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Hannah Arendt and The Hannah Arendt and the Mob Casper Verstegen 1 0 3 4 5 8 7 6 University of Amsterdam Supervisor: Dr. Stefan Niklas 2 - 8 - 2018 Cover Image: A L’aube (1875) Charles Hermans 1 Table of Contents 1.Introduction…………………….....................................................................................................4 2. The mob and world…………………….........................................................................................9 3. The mob and totalitarianism……………………........................................................................20 4. The mob and action……………………......................................................................................32 5. The mob and rule……………………..........................................................................................42 6. The mob and power……………………......................................................................................51 7. The mob today……………………..............................................................................................62 Bibliography……………………......................................................................................................69 2 Does this present not belong to the mob? Nietzsche, Thus spoke Zarathustra 3 1. Introduction That the present belongs to the mob does not only hold true for Nietzsche’s time.1 Indeed, our age of information has proven to be fruitful ground for all kinds of mobs: from the mobilization of progressive groups to the rise of the alt-right, all these have in common that they rely heavily on the internet for both the recruitment of new members as well as the spread of their message. The online communities created by these movements, in turn, fuel mob mentality, since they are highly susceptible to informational problems such as filter bubbles, echo-chambers, and pluralistic ignorance.2 Under these circumstances, political discourse is made impossible; the mob mentality, which regards every differing opinion immediately as hostile, cuts short the deliberative potential of internet communities. In this sense, Andrew Anglin, avowed neo-Nazi and alt-right propagandist, was quite correct when he wrote about the alt-right that: “the mob is the movement.”3 What Anglin fails to notice, however, is that this, to some extent, also applies to the deafening cries for political correctness of some left leaning groups. The only difference is that these cries, more than anything, tend to harm the progressive cause; since the space for politics is filled to the brim with echoes of condemnation and reproach, no room is left for true political action and speech. The alt-right, on the other hand, is empowered by its mob mentality, precisely because it leaves no room for politics proper; the political space is intentionally made impervious to rational deliberation, so that nothing is heard, except the shrillest cries. The result of this situation is that, as Hannah Arendt once put it: “the mob on both sides is just waiting for the chance to strike out.”4 Her concept of ‘the mob,’ as is often the case in Arendt’s work, has quite a specific meaning; “The mob,” in her view, “is primarily a group in which the residue of all classes are represented.”5 As such, it plays a crucial role in The Origins of Totalitarianism, and runs, as a kind of red thread, through the book.6 However, in her major works after The Origins, it is scarcely mentioned. But if Nietzsche’s remark is also 1 It should be noted that this quote depends on the translation one consults. For example, the translation by Thomas Common reads “the populace,” whereas that of Thomas Wayne reads “the rabble.” I use the Graham Parkes translation. 2 For an account of these types of problems see: Hendricks and Hansen, 2016. 3 Quoted in Neiwert (2017): 257. 4 Arendt -Jaspers Correspondence L.331. 5 OT 107. 6 Cf. ‘A Reply to Eric Voegelin’ in: EU 4 true for our time, and if Arendt is correct about the connection between the mob and totalitarianism, it is essential to understand the mob, and its role in Arendt’s political theory. Before proceeding, however, some brief methodological remarks are necessary. First, Arendt often made use of Weberian ideal types; that is, she uses a certain set of historical facts and from it constructs a kind of consistent rule.7 An ideal type can be a very useful heuristic device; however, it is important to note that, according to Weber, “It is not a depiction of reality.”8 In a sense, Arendt’s theories are just that, abstract reflections based on a set of historical data; this means, however, that reality is always more complex than what is written down. I follow Arendt in this example, but this will inevitably mean that my analysis of the mob, too, will have what Weber idiosyncratically called a ‘utopian’ character.9 Second, concerning referencing, I follow most Arendt scholars, by using abbreviations in the references to designate certain works, a comprehensive list of their meanings is available in the bibliography. Furthermore, given that I chiefly draw on Arendt’s work, unless otherwise noted, all works cited are hers. The problem of the modern mob seems to be that it is, in Arendtian terms, politically sterile, although this is not to say that mob politics cannot be electorally successful––recent history has indeed proved quite the contrary––it simply means that it cannot create something politically, it lacks the capacity for a constituting act. Another troubling aspect of the mob is that it would be at least as unproductive to accuse the other side of mob mentality. Such reproaches not only stifle deliberation, they often have a polarizing function and are therefore liable to utterly destroy the political space, to the point where action is almost impossible. The reason that accusations of mob mentality stifle deliberation is that there are obvious negative connotations attached to the term ‘mob’. The term first appeared near the end of the seventeenth century, as an abbreviation of the Latin mobile vulgus; meaning fickle crowd, or excitable populace.10 The mob soon designated the mobilized masses, but was always as a pejorative term. This is likely because excitability of crowds has been noticed as a threat to government since antiquity. Polybius, for example, describes the decline of democratic government into ochlocracy (often translated as mob rule), as rule by many 7 ‘Hannah Arendt on Hannah Arendt’ 466-7 in: TWB. 8 Weber (1904): 125. 9 Ibid. 10 Giner (1976): 138. 5 being “replaced by violence and government by main force.”11 The violent nature Polybius ascribes to the mob has remained predominant: it is the case for most modern-day uses of the term––such as lynch mobs or the mafia. However, recently there have been some attempts at a more positive designation––such as flash mobs or smart mobs––though these have done little to change the negative associations. The negative connotation attached to the term likely made Mary McCarthy hesitant to use the expression. She notes in a letter to Hannah Arendt: “possibly out of a kind of prudery or possibly because it sounds shrill, like a mob itself.”12 This comment was a response to Arendt’s use of the word. The responses to her controversial Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) appeared to her as an undue smear campaign. Her account of the cooperation of the Jewish Counsels in territories occupied by the Nazi’s was portrayed as victim blaming, and her critique of the prosecution in the Eichmann case described anti- Semitic.13 About the backlash against her, Arendt wrote to McCarthy that “the mob–– intellectually or otherwise––has been successfully mobilized.”14 Although she obviously knew about the negative connotations, as is already evident from the quote, she replied to McCarthy that the expression was likely to hold a different meaning for her: “I use it as a term, so it doesn’t sound shrill to me.”15 Carol Brightman explains this exchange by referring to “mob” as a pejorative term used in Weimar Germany to designate “persons of influence, including intellectuals, who specialized in vilification campaigns against political or cultural dissidents, thus presumably aiding the rise of fascism.”16 Although this is not altogether incorrect, it is a profound misunderstanding of Arendt’s idiosyncratic use of the concept; that is, the mob as a group in which the residue of all classes are represented.17 Because all classes are represented in it, the mob is often mistaken for the people or the masses. As such, the mob is influential, but by no means is it made up solely out of persons of influence, nor does it aim its vilification only against dissidents––in fact, as we will see, the establishment is an especially grateful target of dissent. Moreover, Brightman’s explanation does not take the mob’s multitudinous 11 Polybius (2010): 377. 12 Between Friends 149. 13 Bernstein (2018): 58. 14 Between Friends 148. 15 Ibid. 153. 16 Ibid. 153n2. 17 OT 107. 6 nature into account, while it is precisely this nature that makes it similar to notions such as crowd, or mass. This similarity is crucial to Arendt, without it, the mob could not be the “caricature of the people” that it is.18 On the other hand, and just as crucial to her argument, she draws a conceptual distinction between the different multitudes; without the fictitious world created by the mob, totalitarian propaganda would not have its profound effect on the masses, in fact, there probably would not have been totalitarian propaganda at all. According to Salvador Giner, Arendt was the first political theorist to draw the conceptual distinction between mobs and masses.19 But the mob is quite different from another kind multitude as well: the crowd. The biggest difference between the two is that the crowd functions only when it is together, that is, when people join together and form a multitude in an actual place. In this sense, it is impossible for an individual to be alone and part of a crowd at the same time. Arendt’s mob, on the other hand, can subsist if all its elements are isolated; that is, the elements do not need to be present physically.
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