Ten Things You Really Should Know About Ancient Greek Democracy Transcript
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
The Demos in Demokratia.Pdf
The Classical Quarterly 1–20 © The Classical Association (2019) 1 doi:10.1017/S0009838819000636 THE DĒMOS IN DĒMOKRATIA* The meaning of dēmokratia is widely agreed: ‘rule by the people’ (less often ‘people- power’), where dēmos, ‘people’, implies ‘entire citizen body’, synonymous with polis, ‘city-state’,orπάντες πολίται, ‘all citizens’.1 Dēmos, on this understanding, comprised rich and poor, leaders and followers, mass and elite alike. As such, dēmokratia is interpreted as constituting a sharp rupture from previous political regimes.2 Rule by one man or by a few had meant the domination of one part of the community over the rest, but dēmokratia, it is said, implied self-rule, and with it the dissolution of the very distinction between ruler and ruled.3 Its governing principle was the formal political equality of all citizens. In the words of W.G. Forrest, between 750 and 450 B.C. there had developed ‘the idea of individual human autonomy … the idea that all members of a political society are free and equal, that everyone had the right to an equal say in determining the structure and the activities of his society’.4 * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2013 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, the 2015 meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association and the department of Classics at Yale in 2016. In addition to those audiences, I thank Cliff Ando, Victor Bers, Paul Cammack, Paul Cartledge, David Grewal, Kinch Hoekstra, David Lewis, John Mulhern, Hari Ramesh, Gunnar Seelentag, George Scialabba, Richard Tuck, John Tully, Jane Mansbridge, Josiah Ober, John Zumbrunnen, two anonymous referees and my colleagues in the department of Political Science at Yale, where this research was completed. -
Who Freed Athens? J
Ancient Greek Democracy: Readings and Sources Edited by Eric W. Robinson Copyright © 2004 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd The Beginnings of the Athenian Democracv: Who Freed Athens? J Introduction Though the very earliest democracies lildy took shape elsewhere in Greece, Athens embraced it relatively early and would ultimately become the most famous and powerful democracy the ancient world ever hew. Democracy is usually thought to have taken hold among the Athenians with the constitutional reforms of Cleisthenes, ca. 508/7 BC. The tyrant Peisistratus and later his sons had ruled Athens for decades before they were overthrown; Cleisthenes, rallying the people to his cause, made sweeping changes. These included the creation of a representative council (bode)chosen from among the citizens, new public organizations that more closely tied citizens throughout Attica to the Athenian state, and the populist ostracism law that enabled citizens to exile danger- ous or undesirable politicians by vote. Beginning with these measures, and for the next two centuries or so with only the briefest of interruptions, democracy held sway at Athens. Such is the most common interpretation. But there is, in fact, much room for disagree- ment about when and how democracy came to Athens. Ancient authors sometimes refer to Solon, a lawgiver and mediator of the early sixth century, as the founder of the Athenian constitution. It was also a popular belief among the Athenians that two famous “tyrant-slayers,” Harmodius and Aristogeiton, inaugurated Athenian freedom by assas- sinating one of the sons of Peisistratus a few years before Cleisthenes’ reforms - though ancient writers take pains to point out that only the military intervention of Sparta truly ended the tyranny. -
Unpopular Policies and the Theory of Representative Democracy Pierre Salmon
Unpopular policies and the theory of representative democracy Pierre Salmon To cite this version: Pierre Salmon. Unpopular policies and the theory of representative democracy. [Research Report] Laboratoire d’analyse et de techniques économiques(LATEC). 1991, 25 p., ref. bib. : 2 p. hal- 01526994 HAL Id: hal-01526994 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01526994 Submitted on 23 May 2017 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. LABORATOIRE D'ANALYSE ET DE TECHNIQUES ÉCONOMIQUES UMR 5601 CNRS DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL �I CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE I SCIENTIFIQUE '1 UNIVERSITE DE BOURGOGNE Pôle d'Economie et de Gestion 2, boulevard Gabriel - 21000 DIJON - Tél. 03 80 3954 30 - Fax 03 80 39 54 43 ISSN : 1260-8556 9102 UNPOPULAR POLICIES AND THE THEORY OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY Pierre SALMON* May 1991 Université de Bourgogne * I am grateful to the participants of the Fourth Villa Colombella Seminar, especially Ron Wintrobe, to Alain Wolfelsperger and to an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. The errors and shortcomings that remain are solely my responsability. INTRODUCTION: IS MOB RULE OUR IDEAL OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY? Their platforms reflect concern with enhancing the probability of being elected, but some candidates often, or all candidates occasionally, voluntarily adept stances that reduce that probability. -
Freedom Or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq Hannibal Travis
Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 4 Spring 2005 Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq Hannibal Travis Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr Recommended Citation Hannibal Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq, 3 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 1 (2005). http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol3/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Copyright 2005 Northwestern University School of Law Volume 3 (Spring 2005) Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights FREEDOM OR THEOCRACY?: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ By Hannibal Travis* “Afghans are victims of the games superpowers once played: their war was once our war, and collectively we bear responsibility.”1 “In the approved version of the [Afghan] constitution, Article 3 was amended to read, ‘In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.’ … This very significant clause basically gives the official and nonofficial religious leaders in Afghanistan sway over every action that they might deem contrary to their beliefs, which by extension and within the Afghan cultural context, could be regarded as -
Sorcerer's Apprentices
Faculty & Research The Spirit of Despotism: Understanding the Tyrant Within by M. Kets de Vries 2004/17/ENT Working Paper Series The Spirit of Despotism: Understanding the Tyrant Within Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries* * Raoul de Vitry d’Avaucourt Clinical Professor of Leadership Development, INSEAD, France & Singapore. Director, INSEAD’s Global Leadership Centre. 1 Abstract The objective of this article is to better understand the developmental history of despotic regimes and the existence of leadership by terror. To gain greater insight into this phenomenon, the unusual relationship between leaders and followers in despotic regimes is explored, and the self-destructive cycle that characterizes such regimes is examined. The price paid in the form of human suffering and the breakdown of the moral fabric of a society is highlighted. In this article, particular attention is paid to highly intrusive totalitarian regimes. The levers used by such regimes to consolidate their power base are discussed in detail. The role of ideology, the enforcement of mind-control, the impact of the media, the inception of the illusion of solidarity, and the search for scapegoats are part of the review. Finally, suggestions are made on how to prevent despotic leaders from gaining a hold on power. Observations are made about the newly founded International Criminal Court, a permanent international judicial body that has been specially set up to try despotic rulers for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. KEY WORDS: Despotism; tyrant; leadership; totalitarianism; autocracy; tyranny; dictatorship; societal regression; democracy; paranoia; narcissism; scapegoat; ideology; mind-control; aggression; violence; sadism; terror; genocide; war; crimes against humanity; war criminal; International Criminal Court. -
The Unsettled Debate: Monarchy and Republic in Spain and Greece in the Interwar Years*
■ Assaig] ENTREMONS. UPF JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY Barcelona ﺍ Universitat Pompeu Fabra Número 6 (juny 2014) www.entremons.org The Unsettled Debate: Monarchy and Republic in Spain and Greece in the Interwar Years* Enric UCELAY-DA CAL (Universitat Pompeu Fabra) abstract The following essay examines the political development in Spain and Greece between the World War I and World War II, comparing these two Mediterranean countries and placing them in a broader European and global context. The conflict between the supporters of monarchy and republic as forms of government was extremely important in the political debate in both countries, and shaped their history in a quite remarkable way. The discussion of these intricate dynamics will help to appreciate the problems that Spain and Greece faced at that time, and can also contribute to a deeper understanding of some key features of the historical change in these two countries. resumen El siguiente ensayo examina el desarrollo político en España y Grecia en el período entre la Primera y la Segunda Guerra Mundial, comparando estos dos países mediterráneos y situándolos en un contexto europeo y global más amplio. El conflicto entre los partidarios de la monarquía y la república como formas de gobierno fue muy importante en el debate político de ambos países, influyendo en su historia de una manera muy notable. La discusión de estas dinámicas complicadas ayudará a apreciar mejor los problemas a los que España y Grecia se enfrentaban en ese momento, contribuyendo asimismo a una comprensión más profunda de algunas de las características clave del cambio histórico en estos dos países. -
Separation of Powers: the Phenomenon of Legislative Courts
Indiana Law Journal Volume 42 | Issue 2 Article 1 Winter 1967 Separation of Powers: The heP nomenon of Legislative Courts Edwin H. Greenebaum University of Arkansas W. Willard Wirtz U.S. Labor Department Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj Part of the Courts Commons, and the Legislation Commons Recommended Citation Greenebaum, Edwin H. and Wirtz, W. Willard (1967) "Separation of Powers: The heP nomenon of Legislative Courts," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 42 : Iss. 2 , Article 1. Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol42/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INDIANA LAW JOURNAL Volume 42 Winter 1967 Number 2 SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE PHENOMENON OF LEGISLATIVE COURTS EDWIN H. GREENEBAUM t W. WILLARD WIRTZ t Federal legislative courts are tribunals which hear, decide, and ren- der binding judgments in "cases" and "controversies" which may be constitutionally entertained by courts established pursuant to the third article of the Constitution,' but whose judges do not enjoy the salary and tenure guaranties provided by article III. These tribunals sometimes act in non-judicial ways, performing legislatively assigned tasks which cannot be performed by article III courts, but when legislative courts do act in a judicial manner their judgments are directly reviewable by the Supreme Court.2 The Supreme Court has recognized the constitu- tional existence of such tribunals in several cases,' but the opinions in those cases have not produced clarity as to how legislative courts can be permitted in a government with a constitutional separation of powers or as to whether there are any constitutional limitations on what matters Congress may entrust to legislative courts to the exclusion of any orig- inal juridiction in article III or state courts. -
The Economic Foundations of Authoritarian Rule
University of South Carolina Scholar Commons Theses and Dissertations 2017 The conomicE Foundations of Authoritarian Rule Clay Robert Fuller University of South Carolina Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Fuller, C. R.(2017). The Economic Foundations of Authoritarian Rule. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/4202 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE by Clay Robert Fuller Bachelor of Arts West Virginia State University, 2008 Master of Arts Texas State University, 2010 Master of Arts University of South Carolina, 2014 Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science College of Arts and Sciences University of South Carolina 2017 Accepted by: John Hsieh, Major Professor Harvey Starr, Committee Member Timothy Peterson, Committee Member Gerald McDermott, Committee Member Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School © Copyright Clay Robert Fuller, 2017 All Rights Reserved. ii DEDICATION for Henry, Shannon, Mom & Dad iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Special thanks goes to God, the unconditional love and support of my wife, parents and extended family, my dissertation committee, Alex, the institutions of the United States of America, the State of South Carolina, the University of South Carolina, the Department of Political Science faculty and staff, the Walker Institute of International and Area Studies faculty and staff, the Center for Teaching Excellence, undergraduate political science majors at South Carolina who helped along the way, and the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict. -
Preventing Mob Rule
In a democracy, the people rule. This means that if a majority of HANDOUT: the public demands a law or public policy, elected leaders have an obligation to seriously consider that demand. However, sometimes the majority demands a law or public policy Preventing that could trample the rights of minorities. The phenomena of the majority wanting to trample the rights of a minority is also known as Mob Rule: ochlocracy, or mob rule. Passing a Law To keep ochlocracy at bay, liberal democracies spread power amongst several institutions. The separate powers of the Senate, the House of Commons, and even the Queen illustrate how the power to create and enact laws is spread amongst different institutions in Canada. Each institution can act as a check on the power of the others. By having power spread across institutions, the law-creation process can be more reasoned and less mob-like. There are more opportunities to consider positions, consult experts, and ask questions. This helps temper emotions, protect minority rights, and promote reason when creating laws. The Path to Creating a Law In Canada, the federal government cannot simply declare a law, without a debate and without that law being subjected to reviews and consideration. The rule of law requires that there are open and established processes to guide the creation of laws. The process below outlines the steps to creating most federal laws in Canada. The process for creating laws at the provincial level is similar, except that there is no Senate review of provincial laws. Three Readings When a proposed law—also known as a bill—is first introduced in the House of Commons, it must pass a series of three votes. -
Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (In a Constitutional Democracy)
Georgetown University Law Center Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 2013 Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional Democracy) Imer Flores Georgetown Law Center, [email protected] Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-161 This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1115 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2156455 Imer Flores, Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional Democracy), in LAW, LIBERTY, AND THE RULE OF LAW 77-101 (Imer B. Flores & Kenneth E. Himma eds., Springer Netherlands 2013) This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons Chapter6 Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (in a Constitutional Democracy) lmer B. Flores Tse-Kung asked, saying "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" K'ung1u-tzu said: "Is not reciprocity (i.e. 'shu') such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not ckJ to others." Confucius (2002, XV, 23, 225-226). 6.1 Introduction Taking the "rule of law" seriously implies readdressing and reassessing the claims that relate it to law and liberty, in general, and to a constitutional democracy, in particular. My argument is five-fold and has an addendum which intends to bridge the gap between Eastern and Western civilizations, -
Deliberation in Ancient Greek Assemblies
DELIBERATION IN ANCIENT GREEK ASSEMBLIES Daniela Cammack Yale University Classical Philology, forthcoming When an ancient Greek dēmos (“people,” “assembly”) deliberated, what did it do?1 On one view, it engaged in a form of public conversation along the lines theorized by contemporary deliberative democrats; on another, a small number of active citizens debated before a much larger, more passive audience. Both accounts represent deliberation as an external, speech-centered activity rather than an internal, thought-centered one. The democratic ideal, it is suggested, was at least occasional participation in public speech. This article questions that interpretation. A study of βουλεύομαι, “deliberate,” and related terms from Homer to Aristotle reveals three models of deliberation: internal, dialogical, and another that I shall call “audience,” in which a deliberating audience came to a decision after hearing advice. Assembly deliberation was almost always represented as audience deliberation. The dēmos, or listening mass, deliberated (ἐβουλεύετο), that is came to a decision about an action in its power, while those who spoke before it advised (συνεβούλευσε). Citizens did not fall short of a democratic ideal when they did not speak publicly. To the contrary, the dēmos was expected to exercise its authority through internal reflection, culminating in a vote. This argument has profound implications for our conceptualization of ancient Greek democracy and its differences from its modern counterpart. A common criticism of modern representative democracy is that ordinary citizens play too small a part in it, their role typically being limited to voting in periodic elections. Ancient Greek democracy has been represented as more inclusive at least in part because ordinary citizens shaped policy through public speech. -
Democracies and International Relations
Open Journal of Social Sciences, 2019, 7, 249-271 http://www.scirp.org/journal/jss ISSN Online: 2327-5960 ISSN Print: 2327-5952 Democracies and International Relations Dingyu Chung Utica, Michigan, USA How to cite this paper: Chung, D. (2019) Abstract Democracies and International Relation. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 7, 249-271. This paper proposes the five different democracies and their international re- https://doi.org/10.4236/jss.2019.77023 lations. Democracy literally means that power (kratos) belongs to the com- mon people (demos) instead of dictators and inherited kings-aristocrats. Dif- Received: June 21, 2019 Accepted: July 23, 2019 ferent types of powers and different types of the common people constitute Published: July 26, 2019 different types of democracies. Within a democratic nation, the intergroup relation among different social groups can be competitive or cooperative. The Copyright © 2019 by author(s) and most conventional democracy is liberal democracy where power, intergroup Scientific Research Publishing Inc. This work is licensed under the Creative relation, and people are liberty, competition, and all people, respectively. The Commons Attribution International power of the liberty to compete belongs to all people. All people have liberty License (CC BY 4.0). to compete. Democracies in general are the combinations of different powers http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ (elitism, tradition, liberty, equality, and wellbeing), different intergroup rela- Open Access tions (competition and cooperation), and different people (few, most, and all). Therefore, depending on powers, intergroup relations, and people, the five democracies are elite democracy (elitism, competition, few people), na- tionalist democracy (tradition, competition, most people), liberal democracy (liberty, competition, all people), socialist democracy (equality, competition, all people), and relationalist democracy (wellbeing, cooperation, all people).