Debbie Lewis – Written Evidence (RSK0021)
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Debbie Lewis – Written evidence (RSK0021) Resilience Preparedness Consultant, Axiom (Alderney) Limited, acting in an individual capacity 1. Introduction 1.1 The effects from Near-Earth Objects (NEO’s) are similar to those that have been experienced by natural disasters, such as the extent of the local and regional destruction and devastation caused by the Japan earthquake and tsunami that occurred on March 11th 2011. The hazard exists from both larger asteroids over 1km in diameter and from those under 100 metres in diameter. It is inevitable that, on an indeterminate date, the Earth will be in collision with a NEO. Although great uncertainty exists as to when such an event can be expected, it is another case, as with both the 2009 swine flu pandemic and the 2019 Corona Virus, of ‘when, not if.’ This assertion is evidenced from the numerous impact events which have occurred through the Earth’s history, such as the Yucatan Peninsula impact which resulted in the formation of the 200 km crater at Chicxulub in Mexico, 65 million years ago, Tunguska in 1908 which devastated 2000 km2 of forest and more recently, the Chelyabinsk meteor that entered Earth’s atmosphere, over Russia, on February 15th 2013. 1.2 The hazard to humanity from NEO’s demands the engagement of political establishments and international communities to review the severity of the risk and the likelihood of it occurring. In order to facilitate this, the NEO impact hazard ideally needs to be more considered as part of the UK’s National Security Risk Assessment. If, as a nation and through our membership of international community, we are able to substantially improve the collective resilience to the effects of NEO impact events, then we are also able to improve the resilience and response to emergencies from other natural hazard events. 2. Significant Extreme Risks 2.1 The most significant extreme risks that the UK faces are those posed by asteroids, meteors and comets. 2.2 These are discrete risks that have arisen from a naturally occurring phenomenon that, currently, is only recognised by the scientific community and does not appear to be fully understood by civil servants, politicians, non- specialist emergency planners and responders, nor by the general public. 2.3 In the NEO context, the term ‘extreme risk’ is defined as a potential event that is unlikely to occur but could have a catastrophic impact on human welfare, behaviour, essential services, security, the environment and the economy. 3. Types of Risks 3.1 The UK is poorly prepared to respond to impact events from asteroids, meteors and comets. 3.2 The reason for this is that the status quo determines that there is, perhaps understandably, more emphasis upon ensuring that lessons are leaned from previous incidents, so as to promote better preparedness for future disasters of the same or similar effect. However, there is a danger with preparing for previous incidents that the potential for new risks emerging and ‘Black Swan’ events are not effectively considered. An example of such an event was the eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland in 2010, the volcanic ash cloud from which severely disrupted aviation and led to stranded, displaced people and interrupted supply chains. 3.3 This type of event had not been considered, nor risk assessed, prior to its occurrence in 2010 and as a result it was not included within the UK’s National Security Risk Assessment. Consequently, no preparation to mitigate the effects from this risk had been considered nor put in place prior to this event occurring. However, since this event, the risk has subsequently been added to the NSRA. 3.4 The current arrangements for considering new risks needs to be reviewed and, in particular, a broader approach taken as to how new and emerging risks are assessed and managed. Ideally, scientists, subject-matter experts and specialist emergency planning professionals need to be more fully engaged in the process, conducting the required research and analysis when new risks are being considered for inclusion on the National Security Risk Assessment. 4. Risk Assessment 4.1 The Government’s approach to the risk assessment process could be strengthened by including the input from subject matter experts, particularly those who work in this area in the UK, such as The Spaceguard Centre, which is home to the National Near Earth Object Information Centre, as well as Universities, scientists, academics, and emergency planning professionals with expertise pertaining to the understanding of the risk posed by asteroids, meteors and comets. 4.2 The UK Space Agency and the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat could also be strengthened to coordinate and collaborate with other space agencies such as NASA’s ‘Planetary Defense Coordination Office’ and ESA’s NEO Coordination Centre as well as to enhance the role of The Spaceguard Centre. 4.3 The UK Government should also be aware of the Discovery programme which seeks to: identify and quantify those asteroids, meteors and comets that could be on a collision course with the Earth; analyse whether the UK lies within the risk corridor; and assess the potential impact site to confirm whether that is either in the UK or a UK dependent territory and if British interests overseas could also be affected by an impact event. 4.4 Any panel of experts advising the Government should include representation from as wide a cross section of related disciplines as is appropriate to the likely impact of the hazard. 4.5 Scientific advice, which encompasses social sciences, engineering and technology, should be a central component of the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) process. The Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA) and the Government Office for Science (GO-Science), in conjunction with the Cabinet Office, need to be officially participative in of all the NSRA stages. The CGSA, once satisfied that all risks requiring scientific involvement and evaluation have been fully considered, should sign off the NSRA. Further to this, consideration should be given for GO-Science to be located within the Cabinet Office, whilst retaining a semi-autonomous status. In addition to this the Cabinet Office should also include representation and participation from the UK Space Agency as the nominated lead government department for the NEO impact hazard. 4.6 As the NSRA is an understandably unpublished document, public and parliamentary assurance could be provided by an independent scientific advisory committee, which would be established to provide risk assessment advice to the Cabinet Office. This would be similar to the previous standing committee, the Scientific Advisory Panel on Emergency Response (SAPER) which provided scientific advice to the GCSA informed by a variety of sources such as the ministries, agencies and wider academia. This would ensure that effective decision-making mechanisms were in place prior to a disaster occurring, rather than the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies being activated only during the response to provide scientific advice to the government. It cannot be emphasised enough that, where a NEO impact event is concerned, this would be far too late to provide the scientific advice required. 4.7 The risk assessment process required for a NEO impact, would additionally benefit from the previously established behavioural insight team. The involvement of the team would be required for determining public policy in relation to civil protection in order to better understand human behaviour. Further consideration should be given to the appointment for the role of the Government Chief Social Scientist (GCSS) working with the GCSA and the Cabinet Office. 4.8 More openness and transparency are required in which risk assessments are conducted, along with the rationale used for decision-making. Consideration should be given to the provision of available information such as scientific papers and following the NEO characterisation missions, publication of the estimated size, scale and prediction of likely fatalities consequent upon an impact event occurring. 4.9 In conclusion, the Government should ensure that it identifies and considers as wide a range of risks as possible by reviewing the ‘register’ of those currently involved in the risk assessment process, broadening its scope through the inclusion of more subject matter experts. Submissions should be sought from a wider audience than that included under current arrangements, making these more inclusive and transparent. 5. Risks Currently Excluded from the National Security Risk Assessment 5.1 Within Annex B, Full Scenario Assessments, of the 2019 NSRA is the inclusion of section 07, entitled, “Risks Under Review”. This section provides a list of risks and the rationale for monitoring them. Although reassuringly this list is headed up by the NEO impact risk, the reasonable worst-case scenario is only based on a 50m diameter asteroid hitting the Earth and the example cites just one impact event, that of Tunguska which occurred in 1908. 5.2 Some rather one dimensional and spurious analysis has been conducted which asserts that, “a land fall of such an impact somewhere within the UK would be estimated to occur on average once every 200,000 years”. As a result of this observation the likelihood of occurrence is calculated to fall below the threshold required for inclusion of the NSRA. 5.3 This rather limited perspective fails to take into consideration other aspects of this hazard, such as impact scenario planning for the different types and sizes of asteroid; an awareness of previous impact events and their consequences; the impacts from small objects; and an awareness of the possible environmental impact effects. This information needs to be taken into consideration when determining the extent of the risk posed. The sheer diversity of likely NEO events and their likely effects - notwithstanding the singular example of the 1908 Tunguska event - are illustrated in the attached four annexes.