Secular Muslim Women and the Politics of Difference in France
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
MAYANTHI L. FERNANDO Exceptional citizens: Secular Muslim women and the politics of difference in France This article traces the emergence of secular Muslim women into the French public sphere. I focus on Fadela Amara, co-founder of Neither Whores Nor Doormats (Ni Putes Ni Soumises), an association protesting the denigration of women in the immigrant suburbs. I argue that Amara is politically efficacious for the French government, shifting focus from the structural causes of socio-economic problems in the suburbs to ‘Islamic fundamentalism’. In addition, I argue that figures like Amara are effects of the dual universalising and particularising imperatives of republican citizenship and, moreover, that such figures help to defer the contradiction between those imperatives. Key words citizenship, Islam, secularism, France, immigration, republicanism Introduction The term ‘Muslim women in Europe’ – the theme of this collection of essays – tends to evoke the image of the Islamic veil, and with it, the increasing visibility of Islam in the public sphere. In France, the burgeoning Islamic revival is largely regarded by the secular majority as a threat to the cultural integrity of France, and to the secular values of freedom, gender equality, and tolerance that ostensibly define France, and Europe more generally. Yet alongside the paradigmatic Other of the veiled woman and the seemingly incommensurable Muslim difference she signifies has appeared another kind of Muslim woman in the French public sphere, namely, the self-declared ‘secular Muslim woman’ (la musulmane laıque¨ ).1 Between 2002 and 2004, the French public sphere was consumed by debate over the Islamic headscarf, a debate that culminated in the adoption of a law in March 2004 1 I take the phrase musulmane laıque¨ from the terminology of a number of ‘secular Muslim’ associations that have been formed in recent years, including the Conseil franc¸ais des musulmans laıques¨ (French Council of Secular Muslims) and the Mouvement laıque¨ des musulmans de France (Secular Movement of Muslims of France), formerly known as the Mouvement des musulmans laıques¨ de France (Movement of Secular Muslims of France). For more on ‘secular Muslims’ and ‘secular Islam,’ see Mas (2006). Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2009) 17, 4 379–392. C 2009 European Association of Social Anthropologists. 379 doi:10.1111/j.1469-8676.2009.00081.x 380 MAYANTHI L. FERNANDO banning ‘conspicuous religious signs’ in French public schools. During these debates, three highly mediatised figures – Fadela Amara, Loubna Meliane,´ and Chahdortt Djavann – emerged as vociferous proponents of the ban. Amara and Meliane´ are both anti-racist activists and co-founders of Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Doormats), a group protesting the denigration of women in immigrant suburbs (banlieues); Chahdortt Djavann is an Iranian dissident and writer. All three women published popular autobiographies of their difficult personal experiences with Islam – Amara’s entitled Neither Whores Nor Doormats,Meliane’s´ Living Free, and Djavann’s Down with the Veil!2 – and all three were prominently featured in newspaper articles and on radio programmes and television shows between 2002 and 2004. Like Ayaan Hirsi Ali in Holland and Irshad Manji in North America – other secular Muslim and ‘ex- Muslim’ women who are vocal critics of conservative Muslim-immigrant communities – Amara, Meliane,´ and Djavann positioned themselves as having cast off the chains of Islamic tradition and embraced the secular-qua-universal values of liberty, equality, and tolerance. Moreover, having experienced first-hand the supposed evils visited upon Muslim women, Amara, Meliane,´ and Djavann claimed to be ideally suited to speak on behalf of their sisters silenced by patriarchal Islamic ‘fundamentalists’ (integristes´ ). Amara and Djavann were invited to speak before the Stasi Commission, a committee of academics and education specialists convened in 2003 by then-President Jacques Chirac to investigate threats to French secularism, or laıcit¨ e´, and to propose any necessary action (the 2004 law banning religious signs was initially recommended by the Stasi Commission after three months of hearings). Amara and Meliane´ have both translated their presence in the public sphere into political positions, Amara as a junior cabinet minister in Nicholas Sarkozy’s current conservative government and Meliane´ as an official in the opposition Socialist Party. While social scientists have long paid a great deal of attention to publicly pious Muslim women in France (Boubekeur 2004; Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 1995; Jouili and Amir-Moazami 2006), scholars have only recently begun to critically analyse the emergence of publicly secular Muslims, and in particular secular Muslim women.3 This article is part of that nascent effort. Unlike critics who focus on the personal ambitions of women like Amara and Meliane´ in explaining their meteoric public and political ascension (Bouteldja and Delphy 2007; Tevanian 2007), I am not particularly interested in the question of individual intention. What I investigate are some of the political, discursive, and ideological conditions undergirding, even compelling, the appearance of secular Muslim women like Amara, Meliane,´ and Djavann in the French public sphere. Focusing in particular on Fadela Amara and her autobiography Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Doormats), which won the French National Assembly’s Political Book Prize in 2004, I make a series of interrelated arguments. First, I argue that Amara and her organisation Ni Putes Ni Soumises (NPNS) are politically efficacious for the French government, shifting political and public focus (and blame) from the structural root causes of the pressing social and economic problems in the banlieues – unemployment, social segregation, drug and gang violence, delinquency, and overcrowded schools – to ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and, consequently, to symbolic panaceas like the headscarf ban. 2InFrenchNi Putes Ni Soumises (Amara 2003), Vivre Libre (Meliane´ 2003), and Bas les voiles! (Djavann 2003). 3 The exceptions are Fregosi´ (2005), Mas (2006), and Raissiguier (2008). C 2009 European Association of Social Anthropologists. EXCEPTIONAL CITIZENS 381 Second, going beyond the question of symbolic politics and political efficacy, I argue that the emergence of Amara and NPNS must be understood in relation to what Gary Wilder (2005 and 2007) has called the dual imperatives of French republicanism to universalise and to particularise simultaneously. These contradictory imperatives of republicanism are articulated in the concurrently contractual and cultural bases of republican citizenship. I suggest that the universal promise of abstract citizenship depends in part on figures like Amara, whose assimilation of French/universal values belies the particular bases of French identity evidenced in the racial discrimination and socio-economic marginalisation suffered by non-white immigrant-origin citizens (Fassin and Fassin 2006; Keaton 2006; Silverstein 2004). At the same time that figures like Amara defer the contradictions of republican citizenship, however, they are also themselves effects of the dual imperatives to universalise and particularise. In other words, while Amara represents the universal promise of abstract citizenship, the racial and cultural bases of citizenship render her incapable of transcending her Muslim difference; she therefore remains in the end unable to fulfil the particular requirements of Frenchness necessary to being a full (abstract) citizen. I conclude the article by suggesting that it is precisely the existence of Amara’s difference that makes its (ultimately impossible) erasure meaningful, and that the promise of universal citizenship depends on the simultaneous erasure and recognition of commensurable forms of difference.4 Displacing culpability, defending the Republic In October 2002 in a housing project on the outskirts of Paris, an 18-year-old woman named Sohane Benziane was burned alive by a male acquaintance, reportedly in retaliation for a slight inflicted on him by Sohane’s boyfriend.5 Although Ni Putes Ni Soumises had been formed only a few months earlier, Sohane’s murder galvanised the association to plan a five-week march across France in early 2003 to draw attention to the dire condition of young women in mostly immigrant housing projects. Indelibly linked as it was to Sohane’s murder, which drew a great deal of media coverage, the march catapulted Ni Putes Ni Soumises to the forefront of the growing national debate about France’s immigrant suburbs and its apparent ‘Muslim problem’ (Benabdessadok 2004). Later in 2003, Fadela Amara published Ni Putes Ni Soumises (translated into English and published in the USA in 2006 as Breaking the Silence),6 which chronicles not only the development of the NPNS movement, but also the rapidly degrading conditions of women in the banlieues and Amara’s own childhood growing up in a housing project in Clermont-Ferrand, a working-class city in central France. Amara’s autobiography is an odd read, notable for its unexpected juxtaposition of depictions of racism and social marginalisation with Amara’s glorification of the French Republic and its commitments to liberty, equality, and fraternity. The first chapter of the book recalls how her parents, like so many other North African immigrants recruited 4 My notion of commensurable difference expands on the trope of incommensurable difference in anthropological scholarship