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Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Frontmatter More information AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS Australian Constitutional Landmarks presents the most significant cases and controversies in the Australian constitutional landscape. Including the Communist Party case, the dismissal of the Whitlam government, the Free Speech cases, a discussion of the race power, the Lionel Murphy saga, and the Tasmanian Dam case, this book highlights turning points in the shaping of the Australian nation since Federation. Each chapter clearly examines the legal and political context leading to the case or controversy and the impact on later constitutional reform. With contri- butions by leading constitutional lawyers, judges and two former chief justices, this book is sure to have lasting appeal to all members of the judiciary, lawyers, political scientists, historians and all people with an interest in Australian politics, government and history. H. P. Lee is the Sir John Latham Professor of Law at Monash University. The author of many legal works on Australia, Singapore and Malaysia, he has been a member of various committees advising on the press and humanitarian law. His most recent work, co- authored with Enid Campbell, is The Australian Judiciary. George Winterton is Professor of Law at the University of New South Wales. He has published extensively in Australia and overseas and was a member of the Executive Government Advisory Committee of the Constitutional Commission, the Republic Advisory Committee, and an appointed delegate to the Consti- tutional Convention. © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Frontmatter More information AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LANDMARKS Edited by H.P. LEE Monash University, Melbourne GEORGE WINTERTON University of New South Wales, Sydney © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Frontmatter More information CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521152853 © H. P. Lee & George Winterton 2003 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2003 First paperback printing 2010 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library National Library of Australia Cataloguing in Publication data Australian constitutional landmarks. Includes index. ISBN 0 521 83158 X. 1. Constitutional law – Australia – Cases. I. Lee, H. P. (Hoong Phun). 342.94 ISBN 978-0-521-83158-1 Hardback ISBN 978-0-521-15285-3 Paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Frontmatter More information Contents List of Cases vii List of Commonwealth Constitution Provisions xviii List of Statutes xx List of Contributors xxiii Preface xxvii Introduction: The Commonwealth’s Constitutional Century xxix H. P. Lee and George Winterton 1 The Emergence of the Commonwealth Constitution 1 John Williams 2 The Engineers Case 34 Keven Booker and Arthur Glass 3 The Uniform Income Tax Cases 62 Cheryl Saunders 4 The Bank Nationalisation Cases: The Defeat of Labor’s Most 85 Controversial Economic Initiative Peter Johnston 5 The Communist Party Case 108 George Winterton 6 Fitzpatrick and Browne: Imprisonment by a House 145 of Parliament Harry Evans 7 The Boilermakers Case 160 Fiona Wheeler v © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Frontmatter More information 8 The Race Power: A Constitutional Chimera 180 Robert French 9 The Double Dissolution Cases 213 Sir Anthony Mason 10 1975: The Dismissal of the Whitlam Government 229 George Winterton 11 The Tasmanian Dam Case 262 Leslie Zines 12 The Murphy Affair in Retrospect 280 Geoffrey Lindell 13 The Privy Council and the Constitution 312 Sir Gerard Brennan 14 Cole v Whitfield: ‘Absolutely Free’ Trade? 335 Dennis Rose 15 The ‘Labour Relations Power’ in the Constitution and 355 Public Sector Employees Marilyn Pittard 16 The Implied Freedom of Political Communication 383 H. P. Lee Index 412 vi © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Frontmatter More information Cases Abley v Dale (1851) 20 LJ (CP) 235, …58 Abrams v United States (1919) 250 US 616, …136 Ackroyd v McKechnie (1986) 161 CLR 60, …352 Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169, …142, 272 Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116, …110, 135, 137, 139 Airlines of New South Wales v New South Wales (No. 2) (1965) 113 CLR 54, …50, 58, 60 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 14 CAR 428, …57 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, …xxxii, 34–60, 71, 83, 129, 141, 270, 278, 318, 320, 331, 333, 334, 373, 381 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1921) 29 CLR 406, …57 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54, …393 Application for Registration of Association of Australian University Staff, Re (1981) 23 AILR [222], …369 Arena v Nader (1997) 71 ALJR 1604, …159 Asma Jilani v Government of Punjab [1972] PLD (SC) 139, …143 Attorney-General (Cth) v Colonial Sugar Refining Company Pty Ltd (1913) 17 CLR 644; [1914] AC 237, …316, 317, 320, 330 Attorney-General (Cth) v Finch (No. 1) (1983) 155 CLR 102, …334 Attorney-General (Cth) v Finch (No. 2) (1984) 155 CLR 107, …334 Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1, …334, 388, 397 vii © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Frontmatter More information viii CASES Attorney-General (Cth) v R; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1957) 95 CLR 529; [1957] AC 288, …175, 177, 260, 318, 319, 326 332, 334 Attorney-General (Cth) v T & G Mutual Life Society Ltd (1978) 144 CLR 161, …334 Attorney-General of Mauritius v Ramgoolam [1993] 3 LRC 82, …309 Attorney-General (NSW) v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 394, …257, 334 Attorney-General (NSW) v Trethowan (1932) 47 CLR 97; [1932] AC 526, …328, 329, 334 Attorney-General for Ontario v Attorney-General for Canada [1912] AC 571, …58, 320 Attorney-General (Victoria); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559, …79, 84 Attorney-General (Victoria); Ex rel Dale v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, …104, 142 Attorney-General (WA) v Australian National Airlines Commission (1976) 138 CLR 492, …60 Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 77 ALJR 491, …49, 50, 59, 102 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; 185 ALR 1, …107, 401 Australian Capital Television v Commonwealth (1992) 104 ALR 389, …406 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, …xxxi, xxxv, xxxvi, 32, 58, 107, 134, 143, 354, 383, 384, 386, 387, 389, 391–5, 397, 398, 406–8 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, …xxxii, xxxvi, 103, 108, 124, 129–35, 137, 139–44, 212, 300, 310 Australian Education Union, Re; Ex parte Victoria (1995) 184 CLR 188, …49, 59, 84, 375, 376, 378, 381 Australian Insurance Staffs’ Federation v Accident Underwriters Association; Bank Officials’ Association v Bank of Australasia (1923) 33 CLR 517, …361, 365, 366 Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29, …90, 103, 104, 142, 319 Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (No. 2) (1946) 71 CLR 115, …319, 332 Australian Social Welfare Union v Jobless Action Civic Community Youth Support Scheme (1982) 2 IR 18, …379 Australian Workers’ Union v Adelaide Milling Co Ltd (1919) 26 CLR 460, …56 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1, …xxx, 85, 87, 93, 98–101, 105, 106, 130, 140, 142, 337 Barley Marketing Board (NSW) v Norman (1991) 171 CLR 182, …338, 347, 348, 352 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-15285-3 - Australian Constitutional Landmarks Edited by H. P. Lee and George Winterton Frontmatter More information CASES ix Barnwell v Attorney-General [1994] 3 LRC 30, …309 Bath v Alston Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 411, …339, 340, 342, 348, 352 Baxter v Commissioners
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