DOCSLIB.ORG

Reversing Pension Privatization in Kazakhstan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Reversing Pension Privatization in Kazakhstan ESS – Extension of Social Security Reversing Pension Privatization in Kazakhstan Elena Maltseva Saltanat Janenova ESS – Working Paper No. 67 Social Protection Department INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, GENEVA Copyright © International Labour Organization 2018 Publications of the International Labour Office enjoy copyright under Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. Nevertheless, short excerpts from them may be reproduced without authorization, on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation, application should be made to ILO Publications (Rights and Licensing), International Labour Office, CH-1211 Geneva 22, Switzerland, or by email: [email protected]. The International Labour Office welcomes such applications. Libraries, institutions and other users registered with a reproduction rights organization may make copies in accordance with the licences issued to them for this purpose. Visit www.ifrro.org to find the reproduction rights organization in your country. ISSN 1020-9581; 1020-959X (web pdf) The designations employed in ILO publications, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the International Labour Office concerning the legal status of any country, area or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers. The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles, studies and other contributions rests solely with their authors, and publication does not constitute an endorsement by the International Labour Office of the opinions expressed in them. Reference to names of firms and commercial products and processes does not imply their endorsement by the International Labour Office, and any failure to mention a particular firm, commercial product or process is not a sign of disapproval. Information on ILO publications and digital products can be found at: www.ilo.org/publns. The editor of the series is the Director of the Social Protection Department, ILO. For more information on the series, or to submit a paper, please contact: Isabel Ortiz, Director Social Protection Department International Labour Organization 4 Route des Morillons CH-1211 Geneva 22 Switzerland Tel. +41.22.799.6226 • Fax: +41.22.799.79.62 Printed in Switzerland Abstract This paper documents the reversal of pension privatization and the reforms that took place in the 1990s and 2000s in Kazakhstan. The report analyses the political economy of different reform proposals, and the characteristics of the new pension system, including laws enacted, coverage, benefit adequacy, financing and contribution rates, governance and social security administration, social dialogue, positive impacts and other key issues of Kazakhstan’s pension system. JEL Classification: I3, H53, H55, J14, J26 Keywords: pension privatization, pension reform, social security policy Reversing Pension Privatization in Kazakhstan iii Contents Page Abstract ............................................................................................................................................. iii Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................... vii Authors ............................................................................................................................................. vii Acronyms .......................................................................................................................................... ix Summary of Reforms related to Pension Privatization and its Reversal .......................................... xi 1. Introduction: Kazakhstan’s pension system in transition ........................................................ 1 2. Kazakhstan’s pension system before 2013 ............................................................................. 2 Key characteristics of the Soviet pension system ................................................................... 2 The Soviet pension system during the 1990s .......................................................................... 3 Social and demographic processes in Kazakhstan during the 1990s ...................................... 3 The Kazakhstani 1998 pension reform in the context of the post-Soviet economic transition ..... 4 Assessment of the structure and performance of the Kazakhstani privatized pension system ...... 5 3. The 2013 reform: Key characteristics ..................................................................................... 7 Basic characteristics of the new pension system ..................................................................... 7 Legislative and institutional changes and coordination mechanisms ...................................... 9 4. The 2013 reform: How was it done? ....................................................................................... 11 Sequence of reforms and critical details of the implementation process ................................ 11 5. The 2013 pension reform: Major impacts ............................................................................... 13 Fiscal and socioeconomic results of the reform after implementation .................................... 13 References ......................................................................................................................................... 17 Additional bibliography consulted .......................................................................................... 22 List of figures 1. The Impact of the Pension Sector on Kazakhstan’s Economic Performance ......................... 15 List of tables 1. Kazakhstan’s Pension System ................................................................................................. 8 2. The Number of Depositors of Accumulative Pension Funds .................................................. 14 3. The Size of Pension Funds (in bln. tenge), as of September 1, 2015 ...................................... 14 4. Pension Funds of Depositors ................................................................................................... 14 5. Structure of the Investment Portfolio of UPF, as of September 2015 ..................................... 15 Reversing Pension Privatization in Kazakhstan v Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection and the Public Social Security Fund for the detailed information and explanation of the Kazakh reforms. Any error is the sole responsibility of the authors. The paper was reviewed by Isabel Ortiz, Director of the ILO Social Protection Department; Fabio Durán Valverde, Head of Public Finance, Actuarial Services and Statistics, Social Protection Department, ILO; Stefan Urban, Social Protection Financing Expert, Social Protection Department, ILO; Veronika Wodsak, Social Security Expert, Social Protection Department, ILO; and, Artiom Sici, former ILO Social Protection Officer, ILO, Moscow. The authors Elena Maltseva is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Windsor, Canada (2014-present). Saltanat Janenova is an Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy, Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan (2013-present). Reversing Pension Privatization in Kazakhstan vii Acronyms ADB Asian Development Bank AFN Agency for the Regulation and Supervision of Financial Market and Finance Institutions PPFA Private Pension Fund Administrator BSP Basic Social Pension UPF/ENPF Unified National Pension Fund (in Russian, Edinyi Natsional’nyi Pensionnyi Fond) GDP Gross Domestic Product ILO International Labour Organization MSL subsistence minimum NBRK National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan OECD Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development PAYG Pay-as-you-go RK Republic of Kazakhstan SAPF Public Accumulation Pension Fund SOE Public enterprises UPF Government unified pension fund USAID United States Agency for International Development USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WB World Bank Reversing Pension Privatization in Kazakhstan ix Summary of Reforms related to Pension Privatization and its Reversal 1998 The pension system following the 1998 privatization: 1st Pillar: mandatory funded and privately-managed, defined-contribution pension system based on individual accounts 2nd supplementary occupational pension plans. 3nd Pillar: voluntary pension system (also funded and privately managed) to provide for additional savings and insurance. The solidarity pension (0 Pillar) was phased out as people in the pre-1998 pension system retire. 2004 Introduction of the social security rate. It is charged to companies and covers social programs including pension, healthcare, and many other benefits. The rate averaged 26.6 per cent since 2004 and is now at 11 per cent (July 2018). 2005 Introduction of the unconditional, universal Basic Social Pension (BPP). (Reformed in 2017). 2013 Reversal of the privatization and rebuilding a public pension system: Law No. 105-V ZRK of 21 June 2013 «On Pensions in the Republic of Kazakhstan» The new model: 0 Pillar: Basic Social Pension (BPP) (unconditional, universal pension payment) 1st Pillar: Fully-funded, individual-account, defined-contribution pension (mandatory – managed by the new public Unified Pension Fund (UPF); 2nd Pillar Occupational pension (high-risk employment). Plus a Solidarity pension PAYG paid by the government to citizens employed no less than six months
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Shortcomings of Pension System in Turkey: Solutions with a New Model Proposed
    International Journal of Islamic Economics and Finance Studies, 2019/2: 23-48 The Shortcomings of Pension System in Turkey: Solutions with a New Model Proposed Levent Sumer*, Beliz Ozorhon ** Received: 03.05.2019 Accepted: 19.07.2019 DOI: 10.25272/ijisef.559898 Type: Research Article Abstract Investing for retirement years due to future income concerns is one of the main reasons for people to make savings. Pension funds have always been important tools that match the idea of future investments. Despite the rapid development and increase in the size of the Turkish pension system in the last few years, major improvements and amendments in the current system are required for increasing the total size to OECD level, as well as attracting more participants by increasing the returns and providing alternative investment options. This study investigates the Turkish pension system and suggests a new model to solve the current problems of the system by structuring a sustainable model which may also be applied worldwide. A comprehensive pension system and comparative return analysis of different investment tools are conducted, and the new model is proposed based on creating a new pool of new investment tools consists of asset-based capital market instruments that are issued for long-term specific investment projects financing. While the new model brings a new perspective to the pension system, it also helps to solve the problems of both the current pension system and the financing of investment projects. In the study, policy recommendations and suggestions
    [Show full text]
  • Rethinking Normal Retirement Age for Pension Plans
    American Academy of Actuaries MARCH 2009 MARCH 2013 Key Points Rethinking Normal Retirement Age for Pension Plans n Social Security normal retirement age has been raised to 67 for all he American Academy of Actuaries currently advocates that any individuals born after 1960. Tresolution to the long-term financing problems of the Social n ERISA currently does not allow a plan Security system should include an increase in the Social Security sponsor to raise the normal retirement normal retirement age. This issue brief investigates the effect of age for DB plans beyond age 65 to be similarly raising the normal retirement age in a qualified defined consistent with Social Security. benefit (DB) pension plan, and analyzes the merits of such a move. n Aligning the normal retirement Many of the issues identified in the Academy’s 2008 Social Se- age for DB plans with the Social curity position statement, Actuaries Advocate Raising Social Secu- Security normal retirement age would rity’s Retirement Age, and the Social Security Committee’s 2010 facilitate and encourage more workers issue brief, Raising the Retirement Age for Social Security, includ- to remain in the workforce longer. ing longevity and demographic concerns, apply equally to the n Changes to ERISA should allow, but idea of allowing employer-sponsored plans to raise their plan’s not require, employers to increase normal retirement age. Notably, that issue brief discusses impor- their normal retirement age. tant behavioral effects that a defined normal retirement age can n Transition rules should be considered have. Permitting employers to increase the normal retirement age carefully.
    [Show full text]
  • Raising the Retirement Age for Social Security
    American Academy of Actuaries MARCH 2009 OCTOBER 2010 Key Points Raising the Retirement Age When Social Security began paying for Social Security monthly benefits in 1940, workers could receive unreduced retired-worker benefits his issue brief examines in some detail the potential impact of beginning at age 65. This age is known as the Normal Retirement Age (NRA). Traising the retirement age. It is important to note that the Social Insurance Committee of the American Academy of Actuaries has To address an impending solvency crisis, changes legislated in 1983 included gradu- extensively reviewed different reform options for Social Security. ally increasing the NRA (from age 65 to For example, a recent issue brief on Social Security Reform fo- 67) beginning in 2000, recognizing that cuses on possible changes in the benefit formula or in the federal longevity had increased greatly since the income tax treatment of Social Security benefits. The Academy be- system began. lieves that raising the retirement age is one component, though a Social Security now faces another solvency necessary one, of restoring Social Security’s financial health. challenge, with long-term income pro- jected to be insufficient to pay promised Background benefits. Raising the NRA further would improve Social Security’s Board of Trustees projects that, under their best-esti- Social Security’s financial status. Depend- mate assumptions, income to the system will be insufficient to finance ing on the timing and magnitude, raising its benefits in the long run, absent corrective legislation. These finan- the NRA could make a significant contri- cial problems stem partly from the impact of individuals’ living longer bution toward restoring the Social Security and receiving Social Security benefits for a longer period of time, and program to long-range actuarial balance and sustainability.
    [Show full text]
  • Civil Service Superannuation Board – Pension Benefits
    CIVIL SERVICE SUPERANNUATION BOARD PENSION BENEFITS: Can I continue to contribute to my pension while on Maternity Leave? Yes- you must complete an “Election Form to Contribute While on Maternity Leave” form (see link below) and return it to your Pay & Benefits Office. Your contributions will be the same as they would be if you had not been on leave. The cost to purchase is based on your salary as at the date of leave and is calculated on 8% of pensionable earnings up to the Canada Pension Plan Maximum and 9% on any pensionable earnings above the maximum for the period you are on maternity leave. To be eligible you must apply prior to the commencement of your maternity leave. • Election Form to Contribute While on Maternity Leave: http://media.wix.com/ugd/a8e4c9_27caeee2b8d84f6bb8999aa9da6ec39e.pdf Can I continue to contribute to my pension while on Parental Leave? Yes – you must complete an “Election Form to Contribute While on Parental Leave” form (see link below) and return it to your Pay & Benefits Office. Please note that you will be required to contribute both the employee portion and the employer’s portion during Parental Leave. The cost to purchase is based on your salary as at the date of leave and is calculated on 8% of pensionable earnings up to the Canada Pension Plan Maximum and 9% on any pensionable earnings above the maximum PLUS an equal and matching portion for the period you are on parental leave. To be eligible you must apply prior to the commencement of your parental leave.
    [Show full text]
  • Automatic Indexation of the Pension Age to Life Expectancy: When Policy Design Matters †
    risks Article Automatic Indexation of the Pension Age to Life Expectancy: When Policy Design Matters † Mercedes Ayuso 1,*,‡ , Jorge M. Bravo 2,‡ , Robert Holzmann 3,‡ and Edward Palmer 4,‡ 1 Department of Econometrics, Statistics and Applied Economy, Riskcenter-UB, University of Barcelona, 08034 Barcelona, Spain 2 NOVA IMS Universidade Nova de Lisboa, MagIC, and Université Paris-Dauphine PSL, and CEFAGE-UE, 1070 Lisbon, Portugal; [email protected] 3 Austrian National Bank, and Austrian Academy of Sciences, and Australian Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research, CEPAR@UNSW, 1090 Vienna, Austria; [email protected] 4 Uppsala Center for Labor Studies and Department of Economics, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden; [email protected] * Correspondence: [email protected] † This paper is an extended and revised version of the conference paper presented at WorldCIST’21. ‡ These authors contributed equally to this work. Abstract: Increasing retirement ages in an automatic or scheduled way with increasing life expectancy at retirement is a popular pension policy response to continuous longevity improvements. The question addressed here is: to what extent is simply adopting this approach likely to fulfill the overall goals of policy? To shed some light on the answer, we examine the policies of four countries that have recently introduced automatic indexation of pension ages to life expectancy–The Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal and Slovakia. To this end, we forecast an alternative period and cohort life expectancy measures using a Bayesian Model Ensemble of heterogeneous stochastic mortality models Citation: Ayuso, Mercedes, Jorge M. comprised of parametric models, principal component methods, and smoothing approaches.
    [Show full text]
  • 65 Years Wage and Cost in Turkey
    Kastamonu Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi- Cilt 18, Sayı 1, ICEBSS 2017 Özel Sayı Kastamonu Üniversity Journal of faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences- Volume 18, Issue 1, ICEBSS 2017 Special Issue 65 YEARS WAGE, COST AND FINANCE IN TURKEY1 Faruk DAYI* *Kastamonu University, Corresponding Author, [email protected] Zeynep ARABACI** **Kastamonu University, [email protected] Abstract: While World Health Organization took into account the age limit as 60 years in the 1970s, as today's retirement age is 65 years in industrialized countries. The number of elderly people, which is an important part of social life, is increasing every year. Furthermore, it is necessary to take measures to meet needs of the elderly population. Thus, a part of the needs of the elderly for the social state principle needs to be met by the state. It is taken for a measures that 65 years wage is paid for old people in our country for their life. Purpose of the study, is to compare the 65-year-old pension applied in our country with the similar practices in the world, but also to increase the share of the elderly in social life. In the research conducted, while the number of elderly people 65 years wage was 363.747 in 1977, it increased to 797.426 in 2011. Furthermore, while the 65 year wage was paid 76,47 TL in 2007, it increased to 212,30 TL in 2016. As a result of the work, it is seen that wages increase and care services increase in order to meet the needs of the elderly in our country.
    [Show full text]
  • The Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006: a Legitimisation of Age Discrimination in Employment
    Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 35, No. 3, September 2006 Industrial Law Society; all rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] doi:10.1093/indlaw/dwl017 The Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006: A Legitimisation of Age Discrimination in Employment MALCOLM SARGEANT* ABSTRACT The Employment Equality (Age) Regulations, which implement the Framework Direc- tive on Equal Treatment and Occupation, take effect in October 2006. Tackling age dis- crimination is seen to be a means of achieving a more diverse workforce, yet in trying to achieve this objective there have been compromises with the principle of non-discrimination. During the consultation exercises preceding the Regulations there have been important differences of approach between employers and trade unions. The Government has, mostly, adopted the approach supported by employers. The result is a set of Regulations, which, although an important step forward in tackling age discrimination, have numbers of exceptions which effectively legitimise some aspects of age discrimination at work. 1. INTRODUCTION The Labour Government which came to power in 1997 had a commitment to taking some action on age discrimination in employment, although it was not clear what action would be taken. In the event it took a voluntarist route, which few thought would succeed. At the same time the European Commission had been developing its own approach to a forecast and significant ageing of the population of the EU. The result of which, amongst other measures, was the Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation,1 which included age discrimination in employment amongst its provisions. The Directive allowed Member States to apply for an extension of up to three years from the original implementation date of 2 December 2003 ‘in order to take account of particular conditions’.
    [Show full text]
  • The Case of Kazakhstan's 2013 Pension Reform
    Elena Maltseva* and Saltanat Janenova** The Politics of Pension Reforms in Kazakhstan: Pressures for Change and Reform Strategies*** Abstract: Following the Soviet Union‘s disintegration, many post-Soviet states introduced liberal economic and social reforms. The reforms included the replacement of the Soviet-era ―pay-as-you-go‖ pension system with a new fully funded, defined contribution pension system that was based on individual accounts. Built on the example of the 1981 Chilean pension reform and the advice of international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, the driving idea behind the post- Soviet pension reform was to reduce government‘s costs, to encourage personal savings, to avoid government mismanagement of pension funds and to contribute to the development of the financial sector. However, as time passed, the new pension systems displayed several shortcomings, including low coverage, especially of the poor population and women; high fiscal costs of transition from one pension system to another; high administrative costs; serious financial risks for the pensioners; and several other. As a result, in recent years, a number of governments in Latin America, Eastern Europe and CIS, including Kazakhstan, launched another round of pension reforms, this time rolling back the earlier privatization schemes, and reintroducing or strengthening the publicly managed components into/of their pension systems. This paper discusses the origins and outcomes of the liberal 1998 pension reform in Kazakhstan, and the rationale
    [Show full text]
  • Pension Reform
    No. 113 January 2020 Abkhazia South Ossetia caucasus Adjara analytical digest Nagorno- Karabakh www.laender-analysen.de/cad www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/cad.html PENSION REFORM Special Editor: Martin Brand (CRC 1342 “Global Dynamics of Social Policy” and Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen) ■■Introduction by the Special Editor: The Rise of Pension Privatisation in the South Caucasus 2 ■■Economic and Political Aspects of the Pension Reform in Armenia 3 By Gayane Shakhmuradyan (American University of Armenia) ■■OPINION POLL The Attitude of the Armenian Population towards Pension Reform 8 ■■Pension Privatization in Georgia: Accumulation Against Solidarity 10 By Alexandra Aroshvili and Tornike Chivadze ■■The Current State of the Pension System in Azerbaijan: Challenges and Prospects 14 By Gubad Ibadoghlu (Economic Research Center, Baku) Research Centre Center Center for Eastern European German Association for for East European Studies for Security Studies CRRC-Georgia East European Studies Studies University of Bremen ETH Zurich University of Zurich CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 113, January 2020 2 Introduction by the Special Editor: The Rise of Pension Privatisation in the South Caucasus The privatisation of pension systems has spread worldwide, especially in the 1990s and 2000s, first mostly in Latin America, followed by numerous countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In recent years, South Caucasus countries have also reformed their pension systems. Armenia and Georgia have introduced a mandatory system of private, indi- vidual pension savings, while Azerbaijan has so far maintained its pay-as-you-go system with supplementary volun- tary private pension savings. The late rise of pension privatisation in the South Caucasus is surprising given that in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, many countries in Central and Eastern Europe scaled down mandatory private retirement accounts and restored the role of public provision.
    [Show full text]
  • Social Protection and Social Security (Including Social Protection Floors)
    Guiding Questions for Defining the Normative Content of the Issues Examined at the Tenth Working Session of the Open-ended Working Group: Social Protection and Social Security (including social protection floors) Definition 1. What is the definition of the right to social security and social protection (including social protection floors) for older persons in the national legislation in your country? Or how should such a right be defined, considering existing national, regional and international legal framework? The Ministry of Social Integration, Social Security and National Solidarity has been set up to provide fair, equitable and responsive social protection in a sustainable manner to citizens of the Republic with special attention to senior citizens, persons with disabilities as well as vulnerable persons and reinforce national solidarity. The National Pensions Act Scope of the right 2. What are the key normative elements of the right to social protection and social security for older persons? Please provide references to existing standards on such elements as below, as well as any additional elements: a) Availability of contributory and non-contributory schemes for older persons Non-contributory Benefits Every Mauritian citizen benefits from the National Pension Scheme (NPS) as from the age of 60, at the monthly rate of Rs. 9,000. A person aged 90 and below 100 years receive a pension of Rs 16,210, while centenarian receives Rs 21,710. 1 Retirement Gratuity Older persons who have been in continuous employment for at least 12 months benefit from a retirement gratuity at retirement age (S49, Employment Rights Act). The retirement gratuity is paid in the form of a one-off lump sum, which is calculated on basis 15 days' remuneration for every 12 months' in continuous employment.
    [Show full text]
  • Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress
    Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress Katelin P. Isaacs Specialist in Income Security Updated August 8, 2019 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL30631 Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress Summary Prior to 1984, neither federal civil service employees nor Members of Congress paid Social Security taxes, nor were they eligible for Social Security benefits. Members of Congress and other federal employees were instead covered by a separate pension plan called the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). The 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act (P.L. 98-21) required federal employees first hired after 1983 to participate in Social Security. These amendments also required all Members of Congress to participate in Social Security as of January 1, 1984, regardless of when they first entered Congress. Because CSRS was not designed to coordinate with Social Security, Congress directed the development of a new retirement plan for federal workers. The result was the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986 (P.L. 99- 335). Members of Congress first elected in 1984 or later are covered automatically under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS). All Senators and those Representatives serving as Members prior to September 30, 2003, may decline this coverage. Representatives entering office on or after September 30, 2003, cannot elect to be excluded from such coverage. Members who were already in Congress when Social Security coverage went into effect could either remain in CSRS or change their coverage to FERS. Members are now covered under one of four different retirement arrangements: CSRS and Social Security; The CSRS Offset plan, which includes both CSRS and Social Security, but with CSRS contributions and benefits reduced by Social Security contributions and benefits; FERS, which includes the FERS basic retirement annuity, Social Security, and Thrift Savings Plan (TSP); or Social Security alone.
    [Show full text]
  • United Kingdom
    United Kingdom United Kingdom: Pension system in 2018 Key indicators: United Kingdom The UK introduced a new State Pension system on 6 United Kingdom OECD April 2016 for people reaching State Pension age from Average worker earnings (AW) GBP 39 328 31 171 that date onwards. It is a flat rate scheme, with some USD 52 467 41 584 transitional arrangements. For people who reached Public pension spending % of GDP 6.2 8.0 State Pension age before that date, the public scheme has two tiers, (a flat-rate basic pension and an earnings- Life expectancy at birth 81.1 80.7 related additional pension). Both are complemented by at age 65 19.8 19.7 a large voluntary private pension sector. An income- Population over age 65 % of working- age population 32.0 31.2 related benefit (Pension Credit) targets extra spending 1 2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888934044214 on the poorest pensioners. Qualifying conditions State Pension age is currently around 65 years and 3 months for men and women, rising to 66 years by October 2020 and to 67 years between 2026 and 2028. The Government has made provision for regular reviews of State Pension age, to take into account changes in life expectancy and other relevant factors. Under the old system (pre 2016), an individual reaching State Pension age qualified for a full basic State Pension by: i) paying; or ii) having been treated as having paid; or iii) being credited with, National Insurance contributions, for 30 qualifying years in their working lives. A proportionally reduced basic state pension was paid to people with fewer than 30 qualifying years, to a minimum of one qualifying year of contribution or credits (for those reaching State Pension age between 2010 and 2016).
    [Show full text]