Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalization

Problems of Post-Communism ISSN: 1075-8216 (Print) 1557-783X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mppc20 Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalization Zsolt Enyedi To cite this article: Zsolt Enyedi (2016) Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalization, Problems of Post-Communism, 63:4, 210-220, DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2015.1113883 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2015.1113883 Published online: 14 Jan 2016. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 1213 View Crossmark data Citing articles: 11 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=mppc20 Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 63, no. 4, 2016, 210–220 Copyright © 2016 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1075-8216 (print)/1557-783X (online) DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2015.1113883 Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalization The Role of Party Politics in De-Democratization Zsolt Enyedi Department of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary The institutionalization of party politics is supposed to contribute to the consolidation of democracies. Analysis of Hungary’s democratic backsliding shows, however, that this is not necessarily the case. This article demonstrates that the combination of populist party strategies, polarized party relations, and the inertia of the party system constitutes a significant challenge (here labeled “populist polarization”) to the consolidation of liberal democracy. After considering the applic- ability of structuralist and transitologist frameworks to the political dynamics in Hungary, the article differentiates the notion of populist polarization from similar concepts and argues that populist polarization in the region poses a more acute danger to high-quality democracy than the much-feared under-institutionalized and fragmented configurations of party politics. INTRODUCTION institutions overshadow parties in policy-making; in France, individual political entrepreneurs regularly intro- While democratic theory often neglects party politics, poli- duce new party labels, and so forth. Despite such “deficien- tical science research rarely fails to emphasize the funda- cies,” few would question the democratic character of the mental role played by parties in the consolidation of modern respective political systems. However, when the focus is on democracies (e.g., LaPalombara and Weiner 1966). In addi- the consolidation of new democracies, one of the most tion to structuring the electoral process, parties are supposed investigated aspects is exactly the development of a “stable, to fulfill the functions of articulating preferences and inter- moderate, socially rooted party system” (to quote a variable ests, aggregating them into comprehensive platforms, chan- from the Bertelsmann Transformation index). This is so neling them into governmental policies, socializing because a strong and predictable party arena is seen both individuals into loyal citizens of competitively run polities, as a good indicator and a major cause of a successful disseminating politically relevant information among the transition to democracy (Carothers 2006; Catón 2007). public, and organizing the work of legislatures and execu- Countries with fragile parties run the risk of being domi- tives. Accordingly, it is assumed that the processes of repre- nated by oligarchs, idiosyncratic and self-serving political sentation and accountability in modern democracies imply notables, destructive protest movements, or non-democratic strong, stable, coherent, multifunctional parties. institutions such as armies, intelligence services, and On the other hand, it is also a well-recognized fact that churches. In such systems decision-makers are not disci- the relevance and stability of political parties varies across plined by a corporate agency, the party, which cares about democratic countries. Many utilize practices that are in its long-term reputation; consequently, they are considered tension with the ideal-typical model (Katz 1987) of party to have a short time-horizon. The excessive fragmentation government. In the United States, parties lack unified lea- of parliaments hinders the formation of stable majorities, dership; in the Scandinavian countries, corporative and therefore is considered to pose a major threat to effec- tive government (Lowell 1896, Hermens 1941, Duverger 1954, Huntington 1965, Sartori 1976, Mainwaring 1993, etc.). In countries with weak parties and fragmented party Address correspondence to Zsolt Enyedi, Department of Political Science, Central European University, Nador 9, Vigyazo Ferenc u. 2, systems, the complex and non-transparent political struc- Room 204, Budapest, 1051, Hungary. E-mail: [email protected] tures may discourage citizens from participating in the POPULIST POLARIZATION AND PARTY SYSTEMS 211 electoral process; they may then turn to informal, and pos- institutionalized party system of the region (Enyedi and sibly illegal, forms of control over the elites (see, for exam- Casal Bértoa 2011) and used to be the frontrunner in post- ple, Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). Finally, the reduced communist democratization (Herman 2015). Yet, during the turnout may deprive the regime of popular legitimacy. last decade, nowhere was the decline in the quality of These perils to democratic consolidation are apparent in democracy as spectacular as in this country (Kornai 2012, Eastern Europe. The region is often described, at least in Bozóki 2015, Scheppele 2013, Innes 2015, Ágh 2013). contrast to established democracies, as being characterized In 2003, the Bertelsmann Foundation placed Hungary at by relatively weakly institutionalized, fragmented, even ato- the very top of the list of 120 “developing” countries in mized, feeble and unrepresentative parties and party systems. terms of quality of democracy. The country received 10 out It has been repeatedly documented (Tavits 2005, Birch 2003, of 10 for its “democracy status,” and its overall status index Powell and Tucker 2014) that fragmentation contributes to was 9.71. By 2014, Hungary’s “democracy status” score the exceptionally high electoral volatility in the region. had dropped to 7.95 and its overall status index had Additionally, parties in the region are often found to be declined to 8.05. For the first time, the country was labeled ideologically amorphous, personalistic, lacking a strong pre- a “defective democracy” and the 2014 country report regis- sence across the entire country, short of funding, and unable to tered the “dismantling of democratic institutions” in create stable coalitions (Carothers 2006,27).Ingeneral,their Hungary.1 On the World Bank’s “voice and accountability” overall role within the political structures appears as less index, between 2003 and 2013 Hungary’s score declined central than in Western Europe. The so-called parties of from 87 to 70, and on the rule of law index from 78 to 67.2 power in the less democratic countries of the region are better On Freedom House’s Nations in Transit democracy index, organized. But this is so simply because they function as the between 2005 and 2014 Hungary moved an entire unit, from representatives of the government, and not as autonomous 1.96 to 2.96. The only other country with a similarly steep actors, and therefore they can fulfill the linkage function only deterioration was Azerbaijan.3 With regard to Freedom in a very limited fashion. The relationship between parties and House’s principal civil liberties and political rights indices, citizens is often soured further by the elitist character of party Hungary dropped from the first to the second category,4 and politics, the symbiosis of parties with the state, the importance by the end of the period its press was labeled “partly free.” of back-room deals, and the concomitant weakness of account- In 2014 a large number of human right associations, ability, inviting the application of the “cartel party theory” to including Transparency International, condemned the gov- theanalysisofpost-communistpolitics(Lewis2000). ernmental intimidation of non-governmental organizations If the above account is correct, and the principal vices are (NGOs). The 2014 report of Human Rights Watch noted elitism, feebleness, ambiguity, fragmentation, and volatility, that the “Legal changes introduced by the government con- then the virtues to be pursued are also defined, and they are: tinued to threaten the rule of law and weaken human rights stability, discipline, organization, ideological divergence, protection.”5 The organization’s 2015 report titled and mobilization based on the emotional identification of “Hungary: Outstanding Human Right Concerns” pointed large segments of population with political parties. out that “the Fidesz government has stepped up its pressure The present article draws attention to the fact that achiev- on media and civil society.”6 In the Press Freedom index of ing the above-listed attributes is no guarantee for democratic Reporters Without Borders, Hungary held the twenty-third consolidation. Furthermore, I argue that if polarization com- place in 2010, but by 2015 it had dropped to the sixty-fifth bines with populism in the way it does in Hungary, then this position.7 In a recent article, Jan-Werner Müller (2013) combination creates a far more dangerous environment than argues that developments in Hungary (and in Romania) the fragility and fragmentation of party politics or the collu-

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