial injustice embodied in the work and example of, say, Martin Luther King 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 3

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Jr., are different than the opposition to unjust occupation embodied by the armed struggle of, for 9 10 instance, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Both are confrontations, however necessary or 11 12 contested. King wrote in Stride Toward Freedom , that ‘[t]rue pacifism is a confrontation of evil with the 13 14 power of love’ (1958: 80). Love, in this sense, is a political and transformative force (see Lanas and 15 16 Zembylas, 2015). bell hooks writes that, for King, ‘loving practice is not aimed at simply giving an 17 18 individual greater lifeFor satisfaction; Peer it is extolled as theReview primary way we end domination and oppression. 19 20 This important politicization of love is often absent from today's writing’ (hooks 2000: 76; see also 21 22 Inwood 2009; Johnson, 2014). Yet theorising human sociality and politics as constituted necessarily 23 24 antagonistically places the emphasis for politics on confrontation rather than love or peace. One 25 26 consequence for us is the observation that if politics becomes theorised almost exclusively agonistically, 27 28 peace as a constitutive force (or ‘love’ in King’s terms) loses a critical valency. We argue that this is 29 30 especially true in the current context wherein ‘war and violence…have been so compellingly 31 32 deconstructed and critiqued within critical geography in recent years’ (Williams et al. 2014: 1). Our 33 34 simple question is: at what expense? Why can’t love itself be political or critical, simply by being always 35 36 already exemplary? Why do we overwhelmingly focus in our critical approaches to politics on 37 38 confrontation, while the innervating force of the demand for justice, and so the constitutive grounds of 39 40 peace – love, care, compassion, empathy, etc. – are framed as either apolitical or irreducibly infused 41 42 with their opposite? 43 44 45 The following paper provides a diagnosis of how dominant critical and theoretical lenses within 46 geography over-determine sociality as either agonistic or violent, and so preclude thinking peace 47 48 positively rather than only negatively - that is, as the absence of violence. We also provide a means for 49 50 addressing how positive accounts of peace may be mobilised without losing the critical purchase of 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 4

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 important theoretical tools, like historical materialism, deconstruction, or post-structuralism more 9 10 generally. 11 12 13 The first half of the paper considers influential theoretical foundations for critical geopolitics. We focus 14 15 on geopolitics to highlight how a particular critical emphasis on contestation, violence, and state- 16 17 centred forms of political sociality in critical geographies forestalls thinking more expansively about 18 For Peer Review 19 what ‘peace’ means (Williams et al, 2014: 1). In particular, we examine the influence of Michel Foucault 20 21 and Jacques Derrida, whose theories of agonism as violence, as adopted by critical geopolitics and 22 23 political geographies (ex. Dalby, 2010; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Ó Tuathail, 1996) reveal the conflicts 24 25 underlying the social, the political, and, in Derrida’s case, language and meaning itself (see Hanssen, 26 27 2000). These theoretical influences, have, like many political geographers today, been situated within a 28 29 longer critical tradition of historical materialism. Marx too, of course, read sociality and history as 30 31 suffused with dialectical conflict and struggle. Although we, the authors, see ourselves very much as 32 33 products of these two critical traditions, we ask here whether such perspectives also undermine critical 34 35 ontologies of peace. We argue they do, and so risk reproducing the loss of peace as either a theoretical 36 37 possibility, or even the loss of the means by which to recognise peace as an always already, or perpetual 38 39 expression of lived human collectivity. If what we perceive as peaceful is inherently permeated by 40 41 struggle and violence, then peace can only be deferred as Messianic, unachievable, aporetic, an 42 43 impossible perfection. A theoretical dichotomy results, with unavoidable violence on one side and 44 45 unachievable peace on the other. While it is important to note that the potential for violence may 46 always be present in social contexts, we argue that the potential for peace, as always already present 47 48 itself, struggles to be recognised if we read sociality as irreducibly conflictual. Again, our claim is quite 49 50 simple: looking for violence and calling it critique will not reveal peace. We need in addition to look for 51 52 the relational conditions that are always already producing peace as a positive ontology of being alive in 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 5

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 the everyday sociality of human and non-human interaction; in other words, we need to be able to 9 10 recognise theoretically , as well as empirically, the practical grounds that make peace thinkable. We 11 12 gesture here to the peace activist, social reformer, and early feminist, Jane Addams, whose work in the 13 14 th early 20 century was amongst the first to define an ontology of peace as relational, practical, 15 16 processual, and positive (ex. Addams, 2007). 17 18 For Peer Review 19 The second half of the paper considers how we might negotiate the challenge that agonism poses for 20 21 conceptualising peace. What potential for theorising peace might be established between the two 22 23 extremes - neither a utopian perfection, nor a paralysing negation of peace? Here we align our 24 25 argument with an emerging and heterogeneous body of research sometimes referred to as, amongst 26 27 other things, ‘political ontology’ (ex. Blaser, 2009; Mol, 1999; Viveiros de Castro, 2015). The political 28 29 emphasis for this work lies less in detailing problems to be overcome (i.e agonism or violence), but in 30 31 how extant and unfolding alternatives ‘…“figureates” the future in [their] very enactment’ (Holbraad et 32 33 al., 2014). The pre-figurative political focus, thus, is on ‘world-making’ (Tsing, 2015: 292), what Shields 34 35 and Soeters – via Addams – term ‘peaceweaving’ (2015: 9), those practical and diverse relationships 36 37 already practiced, which make other worlds and their livelihood processes possible. Political ontology 38 39 has close, often unacknowledged, affinities with some contemporary feminist political economies (ex. 40 41 Gibson-Graham, 2006a; Povinelli, 1995) and indigenous political theory (ex. Coulthard, 2014; Simpson 42 43 and Smith, 2014; Simpson, 2014; Todd, 2016), both of which just get on and decolonise politics without 44 45 worrying about the finer academic points of ‘ontology’. The emphasis for the latter lies in theorizing 46 ‘from life’ (Million, 2014), that is, from the actually existing forms of socio-ecological care and reciprocity 47 48 that people (and non-humans) use, always already, to co-produce relational conditions of creative 49 50 commitment to one-another. The Papachase Cree scholar, Dwayne Donald, defines this as ‘ethical 51 52 relationality’: ‘…an ecological understanding of human relationality that does not deny difference, but 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 6

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 rather seeks to more deeply understand how different histories and experiences position us in relation 9 10 to each other (2009: 6). We argue that these everyday conditions of ethical relationality contain the 11 12 ontological grounds for positive peace. 13 14 15 We have chosen to focus the argument through a related theoretical account, which makes the point 16 17 about politics as ontology in a pointed and provocative way. We focus on how Spinoza’s (1996) 18 For Peer Review 19 relational ontology is utilised in the political theory of Hasana Sharp to ‘re-naturalise’ the basis for 20 21 political critique (Sharp, 2011). With the term ‘renaturalise’, Sharp argues against human-nature 22 23 divisions (as, indeed, does Donald). Humans do not represent an ontologically separate category to be 24 25 understood in reflexive phenomenological separation. Rather, human experience is immersed in, and 26 27 determined through, the mess of relations that exist between all beings, which Spinoza names ‘Nature’. 28 29 Sharp’s text considers the political implications of such a relational ontology, exploring what new 30 31 political avenues are revealed when we take into account material relationality as an ontological 32 33 condition. By challenging the constructivist assumptions around ‘de-naturalising politics’, which depend 34 35 on reproducing nature-culture distinctions, Sharp’s alternative theoretical starting point neatly captures 36 37 what is at stake in the effort to engender a more productive and affirmative ontological engagement 38 39 with peace within critical geopolitics and political geographies. A re-naturalised ontological position 40 41 allows for the conditions of both violence and peace, but, crucially, gives neither a privileged nor 42 43 foundational status; human political experience emerges from the ontological conditions of both. Our 44 45 approach seeks to account for the key conditions that a geography of peace must acknowledge. As such, 46 it is also aligned with alternative (particularly feminist) critical geopolitical projects that advocate more 47 48 constructive and positive political elements to critical political and geopolitical work (see for ex. Dowler 49 50 and Sharp, 2001; Koopman, 2011a; Pain, 2009). Conceptualising peace as arising from necessary inter- 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 7

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 connections of individual bodies in everyday processes affirms productive ways to study a political 9 10 ontology of positive peaceful relations already extant within critical political geographies. 11 12 13 A II. Negating peace: agonistic social theory 14 15 16 It is a commonplace that critical geopolitics and political geography more generally have 17 18 overwhelmingly beenFor concerned Peer with violence, andReview with the need to deconstruct and challenge 19 20 geopolitical ideologies that justify conflict and warfare (Dalby, 2010). In recent years, this has, in 21 22 particular, been characterised by a response to generalised ‘war’, the ‘war on terror’, the ‘war on drugs’, 23 24 or the ‘war on poverty’ (see for ex. Dodds, 2005; Gregory, 2004; Gregory and Pred, 2007; Ingram and 25 Dodds, 2009). This section discusses the agonistic social theories that influence these critical geopolitical 26 27 geographies. The aim is to show that the constant critique and revelation of inherent violence means 28 29 that a conceptualisation of peace is not only negated and neglected, but theoretically precluded by 30 31 epistemological and ontological commitments to conflict as a founding, if anti-foundational, condition of 32 33 language, sociality, and community. 34 35 36 Particular attention is given to agonism and violence in the work of Foucault and Derrida. Acknowledged 37 38 by Ó Tuathail (1996: 18) as the ‘intellectual inspiration’ in his development of the critical geopolitical 39 40 project, critical geopolitics continues to utilise discourse analysis and deconstruction in its treatment of 41 42 geopolitical scripts (Power and Campbell, 2010). As shall be demonstrated, these influential critical 43 44 approaches are closely related to agonistic social theories in Foucault and Derrida, and their concern 45 46 with exposing the ways in which society is permeated by conflict, struggle, and violence. 47 48 ‘Violence’ here assumes a broad definition, one which illustrates a frequent tendency within 49 50 contemporary theory to conflate struggle (agonism) with violence. Never-the-less, the definition 51 52 includes factors that cannot be attributed to an identifiable actor, such as those captured by Galtung’s 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 8

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (1969: 171) notion of structural violence: ‘the violence is built into the structure and shows up as 9 10 unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances’. Galtung (1990) later added ‘cultural violence’ 11 12 to his analysis, which he defined as any cultural discourses that legitimise either direct or structural 13 14 violence. More recently, Žižek (2009) has proposed a similar distinction between what he calls the 15 16 subjective violence of people’s actions, and the objective violence that is, for Žižek, society’s foundation. 17 18 Žižek identifies twoFor forms of the latter:Peer the symbo licReview violence of language, and the systemic violence of 19 20 our political and economic systems. If subjective violence disrupts the normal state of things, Žižek 21 22 (2009: 2) claims that objective violence is ‘precisely the violence inherent in this “normal” state of 23 24 things’. These ‘hidden’ forms of violence are also of key concern for Foucault and Derrida, each of whom 25 26 theorise a close relationship between structural/symbolic violence, and outbursts of ‘actual’ subjective 27 28 violence. 29 30 31 Before turning to these two thinkers in more detail, it is first worth highlighting their relation to critical 32 33 Marxism, and the significance of this relation when discussing agonism. Critical Marxism is characterised 34 35 by the attempt to over-come, via collective action, the inherent, material and epistemic violences of 36 37 capitalism (notably, primitive accumulation and alienation) and class division that are both part of, and 38 39 engines within, dialectical materialism. What are understood to be the broadly post-structuralist 40 41 positions of both Foucault and Derrida emerged in conversation with, and in critical response to, Marx’s 42 43 structural critiques of capitalist political economy. It would be false and short sighted not to recognise 44 45 the influence of critical Marxism within how post-structuralist and related positions, like those of Ó 46 Tuathail, Galtung, or even Žižek, are taken up today within critical geopolitics. But, excepting Žižek (see 47 48 2012), critical accounts of geopolitical change have loosened their commitments to a dialectical and 49 50 historical logic underlying the material and economic structures of contemporary neoliberal capitalism 51 52 and capitalist globalisation. While a linear, teleological historical narrative certainly lost theoretical sway 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 9

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 with post-structuralism’s influence – a position largely upheld today within critical geography – what has 9 10 not diminished is the emphasis on social agonism. Indeed, where Marx’s teleology postulated a future 11 12 free from social conflict given material equanimity (‘the idea of communism’, see, Badiou, 2010), post- 13 14 structuralist and critical positions today often highlight the impossibility of overcoming agonism or 15 16 difference. Difference, and the tensile conditions difference affords, permeate and condition not only 17 18 social change, but Foralso thought itself.Peer What is also notReview lost in the Marxist critical legacy is the ethical 19 20 commitment by scholars to seizing the opportunities manifest in such conditions so as to promote 21 22 change and betterment. Critical geopolitical theorists, like critical geographers more generally, see 23 24 themselves, laudably, as politicised subjects committed in an ethos of social change. But it is an ethos 25 26 made possible by a foundational confrontation within agonistic struggle, including the possibilities, as 27 28 well as inequities and injustices that result. Foucault’s great and lasting insight, after all, was to 29 30 understand power, emergent in agonism, as productive. 31 32 33 Indeed, the place of agonism and violence in the work of Foucault is intimately connected with his 34 35 project of understanding the operation of power in society and how it produces subjectivity and 36 37 subjectivations. One of Foucault’s most explicit discussions of conflict is in the Collège de France lecture 38 39 series transcribed and published in English as Society Must Be Defended (Foucault, 2004). In these 40 41 lectures, Foucault explores the idea that we can analyse the productivity of power ‘in terms of conflict, 42 43 confrontation, and war’ (2004: 15). It was also in these lectures that he introduced his well-known 44 45 theory of ‘bio-power’, (later developed in Foucault, 1998), which he identifies as the form of power 46 unique to the modern nation state. Focused on the fostering of life, bio-power operates through 47 48 ‘numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of 49 50 populations’ (Foucault, 1998: 140). These techniques include surveillance, meticulous ordering of space, 51 52 medical/psychological examination, and the collection of population data such as mortality rates and 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 10

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 migration patterns. These demonstrate Foucault’s conflation of power/knowledge, showing that power 9 10 operates in tandem with scientific discourse to shape disciplinary forms of social control and productive 11 12 subjectivisation. 13 14 15 Already this discursive analysis can be seen as theoretically supported by commitments to structural and 16 17 symbolic forms of ‘conflict, confrontation, and war’. Foucault shows how discourses are complicit in 18 For Peer Review 19 ‘objective’ violence, in that they produce epistemic categories of people and places that are deemed 20 21 inferior, as well as narratives of ‘us and them’. Yet what is particularly striking is the connection that 22 23 Foucault makes between bio-power and empirical violence itself, noting that ‘wars were never as bloody 24 25 as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes 26 27 visit such holocausts on their own populations’ (Foucault, 1998: 136-7). Foucault argues, then, that bio- 28 29 power is quite compatible with a logic and relationship of war. Under bio-power, killing comes to be 30 31 justified under the guise of protecting the population. He gives the examples of racism and eugenics, 32 33 citing, in particular, state racism and eugenics in Germany under National Socialism. He reasons as 34 35 follows: if bio-power is concerned with the health of citizens, then it can justify killing based on the idea 36 37 that it will protect and improve the vitality of the populace. The death of those considered racially or 38 39 biologically inferior, ‘is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer’ (Foucault, 40 41 2004: 255). The assertion is that genocide has not occurred in spite of this drive to foster life, but 42 43 precisely because of the focus on life (Foucault, 1998). In a pessimistic closure to his lecture series, 44 45 Foucault (2004) suggests that this connection between bio-power and killing is ‘inscribed in the workings 46 of all States’ (p.260). 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 11

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Foucault’s arguments regarding the relationship between power, the modern state, and violence, 9 10 problematise today’s liberal democratic understanding of peace, which emphasises the role of the law 11 12 and the state in ensuring peace (Joas, 2003). Foucault writes, 13 14 15 Law is not pacification, for beneath the law, war continues to rage in all the mechanisms of 16 17 power, even in the most regular. War is the motor behind institutions and order. In the 18 For Peer Review 19 smallest of its cogs, peace is waging a secret war. To put it another way, we have to interpret 20 21 the war that is going on beneath peace; peace itself is a coded war (2004, p. 50-51). 22 23 24 Although Foucault himself would later make a distinction between power and violence (Foucault, 1982; 25 for further discussion see Oksala, 2012), contemporary readings of his work emphasise the connection 26 27 between the two (Frazer and Hutchings, 2011; Polat, 2010; Reid, 2003). The importance of this, for the 28 29 present argument, is that the assumption of agonism and violence precludes any discussion of 30 31 compassion, love, or empathetic cooperation as productive capacities, that is, as felt realities capable of 32 33 producing new forms of living together that are not always already pregnant with the potential of 34 35 violence. Peaceful concepts are not considered because the theoretical starting point foregrounds 36 37 agonism and violence, and designates the political task one of the struggle to reveal the violences that 38 39 are interpreted as irreducibly manifest in sociality. Anything considered peaceful must be examined to 40 41 reveal its inherent potential to dominance or violence; such is the reflexive responsibility of thinking as 42 43 critique. 44 45 46 Jacques Derrida offers a theorisation of violence that is perhaps even more radical than Foucault’s. In Of 47 48 Grammatology (1997), Derrida introduces a three-part structure of violence: violence of language, 49 50 violence of law, and empirical violence. Each part is linked to the one before it, resulting in a systematic 51 52 reading of violence as constitutive (for more detailed elaborations, see Corson, 2001; Grosz, 1998). First, 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 12

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 and fundamental to his philosophical work, is the violence of language, which we could also call the 9 10 violence of differentiation. For Derrida, to name something, and thus inscribe it in the symbolic order of 11 12 language, is the ‘arche-violence’ (1997: 112) upon which meaning itself lies. The act of naming things 13 14 puts everything into a system of classification and confrontational differentiation; it is the origin of ‘us’ 15 16 and ‘them’, ‘self’ and ‘other’, ‘subject’ and ‘object’, ‘sign’ and ‘referent’. Language is designated as 17 18 violent because it Forbreaks up and Peer divides the world. Review This division is not only a pretext to (empirical) 19 20 violence, but is violent in itself (Frazer and Hutchings, 2011). 21 22 23 The violence of the law, or the institution of morality, follows the violence of language. This second level 24 25 of violence is related to the first level in as much as it denies it. As Grosz (1998: 193) puts it, the law 26 27 ‘refuses to face up to its own dependence on, and enmeshment in, the more primordial structure’. It is 28 29 thus violent precisely because it places itself beyond violence and tries to maintain order, forgetting the 30 31 ‘accidents and contingencies of [its] favoured patterns of inclusion and exclusion’ (Corson, 2001: 871). 32 33 Further developed in his famous essay, ‘Force of Law’, Derrida (1992: 14) writes, ‘…since the origin of 34 35 authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can’t by definition rest on anything but 36 37 themselves, they are themselves a violence without ground.’ The law designates what passes as violent; 38 39 it institutes what is right and wrong, and yet, ultimately, it has no essential claim to such authority. It 40 41 can only be an imposition, hence Derrida’s focus on the word ‘force’, and the phrase ‘to enforce the 42 43 law’. The force of law, ‘is not an exterior or secondary possibility that may or may not be added as a 44 45 supplement to law. It is the force essentially implied in the very concept of justice as law ’ (Derrida, 1992: 46 47 5, emphasis in original). And, deconstruction, that is, honest critique, is only possible ‘as an experience 48 49 of the impossible, there where, even if it does not exist (or does not yet exist, or never does exist), there 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 13

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 is justice’ (Ibid.: 15, emphasis in original). Justice, then, is impossible precisely because of inescapable 9 10 violence and social conflict. 11 12 13 The third and final violence in Derrida’s structure is the empirical violence we recognise in the everyday 14 15 realities of war, assault, murder, rape and so on. For Derrida, this third layer also rests on the previous 16 17 two. It arises because of the inability of the second level (law) to maintain order in the first level 18 For Peer Review 19 (difference). Empirical violence is thus the material realisation of the originary system of differentiation. 20 21 And it, in turn, confirms the violence of the law in its very transgression of the law, demonstrating that 22 23 the law must be enforced. 24 25 The significance of this structure is that it has no outside. Violence and conflict are conditions of 26 27 meaning itself, from which follows the violence of law and empirical violence. For Derrida, because 28 29 there is violence in all meaningful interaction, the ethical imperative is to always avow this violence 30 31 (Derrida, 2013; Frazer and Hutchings, 2011). We must be attentive to the ways in which we are always 32 33 doing violence, always excluding someone, always defining ourselves against an Other in a form of 34 35 agonal contest. He is therefore very sensitive to the ways in which violence is occurring in what would 36 37 commonly be considered innocent concepts. Exposing such violence is part of a deconstructing or 38 39 problematising approach. Take, for example, his suspicion of the term ‘community’: ‘If by community 40 41 one implies…a harmonious group, consensus, and fundamental agreement beneath the phenomena of 42 43 discord and war, then I don’t believe in it very much’ (Derrida, 1995: 355). To have a community, to 44 45 imagine a fixed and shared identity, is to be fortified against agonal difference. Even in this supposedly 46 47 innocent word, Derrida uncovers the violent exclusion of the other. As Caputo (1997: 113) explains, 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 14

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 while the word sounds like something warm and comforting, the very notion is built around a 9 10 defense that a ‘we’ throws up against the ‘other’…the harmony and peace of community 11 12 depends upon having adequate “munitions” (munio, munitio) and a readiness for war. 13 14 15 Deconstructive approaches do not glorify violence – far from it – but point to the greatest harm done in 16 17 the dishonest refusal to see violence as extending underneath, supporting, and enclosing modern liberal 18 For Peer Review 19 political claims to fostering freedom, community, and communication. 20 21 22 Foucault and Derrida both provide comprehensive theorisations of agonism and violence. Frazer and 23 24 Hutchings (2011) identify two key shared themes that are relevant to the present argument. First, 25 contexts of government are contexts of violence. As has been demonstrated, Foucault and Derrida both 26 27 examine the violence inherent in the law and the state. Second, both critique the disavowal of violence 28 29 – philosophical and modern claims to peace are exposed as masking hidden violence (Frazer and 30 31 Hutchings, 2011). These key theoretical points disrupt common notions of peaceful, law-abiding, 32 33 societies. Agonistic perspectives have particularly been critical of the ‘liberal democratic’ model of 34 35 peace. Emerging from the Enlightenment (Joas, 2003), and the thought of Immanuel Kant (see Kant, 36 37 2009), this model is based on the idea that peace derives from ordered, law-abiding republican states, 38 39 precisely those phenomena that are revealed as violent in the theories of Foucault and Derrida. Under 40 41 the liberal model, peace is something that can paradoxically be enforced by military intervention (Joas, 42 43 2003). Drawing upon Foucault’s analysis of the relation between biopolitics and war, Dillon and Reid 44 45 (2009) elaborate upon this central paradox: despite posing itself as a means to reduce war, liberalism in 46 47 fact produces more reasons to go to war. Following Foucault, they claim that the justification for liberal 48 49 warfare is to ‘make life live’, and indeed proclaim that the ‘liberal peace becomes the extension of war 50 51 by other means’ (p. 129). 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 15

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 In light of this, some have argued the merits of the agonistic approach to peace. Shinko (2008) argues 9 10 that agonism is useful precisely because it destabilises any version of peace based on consensus. It 11 12 avoids notions of peace falling into ‘hegemonic iterations of disciplinary order’ (Shinko, 2008: 475). She 13 14 argues that the task for an agonistic approach is to ‘locate structural inequities… [and] identify the 15 16 power resources that have held and continue to hold them in place’ (p. 491). Likewise, Polat (2010) 17 18 contends that we mustFor be suspicious Peer of every narrat iveReview of peace as ‘a privileged manifestation of power, 19 20 hegemonic and violent’ (p. 339). Within geography, Ross (2011) similarly draws attention to the need to 21 22 destabilise those versions of peace that ‘support the hegemony of the status quo’ (p. 198) and suppress 23 24 efforts to combat inequality. She posits that we must ‘recognise the violence in the purported peace’ (p. 25 26 198). The parallel between this argument and Foucault’s claim that we need to address the ‘war 27 28 beneath peace’ is apparent, and exemplifies the often easy slippage between struggle and violence in 29 30 characterisations of politics as negotiated difference. These arguments are also in line with Popke’s 31 32 (2003) declaration that a post-structuralist ethics in geography must involve a ‘politics of 33 34 deconstruction’ (p. 311) so as to question the ways in which identities are naturalised, and to investigate 35 36 how ‘spatial boundaries and divisions have been used to draw distinctions between self and other’ (p. 37 38 311). 39 40 41 This is a project that critical political geography is already doing ‘to interpret the war that is going on 42 43 beneath peace’ (Foucault, 2004: 51). Gregory (2007), for instance, exposes the way that the law 44 45 functioned as an aid to warfare in the Bush administration; ‘law and violence are not opposed but hold 46 each other in a deadly embrace’ (p.211). Olund (2007) examines how US governmental discourse of 47 48 cosmopolitanism has justified their foreign military interventions. Graham (2006) has shown how the 49 50 ostensibly positive connotations of ‘homeland’ cities are complicit in the killing of the ‘other’ against 51 52 which they are defined. Kirsch and Flint’s (2011) edited collection aims to ‘better understand how 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 16

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 processes of war, and relations of power shaped through war, are indeed embedded in the peace’ (p. 3- 9 10 4). Even Brickell (2015), who situates her paper, like Darling (2014) quoted at the outset, within the call 11 12 for wider geographies of peace than geopolitics, predominantly demonstrates how local Cambodian 13 14 reconciliation measures for domestic abuse can trap women in a violent marriage. In all, concepts that 15 16 might ordinarily be associated with peace (law and order, cosmopolitanism, a sense of home/identity, 17 18 reconciliation) are revealedFor as masking Peer agonal oper ations,Review and even violence. 19 20 21 All of these are important and necessary interventions. A deconstructionist approach is ‘perpetually 22 23 relevant’ (Dittmer, 2015: 669) in critical geopolitics and critical geography more generally. However, 24 25 such projects struggle to offer any positive conceptualisation of peace and the plurality of engagements 26 27 making up peaceful practices, precisely because sociality and its necessary politics is based on conflict or 28 29 even violence. What is peace and how can we recognise it, if sociality is only agonistic, or if violent 30 31 difference constitutes and delimits the contingency of the sayable? Critique – as the reflexive analysis of 32 33 difference within the phenomenological limits of what is sayable and knowable – itself becomes 34 35 increasingly unable to account for ontological aspects of human (and non-human) political agency, like 36 37 love, compassion, empathy, non-harmful co-operation, and nurture. As a result, important disciplinary 38 39 fields like critical geopolitics, and political geographies more widely, fail to address adequately the range 40 41 and spirit of theoretical and political possibilities open to them. Deadlock remains, between impossible 42 43 peace and unavoidable violence, and so an affirmative project for studying the heterogeneity of peace 44 45 as a constitutive or productive capacity in human interaction is not formed. It is not able to be formed 46 because critique is predicated on ‘reading…the persistence of violence in apparently peaceful relations 47 48 of care and conviviality’ (Darling, 2014: 237). Extant geographies of the predicates of peace - those 49 50 actual forces of love, care, and conviviality that materially innervate, in everyday practice, rationales for 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 17

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 justice - become processes that go under-recognised, under-theorised, and perhaps even under- 9 10 theorisable in their diverse, positive manifestations. 11 12 13 This paralysing critique within, particularly, critical geopolitics has not gone unnoticed and has been 14 15 identified as problematic, in particular by feminist scholars. Dowler and Sharp (2001: 167) succinctly 16 17 capture the problem: ‘although critical geopolitics might offer very eloquent deconstructions of 18 For Peer Review 19 dominant political discourse, there is often little sense of alternative possibilities. It offers an important 20 21 critical intervention, but the critique is constant’. Whilst they acknowledge that this deconstructive and 22 23 critical precision will always be necessary, Dowler and Sharp stress the importance of beginning to think 24 25 about ‘a more constructive side to critical geopolitics – a more positive politics’ (p. 167). 26 27 Dowler and Sharp’s arguments echo theorisations of ‘positive peace’ proposed much earlier than is 28 29 often recognised to be the case 1. In 1914, in consort with a collective of early feminist voices against war 30 31 and the continued exclusion of women from public policy discussions regarding peace, Jane Addams 32 33 extended her earlier positive theory of peace, developed in 1907, to encompass an ‘everyday ontology 34 35 of peace’ (Shields and Soeters, 2015: 5). This practical work focused on the welfare of marginalised poor 36 37 and immigrant populations in inner cities, and fostered as central to a geo politics of peace those 38 39 immediate human relationships of care and attention necessary for social transformation (Addams, 40 41 2002). Key for Addams was the idea of building relational processes – ecologies – of interaction that 42 43 began in the micro-political, domestic, and community scales, which then extended outward to nations. 44 45 Struggle, for her, was not anathema to domestic politics, but because her focus was on fostering the 46 47 intimate, relational conditions present for attenuating violence or harm successfully, peace emerged as 48 49 the extant processual capacities unfolding in ongoing relationships of immediate care. Peace was built, 50 51 thus, from the positive presences already at work in relational human ecologies. 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 18

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Consonant efforts are perhaps more familiar to geographers today in the work of J-K Gibson-Graham 9 10 and associated diverse community economies projects. Like Addam’s, they too focus on the 11 12 ‘performative ontological project[s]…of bringing new economies into being – rather than a realist 13 14 epistemological project of capturing and assessing existing objects’ (Gibson-Graham, 2008: 616). Indeed, 15 16 we read Gibson-Graham’s and similarly inspired arguments, approaches, and empirical studies to be, in 17 18 a very real sense, likeFor Addams’, alternativePeer geo politics Review of peace: of taking care, locally, performatively, 19 20 and experimentally. Gibson-Graham’s now long-standing arguments against critique in the negative 21 22 spirit or as ‘strong theory’ can be applied to the present discussion. It is precisely because of critique’s 23 24 iteration of epistemological limits that it is difficult to establish positive conceptions of peace, something 25 26 that might be generative of a productive politics of engagement. As Jones and Sage (2010: 321) put it, 27 28 ‘the relentlessness of critique [is] seen to have left little room for different, and more radical, forms of 29 30 geopolitics to emerge.’ This problematic demands that we re-think our theoretical underpinnings, such 31 32 that peace can be conceptualised in a positive and affirmative way, and not constantly undermined by 33 34 theoretical frameworks that shape expectations of agonism or violence. The next section of this paper 35 36 takes up this challenging problem. 37 38 39 A III. Beyond agonism: relational ontology and the possibilities for theorising peace 40 41 This section addresses the possibilities for theorising a positive approach to peace that is neither naïvely 42 43 utopian, nor paralysed by the view that politics and human social engagement begins in agonism. The 44 45 aim is to begin to account for positive peace as an emergent property of diverse relational ontologies of 46 47 localised experience and agency. In doing so, we take the framing of peace not as a homogenous steady 48 49 state to be achieved – or not – but as the immanent product of heterogeneous capacities for thought 50 51 and action always already extant in assemblages of human (and more-than-human) intimacy. 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 19

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Tyner and Inwood (2014) have recently highlighted the importance of avoiding granting violence an 9 10 ontological status. They argue that academic work within social sciences has ‘too often fetishized 11 12 violence’ (p. 771) – and the slippage between forms of agonism and violence – and that this privileging 13 14 ‘gives the appearance of violence as being natural and aspatial to the human condition’ (p. 772, 15 16 emphasis in original). Against fetishization, they claim that agonism or violence, as such, do not have a 17 18 pre-established realityFor outside ofPeer the milieu of re lationsReview that constitute it. They are not ‘things’ in 19 20 themselves, but rather always a result of the ‘sociospatial relations and processes that give “violence” its 21 22 meaning’ (p. 771). Thus, when addressing violence, we must ask by what processes and relations 23 24 violence is constituted. Even supposedly similar acts of violence can be brought about by radically 25 26 different underlying social and spatial relations (Tyner and Inwood, 2014). 27 28 29 We find value in Tyner and Inwood’s call for a diverse relational semantics of violence, and we echo 30 31 them in a qualified manner for a geopolitics of peace. We suggest, however, unlike their argument, that 32 33 relational accounts require discerning more nuanced ontologies of political agency, for the simple 34 35 reason that there is nothing outside the relations themselves; there are only ontological relations. 36 37 Political notions like self, subjectivity, nature, etc., are products (or ‘locations’ as Heaney puts it in the 38 39 epigraph) of their practice. As are love, compassion, empathy etc. A political subject is simply love (or 40 41 hate) in its action; the subject does not precede the relation that love, care, or harm manifests. Thus, 42 43 emphasis on meaning arising in ‘socio-spatial relations and processes’ is, necessarily, ontological. As 44 45 Andrew Benjamin (2015: 1) writes, 46 relationality brings a form of plurality into play…and the truth of relationality could not be 47 48 given by any one form of singularity in which that singularity would have been taken as 49 50 primary. Were singularity to precede relationality, then the truth of relationality would have 51 52 already been provided. 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 20

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 In other words, if either violence or peace should be recognised to emerge from ‘socio-spatial relations 9 10 and processes’, then their relationality has, as Benjamin continues, ‘an original presence’ (p. 2); there is 11 12 nothing before the relation that we need to worry about essentialising or limiting. Concerns to 13 14 denaturalise politics attempt, legitimately, to critique political impositions of one account of singular 15 16 truth as natural. But, crucially, if we posit relationality and process as a source of meaning, then we 17 18 must posit an ontologicalFor account Peer from which meanin Reviewg emerges; violent actions and peaceful actions, in 19 20 their heterogeneous doing, shape what counts as political and meaningful. 21 22 23 We argue that it is, therefore, important to study and develop an understanding of the multiple kinds of 24 25 sociospatial relations that produce nonviolence, justice, equality and compassion; such relations would 26 27 also be peaceful relations. The remainder of this paper gestures towards developing an understanding 28 29 of peace as a relational, and hence, political process. Hasana Sharp’s (2011) contemporary reading of 30 31 Spinoza in her book Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization helps in this regard. Drawing principally 32 33 on Spinoza’s Ethics (Spinoza, 1996), Sharp develops an affirmative politics that, we argue, can inform 34 35 positive accounts of peace. We conclude by showing how such a relational approach incorporates the 36 37 key themes of the recent ‘geographies of peace’ literature, and can also be aligned with other 38 39 alternative critical geopolitical projects. 40 41 Sharps’ ‘politics of renaturalization’ is developed through considering the political consequences of 42 43 Spinoza’s relational ontology, the idea that all beings, human and non-human, are necessarily in 44 45 relation. It is a ‘re-naturalising’ position because the natural is not constructed as separate from the 46 47 human or prior to social relationships, but how the human articulates itself is a function of the diverse 48 49 and unbounded processes emergent in the material relationships that make it possible. These include all 50 51 of the material assemblages through which we articulate the ecologies of our actions. Sharp draws on 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 21

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Spinoza to make this argument. For Spinoza, our whole experience of, and being in, the world is 9 10 determined through our relations with not only each other, but with everything we encounter. This is 11 12 why Sharp names her project one of ‘renaturalization’. Against the privileging of human existence above 13 14 the natural world, Sharp (2011: 23) uses Spinoza’s account to ‘reinsert human action and existence into 15 16 nature’. We are as much a part of the ecology of relations as anything else; indeed, there is nothing 17 18 outside the relations.For Humans are,Peer if you like, the relationsReview themselves. Singularity does not precede 19 20 relationality, and like-wise, knowledge and critique are part of the relational process itself. 21 22 23 From this ontology comes Spinoza’s theory of affect, an ‘inescapable interdependency’ (Sharp, 2011: 26) 24 25 whereby we affect, and are affected by, human and non-human forces. Spinoza (1996: 70) defines affect 26 27 as ‘affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or 28 29 restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections’. The phrase ‘power of acting’ refers to 30 31 every being’s striving to persevere in its own existence, in its ‘capacities to feel, act and perceive’ 32 33 (Massumi, 2015: 208). If an encounter between beings increases the power of acting, Spinoza names 34 35 this ‘joy’. If the encounter decreases the power of acting, this he names ‘sadness’. It must here be 36 37 emphasised that, for Spinoza, ‘joy’ and ‘sadness’ do not refer to emotions as we attribute them today; 38 39 they are what he terms ‘primitive affects’ (1996: 101) which centre around the problem of agency 40 41 within a relational ontology (Massumi, 2015). ‘Joy’ in Spinoza’s sense is not about feeling happy, but 42 43 rather is strictly referring to a change in the relational body’s power of acting (something which may be 44 45 accompanied by a whole variety of emotions). What is important here is not necessarily the terms ‘joy’ 46 or ‘sadness’ but how these name the embodied affective states that Spinoza argues emerge across the 47 48 ecologies of action that become politicisable as relational assemblages. 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 22

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Affect theory provides a useful way for thinking about accounts of both war and peace, deriving from 9 10 Spinoza’s formal definition of both love and hate. Love is defined as ‘a joy, accompanied by the idea of 11 12 an external cause’ (Spinoza, 1996: 105). Following the same structure, hate is defined as ‘a sadness, 13 14 accompanied by the idea of an external cause’ (p. 106). Thus, when we perceive an external cause to be 15 16 a constraint and negative force on us, this can produce hatred and can lead to conflict and violence 17 18 because we strive toFor remove the Peerthing we hate. Conv Reviewersely, when we perceive an external cause to be 19 20 an enabling and positive force on us, this can produce love and can lead to compassion, care and 21 22 friendship because we strive to preserve the thing we love. We can add to this another of Spinoza’s 23 24 propositions: 25 26 27 If someone has been affected with joy or sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different 28 29 from his own, and this joy or sadness is accompanied by the idea of that person as its cause, 30 31 under the universal name of the class or nation, he will love or hate, not only that person, but 32 33 everyone of the same class or nation (Spinoza, 1996: 94). 34 35 These definitions and proposition provide an explanation of the seemingly interminable conflicts that 36 37 exist today – each ‘side’, ‘class’ or ‘nation’ perceives the other as the external cause of their reduced 38 39 power of existence, and so each strives to remove the other. 40 41 42 Therefore, Spinoza’s position is not naïve. He explicitly recognises that we are not all the same, that we 43 44 have different strivings, and that conflicts follow from such tensions. The connectedness that his 45 46 ontology posits is as much the condition of hatred as it is the condition of love. What is of central 47 48 importance here, however, is that agonism is not given the privileged status that it receives in 49 50 contemporary accounts. Hostility, conflict and violence are always constituted and emergent from socio- 51 52 spatial relations, but they are not given special status as being foundational or all-encompassing. The 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 23

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 relational ecologies constitutive from ‘joy’ are as primary as the relational ecologies constitutive from 9 10 ‘sadness’. Conceptualising agonism or violence in this way represents an important shift away from 11 12 conflict reductive accounts of society. Under this model the political task is to understand and promote 13 14 the ways in which enabling relations already exist and are established and maintained, relations that 15 16 collectively enhance the power of acting, producing equality, compassion and nonviolence. Thus peace 17 18 becomes conceivedFor of as collective Peer action that is c onstantlyReview mutually enabling, but within and from the 19 20 diverse praxes that make it a felt reality. It does not deny suffering, nor does it deny the reality of 21 22 violence; it does, however, highlight the extant and very present social relations that affect compassion 23 24 and love against those that foster hatred. The crucial point is that peaceful actions exist and are felt just 25 26 as manifestly as agonistic ones. Only, given the theoretical lenses we predominantly use to underpin the 27 28 rationales of critical politics, we fail to account for their ontological presence as critique itself. 29 30 31 Recognising that ‘we are constantly animated by love and hate’ Sharp (2011: 171) recommends that ‘the 32 33 question for the politics of renaturalization becomes: how do we address hatred among us?’ (Ibid.: 171). 34 35 Although the focuses in her text are predominantly the questions of sexual and racial equality, Sharp’s 36 37 response to this problem can usefully be applied to the present discussion of peace. Of particular 38 39 relevance is her renaturalization of ideology critique, which she argues opens up new ways to resist 40 41 oppression. She begins with the notion, from Spinoza’s relational ontology – that, just as bodies are 42 43 transindividual, so too are ideas; ideas are equally part of the physical inter-dependence of material 44 45 becoming we have learned to call ‘nature’. Ideas can grow and thrive just as bodies can – ideology 46 critique therefore ‘becomes an engagement with the “life force” of ideas’ (Sharp, 2011: 57). 47 48 49 By Sharp’s own admission this is a position that is hard to comprehend; it is perhaps difficult to accept 50 51 that we do not think independently of other minds. Sharp illustrates her argument by referring to an 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 24

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ‘ecosystem’ of ideas, struggling to survive – ‘the image of the ecosystem highlights the fact that ideas, 9 10 like all natural things, desire to persevere in being and survive only in a favourable environment’ (Sharp, 11 12 2011: 73). Ideas require nurturing and support to survive, just as bodies do. They connect with other 13 14 similar ideas and so can increase in power. As Sharp (2011: 71) observes, ‘the ideas that most occupy 15 16 the mind are not necessarily the truest ideas but the ideas with the most life support, as it were, from 17 18 fellow ideas’. Importantly,For she emphasisesPeer the mate Reviewrial element of ideology, as it is reproduced in 19 20 ‘corporeal habits, rituals, performances, and discipline’ (Sharp, 2011: 75). 21 22 23 This understanding of ideas connecting and growing in strength accounts for the power of ideology. Our 24 25 ideas are not formed independently but in combination with many others ‘especially those [in our] 26 27 immediate surroundings, social milieu and political environment’ (Sharp, 2011: 67). An example 28 29 demonstrating this might be a child born into a racist community. The child does not independently 30 31 develop a racist ideology, but acquires it because s/he is in a social milieu where that particular ideology 32 33 is strong and is supported by similar ideas. It would require the exposure to alternative ideas to 34 35 challenge the racist ones. This leads us into the political project that Sharp posits as a result of the 36 37 renaturalization of ideology. We have to ‘identify those forces contrary to our perseverance and to unite 38 39 with those ideas amenable to our thriving’ (Sharp, 2011: 76). She uses as an example the idea of ‘black is 40 41 beautiful’ that arose in the USA in the 1960s. Against the damaging hegemonic idea that white skin is 42 43 more beautiful than black skin, ‘black is beautiful’ became a strong idea ‘by virtue of the actions and 44 45 passions of many resistant thinking powers’ (Sharp, 2011: 83). In such cases, living by example, rather 46 than in direct opposition or in a spirit of contestation becomes a ground for positive, relational 47 48 articulation. Some might argue that advocating a ‘politics by example’ might be post-political (Wilson 49 50 and Swyngedouw, 2014); we certainly would not, for a relational ontology seeks to shift the grounds of 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 25

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 what counts as political (in our case recognising the positive ‘worldings’ or ‘peaceweaving’ already being 9 10 lived as love or care), rather than decrying the erosion of orthodox categories of ‘the political’. 11 12 13 The project engendered by renaturalization is similar to that called for by Tyner and Inwood’s (2014) 14 15 emphasis on geopolitical relations, only it requires accepting political actions as pluralising ontological 16 17 possibilities. Tyner and Inwood note that their approach is about working towards a more just and 18 For Peer Review 19 peaceful future. They see hope in their claim that violence is always constituted in socio-spatial 20 21 relations; because socio-spatial relations can be transformed, so too can violence. We must endeavour 22 23 to understand and promote those extant socio-spatial relations that do not readily produce instances of 24 25 violence, be they ‘direct’ or ‘structural’. This echoes Sharp’s (2011) claim that working towards a more 26 27 peaceful society requires organising social relations to counter hatred and concomitantly fostering and 28 29 supporting enabling ideas to oppose damaging ideology. Although they begin from different theoretical 30 31 starting points, their shared focus on the relational means that they come to similar conclusions about 32 33 how we might proceed in fostering peaceful relations, and in studying the extant processes that, along 34 35 with agonism, also shape social life. 36 37 In identifying the ways in which geographical imaginaries exclude the ‘other’ and justify use of violence, 38 39 critical geopolitics is exposing damaging ideas. Sharp (along with authors in geography, foremost 40 41 amongst them Gibson-Graham) adds to this the need to recognise and foster enabling ideas. So the 42 43 renaturalization of ideology is not a replacement for deconstruction or discourse analysis, but instead 44 45 demonstrates how critique is only one part of the political undertaking if we want to try and reduce 46 47 harmful ideas and promote enabling ideas. We need also to study and understand the many and varied 48 49 processes through which political relations of respect, care, and cooperation are taking place, and 50 51 recognise them as productive capacities, even in places with ongoing conflicts and social divisions. Such 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 26

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 a project is therefore aligned with feminist approaches to geopolitics that emphasise the need for 9 10 positive, transformative political engagement – ‘feminist geopolitics is not just about critiquing 11 12 hegemony, but also about pointing to, and I would also argue creating , alternatives (Koopman, 2011a: 13 14 277, emphasis in original). The fostering of peaceful relations may not attract international attention in 15 16 the way spectacles of violence do, but that does not mean that they are not worth foregrounding as 17 18 open possibilities forFor imagining alternativePeer political Review ontologies of life. It is, precisely, that these are 19 20 embodied commitments to the politics of peace as well. 21 22 23 A IV. Conclusion 24 25 The contemporary approach to peace that this paper proposes does not deny the possibility that 26 27 peaceful relations are established and maintained between people, even in societies with a history of 28 29 conflict. As Martin (2014) writes, even within contexts of war, peace, as a function of its ontological 30 31 correlates, is always also being done. It is important to stress that this is not an essentialist claim to a 32 33 transcendent ‘truth’ of peace. The aim of the paper has not been to propose a collective meta-narrative 34 35 of peace. Rather, it is to provide a theoretical framework that accounts for the fact that peace means 36 37 different things to different people in different places, and, importantly, that the meaning of peace is an 38 39 ethical relationality ‘grounded in place, bodies, and national settings’ (Williams, 2013: 232). A 40 41 theoretical approach to peace must allow for pluralising the meaning of peace to include its ontological 42 43 work as altruism, compassion, love, quietude, friendship, and so on. A more expansive understanding of 44 45 peace grants it the same heterogeneity with which violence is theorised, and becomes part of our 46 47 ‘striving to conceptualise peace as richly as war’ (Williams and McConnell, 2011: 930) 48 49 50 We argue – with Addams, Sharp, Donald, Gibson-Graham, and others – that love, compassion, empathy, 51 52 care, and their related ontological correlates, which shape how peace is typically understood, do shape, 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 27

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 albeit differentially, how social relationships exercise themselves in ecologies of peace-making. 9 10 Questions of politics should not be understood as distinct from how care, love, or compassion 11 12 collectively shape – as praxes of ethics – human and more-than-human relationships. Crucially, we think, 13 14 critical research too often neglects those extant micropolitical and local processes (cultural, social, 15 16 economic, etc.) that are peaceful but manifest themselves in constitutive and intimate expressions – 17 18 and affects – of nurture,For love, compassion, Peer friends hip,Review and care. Instead, the too narrow focus through 19 20 reflexive critique seems to condemn thinking either, first, to deconstructing and so not seeing peace and 21 22 its ontological correlates as on-going predicates of positive geo political conditions, or, second, to 23 24 negotiating negatively, and so deferring ad infinitum, peace as an aporia. 25 26 27 By way of conclusion, we wish to highlight the important consequences to be drawn from a Spinozist 28 29 position for the way peace can be conceptualised as a topic of study, and demonstrate how they 30 31 correspond with the key themes recognisable in the ‘geographies of peace’ literature. First, it is a 32 33 positive conceptualisation of peace, that is, peace as more than the absence of fighting. Whilst a 34 35 negative peace may be preferable to the continuation of empirical violence, the literature is in 36 37 agreement that peace must be engaged as more than just a cessation of hostilities. 38 39 Second, it locates peace not at the level of the nation state, but at the distributed intersection of 40 41 intersubjective and material relationships. Rather than something that is formally instituted by the law 42 43 and authority, as in the liberal model, peace becomes conceived of as an ongoing project of mutually 44 45 enabling transversal social relations, everyday as well as exceptional. A focus on the ‘everyday’ of 46 47 geopolitics echoes feminist geopolitical arguments (Dowler and Sharp, 2001; Koopman, 2011a) and the 48 49 desire to incorporate the study of those elements that get ignored when only focusing on the scale of 50 51 states, governments and international relations. Although, within the relational framework we can claim 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 28

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 that certain legal/state structures may be more enabling than others, and more conducive of peaceful 9 10 relations. Indeed, it is important to understand the relationship and connectedness between the 11 12 different sites at which politics operates, and how ‘big’ politics is related to, and materialised in, 13 14 everyday experience (Hyndman, 2001; Koopman, 2011b). 15 16 17 Third, peace is something that is done; it is not a deferred or fixed state to be achieved. Woon (2014) 18 For Peer Review 19 has argued that we must understand nonviolence as a practice; the same can be said of peace. It is an 20 21 ongoing process, one that can have set-backs and must be renewed (Loyd, 2012; Williams et al., 2014). 22 23 For Sharp (2011), this process involves organising our social relations to counter hatred. She argues that 24 25 we must recognise damaging ideologies, and counter them with more enabling ideas. Examples might 26 27 include the rhetoric of ‘hands across the divide’ in Northern Ireland , the ‘Hindu-Muslim brotherhood’ of 28 29 weaving that Williams (2013) observes in Varanasi, India, or the ‘ArabsAndJewsRefuseToBeEnemies’ 30 31 social media campaigns discussed by Martin (2014). Such ideas can, and do, have political impacts. 32 33 Fourth, this understanding goes beyond thinking of war and peace as binary opposites and allows that 34 35 they exist together, a ‘spectrum of violence and non-violence’ (Williams and McConnell, 2011: 930). 36 37 Even in societies that are ‘at war’, there can still be peaceful relations, where cooperation can engender 38 39 mutually enabling affects. Agonism has exposed the war that is within peace – but, as Koopman (2011b: 40 41 193) states, ‘peace too is inside war’. We advocate the need to expose peace as an ontological presence 42 43 that is also within sociality. A Spinozist framework can help us identify such peace inside, and in spite of, 44 45 agonism and war. Indeed, perhaps most importantly, difference is not necessarily violent or divisive. If 46 47 we can begin to understand the differential processes that are peaceful relations, then they can be 48 49 promoted, against those relations that maintain hatred and conflict. The examples of nonviolence, 50 51 cooperation and negotiation are there, it is just that they need to be studied and built upon, something 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 29

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 that is difficult to do if ‘one starts from the premise that all that has ever prevailed is force and rumours 9 10 of war’ (Kearns, 2009: 281). There is potential, then, for further research into understanding the 11 12 processes through which such peaceful relations emerge. Lanas and Zembylas’ (2015) study of a teacher 13 14 working towards better relations between her school and the local community is an instructive example 15 16 from outside of geography. They provide a positive empirical study of the everyday practices through 17 18 which conflicts wereFor mitigated Peer and positive relatio Reviewns were developed. Such research could even 19 20 contribute to Sharp’s ‘enabling ideas’, promoted against those relations that maintain hatred and 21 22 conflict. 23 24 25 Finally, ontological and relational accounts enable understandings that are contextual and variable 26 27 across time and space. Because this model views peace as emerging through collective action as 28 29 distributed and enabling ecological relations, studying peace conceptualised in this way will necessarily 30 31 reference the unique socio-spatial contexts in which peace develops. Patricia Daley, who researches 32 33 conflict resolution in central Africa, has written about the problems caused when Western 34 35 understandings of peace are imposed at the expense of the local understandings of peace (Daley, 2014). 36 37 A relational approach to peace would encourage contextual commitment and enable a more fruitful 38 39 exploration of difference in cultural values and how they influence efforts towards peace. 40 41 What emerges from this theoretical position is a response to the calls for bringing peace firmly into 42 43 critical geopolitical research. We have argued that to do so, we also need to attend to how the 44 45 theoretical frameworks we use are complicit in shaping our research expectations, ontologies, and 46 47 outcomes in particular, privileging, and ultimately limiting ways. Our account acknowledges other 48 49 similar efforts to date (for ex. Brickell, 2015; Darling, 2010; Tyner and Inwood, 2014; Williams, 2013), but 50 51 suggests there are deeper theoretical causes that also demand re-thinking. Our account of a positive 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 30

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ontology of everyday, intimate, and distributed peace, one that recognises peaceful presences, as well 9 10 as violent actions by social and political agents, might be one further step towards opening geopolitical 11 12 landscapes to the diversity of lived expressions that make up social realities beyond agonism. In so 13 14 doing, we encourage grasping the ways forms of peace are being produced, right now, in the mess of 15 16 relations that reside between utopian perfection and unavoidable violence, but which also lend hope to 17 18 both critical and politicalFor praxes. Peer Review 19 20 21 Acknowledgements 22 23 24 The authors would like to thank the four anonymous reviewers and the editors for their careful readings 25 and suggestions. The paper significantly improved as a result of their valuable contributions. We would 26 27 also like to thank JD Dewsbury, Ciara Merrick, and Tom Keating for reading and commenting on previous 28 29 versions. 30 31 32 Notes 33 34 35 1. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that the term ‘positive peace’, widely attributed 36 37 to Johan Galtung, was developed in Jane Addams’ 1907 text, Newer Ideals of Peace (Addams, 2007) . 38 39 The term was also used prior to Galtung by Martin Luther King Jr. in his ‘Letter from Birmingham 40 41 Jail’, in 1963. 42 43 References 44 45 46 Addams J (2002) Peace and Bread in Time of War, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. 47 48 Addams J (2007) Newer Ideals of Peace, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. 49 50 Badiou A (2010) The Idea of Communism. In: Douzinas C and Žižek S (eds) The Idea of Communism. 51 52 London: Verso, 1-14. 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 31

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