THE GREAT CONVERSATION

A Historical Introduction to Philosophy

Fourth Edition

2Iit",,_ 4'0" Norman Melchert ~JItjc I1}0'&; .'l0s Virginia Commonwealth University ~ &ctEt1"'C'/lq.t % y flii?e l?lJ Cb..o ~·69 lI.8. rt;OIq '8.)

"~ALiSISII

New York Oxford OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS For Richard, Clark, and Emmy Ray

Oxford University Press

Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chenna! Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Sao Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto

Cop)Tighl © 2002, 1999, 1995, 1991 by Oxford University Press, Inc. A Word to Instructors ix A Weird to Stu.;lents xi Published by Oxford University Press, IK Acknowledgments xv 198 Madison Avenue, New York. New York 10016 ",,",w.oup.com Chapter 1 Oxford is a registered trademark of Ox1:ord University Press Before Philosophy: Myth

reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, in Hesiod and Homer 1 retrieval system, or transmitted, itl any form or by any means, Hesiod: War among the Gods ekctronic, mechanical, photocopying. recording. or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Homer: Heroes, Gods, and Ex.

Cove" The .\,haol ifA,lle", by Raphael, fresco, 1510-11, Papal Apartments, . the Vatican, Rome. Scala I Art Resource. Raphael represents philosophers and Chapter 2 scientists from various periods and places as though they were aU involved in Philosophy before Socrate: one great conversation. Thales: The One as Water 11 Tex:t and photo credits appear on page C·1. which constitutes a continuation of Anaximander: 'The One as the the ,"'pyright page. Xenophanes: The Gods as Ficti ISlIN·a 9780·19.·\17510.3 ISBN· 10, 0-19·517510·7 Profile: Pythagoras 16 Heraclitus: Oneness in the LOB' Parmenides: Only the One 24

Printing number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 ,) 2 1 Zeno: The Paradoxes of Comn Atomism: The One and Printed in the United States of America on acid~free paper the Many Reconciled 30 The Key: An AmbigUity 30 , . \ ~ The Pragmatists: Thought and ActIO'"

,uld We be naturalists? Are Notes Chapter Twenty-Two 1, References to the works of Charles Sanders Peirce lrohlem solving? are as follows: he quest for certainty? FB: "The Fixation of Belief;" HMIC: "How to cisms of empiricism? Of Make Our Ideas Clear;" WPI: "What !owledge? tism Is;" SCFI: "Some Consequences of Analysis uc of scientism? Incapacities;" and SP: "Survey of Pragmatism," 11? in CoJ/ected of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Logical Atomism and the Logical Positivists md chairs events with Charles and Paul Weiss, vol. 5 meaning, or arc there (Cambridge, MA: Harvard College, 1934). 2. Note added by Peirce in 1903 to "The Fixation due? How does of Belief,!' in Hartshorne and Weiss, Collected the valuable is not 232. len to like? 3. Epigraph (translated from the German) to W. V. O. between ends-in-view and Quine's Word and Object (New York: John Wiley les Dewey think that means and Sons, 1960). ,ted? 4. References to the works of John Dewey are as s rise to the peculiarly mod­ UCR, how does pragmatism FAE: "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," and roblem? And what role does NRP. "The Necd tor a Recovery of Philosophy," 1C resolution? in Dewey: On Nature, and Freedom. ed. Richard Bernstein (Indianapolis: Babbs-Merrill, NE OF TH£ MAJOR interests in twentieth­ merely fictions or illusions. Kant holds that we do 1960). century philosophy is language. At first not understand how words such as "substance" erThought !DP: "The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy, O glance, this may seem puzzling, but a sec­ or "cause" or "I" actually work. Nietzsche thinks h urge fallibilism, giving up in lohn Dewey: The Middle Works (! 899-1924), ond look suggests that it is not so surprising. Our nearly all of traditional philosophy is a house of . Imagine that our culture 4, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, IL: scientific theories, our religiOUS and philosophical cards built from misleading words. Peirce says his t would be the rcsult? Do Southern minois University Press, 1977). views, and our commonsense understandings are pragmatism is nothing but a doctrine of meaning ~O: The QEestJor Certainty: A Study cfthe Relation cf ;)c mostly good or aU expressed in language. Whenever we try to and explores the geography of the land of Knowledge and Action (1929; New York: G. P. communicate with someone about a matter of any Only in our century, however, does attention to Putnam's Sons, Capricorn Books, 1960). importance, it is language that carries the freight. language hecome a major preoccupation of philos­ we human ar!" with­ HWf: How We Think (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., What if there were something mis]eadino about the ophers, both on the European continent and in the )f the natural world ex 1933). , - not thinking souls (Plato, EN: and Nature (New York: W. W. Nor­ language in which we think? What if it set traps Anglo-American world. The interest in language f oerceptions (Humc), nou­ ton and Co., 1929). for us, catapulted us into errors without our even has been so dominant that some speak of "the Iin­ World Spirit on its TV: cf Valuation (Chicago: University of Chi­ realizing it? Perhaps we ought not to trust it at aIL turn" in philosophy. Why should we cago Press, 1939). Actually, this suspicion is a sort of subtext run­ In this chapter and the next we examine two philosophical through modern philosophy. Descartes notes phases ofthis interest in language. These two phases we naturally say that we "see" men passing are often called ana!Ytic philosophy and ordinary ]an­ by, but the truth is we see only colors and shapes; ouaoc philosophy. Both are complex movements in­ we "judge" that these are men. So our language volving many thlnkers, and one could get a taste misleads us. Hobbes tells us that words are the of these styles of doing philosophy in a number of money of fools who think they can buy truth with ways. I have chosen to focus on one remarkable them, but that the wise are not deceived. One thinker, LudWig Wittgenstein, whom many would of the four books of Locke's Essays is titled "Of cite as one ofthe greatest philosophers of the twen­ Words." Berkeley claims we have misunderstood tieth century. He has had, and continues to have, a how general tenus work. Hume thinks that lan­ pervasive influence on philosophical thought. Sur­ guage deludes us into identifying as ideas what are nri.inalv he can stand as an emblem for both ofthese

605 Ludwig \Vittgensh'in: Traclotus LOflico-Philos(lphiCUS 607 606 Chapter Twenty-Two Analysis! Logical Atomism and the Logical Positivists the conviction tbat natural such as or- York" to be meaningful, there must be something field, from n""r,tinns In Wittgenstein's of mind and his English, does not in fact possess this sort that they name: Although definite can show us severe critique of his own earlier analytic thought, The language we normally speak is look like names, they actually have the which assertions are inconsistent with each other, we can see how attention to language in its ordi­ of vagueness, ambiguity, and confusion. [t ications. If we can get clear about lhe lOgiC and so on. Being formal in this sense, it sets out nary ernployment tends to supplant the earlier at­ is by no means what Russell calls "a logically we will clear up our confusion. a kind of logical skeleton that can be fleshed out in tradion to constructing an ideal language. Witt· perfect language." The second idea is the suspicion to Russell, to say, "The any number of ways, while preserving the logical genstein is also interesting because he is not that these tawdry features of our naturallanguae:es mountain does not exist," is equivalent to saying, relations precisely. interested in language -- or even just in tend to lead US astray, particularly when we "There exists no tiring that has both of these prop­ The pro''Pect opened up by the new logic is tional philosophical problems; his passionate con­ about philosophkal matters, which are always at erties: being and being a mountain." In that of a language more precise and clear than the cern from first to last is, How shall we lil'c? But first some conceptual distance from everyday talk "of the language formal logic, this is expressed as language we normally speak---a purified, ideal lan­ we need a little background, shoes and ships and wax, of cabbages and follows: -(3x)(Gx &.Mx). In this formula, it is auaae, in which there is no ambiguity, no vague­ kings." tal clear that the "G" (for golden) and the "M" ness, no dependence on emphasiS, intonation, or So the dazzling idea of applying the new logic mountain) are in the predicate position. There are, the many other features of our language that may to traditional philosophical problems takes root in in fact, no names in it at all--not even the occur­ mislead us and that are inessential for representing the imagination of many philosophers. PerhaDs. if rences of the letter "x." which function as vari­ Language and Its Logic the truth. Bertrand Russell expresses the appeal of We could formulate these problems in terms ables ranging over everything. In effect, the for­ such a language in this way: crystalline purity ofthese formal logical structures, mula invites you to consider each and every To understand analytic philosophy, In a logically perfect language the words in a prop­ they could finally-after all these centuries --be and assures you with respect to it;. This is not know at least a bit about modern osition would correspond one by one with the definitively solved. The excitement is great. And and a mountain. And that statement is both very great power, incredibly magrrified in our day component:; of the corresponding fact, with the indeed some very impressive analyses of true and unparadoxicaL the speed and storage capacities of the digital exception of such words as Hor," "not/' "if," uses of language are produced. So by getting clear about the lO[Jic of the lan­ cornputer. Every college and university now teaches "then," which have a different function. In a logi­ As an example, let us consider Russell's "the· . in which the puzzle is stated, we get our- this "formal," or "symbolic," logic, which was cally perfect language, there will be one word and of definite descriptions." A dtfinite description is into a position to understand tllat language devdoped in the period near the turn of the last no more for every simple object, and evervthlnp of the form, "the so-and-so." Some sen­ in a clear and unpuzzling way. We see that it is just century by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Al­ that is not simple will be expressed by a tences containing phrases of this form have it para­ a <:onfusion to think that this language commits us fred North Whitehead, and others. nation of words, by a combination derived, of The power of the new logic derives from ab­ course, from the words for the simple things that doxical chara{:ter. Consider.this sentence; "The to the existence of a golden mountain. Of great golden mountain (that is, a mountain wholly made stracting completely from the meaning or semantic enter in, one word for each simple component. importance, however, is that we also identify the A language of that sort will be completely analytiC, of pure gold) does not exist." We think this is a source of the confusion-which lies very na1 urally content of assertions. It is aformal in just this and. will show at a glance the logical structure of sense: The rules governing transformations from true sentence, don't we? You couldn't fmd a moun­ in the language itself. Phrases sucll as "the the facts asserted or denied. The language which is one symbolic formula to another make reference tain made of gold anywhere. But now ask your­ mountain" do look like names_ set forth in Prjndpja Mathematica is intended to be self: How can it be true that the golden mountain This analysiS has a only to the syntactiCal structures ofthe formulas in a language of that sort.· It is a language wlrich has doesn't exist unless this definite description, "the and a sort of cottage question and not at all to their meaning. Aristotle's only syntax and nO vocabulary whatever. Barring golden mountain," is meaninsful? (Meaning seems bits of language are in logic of the syllogism, of course, is formal in this the omission of a vocabulary, I maintain that it is to be a prerequisite for truth; ifa term lacks mean­ same sense: But it is oversimple. The new logic quite a nice language. It aims at being that sort of provides a symbolism for the internal structure a language that, if you add a vocabulary, would be ing you don't e~en know what it is that is truel) of sentences that is enormously more powerful a logically perfect language. Actual languages are And how can that be meaningful unless than Aristotle's. It can also deal with a more com­ not logically in this sense, and they cannot there is something it means? And if there is ·You mIght think at this .IWhO(i-[ know that's Ilot true; plex set of relations among sentences. For the first possibly be, are to serve the purposes of something that it means-why, then, there must 'Santa C}au~! is a name.~ bilt there lsn't arl),thing that it name.sl" time, it seems plausible that whatever daily life.' be a golden mountain after all. So the original sen­ But Russell holds that "Santa Claus" is not a true name; it is tence seems to be false. not true. So it looks as if shorthand ror "the: fat, jolly, be:

worked on the BERTRAND RUSSELL work drew his interests toward pure mathematics and eventually to the foundations of mathematics. a table. What I have The years of the twentieth century, as we ver a long lifetime • is a :'sense datum" --some trapeZOid have seen, were a time of exciting developments O Russell wrote on .,veT)· conceivable visual figure or a tactual feeling of resistance. Corn~ topic. His books range from Prjl mon sense (and too) characteristically in logic and the foundations of mathematics. motics (\903) and Hum"" Know/ednc, Its from of a table quite It was apparently Frege who advised Wittgcn~ Limits (\948) to The ConQl1esense data (actual and pos~ to me and said: "Will you I am a complete idiot or notl" knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of sible) that. in ordinary speech, we would say are fellow, I don't know. Why arc mankind. "of" the table. Thus the inference to the table ex~ said, "Because, ifI am a complete idiot, Though his views changt·d and ternal to nly evidence is t"pnhrf':c1 bv a set of rela­ become an aeronaut; but if not, I "hall become <. he \vaS consi~tcnt in tions among the data consltitlltil'g evidence. a " I told him to write me more scientifiC. As one the major About those items, do not arise. during vacation on some philosopbical subject contributors to the new looic.he held that trad!· In matters of ethics, took a utilitarian and I would then tell rum whether he wa, a com~ line, holding tbat actions are those that pro~ "At some point one has to passfrom explanation to mere At follow~ duce the greatest overall satisfaction. With respect idiot or not. the beginning of the description. " ing tent! he brought me the fulfillment of this sug~ to religion, he was an He was once asked LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN what he would say rus death·he found ru111~ After reading only one sentence, I said to "No you must not become an aeronaut:) 2 self confronted with his Maker. He replied that he l i.nferences whenever r'--~ . would say, "God, why did you make the. evidence When the wa~ broke out in I 914, Wit"TPr,"",;n might be able to do for example, our of.the for your existence so insufficient?" He was invited world; suppose I think I am now seeing was working on a manuscript that was to the Tractotus LOBico~Phjlosophicus. He served in the he submitted the Austrian army and spent the better part of a read-as his dissertation. in an Italian prisoner~of~war camp, where he He lectured there for a time during the i~hed writinf' this dense, aphoristic little work Second World War) until before his death Ludwig Wittgenstcin: pVj>rvl hing from logiC to h.nninp.« in 19.51. He published nothing in his lifetime, Tractatus LoOico-Philosophicus away the fortune be in- several manuscript~ circulated informally. designating part of it for A second major book, Philosophical ImesUE/aUom, In 1889 a son was born into the wealthy and tal" the support ofartists and poets. He considered that was published posthumously in 19.5 3. Since then, ented Wittgenstein of Vienna. He grew up he had set out in the Tractati1s the final solution of many other works have been published from notes in an atmosphere of culture; the most promi~ the problems addressed there and left philosophy and writings he left. This later work is the nent composers, writers, architects, and artists of to teach school in remote Austrian villages. He of our next that great city were visitors to his home. lived, at that time and afterward, in severe sim~ Subsequent dcvc\onml'nts His father was an and industrialist, his plicity and austerity. Wittgenstein is one mother was very musical, and Ludwig was talented His as a schoolmaster did not last crs. He is also one of the most .Think, fOT example, of ,"vhat might happ~;o to Plato's semantic both mechanically and musically. It was also, how~ however, and for a time he worked as a human bein9's to have argument for the reality of the Forms (p. (23), if understood ever, a troubled family; there were several monasterY. Then he took the le.ad in in this light. Hi~ argument is that terms such as 'lsquare" and sui~ "equal" du Hot name anything in the visihle: world, yet they arc cides among his siblings. He hlmself seems to have meaningful. So they must namc something in the intelligible mental illness most of his life. the most important question of all, he is he went world, Hut if what _Plato takes to he a (Wme has the logic of a to how to live. As we'll see, however, he also believes prediwte, thc whole

In fact, he thinks getting clear about what one can­ thinks, we will see what the limi!.S of language are, perhaps even experienccable or knowablc. How, not say is just about the most important thing wc We will also see that thinkers violate those limits· then, is it possible to set a limit to thouOht? To do can do. whenever they pose and try to answer the sorts of so, it would seem we would have to "think what problems we call philosophical, cannot be thought," survey what is on the other side of the boundary line, if only to know what it decades of the twentieth century, he is Thus the aim of the hook is to set a limit to thought, is We intend to exclude. Wittgenstein's ingenious the degree to which the hypocritical, the or rather~-not to thought, but to the expression the ornate and merely decorative, the notion, which we explore in the next section, is ~ of thoughts: for in order to be able to set a limit pretentious, and the striving for ~ffect character­ to thought, We should have to find both sidL"S of that this limit setting must be done in language­ izes politiCS, daily life, and art at this time. He is a the limlt thinkable (i.e" we should have to be able and from inside language, He thinks he has found a ~ kindrt'd spirit of the revolt that includes Arnold to think what cannot be thought), way to draw the line, which doesn't require haVing Schonberg in music arid Adolf Loos in architecture. It will therefore only be in language that the limit to say in language what is excluded, what lies out­ An austere lucidity and ruthless honesty are the can be sct, and what lies on the other side of the side the limit. One can set the limit, he thinks, by limit "'-ill simply be nonsense, (Tractatus, values Wittgenstein sets against the confusion of working outward from the center through what This diagram, we can say, pictures a stare of'!ffairs , ace, 3) the age. It is not, perhaps, accidental that he mas­ can be said, The center is defined by what a lan­ It may not, of course, represent what ters the new logiC of Frege and Russell and be­ Thishas a somewhat Kantian ring to it, and it guage is. by the essence of language, What lies out really happened. Let us call the actual state of af­ comes an important contributor to it, He sees in it is worth taking a moment to compare it to Kant's beyond the bolUJdary simply shows itseif to be lin­ fairs thefacts. We can then say that this is a picture the key by which certain fundamental problems of view of the limits of knowledge, You will recall guistic nonsense, of a possible state ofaffairs-a picture of what life and culturc can be definitively solved. He also that Kant sets himself to uncover the limits of ra­ Here are the first two sentences in Witt­ might have been the facts. (We can imagine the shares the feeling that the new logic might make all tional knowledge and thinks to accomplish that by genstein's youthful work, the Tractatus [OOico­ lawyers On each side presenting contrasting pic­ the difference for philosophy. In the preface to the a critique of reaSon, Knowledge, Kant holds, is a Philosophicus: tures of the accident.) Tractatus, he writes, product of a priori concepts and principles sup­ t, The world is all that is the case, plied by reasOn on the one hand and of intuitive 2,1 The book de.ls,with the problems ofphilosophy, I,I The world is the totality of facts, not of We picture facts to ourselves, and shows, I bclieve, that the reason why these material supplied by sensibility on the other. Its, things: 2.12 A picture is a model of reality, problems are posed is that the logic of our lan­ domain is phenomena. the realm of possible experi­ 2,131 These sayings, announced so bluntly, may seem In a picture the elements ofthe picture guage is misunder,tood, The whole sense of the ence, Beyond this are things-in-themselves (nou­ are the representatives of objects. book might be summed up in the follOWing words: mena), thinkable, perhaps, but unknowable by us, dark, but the to unlock these mysteries is at 2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its what can be said at all Can be said clearly, and what Knowledge, Kant believes, has definite limits; and hand: the new lOgic, Wittgenstein believes that he elements are related to one another in we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. can USe this logic to reveal the essence of language, we can know what these arc_' a determinate way (Tractatus, preface, :>:)' and the essencc of language shows us what the Wittgenstein's strategy in the Tractatus bears a 2,141 world must be, But this needs explanation, A picture is a fact. Wittgenstein'5 thought here is a radical one in­ resemblance to this Kantian project, but it deed: The posing of the problems of philosophy is is more radical on two counts: (1) It aims to set The preceding diagram is itself a fact: It is made up itself the problem! If we can just get clear about a limit not just to knowledge, but also to thought Picturing of actual elements (lines on the page) that are re­ "the lOgiC of our language," these problems will itself; and (2) what lies on the other side of that What is language? We are told that Wittgenstein's lated to each other in certain ways. Moreover, each disappear, They will be part of "what we cannot ?~it is not in"any way thjnkable. Wittgenstein calls thinking about this question takes a decisive turn element in the diagram represents some object in the talk about." About them we must be silent.' It nonsense. when he sees a diagram in a magazine story about world (the edges of the streets, cars). So this fact How will getting clear about the logic of Our He refers, rather opaquely, to a problem stand­ an auto accident. Let us suppose it looked like this: pictures another (possible) fact: the way the objects language produce such a startling result? If we get ing in the way of such a strategy. In draWing here represented were actually (or possibly) re­ clear about the logic of our language, Wittgenstein boundaries, we draw a line and say, for example: lated to each other at a certain time and place, Here, on this side, is Gary's land; there, on that "'The Tractatus is arranged in ;hort, aphoristic sentences, or side, is Genevieve's, But as this example shows, small groups of sentences that express a complete thought. Every picture has a certain structure. By "struc­ "TIlose Qfyou who know something of Zen may de-teet a famil­ drawing nrdinary boundaries or setting ordinaty These sentences are numbered according to the fonowing ture," Wittgenstein means the wproposition a thought linds an ex. ments are related to each other in similar ways. the sound produced when it is played (see Trac­ actual states of afTairs are Jacts. So a true pici:ure can tatus, 4.0141). So while we tend to use the word depicts the facts. If there were a picture that was pression that be p"rceived by the Furthermore, the two pictures not only have senses. similar structures but also have something in com­ "picture" rather narrowly, the concept applies true a priori (independent of experience), you 3.11 We use the perceptible sign of a proposi­ mon; what Wittgenstein calls pictorial form. It very wideIy. Wherever there are objeL1:S in relation wouldn't have to "compare it with reality" to tell representing other objects, there is a Wittgenstein­ whether it was true; you could discover the facts tion (spoken or written, etc.) as a pro­ is important to note that piLi:orial form is not an­ jection of a possible situation. other element in addition to the lines in our draw­ ian picture. just by examining the picture. But that, Wittgen­ ing or the colors in the photograph, nor is it the Every piL1:ure, Wittgenstein claims, is a J08icoJ stein says, is precisely what is not possible. To tell So thought finds its expression in perceptible actual structure of these two pictures. Rather, pic­ picture. And logical pictures can depict the world whether a picture is true (represents the facts cor­ or sentenccs--that is, in language. Now we can torial form is the possibility that a picture might (Tractaws, 7.19). As we have seen, a picture may rectly), you have to check its fit with the facts. understand why Wittgenstein thinks he can set a actually have just this structure, that elements of represent reality correctly or incorrectly. 111at is In no case can we tell a priori whether a picture limit to thought by rmding the limits of language. some sort might actual! y be arranged in just this why Wittgenstein ~ays that logical pictures can de­ is true. This is an extremely important feature of It is in language that thought is expressed. If there way. There needn't ever have been a picture, or a pict the world: They depict ways the world might pictures.• are limits to what language can express, these will fact, with elements related to each other like this. be-possible states of affairs. be the limits of thought as well. But even if there never had been, there could have If we think. of a certain two-dimensional space, But what is a propositional sign, a sentence? been. This possibility, actualized in our diagram, such as a desk top, we can see that there are a thought and Language Like all pictures, it is a fact, an arrangement of also be actualized in many more pictures of variety of possible ways the books on it can be ar­ objects. Among the logical pictures, there is one sort that the same state of affairs. All these pictures would ranged. Analogously, we can think. of lonical space. is ofparticular significance: 3.1431 The essence ofa propositional sign is have the same pictorial form. Logical space consists of all the possibilities there are very clearly seen if we imagine one But it is not just similar pictures that share the for all the objects there arc to be related to each 3. A lOgical picture of facts is a thought. composed of spatial ohjects (such as same form. other in all the possibly different ways there are. 3.001 'A state of affairs is thinkable': wbat tables, chairs, and books) instead of Logical space, then, comprises the form not only this means is that we can picture it to written signs. 2.16 If a fact is to be a picture, it must have of all the actual states of affairs but also of all pos­ ourselves. Then the soatial arrangement of these something in common with what it sible states of affairs. Given this notion of logical depicts. 3.01 The totality of true thoughts is a pic­ express the sense of the space, we Can say, proposition. 2.161 There mlL't be something identical in ture of the world. 2.202 A picture represents a possible situation and what it depicts, to enable 3.02 A thought contains the possibility of the For instance, suppose you want to picture the one to b~. a picture of the other in logical space. situation of whicb it is the thought. fact that Sarah is standing to the east of Ralph. You at all. What is thinkable is possible too. Some pictures represent reality correctly, and use a table to represent Sarah and a chair to 2.17 What a picture must have in common others don't. How can we tell whether what a piC­ represent Ralph. By putting the table to the east with reality, in order to be able to de­ Our thoughts, then, are pictures, too. And, ture tells us is true? of the chair, you can picture the fact in question. pict it --·correctly or incorrect]y--in being pictures, they have all the characteristics of This shows us, Wittgcnstein says, "the essence of the way it does, is its pictorial form. 1.2/ What a picture represents it represents pictures we noted earlier: They are composed of independently ofit. truth or falsity, by elements in a certain arrangement, so they are facts a propositional sign." What he means is that writ­ by them (e.g., the pos­ means ofits pictorial form. with a certain struL1:ure; in virtue ofthat, they pos­ ten or spoken sentences are like this, too; they are made up of elements standing in certain relations. must also share the same form. 2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true sess pictorial form; they represent possible states So far we have been thinking of sratial pictures or false we must compare it with reality. But it is not obvious that they are like this. of spatial objects. But there are other kinds of pic­ is 2.224 It impossible to tell from the picture "lfWittgenstein is Tight. rationalist attempts to say what the 4.002 Everyday language is a part. of the tures, too. We can, lor instance, think of an Or­ alone whether it is true or false. world must be like based on reason alone must be: mistaken. human organism and is no less compli. chestra score as a picture; this is a spatial picture 2.225 There are no pictures that are true No matter how Ucl~ar and distinct" one of Descartes' ideas is) cated than it. (the notes are laid out next to each other on a a priori. for instance, one can't deduce from this that it is true. By stres.~~ It is not humanly possible to gather im­ page), but what it primarily pictures is not spatial, ing that there are no pictures that are true a priori. Wittgel:l~ mediately from it what the of lan­ but temporal: the succession ofsounds the orches­ You can't tell just by looking at our a~ident stein expresses one version of empiricism. Compare Hume, guage is. tra plays in a performance. Yet a score is also a diagram, no matter how: microscopically yOU pp +08-·409. Language disguises 614 ChapterTwenty-Two Analysis: Logical Atomism and the Logic... l Positivist•. Ludy.1g Wittgenstein; Trartatm LoeiCO-Pbi!osop}w:us 615

The essence of language is ments, all this would disappear. What would be tions of the Tractatus. Just as sentences represent What this means is that the truth·value of each is Yet it is something that can be disclosed, orshown. left would be names in a structure.* possible states of affairs, true sentences represent independent of the truth value of any other. An facts. True sentences, moreover, are made up of elementary proposition can remain true while the What reveals the hidden essence oflanguage? LoOic. The simple signs employed in proposi­ 3.202 names, and names stand for objects. But a sen­ truth-values of any others (or even all the others) Wittgenstein agrees with Russell that the superfi­ tions are called names. cial grammar of what we say may not be a good tence isn't just a list of names; it has an internal This has consequences for our view of the 3.203 A flame means an object. The object is structure. And a fact isn't just a jumble of things; it as well. indication of the logic of what we say. And he its meaning..... has the same structure as the true sentence that holds that the new logic displays for us the internal 2.061 States of affairs are independent of one 3.26 A name cannot be dissected any further structure, the essence of language. Still, he is not pictures it. Why? Because the pictorial form of another. by means qf a definition; it is a primi­ sentences mirrors the logical form of facts. The to discard our natural languages (German tive sign. 2.06) Fronl the existence or non-existence of for example) in favor of some artifi­ world is what is pictured in the totality of true sen­ one state of affairs, it is impossible to created "ideal" language. Nor does he have As you can see, there would be a very great tences. The world, then, is not just a random collec­ infer the existence Of non -existence of any inclination to reform our language in the direc­ difference between the "look" of a completely tion of objects; it is "the totality of facts, not of another. lion of some postulated ideal. Because the lan­ propositional sign and our ordinary sen­ things" because it shares the same lop"ical form as Recall once more the beginnin!2' of the Tractatus: guages we speak are Jangl/aoes, they too must ex­ tences. One might have a hard time even the true sentences. the complete analysis of a familiar sentence, I emplify the essence of language. So lOgic must .13 The facts in space are the world. .2 The world divides into facts. reside even there, in the heart of our confusin!2', particularly because the names in question have to 1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case So the world is "all that is the case." vague, and ambiguous languages. What we be simpJe signs. What we take to be names in ordi~ while everything else remains the same. nary language are invariably complex; they can be But we do not vet see how to solve the main is not to junk them in favor of some ideal, but to This view, called logical atomism, is reminiscent "dissected ... by means ofa definition." "George problem Wittgens;ein poses: to set a hmit to understand them. of Hume's remark that "all events seem Washington," for instance, is a shorthand expres­ thought. To do this, we have to look morc closely at the logic of propositions! As Russell shows, or- loose and separate." * It means that relations exist­ 5.556, In fact, all the propositions of Ollr sion for "the first president of the United States" language often the logical form of ing between atomic facts cannot he rela­ language, just a.' they stand, (and many other descriptions). These descriptions tions. Given one true elementary proposition, it is lOgical order. themselves need to be analyzed if we are to get to our sentences, but analysis can reveal it. A com~ never necessary that another one be true~or false. the roots of things to understand how·language pic­ plete analysis would leave us with sentences that could not be further analyzed-~-simple sentences There are, of course, logical relations between . Jf they weren't, wouldn't constitute a lan~ tures the world. propositions. If we are given the truth­ If we could get to that level of clarity, Witt~ sometimes called atomic propositions. They would guage! value of p and of q, we can infer something about But because "language disJ,JUises thought," the genstein thinks, we would see that sentences are have constituents (names in a stru~1:ure of possibil­ ity), but they could not be further broken down the truth of the conjunction, p and To display logical structure of our language is not apparent. composed of names in a lOgical structure. And these logical relations, Wittgenstein truth To bring it to light we need analySiS. What sort of nan:,es. are simp!:. They cannot be further analyzed into other sentences. tables. A truth table for analysis, then, can we give of a sentence? We al~ or dIssected. The meamng of a name cannot 4.221 . It is obvious that the sets forth all the logically ready have the elements of an answer in hand. A be given in a definition using other linguistic ele­ sitions must ..., truth~values for its components sentence is a picture, and we knmv that a picture, ments; the of a name is the object it '" propositions which consist of names the corresponding like all facts, is of elements set in a cer­ . stands for. t in immediate mmbination. Here, for example, are truth tables for conjunc­ tain structure. So must be elements and a Now we are ready to go back to the beginning But how are these simple sentences related to tive, disjunctive, and negative nrnnru::itlrm,," and understand those first mysterious proposi­ structure in every sentence. It only remains to de­ each other? Wittgenstein holds that termine what they are. 5.134 One elementary nroDosition cannot be Let's consider again the s.entencc "Sarah is to .. Here is a rough Certain notations in mathematics are deduced from the east of Ralph." We saw that this could be rep­ merely a L'urwenience could be eliminated without dimin­ resented by one in relation to another, a ishing the science. For instance? x J is just x x x, and 4)' can be table and a chair, for instance. The table would in defined as y + y + )' + y. So Wittgenstcin trunks names standing *For OUT purposes, I do not distingUish sentences from propo~ effect be a kind of name for Sarah, and the chair a in ce:rtain relations will express whatever we want to express, though we usually use more economical means. sitions, thougJ:! some philosophen do; a proposition is often The two columns on the left set out the possibili­ naI)1c for Ralph. Wittgenstein concludes that the t It is worth noting that Wittgenstein docs not offer any ex· thought of as an ahstract feature several sentences can share ties: They show us that two propositions may both only elements needed in a language are names. . ample.s of these Simple names in the Ttacr:atus. He argues that when they mean the same thing. For example, "Mary hit Sally" be true, one or the other may be true, or neither Everything else --~all the adjectives and preposi­ such names must be implicit in our language and ultimately and ttSally was hit by Mary" are different sentences but can be tions, for instance -~~are inessential. If sentences reachable by analysis; but just what they are-and what they said to express the same proposition. Another example lS were completely analvzed into their basic ele­ name-is something of a mystery. "Snow is white" and '''Schnee ist weiss." 'See p. 413 LudWig Wittgl~nst(·jn: Tractmus LOf1iw PhllDSOphicus 617 616 Chapter Twenty-Two Analysis: Logical Atomis", and the Logical Positivists

say that the truth of an ",I"",,,, ...br,, bilities are there? The answer is that this is proposition is tme: and a contradiction is true on no one may be true. The truth table for the conjunc­ condition. logic shows us. Our experience of the world Can always contingent tion shows us that dIe conjunction is true only tell uS what the ac1:ual facts are. Logic shows us 2. Logical words such as "not," Hand," ~lor," 4.467 Tautologies and contradictionr.; are not when both of the components are true, and false what they be. Logic is the science of the pos­ and "jf-then" are not names. These terms do not picnu'cs of reality. They do not repn:~. otherwise. The truth table for the disjunction (an sent any possible situations. For the sible. And everything that it shows us is necessary stand for objects; they have an entirely different "or" statement) shows us that the disjunction is former admit all possible situations, (i.e., not contingent). function. They are part of the structure of sen­ true unless both of the components are false. And and the latter nOne. Consider, for the truth table for a tences, not part of the content: the truth table for negation shows that negating a proposition like this: 4.0312 My fundamental idea is that the proposition changes its truth-value. constants" are not representative.5; Saying and Showing Propositions may be of any of com· Either it is rainingl or it is not raining, that there can be no representatives of There may be a very large number of ele­ In 4.461 (above), Wittgenstein makes use of a dis­ the loOic of facts. mentary propositions in its makeup, and the logiC tinction that is very important to him: the distinc­ of their relations may be extremely complicated. Wittgenstein illustrates this "ftuldamental idea" tion between saying and showing. Propositions do two things; they show something and they say The 1ruth table for a proposition such as by considering double negation. There is a taw of logic stating that negating the negation of a propo­ 3meth The first column gives us the possibilities for the and q) then not (r or s)1 sition is eqUivalent to asserting the proposition: truth of p. The next column shows us what is the 4.022 A proposition shows its sense. (t !fand onlj' ifnot u) case when p is negated. And the third displays (not not p) if and only ifp. A proposition shows how stand but it is calculable. The truth-value the results of disjoining the first two. The crucial ifit is true, and it says that do To say that it is not the ca~e that it is not raining so stand. proposition is a function of the truth­ to notice is that whatever the trudl of p (and is equival(,.I1t to saying that it is raining. If the logi­ component this feature is called there are just these two possibilities), or not is p p cal operator "not" were a name ofsomething, the The proposition "All crows are black" shows of the Tractatus is a true. In other words, there is no possibility that or presents its sense. We can see what this means left side of this equivalence would picture some- this proposition could be false. It is necessarily true; if we ask what would be required to understaIld it. quite different from what the right side it is Such a proposition Wittgen. a logical truth. tures, and the law would be false. But it doesn't. To understand this proposition is to grasp its sen~e; stein calls a t.'tutology.t And the of this is that a truth table for this to grasp its sense is to understand what lVould be the There are three important points to notice here. case if it were true. When .we understand the sen­ Logical Truth principle is a tautolol'Y. So the operators are tence, we know that it is true, any crow we not names. if We noted before that no pictures are true a 1 . The sentence by P or noe p is a come across will be black. Notice that understand­ 3. Suppose we interpret p as "It is To determine whether a proposition is true or complex; not an elementary, proposition; pmayor ing the sentence is not yet knowing that all crows false, then, we must compare it to the world. then the tautology p or not p says, "Either it is rain­ may not be elementary, but in this complex propo­ are black. Gi~n that we understand it, we might ing, or it is not raining." But while "It is raining" From the point of view of logie, any .elementary sition, it is set in a structure defined by tbe logical wonder whether it is true or doubt that it is true. ' gives us some information, the tautology tells us proposition might be true, or it be false. operators, "not" and "or.":j: Only propositions It is, after all, possible that some crows aren't Such propositions are called coneinoene: Their truth nothing. It says nothing; it is not a picture. Why is that are logically complex in this way can be nec­ black; the proposition might pres,nt a possihl;, it that the proposition p can tell us It depends on the facts. The of elemen­ essarily true or false. (That is just another way to state of affairs only, not a fact. But we grasp its tary propositions has another implication: How­ can be informative because it picks out one sense in knOWing what would make it either true (lrfalse. ever the world is, whatever the· facts are, eral possibilities and says: That is how things are. That-its sense--"is what a proposition shows. have been different. There is never any neces­ In picking out that possibility, it excludes another. "'If something is possible, it cannot be merely But a proposition such as this plays another sity in the facts. The negation of any true elemen­ possibl~. since whatever actually exists must already be pos­ It tells us something about the world by shutting role. It not only shows its sense but also says that· tary proposition always pictures a possibility. Sup­ sible; so what is possiblr couldn't depend on what the facts are. out one pOSSibility and allOwing another; p or not p, things are this way, that crows actually are black. it is true that it is now raining where I am; tThere are twO limiting cases of propositions. Tautologies are by contrast, excludes nothing. It does not rule out one. case; contradictions arc lhe other. \Vhile fauroioeier are nee· It makes an assertion and so is true or false, de­ it is false that it is not raining here and noW any possibilities, so it does not say anything. cssarily t.rue, cOlluadictiens are necessarily false. TautoloPies do pending on the facts of the world. (see the preceding truth table), hut it is not neces­ not rule out all)' possibilities~ contradictions rule them 4.461 Propositions show what they say: tautol­ Wittgenstcin, this is tht> most sarily false. It is a coherent possibility that it should a sense, it i.s nol stri.ctly correct to call taut.ologies and ron~ ogies and contradictjons show that they tional form----that is, what all propositions not be raining here and now, even if it is. Given tradictions "propositions" because propositions are say A tautology has no truth common: the configuration of the ill the world, it is reality; tautolOgies and contradictions do not picture states of conditions, since it is llllconditionally of the world could haye been affairs. They have a different. and very important. role to play. 4.5 This is how tllings stand. t A leska{ operaror is a term that has the function of producing configured. Propositions propositions from other propositions. Additioml examples are • Compare Russell1s deSCription of a lOgically perfect language their sense; We might like to ask, jtBt how far do these on p. 606. things arc. unrealized extend? How many possi­ "and" and "if-then." 18 Chapter Twenty-Two Analysis: Logical Atomism and the Logical Positivists LuJ\'\'ig WittgE-nstein: Tractr.nm [oHico.PilJ!osophlCUS 619 this fact contains in itself the whole phi­ But tautologies and contradicti()n~ ,how that Remembering the picture theory of meaning, Value and the Self losophy we can sec that this set of propositions I!'Y say nothing. If these limiting cases of propo­ We noted earlier that all the possible states of affairs there are, and in tions say nothing, however, we might wonder What this means is that the propositions of logic concerns "\\-'ere mainlv all their possible combinations. So, it represents hether they have any importance_ Couldn't we can be known a priori. As we saw previously, we have just seen that the the entirety of logical space; it pictures everything 1St ignore or neglect them? No. They are of the can know about the actual world only by compar­ with quite technical issues in logic and the that there could possibly be in reality - ever}' ory greatest importance. They show us what is ing a proposition with reaHty. It is the mark oflogi­ phy of language. How are we to understand this "pOSSible world." Notice that there would be no and what is impossible. They display for us cal propositions that this is not only unnecessary, apparent discrepancy? In a lettcr to a potential pub­ proposition saying that these are all the possible Je structure oflogical space. but also impossible; because they say nothing, they lisher for the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes, facts; in fact, there couldn't be such a proposition. But they have another importance as welL cannot anything we could check out by exam­ But there also doesn't need to be. That these are all The book's is an ethical one. I once meant to are tautologies_ ining the 6.1 The propositions the facts there are shows itselfin these propositions include in the a sentence which is not in So the propositions of logic are one and all tau­ fact there now which I will write out for you Vhat Wittgenstein here calls the "propositions being all there are-- in there simply being no more tologies. And every valid form of inference can be here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work f are sometimes called the laws of logic. propositions that arc pOSSible, calculable, formu­ expressed in a proposition of lOgiC. This means that for you. What I meant to write, then, was this: My as an example the very basic law called lable. And we can see there are no more possible all possible logical relations between propositions work consists of two parts: the One presented bere he principle ofnoncontradiction: No proposition can propositions, because all the possible ones are part can be known a priori. And in knowing them, we all that I have not written, and it is preCisely ,e, both true and false. We can represent this as of this set produced by this operator. . know the logical structure of the world ··Iogical second part that is the important one. My This very large set of propositions contains . book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from not both p and tlOt p. space, what Wittgenstein calls "the scaffolding of it is possible to say, plus the tautologies the inside 3.' it were, and I am convinced that this the world" (6.124). If we write a truth table for this fonnula, we contradictions (which say nothing). is .the ONLY rigorous way of draWing those limits. :all see that it is a tautology~--that is, 6,1251 Hence there can never he surprises in this set of possible propositions lies only nonsense. In short, [ believe that where many others today rue no matter what the truth-values are. logic, So the limit of thought is indeed set from inside. are just gaSSing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly in by being silent about it. 5 p 6.127 All the propositions of logiC are of is expressed in language. The essence equal status: it is not the case that of language is picturing. And, given this, we can T What could this mean~that the impor­ some of them arc essentially primitive F work out from the center to the periphery of of the book is the part he did not Vorite? propositions and others essentially de­ language by means of logic. We do not need to he write it? Was he too lazy' Did he ~o the device of truth tables provides a justification rived propositions. take up a position outside the thinkable in order run out of time? Of course not. He didn't write the ror the laws of logic. Showing they are tmitolo­ Every itself shows that it is a to draw a line circumscribing it. The umit shows important'part hecause he was convinced it couldn't is equivalent to demonstrating their necessary tautology. itself by the lack of sense that pseudopropositions be Wrltteo. What is most imoortant-·· the ethical truth. The truth table shows that there is no alter­ display when we try to say something unsayable. point of the book, the native to the laws oflogic- no pOSSibility that they It is indeed, then, only "in language that the something that cannot be said. might he false_' The Tractatus doctrine is that every Setting the Limit to Thought limit can be set, and what lies on the other side Nonetheless, and again paradoxically, he does principle of logical inference can be reduced to a Finally, we are ready to understand how of the limit will simply be nonsense" Chactaws, have wme to "say" about this sphere, which tautology.t stein thinks he can show us the limits of language. preface, 3). he also calls mysticaL'" Before we examine Moreover, An operation discovered by Wittgenstein can be his remarks~brief and dark sayings, as many have 6.1 13 performed on a set of elementary propositions 5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of noted ~it will be helpful to set out a·consequence sitions that one can reco·gnize to produce all the possible complex propositions the world are also its Umits. of what we have alreadv learned. are true fi-om the symbol alone, and (truth functions) that can be expressed hy that So we cannot say in logiC, 'The world set, Suppose we have just two elementary propo­ has this in it, and thiS, but not that. ' 4. sitions, p and q. this operator, we can calcu­ For that would appear to presuppose ...Of course this also shows that the laws of iOglc say nothing~'­ that we were excluding certain possi 4. II The totality of true propositions is the that is, arc about nothing. The law-s oflogic are purely formal late that there are just sixteen possible truth func­ bilit;es, and this cannot be the case, whole ofnatural science (or the whole and empty of content. And that is exactly why they van be 000­ tions combining them: not p. not q, p or q, p and q. since it would require that lOgiC should corpus of the natural sciences). contingently true, then q, and so on. Now imagine that we were go beyopd the limits of the world; tIn fact this daim is not ('orn.~!"·l. Tnith tables {'Oostitute a deci­ in possession of all the elementary propositions for only in that way could it view those sion procedure for validity only in propo~'Hi()nal Jogie, where the there are; this operation on that enormous anaiysis of strut,."1.ure dot's,not go deeper than whole limits from the other side as welL We set, one simply. calculate all the possible tions. In quant!ficati{1TlaJ (or predJcate) 109u:. where the cannot think what we camlOt think; so ·It is obviously a problem how we an~ to understand what he reveals the internal structure of prop01'itjons, Alonzo Church truth functions there are and so eenerate each and what we cannot think we cannot SflY "says" about the unsayablt. He makes a suggestion we consider later proves there is no such clr.C'lsion procedure" every possible proposition. either. later. . Ludwig Wittgenstein: TraCLQtu5 L09ico-Phj/omphicu5 621 Analysis: Logical Atomism and the Logical Positivists ,20 Chapter Twenty-Two C: 5.632 The subject does not belong to the 6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into The essence of language is picturing; and to world; rather, it is a limit of the world. words. what all is? In a word? Is that what you want )icture is to say, "This is how things stand." The Ethics is transcendental. to know? Just a moment. 5.641 The philosophical self is not the hlllnan ob of natural science is to tell us how things are, (He turns the telescope on the without, looks, lowers being, not the human body, or the hu­ We can think of the Tractatus as the absolute :0 give us a description of the world. And ifnatural the telescope, turns toward Hamm.) man soul, with which psychology deals, endpoint of that road that begins with Copernicus ,cience could finish its job, we would then have a CorpsedJ but rather the metaphysical subject, the complete picture ofreality: Nothing-no object, and leads to the expulsion of value from the frame­ limit of the world-not a part of it. work of the world: The vision of the Tractatus is Beckett's vision could not be more like Witt­ no fact--would be left out. It would include the It seems, then, that there are two "realities" in one where everything in the world is flattened out, genstein's. At the same time, it could not be more totality of true propositions. correlation: the world and the self; however, in the where nothing is of any more significance than any­ unlike it. Turn the telescope to the earth (the But natural science does not contain any propo­ strict sense, the self or subject cannot be said to· be thing else because nothing is of any significance world) and the verdict is "Zero, zero, zero." sitions like these: one ought to do X; it is wrong to a reality. The self is not aJact. Wittgenstein com­ at all. In the world is no value at all, nothing of "Corpsed." In it, no value exists. For Beckett, that Y; the meaning of life is Z. It follows that these are pares the situation to the relation between an eye importance. There are just the facts. And even if is all there is; and that accounts for the sense of not really propositions at all; they look a lot like and its visual field. The eye is not itself part of the there were such a thing in the world as a value, desolation and despair you find in his work. But propositions, but, if Wittgenstein is right, they lie Yisual field; it is not seen. In the same way, all con­ that thing would itself just be another fact. It Wittgenstein also knows another "reality." • beyond the limits iflanBuaBe. Strictly speaking, they tent, all the facts, are "out there" in the world, Ethics, Wittgenstein says, "cannot be put into are unsayable. Those who uttcr them may be "just would have no value. which is the "totality of facts" (1. 1). In Samuel Beckett's play EndBame, a character words." But what does it mean that ethics is some­ BassinB'" Or they may be trying to say the most thing "higher," that it is "transcendental"? To 5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when important things of all but failing bccause they named Hamm, blind and unable to move from his chair, commands his servant, Cloy, to "Look at the understand this saying, we need to consider Witt­ its implications are followed out strictly, "run against the boundaries of language." In a ooincides with pure realism. The self of earth." Clov gets his telescope, climbs a ladder, genstein's views of the subject, the self, the "I." "Lecture on Ethics" Wittgenstein gave in 1929 or solipSism shrinks to a point without ex­ and looks out of the high window. He suggests that if you wrote a book called Th~ 1930 (not published until 1965), he says, tension, and there remains the reality 00­ World As I Found It, there is one thing that would ordinated ,,~th it. This running against the walls of our cage is per­ CLOY: not be mentioned in it: you. It would include all fectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it Let's see. the facts you found, including all the facts about 5.62 For what the solipsist means is quite cor­ rect; only it cannot be said, but makes springs from the desire to say something about (He looks, mOl'inB the telescope.) your body. And it would include psychological the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, itself manifest.' Zero ... facts about yourself as well: your character, per­ tl,e absolute valuable, can be no science. What it (he looks) sonality, dispositions, and ·so on. But you-the What the solipsist wants to say is that only he says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. ... zero. exists, and the world only in relation to himself. But it is a document of a tendency in the human subject, the one to whom all this appears, the one (he looks) t mind which I personally cannot help respecting who.finds all these facts-would not be found. But this cannot be said. Why not? Because to say it 6 ... and zero. deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. would be to use language-propositions-to pic­ HAMM: ture facts. And in picturing facts we are picturing Ethics "can be no science" because science consists Nothing stirs. All is- '"In a phTase as opposed as possible to Beckett's conclusion that the world, not the transcendental self to whom the earth is "corpsed," Wittgenstein says, "The world and life of propositions, and c: the world appears. So this self "shrinks to a point are one" (5.621). But in the light of his claim that the world 6.4 All propositions are of equal value. Zer- consists wholly of valueless facts, this is a dark saying. It does H: (Violently); 6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside seem, though, to be related to the idea that the selfis the Kant's world needs a structure-giver because its ftmdamental Wait till you're spoken to! the world. In the world everything is as "limit" of the world and to the complementarity of solipSism principles are thought to be synthetiC. For Wittgenstein, lOgic it is, and everything happens as it does (Normal voice.) and realism. We examine these ideas subsequently. is ano~ttic. It requires no source beyond itself because it has no happen: in it no value exists-and if it All is . . . all is . . . all is what? t Among thinkers we have studied, this should remind you most content requiring explanation. This "scaflolding of the world" did exist, it would have no value. (Violently.) of Kant~ for whom the ego is also transcendental. It is not iden­ is not itself a fact in the world, nor is it a fact about the world If there is any value that does have All is what? tical with Kant's view, however. Kant believes that, though we •or about rational minds. It is not a fact at all! It shows itself. value, it must lie outside the whole can't come to know t,he nature of "this I or he or it (the thing) Look again at the relevant discussions of Kant on pp. 449-450, sphere of what happens and is the case. which thinks," we could come to know a lot about it-that it is including the diagram on p. 465. the source of the pure intuitions, the categories, the a priori • Compare Descartes' ~truggles to overcome solipSism by prov­ 6.42 And so it is impossible for there to be s),nthetic propositions, all of which explain the structure of the ing the existence of God in Medll.arion Iff; see also pp. 334 and propositions of ethics. "Look back again to the discussion of howfinal causes, purposes empirical world. And all this can be stated in meaningful propo­ 362. Wittgenstein acknowledges there is a truth in solipsism, Prop;'sitions can express nothing that and goals, are excluded from explanations in the new science. sitions. For Wittgenstein, none of this is pOSSible. The structure but such truth as there is already involves the reality of the See p. 318. So far as the world goes, Wittgenstein agrees with is higher. of the world is not dictated by the structure of rational minds world-of which the selfis aware. So there is no need to prove Hume and disagrees with Augustine. See the diagram on p. 243. because the structure of reality is just logic; and logic, consisting the world's existence -·-or that of God, about whom in any case In spirit, though, he may be closer to Augustine. Compare also as it does of empty tautologies, neither has nor needs a source. nothing can be said. • Compare Peirce's similar com·iction, pp. 58':;-586. Nietzsche, p. 551 . .622 Chapter Twenty-Two Analysis: Logical Atomism and the Logical Positivists Ludwig Wittg{~nstein: Twamus L08ico~PhjJll_wphjcU!;. 623

and evil must per­ without extension." And if we a.~k what there is. the by them. It docs seem clear that the reward for would become the world. Only the world of the is in my control, even answer is the world-"all that is the case" (Teac­ .good willing is happiness and the punishment for happy person is identical with the world a.~ it is.' talus, proposition I). And this is just the thesis if the outcome of my in' the world is not. bad is unhappiness. The good person, as Plato also The happy see the world with that disinterested radical realism, the antithesis of solipsism. In a strict sense, my willing is my action: The rest thinks, is the happy person: But this obviouslv enjoyment we experience when we appreciat.e a The concern of ethics is good and eviL But, as is just the result of my action. But now we have to does not mean that fine work of art. In Wittgenstein's words, we have seen, there is no room for good and evil ask what and evil could be, if they pertain to and well, will get whatever she wants in 6.421 (EthicS and aesthetics are one and the the will kind of conne(:tion between willing and the world in the world, where everything just is whatever it same.) doesn't exist. (This fact is also recognized by Kant.) is. What application, then, do these concepts have? 6.422 When an ethical law of the form, 'Thou and Ethics must concern itself with the transcendental: shalt .. ,', is laid dowIl, one's Iirst Goodness does not produce that kind ofhappiness. t the self, the subject. But how? Here is a ciue. is, "And what if I do not do What kind does it produce, then? The work ofart is the object seen sub specie ".terni­ it?" It is dear, however, that ethics has Strictly speaking, this question cannot be an­ rati.'; and the good life is the world seen sub specie 6.373 The world is independent ofmy will. nothing to do with punishment and re­ swered. In the Notebooks, 1914-1916, Wittgen­ aeternUaris. This is the connection between art and 6.374 Even if all that we wish for were to ward in the usual sense of the terms. stein asks, ethics. still this would only be fa­ a So our question about the conrequrnces The usual way "What is the objective mark ofthe happ)', harmo­ vour granted by tate, so to speak. of an action must be unimportant. At if it were from the midst IUOUS life? Here it is again dear that there cannot least those consequences should not be de actemitatis from outside. will or intend to do something, such as be any such mark, that can be delcrihed. This mark events. For there must be something telephone bill. And cannot be a physical one but only a metaphysical about the question we and one, a transcendental one." (N, 78)' must indeed be some the miracle is that the world exists. ethical reward and punishment, And we' know that nothing can be said about That what exists does exist.' they must reside ill the action itself. the transcendental. Still, there are clues and hints. Is it the essence of the artistic way of looking at the muscles must contract in (And it is also clear that the reward What could it mean, for instance, that the world things, that it looks at the world with a happy eye? the bank must not suddenly crash, must he something pleasant and the of the happy person is a different world from that (N, 86e) and so forth. And none of that is entirely in nunishment something unpleasant.) of the unhappy one? That the world waxes and mntrol. That is what Wittgenstein means when To live one'5 life "from the viewpoint of eter­ Good action (good willing) is rewarded with wanes as a whole? Here is a possibility. says the world is independent of my will. If I intend nity" is to live in the present.t And here we have pleasant, and evil action is punished Most of us, most of the time, do not occupy to pay my telephone bill, getting it done is, in a another clue: with the unpleasant. But these are not rewards and the position of the transcendental even way, a "favour granted by fate.'" Whoever lives in the present lives without fear and punishments "in the usual sense"; they cannot be though that is what we essentially arc--- the limit hope. (/Ii, 76e) external to the action itself. cannot, in other of the world, not some entity within the world. Good and Evil, words, be something added by world. How We identify ourselves with a body, with certain What could this mean? The seems to he Happiness and Unhappiness could a Hfavour granted by fate" have anything to desires, with a set of psychological facts. This is, that fear and hqpe essentially refer to time; one do with ethical rewards? Such rewards and punish­ we think, what we are. And in so identifying our­ fears what may happen, and one for the fu­ Wittgen'tein seems to have proved that good and ments must he intrinsic to the actions themselves. selves, our world narrows, wanes. We are con­ ture. But if one lives entirely in the present, there evil cannot lie in the world. Everything just hap­ But what could they be? cerned with this body, with .·o';o!',;,," is no past and future about which to fear and And our world is just the world to these If there is nothing one fears~absolutely 6.43 If the good or bad exercise of the will .. If these reflections are going to rnake any sens(~ to you at ail. concerns. It is as though the rest didn't exist. If we ing~-and if there is nothing one hopes does alter the world, it can alter only you will haye to pause a hit and tty to sink into this way of could, however, identify with the transcendental the limits of the world, not the facts·--­ ably because one lacks !lothing), how Yiewing things. It will not be any good to just try to If'aTn the self, our world would wax larger. Indeed, we not what can be by means of to be haDDv? In his "Lecture on Ethics," Witt· words) or even memorize the sentences. Wittgenstcin would would see it just as it is~a limited whole and the us that when he tries to think of insist that if you are: able only to parrot the words, you will have. language. the totality of facts, none of which are of such impor­ understoo(i notninn. Ue-n: is an exerdsp that might help. Pkk In short effect must be that it be­ comes an altogether different world. It tance that thev crowd out any other. Our world out some fact about your present experience. Focus on it. Try .. Compare Heraclitus, \\r-ho says. "To those who are awake the must, so to socak. wax and wane as a to regaro it as merely a fact in the world 1 one fact among oth­ world urder is onc! common to all; but the ers. Now try to focus on some: psychological state in the same whole. • S(~t Plato'5 discussion of the happiness of the just soul, each into a world of his own." The Traaatus might almost be The world of the happy man is a differ­ way_ Practice in this should make even your 0\0\-'11 psycho) pp. 145-151. n~ad as an extended commentary on this and related sayings by ent one from that of the unhappy man. states havt~ the same "tatus as any other fact in the world; t It might help to remember here that Wittgcnst('in gave away I-Ieraditus, with Jogic"-Ult~ "scaffolding" of the world--play~ will not he "pl'tvileged r" as it were, but just facts that are there, the considerable fortune he inherited ·whe.n his rather died and ing the role of the logos_ See thE' discussion of these matters on These are difficult indeed. And [do not Then ask yourself, For whom are they thtJ-et For .idea."i that art." lived the rest of his life simply and austerely. What the world pp. 19-H. claim to understand Wittgenstein means in some'"' ays similar, see the discussion of the Stoics on p. 207. can supply cannot make you happy! 1Compare Augustine on God's eternity, pp, 24S-246. 624 Chapter Twenty-Two Analysis: Atomism and the Logical Positivists Ludwig \Nlttg<.'nstcin: T(aCfOW5 LOBiCO-PhilosopbiCfJS· 625

self, the manage to all this stuff that he so expliCitly something with absolute value, two To live the life of the question whether the good js more or world but "says" cannot said. This is indeed a PU7Zle we less identical than the beautiful.) corne to mind. metaphYSical self that is not a part its limit, is to have a sense for "the " This must address. What he has been writing is clearly And it is not that the deepest I will describe this {first} jn ()rder~ if life is also the good life, the philosophy. But if, as he (philosophically) says, the problems are in not problems at all. to make you same or similar happy life. It is a life of absolute safety. of trlle propositions is science, what room 6.53 Tbe correct method in philosophy would experiences, so that we may have a common Remember, though, that none of this can is there for philosophy? really be the follOWing: to say for our investigation. I believe the best way be said. It cannot even really be asked except what can be said, i.e., proposi­ desclibing it is to say that when I have it I wonder 4.111 Philosophy is not one of the natural tions of natural science~i.e., some­ It is to think that we can ask, Why does sciences. at the e.dstmce ?f the world. And I am then inclined thing that has nothing to do with phi to use such phrases as "how extralordir,arv the exist? or Why is there anything at all (The word 'philosophy' must mean losoph:~and thel1~ whenever SOOlCtlne rather than nothing? But something whose place is above or anything should exist" or "how extra,ordirlary else wanted to say something metaphysi­ below the natural sciences, not be­ the world should exist." I will mention 6.5 When Ule answer cannot b!" put into cal, to demonstrate to him that he had side them,) straight which I also know and words, neither can the question be put failed tD gi ve a others of you be acquainted with: it into words. in his propositions. tion is, what one might the experience of feeling The riddle does not exist. not be satisfying to the Philosophy i~ not a body of doctrine absolutely safe. I mean the state of mind in which If a question can be framed at all, it is also he would not have the one is inclined t.o say "I am safe, nothing can injure but an activity. possible to answer it. were Ine \'!that eyer ha.ppens." 9* A philosophi~al work consists essen­ The aruwer cannot be put into words because to say tiallv of elucidations. Wittgcnstcin adds that the exnreSSlOn reet one. why the world exists would be to state a fact·,­ Phil~sophy does not result in 'philo­ in and the world itself is already the lOwlity '?fJam: So sophical propositions,' but raU"" in the Plato and Aristotle, Burne and Kant all think clarification of propositions. nonsense. One can the question, "Why does the world exis!?" which they are revealing or truth. But, if Without philosophy thoughts are, as it perhaps, but has exercised so many philosophical mi.nds and has Wittgenstein is right, all of their most important that can express the "fact" that the world exists. were, doudy and indistinct: its task is produced so many arguments forGod's existence, claims are uonsensical. TI1CY aren't evcn candidates to make thc;:" clear and to give them Why not? Because this "fact" is obviously not one It seems like a question ----but for being true! Their theories-to the extent that of the facts that make up the totality that is the sharp boundaries. ,erated by language. are not absorbable by empirical science world, and beyond that totality, there is nothing. What we can say is how the world is. And that The key thought here is that philosophy is an are pseudoanswers to pseudoquestions. Just It is equally nonsense to say that one feels absoilltely is the job of natural science. But activity; its business is clarification. It follows that Such thcnries arise because these philosophers safc. One can be safe from or protected yve should not look to philosophy for result:;, for understand the logic of our language; Witt­ 6.52 We feel ulat even when all pOHible sci­ from polio, but to say, "Nothing whatever can in­ truths, or for "a body of doctrine." To do so is to entific questions have been answered, thinks he has, for the first time, clearly set jure me," is just a misuse of language. Yet, that mistake the nature philosophizing altogether. the prohlems oflife remain completely of forth. is the only satisfactory expression, Wittgenstein untouched. Ofcourse there arc then has been one of the major failings ofthe philosoph, But there is still a worry. Wittgenstein is him­ tlrin.ks, for what is of absolute value. Here we have no questions left, and this itself is the ical tradition, Wittgenstein believes, self not "the correct method" in writing an of running JSJainst the boundaries of answer. tried to produce "philosophical propositions"­ the Tractatus, then, are we to take his own language. that it has thought ofitself as something "beside" 6.521 The solution of the problem of life is "propositions" here? To "wonder at the existence of the world" is seen in the of the problem. the sciences, in the same line of work as science. 6.54 My propositions to experience it as a limited whole. And that Witt­ (Is not this the reason why those who But it is altoaether different from science. It lies, one the calls "the " have found after a long period ofdoubt angles to science. Wittgenstein's recognizes them as that the sense of life became clear to predecessors is seyere: 6.44 It is not how things are in the world that nonsensical, when he has used them·­ them have then been unable to say what is mystical, but that it exists, 4.003 Most of the propositions and questions ••s steps----to climb up heyond them. constituted that sense?) 6.45 To view the world ,rub specie acrerni is to to be found in philosophical works are (He must, so to speak, throwaway the view it as a whole limited whole. 6,522 There are, indeed, things tllat cannot not false but nonsensical. ladder after he has climbed up it.) Feeling the world as a limited whole~it be Dut into words. They make themselves Consequently we carmot give any an­ He must transcend Ulese propositions, is this that is are what is mystical. swer to questionS of this kind, hut can ami then he will see the only establish that are nonsensical. Most ofthe propositions and questions To "see the world is to see it from the The Unsayable of philosophers arise from our failure of eternity, from the point of view of ,. Such a powerful echo of SOClclass as be reminded of that ladder the mystics talk about death" (Ap%!!y41d). no been wondering how lstein can 626 Chapter Twenty-Two Analysis: Logical Atomism and the Logical Positivists LudWig Wittgenstein: 1'racraw:t Loaico-P/lj!(ltopnicus 62j

tions new words appear whose meanings cannot as leanmg to oneness with God. Having climbed natural and social), on philosophy of science, and cnce alone! Out with Plato's Forms, Aristotle's en on general public. These philosophers are ealled again be described in propositions, they must be telechy, Augustine's God, Descartes' mind, Kant', Wittgenstein's ladder, we too can wonder at the the indicated directly; the meaning of. word must noumena, Hegel's Absolute Spirit-and Witt­ existence of the world, feel absolutely safe, expe­ in the end he shown. it must he niven. Tllis is done Logical positivism can be identified with genstein's mystical! Out with metaphysics alto­ rience happiness and beauty- and do our science. by an act ofindication, of pointing; 'and what is three claims, all of which have recognizable roots gether---that attempt to know something But we would always have to keep in mind the last pointed at must be given, otherwise I cannot be in the Tractatus, The first is that logiC and mathe­ what our senses can verify. It is to be purged "propo;ition" of the Tractatus: referred to it.1O matics are analytiC. The positivists accept Witt· human memory.' And the instrument of this purg­ 7. What we cannot speak about we must pass gensteins analysis of the basic truths of logic: The The definitions Schlick refers to are is the principle of meaning!ulnt'ss. Since none o\ter in silence. truths are tautological in nature. Both mathematics stein's analyses of complex propositions into ~ele. notions are verifiable by sense experience, Yet, the things we must "pass over in silence" arc and logic are empirically or factually empty, pro­ mentaryor atomic propositions and ultimately into they are all meaningless. the mogt important of all. viding nO knowledge of nature at aU: They are, words that are not further definable. For Wittgen­ Note. that the positivists are not committed, for In Wittgcnstcin's Tractatus, then, we have an however, extremely important; They provide a stein, as we have seen, elementary-propositions are example, to the atheist's claim that there is no excellent cxample of analytic philosophy. He uses framework in which we can move from one true composed of names in a lOgical syntax. The names God. Such a claim they consider to be as much a the new logiC in an analysis of our language and factual statement to another; that is, they license stand for objeets. He never specifies exactly what metaphysical statement as the claim that there is finds the result to be a kind of logical atomism. In inferences, just as Wittgenstein says they do. i objects the names name. He once said, much later, a God. Both claims are shut out from the realm of tgenstein, however, this logical analysis of lan­ The second principle is a criterion for judg­ that when he wrote the Tractatus, he thought of meaning altogether; if the verifiability criterion is guage is placed in the service of larger ends. His ing the meaningfulness of all nontautological asser­ himself as a logician and believed that it wasnt his correct, both the believer and the atheist arc utter- problem, from first to last, concerns the meaning tions. It is called the verifiability principle. The business to identify the objects that he deduced on meaningless noises. Because their claims are of life. If he had not thought that applying logiC to. positivists believe they can use it to sweep lOgical grounds would have to be there. sense, one cannot senSibly ask which is thought and language would clarify that problem, only the confusions of past philosophy, but But for the positivists, the truth conditions for true: Neither One is even a possible candidate for we cannot imagine he would have devoted himself everything Wittgenstein holds most dear. Here is elementary sentences are given in perception. The truth. So argumentq for (or ap-ainst\ the existence to philosophy in the way he did. He might just have Moritz Schlick's explanation of verifiability: objects deSignated by the. indefinable words of God are completely become an aeronaut. must be the kind of thing you can point to. Schlick The positivists work at When, in are we sure that the uses the Wittgensteinian word "shown" and p'ara pl'inciple to avoid obvious counterexamples. For a Question clear to us? Evidently when and phrases it by "given." The meaning ofa word must vprifiahility needn't be direct, as when I we are able to state exactly" the conditions be something you can point to or indicate in some my own eyes; it can be indirect, tinder which it is to be answered in the affirmative, way_ 'You have to he able to show me what you Logical Positivism or as the case may be, the conditions under which on instrumentation, or (more im­ it is to be answered in the negative. By stating mean. What Schlick means by "given" is "given in portant) when I test the observable consequences In the preface to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein writes, these conditions, and by this alone, is the meaning sense experience." This, then, is the bite of the of a hypothesis that is not itself directly testable. It Perhaps this book will be understood only by of a Question defined. verifiability principle. Unless you can explain what is enough, they say, for propositions to be veeifi­ someone who has himself already had the thoughts meaning of a proposition consists, obviously, pereeptual difference the truth or falSity of your able in principle. They ohviously want to allow for that are expressed in It-or at least similar in this alone, that' it expresses a delinite state of af, assertion would make, the proposition you are as the meaningfulness of propositions that are not thoughts. (TmaDlIIs. preface, 3). fairs. One can, of course, say that the proposition serting is meaningless. Clearly, lOgical positivism is now verifiable only because of technolOgical limi­ t itself already. gives this state of affairs. This is true, a kind of empiricism.· . tations. Moreover, something doesn't have to be This was to prove prophetiC. Russell supplied an but the proposition indicates the state of affairs The positivists have no sympathy for a "good" eonclusively verifiable for it to be meaningful. introduction that Wittgellstcin thought so misun­ to the person who understands it. But when kind ofnonsense, no tolerance for "running against They draw a contrast between strong (conclusive) derstood his intentions that he refused to have it do I understand a proposition? When I understand the boundaries oflanguage." All this they want to verification and weak verification (verification by printed ill the German edition. And his book was the meanings of the words which occur in it? These exterminate. They talk about the elimination ofmeta­ studicd painstakingly by a group of scientifically can be explained by definition. But in the defini­ evidence indicating that something is likely to be oriented philosophers in Vienna (a group that came physics. (One gets the image of lining metaphYSical true or probably true). The positivists hold that to he known as the Vienna Circle) who admired ideas up against the ~all and gunning them dov.-Tl.) weak verifiability is enough to qualify a statement "'Thus they (..'Orrespond roughlj' to what Burne calls relations of What is to be left as meaningful is science-sci­ as meaningful. But unless a proposition is at least its logic and philosophy of language but had no ide.. (see pp. 407-408) and Kant's notion of the analytic a sympathy with what Wittgenstein himself thought priori (see p. 435). Note how different a philosophy of mathe· most important. Because this latter group proved matics this is from tbat of Kant, who believes that arithmetic) "like David Hume, prince of empiridsts~ the positivists want to extremely influential, at least for a time, we briefly while a priori) is not analytic. base alJ nonanalytic knowledge on the data our senses provide. "For J. similar seritiment, see David Hurne's trenchant remarks note their major theses here. The movement they r Review the dismssion ofthe principles oflogic on p. 618. See again the discussion of "the theory ondeas" and Hume', at Ibe end of hi' Enqui'J' (p. 429). It has been said, with some began had a Significant impact on scientists (both lWittgenstein says, "A proposition shaws its sense" (4.022). rule, "No ;rnpress;on, no idea" (p, 4{J6). justice~ that. lOgical positivism is just flume plus modern lOgiC &28 Chapter Twenty-Two Analysis: 14cal Atomism and the Logical Positivists L

pure expressiOns of feeling and as such do not indirectly verifiable, verifiable in principle, and 1936, the English philosopher A. J. Ayer sets out in my experience, arrives with the 0plmon that come under the category of truth and falsehood. verifiable, it is declared to have no sense. the positivist view of ethics. Ethical concepts, he this view of moral judgments is so obvious that it Th~y are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry says, are "mere pseudoconcepts," is very absurd to question it.· (That, of third plank of the positivist platform con­ of pain or a word of command is unverifiahle­ course, is not a very strong in its favor.) cerns the nature of philosophy. Like Wittgenstein, Thus if I say to someone, "You acted because they do not express a genuine proposition. II Ayer', view, sometimes the emotivist the­ they hold that philosophy is not in the business of stealing that money," I am not stating ethics, is stated in a brash and bold fashion. prO\~ding knowledge about the supersensible; its more than if! had simply said, "You s' This is pretty radical stuff, at least as ory of task is the clarification of statements. So it is an " In aduing that tllls action is wrong I am the philosophical tradition. Its ancestry lies in Other thinkers in the same tradition qualify and activity, as Wittgenstcin says. But are con­ any further statement about it. I.am views of the Sophists, that things (at least in the complicate it to meet obvious objections, but it is ,inced that philosophy doesn't have to classified evincing my moral disapproval of it.. It is as moral sphere) just are as they seem to the indi­ good to see it stated in it.. bare essentials, especially as nonsense. of philosophy is clarifi­ said, "You stole that money," in a peculiar vidual human being.· If Ayer is right, there are no since it has been so Widely adopted by the public. results: It issues in tone ofhorror, or written it with the addition of objective truths about the good life or about right It is imDortant to note that the emotivist theory of some special exclamation marks. The tone, or the of the 10gic...1 and wrong, so reason (obviously) cannot help us on a stark contrast between the exclamation marks, adds notlllng to the literal tivists is devoted to what they call fInd them. It follows that Socrates' search for realm and all the rest. This contrast, at least meaning of the sentence. It merely serves to show interested in the nature of piety, courage, and justice is misguided as the positivists it, is based on the verifi­ logiC of science," so that the expression of it is attended hy certain feel· And all the philosophers who build on that assump­ ability principle', adequacy a.s a theory concepts of law and theory, hypothesis and evidence, ill the speaker. tion are mistakcn in what they are doing. Plato's If that theory of is flawed, we of co'!firmarion and prabability. work is I generalize my previous statement and able to by with a radically SlIhi"rtivist produced in understanding these and say, "Stealing money is wrong," I produce a sen­ Form ofthe Good, Aristotle's virtues as human ex· how they relate to each other. Under influ· tence which has nO factual meaning -that is, ex­ cellences, Epicurus' pleasure, the Stoics' keeping morality. We will reexamine once the philosophy becomes a recognized either true or of the will in harmony with nature, Augustine's or­ tion about meaning when we turn to and important part philosophy; without social contract, Kant's cate­ stein's later philosophy, in Chapter 23. work in this area, it is unlikely that most aca­ where the and tlllckne~s ofthe exclamation gorical imperative, Mill's greatest good for the To their credit, it should be noted that certain demic departments would now be teaching courses marks show, by a suitable convention, that a greatest number~all these are not, if Ayer is difficulties in the verifiability principle cial sort of moral disapproval is the in this field .. contributions to a theory of the right and the and examined by the positivists themselves is being expressed. It is clear that there is The late of ethical statements on positivist prin­ good for humans, but merely expressions of how stance, by dividing the analytiC statements said here winch can be true or false. Another man ciples is particularly interesting. Moral judgments these individuals feel about things.t and definition so sharply from verifiable statements disagree with me about the wrongness of If we use a different measure, however, Ayer's of fact, they provoke the question, What sort of do not seem to be verifiable--even weakly, in­ in the sellse that he may not have the same view isn't so radical. In fact, it is the underpinning statcment is the verifiability itself? There directly, and in principle. So they dont seem to about stealing as I have, and he may quar­ seem to be three possibilities: meet tile criterion for factual meaningfulness. That me on account of my moral sentiments. of what seems to many these days the sheerest common sense. Nearly every college freshman, raises the question: What kind of statement is a But he cannot, strictly speaking, contradiCt me. 1. The verifiability might be a factual judgment that stealing is wrong?1 In an explosive For in that a certain type of action is right or statement. But---by its own terrns---the principle, and l.oHic, published in wrong, am not making any factual statement, not to be factual, must itself be verifiable by sense ex­ c"cn a statement about my own state of mind. I *See the motto of Protagoras on p. 44, and the relevance of perience. But what sense experiences could consti­ am merely expressing certain moral sentiments. rhetonc to justice. as developed by Gorgias, Antiphon, and tute the truth conditions for this principle? The And the man who is contradicting me Callicles, discussed on pp. 47-49. A major portion of rhetoric • Uke most of the distmcti\rj', th(~SCS of logical positivism, the is merely expressing his sentiments. So that possibility of seeing red roses constitute the positivists' Wlderstanding of the logic of .deuce is now largely might be thought ofas techniques for olcxpressing moral se-.nti- . of "Some roses are " And experi­ there is plainly no sense in asking which of uS is in l ments ' in persuasive ways. 5urpil.'>st~d. ]t now seems too abstract, too pTescripH\re~ and not ences in a laboratory might (in a complicated and the right. For neither of us is asserting a genuine tIt is important to note that the Wittgenstein of the Tracwtus mindful enough to how science is actually done. The complaint proposition. indirect way) verify "Copper conducts electric­ is, ironically. that positivists are not empirical' enough about sci· would think this turn of events about as awful as could be inlag­ We can now see why it is impossible to find a cri: ined. While he would that value is not a matter of fact he ity." But what experience could show that tJle only ence itself. Historical studies in the past several decades have J terion for determining the validity of ethical meaningful statements arc those verifiable by ex· signi6eantlJ modified our understanding of that important cul­ wants to locate matters-in the life of the ments. It is not because they have an "absolute" tural institution we call science. One of the milestones in this tt~anscendental or philosophical self. Positivist ethics construes perience? As Wittgenstein was to later remark, the "alidity which is mysteriously independent of ordi­ development is Thomas Kutm's 1962 work The Strucrure ifSCI­ value as no lllorc than the way some empirical sdf happens to standard meter bar in Paris cannot be said either r nary sense-experience, but because they have no i!F1.tif1c RevclutimK reel .bout things. What greater dHTerence collid there be! Witt· validity whatsoever. If a sentence makes t Recall Wittgc,nstein's claim that in the: world there is no genstein says, "God does not re\'cal himself In the world" (Trac­ value-and if there were a value in the world, it would have no statement at all, there is obviously no sense in tatus 6.432), The positivist" make each of us a little god. From flO value. The realm offacts exdud(~s the realm of values. You whether what it says is true or false. And Wittgenstein's point of view, ifAyeI' is rightl aU we ever get in "This fact is one of tht~ centerpieces of Alan Bloom's complaint should also look hack to Hume's famoll.'l discussion of the dis~ seen that sentences which morality is "just gasting." St.~ again Wittgp.nstein's views on aboul toNorman Malcolm's Ludwia the positivist view of ~thical propositions. Its enun­ 1 Found It. Would you appear in the book? WittB""stei,,: A Memoir (Oxford, Enl!"land: Oxford ciation would express feelings of approval about 17. How does solipSism coincide with pure reallsm? University Press, 1958). this way of understanding meaning and perhaps 18. [n what way is the world ofthe happy person dif­ others to feel the same way. But if this is what ferent from the world of the unhappy person? verifiability principle amounts to, then there What does it mean to see the world sub spede is no reason why we all should adopt it, and nOll· aeternitatis? positivist.s can (on positivist grounds) simply say, 19. Could a person be ahsolutely safe? (Compare "Well, I feel different about it." And that is llot Socrates in his defense to the jury in ApoloBJ' 41c-d, pp.. 100-101). very satisfactory. 20. What is the "mystical"? Why does it have abso­ nothing to do with the 21. Why won't sdenee solve the problems of life? Basic Questions Why does "the riddle" not exist?

LUDWIG Wll'TGENSTElN (THE EARLY YEARS) 22. What is philosophy? What is its "correct method"? What is the ladder analogy? I. What is Wirtgensteins aim in his Tractatus? And THE LOGICAL POSITIVISTS what motivates that aim·-that is, why does he want to do that? If he had su~'Ceeded, would that I. Explain the verifiability prindplc of factual have heen Significant? meaningfulness. 2. Explain how a picture is a "model of realitr" In 2. In what ways can verification be indirect? Weak? what sense is a picture itself a fact? In principle? 3. Explain the concepts ofpictorial form, possible 3. What is the positivist's =alysis of ethical judg­ state of affairs, and logical space. ments? Compare to Hume; to Kant; to the 4. Why are there no pictures that are true a priori? utilitarians.