Introduction. the School: Its Genesis, Development and Significance
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Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities), 21Pp
Forthcoming in: Uncovering Facts and Values, ed. A. Kuzniar and J. Odrowąż-Sypniewska (Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities), 21pp. Abstract Alfred Tarski seems to endorse a partial conception of truth, the T-schema, which he believes might be clarified by the application of empirical methods, specifically citing the experimental results of Arne Næss (1938a). The aim of this paper is to argue that Næss’ empirical work confirmed Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, among others. In the first part, I lay out the case for believing that Tarski’s T-schema, while not the formal and generalizable Convention-T, provides a partial account of truth that may be buttressed by an examination of the ordinary person’s views of truth. Then, I address a concern raised by Tarski’s contemporaries who saw Næss’ results as refuting Tarski’s semantic conception. Following that, I summarize Næss’ results. Finally, I will contend with a few objections that suggest a strict interpretation of Næss’ results might recommend an overturning of Tarski’s theory. Keywords: truth, Alfred Tarski, Arne Næss, Vienna Circle, experimental philosophy Joseph Ulatowski ORDINARY TRUTH IN TARSKI AND NÆSS 1. Introduction Many of Alfred Tarski's better known papers on truth (e.g. 1944; 1983b), logical consequence (1983c), semantic concepts in general (1983a), or definability (1948) identify two conditions that successful definitions of “truth,” “logical consequence,” or “definition” require: formal correctness and material (or intuitive) adequacy.1 The first condition Tarski calls “formal correctness” because a definition of truth (for a given formal language) is formally correct when it is constructed in a manner that allows us to avoid both circular definition and semantic paradoxes. -
Journal Abbreviations
Abbreviations of Names of Serials This list gives the form of references used in Mathematical Reviews (MR). not previously listed ⇤ The abbreviation is followed by the complete title, the place of publication journal indexed cover-to-cover § and other pertinent information. † monographic series Update date: July 1, 2016 4OR 4OR. A Quarterly Journal of Operations Research. Springer, Berlin. ISSN Acta Math. Hungar. Acta Mathematica Hungarica. Akad. Kiad´o,Budapest. § 1619-4500. ISSN 0236-5294. 29o Col´oq. Bras. Mat. 29o Col´oquio Brasileiro de Matem´atica. [29th Brazilian Acta Math. Sci. Ser. A Chin. Ed. Acta Mathematica Scientia. Series A. Shuxue † § Mathematics Colloquium] Inst. Nac. Mat. Pura Apl. (IMPA), Rio de Janeiro. Wuli Xuebao. Chinese Edition. Kexue Chubanshe (Science Press), Beijing. ISSN o o † 30 Col´oq. Bras. Mat. 30 Col´oquio Brasileiro de Matem´atica. [30th Brazilian 1003-3998. ⇤ Mathematics Colloquium] Inst. Nac. Mat. Pura Apl. (IMPA), Rio de Janeiro. Acta Math. Sci. Ser. B Engl. Ed. Acta Mathematica Scientia. Series B. English § Edition. Sci. Press Beijing, Beijing. ISSN 0252-9602. † Aastaraam. Eesti Mat. Selts Aastaraamat. Eesti Matemaatika Selts. [Annual. Estonian Mathematical Society] Eesti Mat. Selts, Tartu. ISSN 1406-4316. Acta Math. Sin. (Engl. Ser.) Acta Mathematica Sinica (English Series). § Springer, Berlin. ISSN 1439-8516. † Abel Symp. Abel Symposia. Springer, Heidelberg. ISSN 2193-2808. Abh. Akad. Wiss. G¨ottingen Neue Folge Abhandlungen der Akademie der Acta Math. Sinica (Chin. Ser.) Acta Mathematica Sinica. Chinese Series. † § Wissenschaften zu G¨ottingen. Neue Folge. [Papers of the Academy of Sciences Chinese Math. Soc., Acta Math. Sinica Ed. Comm., Beijing. ISSN 0583-1431. -
On the Minimal Non-Fregean Grzegorczyk Logic
Joanna Golinska-Pilarek´ On the Minimal Non-Fregean Grzegorczyk Logic To the Memory of Andrzej Grzegorczyk Abstract. The paper concerns Grzegorczyk’s non-Fregean logics that are intended to be a formal representation of the equimeaning relation defined on descriptions. We argue that the main Grzegorczyk logics discussed in the literature are too strong and we propose a new logical system, MGL, which satisfies Grzegorczyk’s fundamental requirements. We present a sound and complete semantics for MGL and we prove that it is decidable. Finally, we show that many non-classical logics are extensions of MGL, which makes it a generic non-Fregean logic. Keywords: Non-Fregean logic, Descriptive equivalence, Equimeaning, Extensionality. Introduction There are plenty of logical systems discussed in the literature which are fo- cused on different aspects of formal representation of real world problems. Over the years, the question as to which logic is adequate has been a matter of lively discussion. One of the fundamental controversies is the philosoph- ical status of classical two-valued logic, and in particular the paradoxes of material implication and equivalence. In order to remedy the dissatisfactory aspects of classical logic, many logical systems have been introduced, such as modal, intuitionistic, relevant, non-Fregean, and paraconsistent logics, among others. In [3] Andrzej Grzegorczyk introduced yet another logical system in- tended to cover the fundamental properties of descriptive equivalence of sentences. His main assumption is that the human language is used pri- marily to create descriptions of reality and logical connectives are the main tool to represent them formally. In order to be able to speak about inter- actions between descriptions—as Grzegorczyk argues—a logical language Presented by Heinrich Wansing; Received February 21, 2015 Studia Logica (2016) 104: 209–234 DOI: 10.1007/s11225-015-9635-y c The Author(s) 2015. -
Matematické Ćasopisy Vedené V Databázi SCOPUS
Matematické časopisy vedené v databázi SCOPUS (stav k 21. 1. 2009) Abhandlungen aus dem Mathematischen Seminar der Universitat Hamburg Abstract and Applied Analysis ACM Computing Surveys ACM Transactions on Algorithms ACM Transactions on Computational Logic ACM Transactions on Computer Systems ACM Transactions on Speech and Language Processing Acta Applicandae Mathematicae Acta Arithmetica Acta Mathematica Acta Mathematica Academiae Paedagogicae Nyiregyhaziensis Acta Mathematica Hungarica Acta Mathematica Scientia Acta Mathematica Sinica, English Series Acta Mathematica Universitatis Comenianae Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, English Series Acta Mechanica Sinica Acta Numerica Advanced Nonlinear Studies Advanced Studies in Contemporary Mathematics (Kyungshang) Advanced Studies in Theoretical Physics Advances in Applied Clifford Algebras Advances in Applied Mathematics Advances in Applied Probability Advances in Computational Mathematics Advances in Difference Equations Advances in Geometry Advances in Mathematics Advances in modelling and analysis. A, general mathematical and computer tools Advances in Nonlinear Variational Inequalities Advances in Theoretical and Mathematical Physics Aequationes Mathematicae Algebra and Logic Algebra Colloquium Algebra Universalis Algebras and Representation Theory Algorithms for Molecular Biology American Journal of Mathematical and Management Sciences American Journal of Mathematics American Mathematical Monthly Analysis in Theory and Applications Analysis Mathematica -
Alfred Tarski His:Bio:Tar: Sec Alfred Tarski Was Born on January 14, 1901 in Warsaw, Poland (Then Part of the Russian Empire)
bio.1 Alfred Tarski his:bio:tar: sec Alfred Tarski was born on January 14, 1901 in Warsaw, Poland (then part of the Russian Empire). Described as \Napoleonic," Tarski was boisterous, talkative, and intense. His energy was often reflected in his lectures|he once set fire to a wastebasket while disposing of a cigarette during a lecture, and was forbidden from lecturing in that building again. Tarski had a thirst for knowledge from a young age. Although later in life he would tell students that he stud- ied logic because it was the only class in which he got a B, his high school records show that he got A's across the board| even in logic. He studied at the Univer- sity of Warsaw from 1918 to 1924. Tarski Figure 1: Alfred Tarski first intended to study biology, but be- came interested in mathematics, philosophy, and logic, as the university was the center of the Warsaw School of Logic and Philosophy. Tarski earned his doctorate in 1924 under the supervision of Stanislaw Le´sniewski. Before emigrating to the United States in 1939, Tarski completed some of his most important work while working as a secondary school teacher in Warsaw. His work on logical consequence and logical truth were written during this time. In 1939, Tarski was visiting the United States for a lecture tour. During his visit, Germany invaded Poland, and because of his Jewish heritage, Tarski could not return. His wife and children remained in Poland until the end of the war, but were then able to emigrate to the United States as well. -
Conventions, Styles of Thinking and Relativism
S t udia Philosophica Wratislaviensia Supplementary Volume, English Edition 2012 KRZYSZTOF SZLACHCIC University of Wrocław Conventions, Styles of Thinking and Relativism. Some Remarks on the Dispute between I. Dąmbska and L. Fleck* Abstract My comments are focused on the debate between Izydora Dąmbska and Ludwik Fleck. In the course of their debate, which took place in the 1930’s, they discussed some basic issues of epistemology, focusing on the problems of the sources of scientific knowledge, objectivity of knowledge, and truth. The aim of the paper is to place their debate in a the historical context and to demonstrate the novelty of Fleck’s arguments, especially in comparison with Thomas S. Kuhn’s later contribution. I also examine the dominant interpretations of Fleck’s theory of knowledge, as well as the reasons for which his philosophical ideas, especially Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache (1935) have fallen into the philosophical obliv- ion. I argue that Fleck’s views, although innovative, were less radical than it is commonly thought. My comments focus on the polemic that ensued in the 1930s between Izydora Dąmbska and Ludwik Fleck. The authors involved in it either directly or indirectly referred to the fundamental questions of the theory of cognition: the question of the sources of scientific knowledge, objectivity of knowledge (its communicabil- ity), relative nature of scientific knowledge, truth. The small total volume of texts which directly referred to the views of the adversaries as well as the place where the dispute occurred (Lvov, a geographically peripheral part of the “civilised world” at the time) could suggest that this was just a minor episode in the history of thought, not worth mentioning. -
Alfred Tarski and a Watershed Meeting in Logic: Cornell, 1957 Solomon Feferman1
Alfred Tarski and a watershed meeting in logic: Cornell, 1957 Solomon Feferman1 For Jan Wolenski, on the occasion of his 60th birthday2 In the summer of 1957 at Cornell University the first of a cavalcade of large-scale meetings partially or completely devoted to logic took place--the five-week long Summer Institute for Symbolic Logic. That meeting turned out to be a watershed event in the development of logic: it was unique in bringing together for such an extended period researchers at every level in all parts of the subject, and the synergetic connections established there would thenceforth change the face of mathematical logic both qualitatively and quantitatively. Prior to the Cornell meeting there had been nothing remotely like it for logicians. Previously, with the growing importance in the twentieth century of their subject both in mathematics and philosophy, it had been natural for many of the broadly representative meetings of mathematicians and of philosophers to include lectures by logicians or even have special sections devoted to logic. Only with the establishment of the Association for Symbolic Logic in 1936 did logicians begin to meet regularly by themselves, but until the 1950s these occasions were usually relatively short in duration, never more than a day or two. Alfred Tarski was one of the principal organizers of the Cornell institute and of some of the major meetings to follow on its heels. Before the outbreak of World War II, outside of Poland Tarski had primarily been involved in several Unity of Science Congresses, including the first, in Paris in 1935, and the fifth, at Harvard in September, 1939. -
L. Maligranda REVIEW of the BOOK by MARIUSZ URBANEK
Математичнi Студiї. Т.50, №1 Matematychni Studii. V.50, No.1 УДК 51 L. Maligranda REVIEW OF THE BOOK BY MARIUSZ URBANEK, “GENIALNI – LWOWSKA SZKOL A MATEMATYCZNA” (POLISH) [GENIUSES – THE LVOV SCHOOL OF MATHEMATICS] L. Maligranda. Review of the book by Mariusz Urbanek, “Genialni – Lwowska Szko la Matema- tyczna” (Polish) [Geniuses – the Lvov school of mathematics], Wydawnictwo Iskry, Warsaw 2014, 283 pp. ISBN: 978-83-244-0381-3 , Mat. Stud. 50 (2018), 105–112. This review is an extended version of my short review of Urbanek's book that was published in MathSciNet. Here it is written about his book in greater detail, which was not possible in the short review. I will present facts described in the book as well as some false information there. My short review of Urbanek’s book was published in MathSciNet [24]. Here I write about his book in greater detail. Mariusz Urbanek, writer and journalist, author of many books devoted to poets, politicians and other figures of public life, decided to delve also in the world of mathematicians. He has written a book on the phenomenon in the history of Polish science called the Lvov School of Mathematics. Let us add that at the same time there were also the Warsaw School of Mathematics and the Krakow School of Mathematics, and the three formed together the Polish School of Mathematics. The Lvov School of Mathematics was a group of mathematicians in the Polish city of Lvov (Lw´ow,in Polish; now the city is in Ukraine) in the period 1920–1945 under the leadership of Stefan Banach and Hugo Steinhaus, who worked together and often came to the Scottish Caf´e (Kawiarnia Szkocka) to discuss mathematical problems. -
How to Study Mathematics – the Manual for Warsaw University 1St Year Students in the Interwar Period
TECHNICAL TRANSACTIONS CZASOPISMO TECHNICZNE FUNDAMENTAL SCIENCES NAUKI PODSTAWOWE 2-NP/2015 KALINA BARTNICKA* HOW TO STUDY MATHEMATICS – THE MANUAL FOR WARSAW UNIVERSITY 1ST YEAR STUDENTS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD JAK STUDIOWAĆ MATEMATYKĘ – PORADNIK DLA STUDENTÓW PIERWSZEGO ROKU Z OKRESU MIĘDZYWOJENNEGO Abstract In 1926 and in 1930, members of Mathematics and Physics Students’ Club of the Warsaw University published the guidance for the first year students. These texts would help the freshers in constraction of the plans and course of theirs studies in the situation of so called “free study”. Keywords: Warsaw University, Interwar period, “Free study”, Study of Mathematics, Freshers, Students’ clubs, Guidance for students Streszczenie W 1926 r. i w 1930 r. Koło Naukowe Matematyków i Fizyków Studentów Uniwersytetu War- szawskiego opublikowało poradnik dla studentów pierwszego roku matematyki. Są to teksty, które pomagały pierwszoroczniakom w racjonalnym skonstruowaniu planu i toku ich studiów w warunkach tzw. „wolnego stadium”. Słowa kluczowe: Uniwersytet Warszawski, okres międzywojenny, „wolne stadium”, studio wanie matematyki, pierwszoroczniacy, studenckie koła naukowe, poradnik dla studentów DOI: 10.4467/2353737XCT.15.203.4408 * L. & A. Birkenmajetr Institute of History of Science, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland; [email protected] 14 This paper is focused primarily on the departure from the “free study” in university learning in Poland after it regained its independence in 1918. The idea of the “free study” had been strongly cherished by professors and staff of the Philosophy Department of Warsaw University even though the majority of students (including the students of mathematics and physics) were not interested in pursuing an academic career. The concept of free study left to the students the decision about the choice of subjects they wished to study and about the plan of their work. -
Conceptual Metaphors and Concepts of Multiple Realities: Points in Common
KWARTALNIK NEOFILOLOGICZNY, LVIII, 3/2011 KRZYSZTOF KOSECKI (ŁÓDŹ) CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS AND CONCEPTS OF MULTIPLE REALITIES: POINTS IN COMMON The paper discusses the concept of reality and four attempts to account for it: William James’s conception of “sub-universes” and Lawrence LeShan’s idea of “alternate realities”, both developed in psychology; Leon Chwistek’s conception of multiple realities in philosophy and art; Alfred Schütz’s idea of “limited areas of sense (meaning)”, advanced in sociology. It sets them against the second generation cognitive linguistic view of conceptual metaphor, developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. The cognitive linguists claim that metaphors shape people’s ontological orientations and so largely defi ne their everyday realities. Various points in common between the respective conceptions of realities and the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor are considered. The theory of conceptual metaphor is presented as another attempt to cope with the concept of reality. Like the other conceptions, it claims that reality is not homogenous; instead, metaphorical pluralism is the only way that allows one to deal effectively with the complexity of the surrounding world. INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF REALITY The concept of reality is a vague one, which is refl ected in its diverse de- scriptions. A popular view of it was expressed by the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1986: 167-168): A man tends to regard as real those things which he knows best and perceives with least effort. In each of us, the attention seems to be inclined to turn of its own accord to one defi - nite class of objects or another. -