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A Contextualist History of Cartesian : Roger Ariew’s Descartes and the First Cartesians

Domenico Collacciani Sorbonne Université–République des Saviors (USR3608)

1. Introduction The title Descartes and the First Cartesians only partly reflects the scope of the research presented in Roger Ariew’s latest book. To be sure, this study does offer a new and extensive account of the work of the first Cartesians and thus a new perspective on the historical phenomenon that was seventeenth century . Yet it does so on the basis of a vast survey of the Scholastic context from which the new philosophy emerged. The investigation of Cartesianism is thus given shape by the inquiry into (somewhat vague at first, the term is subsequently presented in all its nuances). From this point of view, Descartes and the First Cartesians takes up and completes the research Ariew presented in his 1999 Descartes and the Last Scholastics.Atfirst sight, then, the field surveyed is the tran- sition from one way of doing philosophy, one that is reaching its end, to the new philosophy just beginning. The guiding question seems to be whether and how Descartes’s philosophy succeeded in replacing ’s. Yet, as Ariew has demonstrated throughout his work, while there is indeed a transition taking place in the seventeenth century, it is in no way the case that one replaced another. The approach of Descartes and the First Cartesians thus consists in study- ing the transition from the viewpoint of an unchanging element, in defin- ing a trait that characterizes philosophy before and after Descartes. In considering the relationship of the new philosophy to Scholasticism, Ariew focuses on a specific context: the teaching of philosophy in the seventeenth century. He thus examines a sizable corpus of textbooks published before and after Descartes with the aim of measuring the effects of the encounter between Cartesian thought and a well-established traditional structure of

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knowledge. At the center of his study is the well-known fact that Descartes initially conceived of his own textbook as an annotated edition of an earlier text (his choice had fallen on Eustache de Saint-Paul’s Summa quadripartita) and only later settled on publishing an autonomous work. The major strength of this method of research derives no doubt from the fact that the Cartesians were openly “rivaling” with the Scholastics (Ariew 2014, p. xvi). Historians of Cartesianism are well familiar with the polariza- tion of the debate. On the one hand, the Cartesians—Du Roure, Arnauld, Clerselier, and Rohault—explicitly and forcefully took up their master’s teachings (Azouvi 2002). On the other, the anti-Cartesians—Huygens, Oldenburg, Huet, and, starting the 1660s, the Jesuits—openly called out and criticized their adversaries’ sectarianism. Ariew turns this particular feature of the reception of Descartes into a principle for selecting his corpus. In fact, he remarks, there is no necessary and sufficient condition for calling an author “Cartesian.” Whether on the issue of doubt or of the cogito,ofthe divisibility of , and so on, there always be an assuredly Cartesian author who will nonetheless reject one of these ideas central to Descartes’s philosophy. Yet the of problems to be discussed in the book requires that the central category “Cartesian” leaves no room for doubt: “My rule of thumb is to think of ‘Cartesian’ as an actor’s category in the intellectual universe of the seventeenth century. The authors I cite as Cartesians published works with Descartes’ name prominently displayed in their titles or subtitles; they saw themselves as Cartesians and others saw them as such” (Ariew 2014, p. xvi).1 The first two chapters deal with Scholasticism before Descartes. The first describes Descartes’s position within the institutional setting, throw- ing light on the didactic practices of the religious orders that at the time enjoyed a de facto monopoly over education: the Oratorians, the Doctri- naires, and above all the Jesuits. In the second chapter, the author gives an account of the four part textbook prior to Descartes. The two last chapters show how a Cartesian textbook was constructed, first in the Prin- ciples of Philosophy, then in the work of the first Cartesians.

2. Chapter 1 The events relating to Descartes’s condemnation by the Roman Church have been the object of ample study in the critical . Contempo- raries noted that the attack on substantial forms mounted by mechanized

1. For a recent attempt at defining Cartesianism from a “non-essentialist” point of view via a study of these controversies, see Roux 2013.

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could imply a criticism of the of the Eucharist.2 Nonethe- less, the sources are not entirely clear on this point: despite its significance, the 1663 censure by the Roman Church seems not to have been circulated in . In keeping with its decidedly contextualist orientation, Ariew’s study thus turns primarily to Louis XIV’s 1671 condemnation whose effect on the spread of Cartesianism is indeed easily discernable. While the partisans of the new philosophy famously polemicized against any kind of philosophical sect, Ariew stresses that even before Descartes the field we call Scholastic philosophy was very heterogeneous. Around the middle of the century, Thomist is still the doctrine of ref- erence; , meanwhile, seems to have established itself just as much, judging from the fact that, beside , it is attacked by the Cartesians as one of the main philosophical sects. Like “Cartesian,” however, the his- toriographical categories “Thomist” and “Scotist” are not invented by later historians; they are self-descriptions often explicitly used by the authors. It is thus possible to choose a paradigmatic text, draw certain general theses from it, and attribute these to one or the other of the categories. Ariew chooses the twenty-four Thomist (and anti-Scotist) theses articulated by the Dominican friar Antoine Goudin as a tool with which to “measure” the degree to which other authors are Thomists or Scotists. As for the institutions charged with teaching at mid-century, beside the colleges of the , the market was dominated by the Oratorians and the Jesuits. Each of these schools was different and thus reacted differently to Descartes’ work. At the Sorbonne, instruction was based on the Scotist theses of Eustache de Saint-Paul’s Summa philosophiæ quadripartita, namely: the subject of is the shared by and creatures; it is possible to have an idea of God even if it cannot be demonstrated a priori; there is a third distinction in addition to real and rational distinction, etc. The Oratorians’ teaching stands out in that it was being conducted in French and inspired by the of the order’s founder, Pierre de Bérulle. are more complicated in the case of the Jesuits: even if the ratio studiorum demanded fidelity to Thomas, authors like Cériziers and Gautruche managed to have their Scotist lessons published. While the Society’s in Rome and Spain were Thomist, those in Paris seem to have held less clear-cut positions. Descartes first came into contact with the during his education in the collège at La Flèche, and the relationship with the order continued throughout his life. It can be divided into three periods: the first around the publication of the ; the second dating to the 1640s and marked by the polemic with Bourdin; the third characterized

2. On the debate between Arnauld and Mesland, see Armogathe 1977.

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by the correspondence with Mesland. According to Ariew, the Jesuits—with the notable exception of Bourdin—were not hostile toward Descartes. After his death, however, they become more and more critical of Cartesian philosophy: the main difficulties they saw concerned its newness, its re- duction of physics to , and the explanation of the Eucharist. Descartes’s exchanges with the Oratorians were similarly rich. Ariew points to the meeting with Bérulle at Chandoux’s lecture and the cor- respondence with Gibieuf, whom Descartes asks for assistance in obtaining approbation for publishing the Meditations. In general, the Oratorian order was favorably disposed toward Descartes. Ariew cites the work of Nicolas Poisson, editor and commentator of some of Descartes’s posthumous works; Lamy and Fromentier, who taught Cartesian philosophy and were censored on that count; and, of course, Malebranche. Their adherence to Cartesianism, however, is never mere uncritical acceptance, as a look at de la Grange’s refutation of Descartes shows. By studying the history of Cartesianism via academic institutions, Ariew succeeds in combining several heterogeneous subjects within a stable per- spective. One remarkable result of this approach is that he is able to present the classic historiographical categories from a new angle. In 1978, Gouhier referred to a specifically French tendency within the reception of Descartes as “Augustinized Cartesianism,” which sought to correct Descartes’ system by grafting onto it theses backed up by the of Saint Augustine. In his study, Ariew demonstrates that this phenomenon is almost exclu- sively confined to Oratorian schools. Studying the pedagogical practices of the religious orders here leads to a remarkable result: the coherence of the themes of Augustinized Cartesianism reveals itself to be above all a doc- trinal coherence characteristic of a particular religious order.

3. Chapter 2 The second chapter is devoted to reconstructing the structure of the typical mid-seventeenth-century textbook. The Cartesians’ attempt to introduce the new philosophy in the schools encountered a major hurdle: the order of pre- sentation in Descartes’ texts did not conform to the way the schools ordered the subject matter. The order inherited from the Aristotelian corpus—, , physics, and, finally, metaphysics—is not the same as that of Cartesian science, which comprises, in this order, logic, metaphysics (including nat- ural ), physics, and ethics. In this chapter, Ariew, by means of comparing a vast number of texts, sets out to reconstruct an ideal standard textbook. This view of Scholasticism thus obtained is then compared to the Cartesian didactic model. The construction of a seventeenth century Scholastic textbook results from clearly articulated historical phenomena that also give a of the

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complex situation in which a standard curriculum would have to be de- fined. The between Thomism, Scotism, and new forms of knowl- edge produces a very heterogeneous spectrum, especially since each of the four branches of philosophy underwent a particular evolution of its own, which Ariew retraces. In some cases, especially in treatises of logic and physics, the traditional model of commentary on Aristotle remains domi- nant, while other disciplines move away from that model in both form and content. Until the beginning of the century, logic treatises were running commen- taries of Aristotle’s , sometimes followed by a commentary on Porphyry. With Eustache, logic treatises free themselves from the Aristotelian model and begin to follow a sequence modelled on the operations of the : (1) simple apprehension, (2) judgement and enunciation, and (3) discourse or argument. This choice results from an evolution of logic, whose essential questions are debated in preliminaries to the treatise, where authors proffer reflections on the of the discipline and its subject. Scipion Dupleix, for instance, still puts forward the Thomist argument according to which logic is a science of of . Eustache de Saint-Paul’s position, in turn, seems to be the most advanced and closest to Descartes. To characterize the theory of simple apprehension and judgment in the Summa quadipartita, Ariew employs, for the first and only time in the volume, the term “forerunner”—an eloquent hapax in a text that, even in discussing the transition from “the last Aristotelians to the first Cartesians,” refrains throughout from making connections of this kind. Ethics treatises make noticeably freer use of the traditional sources. Commentaries of Aristotle are much rarer and limited to the . Even Saint Thomas is much less cited, probably because of the theo- logical nature of his work. In the domain of physics, we once again find the practice of faithful Aristotle commentary. For Descartes’ contemporaries, the standard text is Toletus’ commentary, who fixes the order of the corpus once and for all: first the Physics, then the Meteors, and finally the biological treatises. The seven- teenth century also adopts Toletus’ idea that physical science must begin with principles and then proceed to bodies and accepts his identification of the order of science and the order of doctrine. Among the controversies whose Cartesian make them worthy of notice, there is the debate about the notion of place. Faithful to Thomas, Toletus argues for the im- mobility of place and opposes the Scotist thesis according to which place is a relation between the container and the contained. The stakes here are high, for all of physics, because the idea of place has major implications for the definition of motion. The problem consists in knowing whether the defini- tion of motion is absolute or whether it is relative to ambient bodies.

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Ariew’s presentation of Scholastic courses of study concludes with meta- physics. Although there is only one book with that name, it cannot be assigned a single precise position. First of all because, as Ariew drawing on Ross points out, the Metaphysics we know is a disjointed collection of texts, which explains the lacunae in some of the great commentaries, including Fonseca’s. Moreover, the science of being is conceived in terms of two com- plementary determinations: that it is the science of being in general and that it is the science of the highest object, i.e. theology. The Scholastics thus had to come to terms with this double nature of the science of being. The most influential solutions, no doubt, are that of Thomas, who separates theology (the summa) from metaphysics, and that of Suarez’s Disputationes.Among Descartes’s contemporaries, there is a tendency to reintroduce theology into metaphysics by beginning with being in general and concluding with the notion of the perfect being.

4. Chapter 3 The book’s second half takes on the problem of the setup of the and of its introduction in the schools (especially the French schools). Ariew here follows a particular circular method, which is the most innovative aspect of his study. In seeking to understand the ways in which a set structure of knowledge underwent variations, Ariew repeats the analysis of the preceding chapter in order to define a standard image, as it were, of Descartes’s work. In the chapter that follows, Ariew con- cludes his investigation by following the same procedure to account for the Cartesian textbooks. The comparison of the three textbooks—the stan- dard Scholastic text, Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, and the standard Cartesian texts—thus offers an objective measure (if such is possible) of the transitions that took place. The parallels are only telling, of course, if the profound differences be- tween the textbooks of the schools and the Cartesian textbooks are taken into account. As noted above, the main lies in the sequence of the disciplines followed in each curriculum. And as it is impossible to summa- rize all of Descartes’ philosophy in general terms, Ariew limits his exposi- tion of the Cartesian textbook to highlighting a number of aspects that immediately affected the organization of Cartesian philosophy as an academic course of study. To elucidate the position of metaphysics as the foundation of all the other disciplines, it is very helpful to look at the provenance of the well- known image of the tree of philosophy, which features in the preface to the Principia in 1647. In itself, it is nothing new. The image can be found in other authors and, in particular, in Abra de Raconis’ Summa totius philo- sophiae, which Descartes read during the redaction of the Principia.For

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this reason, Ariew rejects the view that the image of the tree should be interpreted in light of the idea of the unity of science asserted in the Regulae. What Descartes provides is not so much a veritable Logic but, rather, a criticism of Scholastic logic and of the syllogism, a criticism he shares with a good number of his contemporaries such as de la Ramée, Sanchez, and Bacon. The reception history is important here, for the Regulae,which might have counted as his logic treatise, were not accessible to contempo- rary readers who, in fact, retained almost exclusively Descartes’ critique of Aristotelianism and the separation of logic and . As for metaphysics, it is here that Descartes’ cursus differs most notice- ably from the textbooks that preceded it. First of all because metaphysics is placed before physics and, second, because the method of exposition does not seem comparable to that of the sources. Descartes and the First Cartesians devotes several pages to the question of whether the Principia follow an analytic or a synthetic order and presents an overview of research on the question. Several recent works have studied the problem first raised by a passage in the Conversation with Burman. Ariew shows that even if in the Principia the order of the demonstrations of the of God is the inverse of that in the Meditations, the rule of evidence is not set out before- hand, as a geometric order would seem to demand. In the end, Ariew adopts Gueroult’sviewthatthePrincipia are a hybrid treatise resulting from a blending of analysis and synthesis. We should note that any attempt at drawing parallels between the first part of the Principia and other metaphysical theories must consider the fact that Descartes never speaks of “being” but always of “substance.” Principia I, 51, clearly affirms that the term “substance” cannot be univocally applied to God and to creatures. There is evidence in the Cartesian corpus to support an interpretation that sees the relationship between God and creature as a rela- tion of ; yet there are also several passages (the Second Replies,for example, or Principia I, 23) to authorize the argument for a dis-analogy be- tween God and creature, notably in matters of the will. This problem is closely linked to the question of the doctrine of distinc- tion. Descartes’ thinking on this point is often compared to Suarez’s theory in the seventh disputatio. Eustache de Saint-Paul, however, is undoubtedly a more direct and more pertinent source. Ariew articulates a genealogical hypothesis asserting that Descartes did not complete the theory as we find it in Principia I, 60–62, until after the Scotist Caterus and Arnauld had voiced their objections to the Meditations. These objections, he claims, compelled Descartes to reconsider the non-technical use of the term distinc- tio and to systematize his theory. The section on metaphysics concludes with a reminder of Descartes’s double principle of : a physical

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individuation through motion applicable to bodies and an individuation through form applicable to human body only. According to a long historiographical tradition that has become some- thing of a commonplace, Descartes invented mathematical physics. Ariew rejects the widely accepted narrative, propagated by Burtt, Dijksterhuis, and, at least in part, Koyré, in which Descartes mathematized physics in the sense that he saw the foundation of physics in mathematics. The commonplace rests largely on a specific interpretation of the Regulae,an incomplete and unpublished treatise, whereas the published texts as well as the letters institute metaphysics (whose outranks that of math- ematics) as the foundation of physics instead. Nonetheless, physical science is not entirely deduced a priori from the principles of metaphysics. In fact, the physical demonstrations of Principia 3 and 4 appeal to other physical principles, which are hypotheses of the kind we find in astronomy. These physical principles are necessary for articulating both the meta- physical that “matter is indefinite and divisible” and the physical truth that consists in knowing how this matter is actually divided. The notion of moral certainty thus joins the absolute certainty of metaphysics, an idea we also find in Scholastic analyses of science, opinion, and (Arriaga and Eustache). The third chapter concludes with an examination of a classic problem in Descartes studies, the “provisional moral code” and its relationship to the definitive laid out in the letter preface to the Principles of philos- ophy. Ariew reveals the great variety of the sources of the “three or four maxims” of the Discourse: Epictetus’s Manual and Neo-, Charron’s and Montaigne’s moderate , etc. Yet it seems altogether pos- sible that the final version of the ethics—the last branch of the tree of philosophy—is no different from these provisional maxims. Contemporaries, however, were reading primarily the posthumous collection of letters to Elisabeth and to Christine, published under the title Ethica.

5. Chapter 4 Having established what a Scholastic summa quadripartita is and how it was transformed by Descartes, Ariew in the last chapter provides an overall view of Scholastico-Cartesian philosophical systems. Some authors, like François Bayle and Jacques du Roure, revise the criticism of the syllogism; du Roure, for example, does so by comparing the old and the new logic. The standard example of Cartesian logic, how- ever, is the Port-Royal Logic, later imitated by Le Grand and Régis, whose precepts are organized into four parts corresponding to , judg- ment, reasoning, and method.

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Cartesian metaphysical systems seem not to have taken up the first philosophy of the Meditations. Spinoza’s Cogitata metaphysica cannot be con- sidered a Cartesian treatise since the way it arranges its material and its questions is rather typical of Dutch Scholasticism. The one author who seems to at least have tried to remain faithful to the first book of the Principia is du Roure who in 1654 cites an unpublished letter by Descartes to Clerselier. In Régis’ Système,wefind the cogito treated as a principle, but doubt is absent. In fact, the metaphysics of this Système owes less to Descartes than it does Desgabets. It is from him that du Roure draws his definition of the indestructibility of matter, the realist conception of the idea, and the a posteriori proof of the . The reception of Descartes’ metaphysics, as we saw, focused essentially on the problem of the univocity and the analogy of being. Yet none of the great Cartesians accepted the solution proffered by their master. Each of them developed a solution of his own. Spinoza argues for equivocal attri- bution whereas Le Grand simply dispenses with the analogy theory by de- fining God as a supersubstantial being. While in Descartes, there is a double definition of the principle of individuation—which in a sense synthesizes the views of Thomists and Scotists—his successors chose either one or the other side of the original thesis. The atomist Cordemoy, for example, subscribes only to the thesis of individuation by motion. He will be criticized by the young Leibniz, who in opposition offers a theory inspired by Scotist Scholasticism. In the case of the physical theories as well, it is difficult to find an author who follows Descartes’s theses to the letter. In fact, the Cartesians were “under great pressure,” as Ariew puts it, because they were sur- rounded by vacuuists (the followers of Gassendi and later Newton) and infinitists (Spinoza and Leibniz). Rohault and Le Grand stand out as the most important defenders of Cartesian physics, all the more so since they correctly understand and employ the theory of the creation of eternal . Moreover, at the very moment he is defending Descartes’ physics from P. D. Huet’s attacks, the Cartesian Régis seems to grant his adversary the point that the distinction between the infinite and the indefinite is fictitious. In general, Ariew argues, the elimination of doubt from the argu- ments that provide physics with a foundation drives the firstCartesiansto erase the distinction between moral and metaphysical certainty and, con- sequently, to adopt a method that proceeds via hypothesis and deduction. The fourth chapter concludes with ethics, highlighting that, like other fields in the Cartesian summa, Descartes’ ethics did not, by itself, have a real afterlife. With the exception of Claude Ameline’s attempt, most Cartesians drew on other sources, on Pufendorf, for example, to whom Le Grand and Régis appeal in their ethics. The central role Descartes played in naturalizing

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ethics—a widespread phenomenon at the end of the century and very much indebted to the Cartesian model—should nonetheless not be underrated.

6. Conclusion By way of conclusion, I would like to come back to what I’ve called Ariew’s “contextualist historical method,” which is what most clearly marks off his study from most current scholarship on Descartes. In the preface to his 1913 Index scolastico-cartésien, Etienne Gilson notes that he did not want to write a book on “Descartes and the Scholastics” because such an undertaking “would necessarily be unilateral and be more likely to hide historical truth than to discover it” (Gilson 1913, p. ii). In criticizing the very idea of a uni- vocal definition of “Scholasticism’sinfluence on Descartes,” which would have to rely on discovering sources effectively exercising such an influence, he presents his Index instead as a tool for exploring the “possible influences” of Scholasticism on Cartesianism.3 Starting with the publication of Descartes and the Last Scholastics, Ariew has opposed Gilson’s . Acknowledging the central role the Index scolastico-cartésien played in renewing Descartes studies, the 1999 vol- ume nonetheless signaled that the work of Gilson had exhausted its func- tion. If on the one hand it had the of opening up a new field of historical and exegetical study, it on the other hand surreptitiously over- emphasized the importance of Thomist sources and acknowledged Scotist influences only in Descartes’ definition of the idea. Ariew provided a his- torical reconstruction that took into account the criticisms developed by Dalbiez, who had been the first to recognize the shortcomings of Gilson’s approach in a 1929 article (Ariew 1999, pp. 41–5, 56–7). Fifteen years later, the spread of Scotism and its importance for Descartes studies are recognized in the literature as well-established facts. In Descartes and the First Cartesians, the question of Gilson’sinfluence is definitely settled. No need, then, to criticize Gilson, to rekindle the debate, nor even to cite the Index. The matter is nonetheless not abandoned completely, nor has research on the question stopped evolving. Recent work views the early twentieth century neo-Thomist current of thought, of which the Index is a prominent example, from a new angle. When in the first chapter, Ariew draws on Goudin’s twenty-four Thomist theses as a basis for “measuring” a thesis’s degree of Thomism or Scotism, he assigns much importance to a text that, even if it dates from the seventeenth century, was not granted the status of an official statement of Thomism until the early twentieth century.

3. On the historical genesis and definition of the notion of an “index,” see Agostini 2015.

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In fact, it was the definition of a standard Thomist position in 1914 and its approbation under Benedict XV in 1917 that triggered the neo-Thomist renaissance, which was to have so profound an influence on Descartes stud- ies at the beginning of the last century. The contextualist method yields particularly remarkable results when, in addition to allowing for an “objective” evaluation of different philosoph- ical sources, it makes a historically founded assessment of the critical liter- ature possible. The method of the Index and the privileging of Thomism that results from it neither should nor need to be refuted: they can now be evaluated and become part of a richer historical reconstruction. The same historical method is at work in another long digression of Ariew’s on the critical literature. His opposition to the “century-old nar- rative” that turns Descartes, along with Galileo and Newton, into “a pro- ponent of the mathematization of nature” is entirely based on his historical method. He relativizes this particular interpretation on two interrelated levels. On the one hand, he reconstructs the genesis of the theses of Burtt, Dijksterhuis, and Koyré and brings out the Husserlian origin of their all- too-radical interpretation. On the other hand, he refutes them by pointing out that not a single one of Descartes’ contemporaries would confirm the hypothesis according to which the foundation of Cartesian physics is to be found in a “mathematization of physics.” In conclusion, then, the most remarkable aspect of Descartes and the First Cartesians—other than the extraordinary amount of sources it makes acces- sible to readers—is the author’s methodological choice to study the impact of a philosophy not so much by focusing on particular problems as by com- paring the “structures” of . The investigation of competing curricula offers a new approach that is able to add new perspectives to lexi- cographical studies (such as, for example, on the shifting meanings of the words substance or metaphysics). By the end of Ariew’s long historical survey, the initial question has acquired a different sense. Given the complexity of the subject and the abundance of sources, it can no longer be a question of a “new philosophy” (an expression Descartes himself was wary of) replacing an old one. Nor is it a question of denying the originality of Descartes’s philosophy by over- emphasizing his reliance on Scholastic doctrine. The effect his philosophy had on the seventeenth century is much too complex for it to be meaning- fully measured by notions as generic as “continuity” and “discontinuity.”

References Agostini, Igor. 2015. “Qu’est-ce que constituer un Index scolastico-cartésien?” Pp. 11–24 in Gilson et Descartes à l’occasion du centenaire de La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie. Edited by Dan Arbib and Francesco Marrone.

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Vol. 2 of Examina philosophica. www.cartesius.net/doc/pubblicazioni/ ExaminaPhilosophica_2.pdf Ariew, Roger. 1999. Descartes and the Last Scholastics. Ithaca: Cornell Uni- versity Press. Ariew, Roger. 2014. Descartes and the First Cartesians. Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press. Armogathe, Jean-Robert. 1977. Theologia cartesiana: l’explication physique de l’Eucharistie chez Descartes et dom Desgabets. The Hague: Nijhoff. Azouvi, François. 2002. Descartes et la France. Paris: Fayard. Gilson, Etienne. 1913. Index Scolastico-cartésien. Paris: Alcan. Roux, Sophie. 2013. “Pour une conception polémique du cartésianisme: Ignace-Gaston Pardies et Antoine Dilly dans la querelle de l’âme des bêtes.” Pp. 315–337 in Qu’est-ce qu’être cartésien? Edited by Delphine Kolesnik- Antoine. Lyon: ENS Editions.

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