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Miller Ku 0099D 16532 DATA 1 Collusion or Representation?: The Cartel Party Theory Reexamined c 2019 Sara Laren Miller B.A. Political Science, University of Colorado Denver 2010 M.A. Political Science, University of Colorado Denver 2013 Submitted to the graduate degree program in Department of Political Science and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Robert Rohrschneider, Chairperson John Kennedy Committee members Nazli Avdan Clayton Webb Steven Maynard-Moody Date defended: May 13th 2019 The Dissertation Committee for Sara Laren Miller certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation : Collusion or Representation?: The Cartel Party Theory Reexamined Robert Rohrschneider, Chairperson Date approved: May 13th 2019 ii Abstract Political discontent appears to be growing across the aging democratic world, with an increase in popular support in many nations for niche or populist parties. Although often connected to this declining support for mainstream parties and the rise of these competitors, it is unclear precisely what is contributing to this diminishing political trust across varying electorates. This dissertation suggests that political discontent may be driven by parties failing to represent voters, a possibly long standing behav- ior, first envisaged by Katz and Mair (1995) in the form of the cartel party theory. The cartel party theory suggests that as party systems mature, party behavior ultimately un- dermines representative connections with voters, with parties becoming increasingly reliant on their relationship with the state and their rivals to maintain their positions in government. If cartelistic behaviors have emerged, it is expected that parties will show broken voter-party linkages and increased collusive relationships with rival par- ties, thus limiting competition, while undermining representation. Furthermore, the issues that are presented to voters across elections should show signs of manipulation, meaning that parties should fail to respond to voters while coordinating to manipu- late their issue positions with their rivals. These two central expectations have guided the following research, testing whether parties appear to be colluding with their ri- vals and disregarding voter sentiments and if the issue spaces that are presented to voters remains representative or manipulated, as suggested by the cartel party theory. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), this work tests whether voter-party linkages appear intact across the left/right issue dimension, mul- iii tidimensional issues, and party types. The findings suggest that mainstream parties are colluding with their rivals to limit inter-party competition, while presenting in- creasingly manipulated issue spaces to voters, suggesting that deepening discontent across advanced democracies may be connected to representative failures of parties participating in cartelistic collusion. iv Acknowledgements First, I would like to thank Dr. Rohrschneider for all of the help and guidance through the totality of this process. You have been instrumental in every step of the way, from the very first intuition to the hundredth revision. I also owe a lot of credit to my wonderful daughter Elsie. If you were not such a delightfully independent infant and ultimately toddler, I would never have been able to spend so much time typing, editing and blustering, while you quietly read your books next to me. And finally, the most important person to me in the world and the person who has supported me through all of the ups and downs of this process, I would like to thank my husband Matt. I cannot put into words how much your support has meant to me through all of this, and even though I’m still pretty sure you have no clear understanding of what this dissertation is actually about, I still could not have done it without you. v Contents 1 Introduction1 1.1 Changing Political Dynamics.............................1 1.2 Assumptions About Voter-Party Linkages......................2 1.3 The Cartel Party Theory...............................3 1.4 The Question of Collusion..............................4 2 Theoretical Expectations9 2.1 From Catch-all to Cartel............................... 11 2.1.1 Systemic Evolution.............................. 11 2.2 Collusion....................................... 13 2.2.1 Party Behavior................................ 15 2.3 Party Coordination.................................. 19 2.3.1 Issue Spaces................................. 20 2.3.2 Collusive Issue Spaces............................ 21 2.3.3 Non-Collusive Issue Spaces......................... 25 2.4 Party and Voter Types................................. 27 2.5 Conclusion...................................... 29 3 Inter-Party Collusion on the Left/Right Economic Dimension 31 3.1 The Cartel Party Theory and Party Behavior..................... 32 3.2 Dimensions of Collusion............................... 36 3.3 Hypotheses...................................... 37 3.4 Data.......................................... 39 vi 3.5 Methods........................................ 45 3.6 Results......................................... 50 3.6.1 Focal Party Response............................. 51 3.6.2 Evolution................................... 55 3.6.3 Issue Space.................................. 59 3.7 Conclusion...................................... 62 4 Multidimensionality 65 4.1 The Cartel Party Theory and Multidimensional Issues................ 66 4.1.1 Multidimensional Issues........................... 67 4.1.2 A New Political Dimension......................... 69 4.1.3 European Union............................... 71 4.2 Hypotheses...................................... 73 4.3 Data.......................................... 77 4.4 Methods........................................ 80 4.5 Results......................................... 83 4.5.1 The Environment............................... 83 4.5.2 Equality.................................... 88 4.5.3 EU Integration................................ 91 4.6 Conclusion...................................... 95 5 Niche Parties 97 5.1 Niche Parties and The Cartel Party Theory..................... 99 5.1.1 Cartel Party Theory.............................. 100 5.1.2 Niche Party Literature............................ 101 5.2 Hypotheses...................................... 103 5.3 Data.......................................... 104 5.4 Methods........................................ 107 vii 5.5 Results......................................... 110 5.5.1 Left/Right Economic Dimension....................... 110 5.5.2 Multidimensional Issues........................... 116 5.5.2.1 Equality.............................. 117 5.5.2.2 EU integration........................... 119 5.5.2.3 Environment............................ 125 5.6 Conclusion...................................... 132 6 Conclusion 135 6.1 Collusion....................................... 136 6.2 Issue Spaces...................................... 140 6.3 Further Research................................... 142 6.4 Implications and Conclusions............................. 143 A Appendix 145 B References 152 viii List of Figures 3.1 Model 3 Marginal Effects............................... 56 3.2 Model 4 Marginal Effects............................... 56 3.3 Model 3 Marginal Effects Europe.......................... 58 4.1 Model 2 Marginal Effects............................... 86 4.2 Model 5 Marginal Effects............................... 90 4.3 Model 8 Marginal Effects............................... 94 5.1 Model 1 Marginal Effects............................... 113 5.2 Model 2 Marginal Effects............................... 114 5.3 Model 3 Marginal Effects............................... 116 5.4 Model 4 Marginal Effects............................... 119 5.5 Model 5 Marginal Effects............................... 120 5.6 Model 6 Marginal Effects............................... 121 5.7 Model 7 Marginal Effects............................... 124 5.8 Model 8 Marginal Effects............................... 127 5.9 Model 9 Marginal Effects............................... 128 5.10 Model 10 Marginal Effects.............................. 131 A.1 Chapter 3 footnote 11................................. 146 ix List of Tables 2.1 Party Policy Position Left/Right Dimension Responsiveness............ 17 2.2 Issue Space Coordination............................... 22 3.1 Party Policy Position Left/Right Dimension Responsiveness............ 33 3.2 Party Policy Position Left/Right Dimension Responsiveness............ 52 3.3 Party Policy Position Left/Right Dimension Influence of Time and Issue Spaces.. 57 4.1 ESS Left/Right and Multidimensional Issues Correlations.............. 74 4.2 Party Policy Position Environment.......................... 84 4.3 Party Policy Position Equality............................ 89 4.4 Party Policy Position EU Integration......................... 92 5.1 Party Policy Position Left/Right ESS and ISSP................... 112 5.2 Party Policy Position Equality ESS.......................... 118 5.3 Party Policy Position EU Integration ESS...................... 122 5.4 Party Policy Position Environment ESS....................... 126 5.5 Party Policy Position Foundational Issue the Environment ESS........... 129 6.1 Collusion vs. Representation Findings........................ 137 6.2 Issue Space Findings................................
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