Packet Materials
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Packet Materials DATE: May 15, 2020 Item No. 7 LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSION Agenda Packet Contents List Staff Memorandum from Bryan Goebel, Executive Officer “Assessing Bank Accountability, The COVID-19 Community Stress Test” Completed by: Alisa Somera Date: May 8, 2020 (This list reflects the explanatory documents provided.) San Francisco Local Agency Formation Commission City Hall 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, Room 409 San Francisco, CA 94102-4689 Tel. 415.554.6756 Fax. 415.554.5163 COMMISSIONERS May 15, 2020 Sandra Lee Fewer, Chair Board of Supervisors TO: LAFCo Commissioners Cynthia Crews-Pollock, Vice- Chair Member of the Public FROM: Bryan Goebel, Executive Officer Matt Haney Board of Supervisors SUBJECT: Item 7 – Presentation and Discussion on the LAFCo Report Gordon Mar Assessing Bank Accountability in San Francisco during the COVID-19 Board of Supervisors Pandemic Shanti Singh Today LAFCo research associate Cara Yi, a fellow in public affairs at Member of the Public- Alternate Coro Northern California, presents the findings of her report, Assessing Bank Accountability: The COVID-19 Community 'Stress Test'. Bryan Goebel There are five recommendations, informed by thorough research and interviews Executive Officer over the last month, that are important steps to help keep banks in San Francisco accountable during this crisis and its aftermath, and underscore the City’s role in Inder Khalsa Legal Counsel filling gaps, especially as it relates to underserved and disadvantaged communities: Alisa Somera 1. Issue a statement of intent to hold banks accountable for community Clerk accessibility, fair practices, and good-faith efforts in the COVID-19 crisis Cara Yi response. Coro Research Fellow 2. Engage with communities of color to document requests for relief and track the granting of COVID-19 assistance from banks. 3. Organize listening sessions with the LEP (limited English proficiency) community to understand how the time-sensitive nature of the crisis response has affected accessibility. 4. Spotlight direct service providers on the sf.gov COVID-10 resources page who offer financial literacy resources and consumer legal assistance. 5. Assess the preparedness and capacity of City networks to scale acquisition and preserve affordable housing units. I want to thank Cara Yi for her invaluable research and work that went into producing this report. RECOMMENDATION: Accept the report and recommendations, provide feedback and direct next steps to staff. SAN FRANCISCO LOCAL AGENCY FORMATION COMMISSION City Hall | 1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place, Room 409, San Francisco, CA 94102-4689 T 415.544.6756 | F 415.554.5163 Assessing Bank Accountability The COVID-19 Community ‘Stress Test’ Cara Yi Coro Fellow in Public Affairs LAFCo Research Associate May 15, 2020 Local Agency Formation Commission City and County of San Francisco ASSESSING BANK ACCOUNTABILITY: THE COVID-19 COMMUNITY ‘STRESS TEST’ 1. Introduction Under the Local Agency Formation Commission’s (“the Commission” or “LAFCo”) special studies authority, I was asked by the Executive Officer, Bryan Goebel, to provide research and policy support for a public bank. Soon after, the coronavirus (“COVID-19”) pandemic hit San Francisco and, under the guidance of the Commission’s Chair, Supervisor Sandra Lee Fewer, shifted to examine the existing banking system and its crisis response. With new direction, I was tasked to assess bank responses to COVID-19 and identify gaps and vulnerabilities left by banks’ (in)actions. To conduct the assessment, I contacted banks, community organizations at the state and local levels, and City officials. This four-week study coincided with the rollout of government programs and mandates catching many at their busiest. A special thanks to the 21 individuals, listed below, who gave their time and shared their resources to inform the findings of this report. Kelly Batson, United Way Bay Area Sushil Jacob, Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Bianca Blomquist, Small Business Majority Sharky Laguana, SF Small Business Coalition Amy Beinhart, SF Supervisor Hillary Ronen’s Office Flor Lorenzo, Beneficial State Foundation Karl Beitel, SF Budget & Legislative Analyst Consultant Jason Matthews, Urban Financial Services Coalition Chelsea Boilard, SF Supervisor Sandra Fewer’s Office Naima McQueen, Alliance for Community Development Peter Cohen, Council of Community Housing Organizations Kỳ-Nam Miller, Metropolitan Transportation Commission Jacob Dumez, SF Office of Financial Empowerment William Ortiz-Cartagena, SF Small Business Commissioner Nick Egger-Bovet, Beneficial State Bank Xiomara Peña, Small Business Majority Lamar Hetystek, Minority Business Development Agency Daisy Quan, SF Supervisor Gordon Mar’s Office Cynthia Huie, SF Small Business Commissioner Kevin Stein, California Reinvestment Coalition Kurtis Wu, SF Public Bank Coalition The largest barrier to more completely assessing bank responses was the lack of transparency. Due to provisions legislated in the banking system, opportunities to examine bank processes and interactions with the community on a statistically significant scale are scarce. Consequently, this report assesses banks according to how the banking system enables and mandates its actors to respond to the COVID-19 crisis. In identifying at-risk groups in the banking system, this report concludes that data-tracking and increased capacity at local community-based organizations can increase bank accountability in San Francisco. 1 ASSESSING BANK ACCOUNTABILITY: THE COVID-19 COMMUNITY ‘STRESS TEST’ 2. Background 2.1 AN OVERVIEW OF BANKS & THE BANKING SYSTEM The basic functions of retail and commercial banks (hereafter, “banks”) are to receive deposits and make loans. As intermediaries operating between agents who supply financial capital via deposits and agents who demand credit via loans, banks reduce transaction costs and enable an efficient allocation of capital in the economy. 1 While individual banks are distributive intermediaries between savers and borrowers, banks acting in a system with other banks can do more. According to fractional reserve theory, banks engaged in systemic interactions in a banking system can increase aggregate capital available in the economy for lending.2 In other words, banks participating in the federal banking system can extend more credit than the capital they receive in deposits. Hence, banks in the banking system function not only as transaction-based distributive intermediaries but also as distributive intermediaries of credit opportunities. Given the various roles banks play to safeguard deposits, allocate credit, and operate the payments system, banks are regulated by a network of agencies. Major bank regulators include the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), and state agencies. Regulators supervise banks for safety and soundness, disclosure, standard setting, competition, and price and rate regulations.3 A bank’s primary regulator depends on the banks’ charter type or legal status. Therefore, when banks choose to apply for a state or national charter, banks effectively de jure choose favorable regulations under either state regulators (for state- chartered banks) or the OCC (for federal-chartered banks), among other factors.4 However, de facto, federal preemption laws (where federal statute is applied to state-chartered banks) 1 “What Is the Economic Function of a Bank?,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, July 2001, https://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2001/july/bank-economic-function/. 2 Richard A. Werner, “Can Banks Individually Create Money out of Nothing? — The Theories and the Empirical Evidence,” International Review of Financial Analysis 36 (December 2014): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2014.07.015. 3 Marc Labonte, “Who Regulates Whom? An Overview of the U.S. Financial Regulatory Framework” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 10, 2020). 4 Jay B. Sykes, “Banking Law: An Overview of Federal Preemption in the Dual Banking System,” 5 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2018). 2 ASSESSING BANK ACCOUNTABILITY: THE COVID-19 COMMUNITY ‘STRESS TEST’ and state parity provisions5 (where state-chartered banks can petition to receive powers granted to federal-chartered banks) narrow the regulatory jurisdictions of state regulators. Though chartering authority is tied to regulatory power, national banks are not wholly immune from state law, and vice versa. According to the Supreme Court, national banks “are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation,” because contracts, acquisition and transfer of property, and the right to collect debt and the liability to be sued for debts “are all based on State law.”6 To summarize, state laws apply to federal-chartered banks so long as they are limited to “establish[ing] the legal infrastructure around the conduct of [bank activities].”7 Regulations on “the manner, content or extent of the activities authorized for national banks,” including administrative oversight, are reserved for the OCC.8 State-chartered banks are likewise subject to federal laws, especially as they pertain to federal tax, consumer protection, and anti-discrimination laws. 9 The designation of consumer protection