EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 251 OVERVIEW Human Rights Developments in Russian custody guards and riot police The civilian carnage in Chechnya and the tortured many of them systematically. further entrenchment of authoritarian gov- The international community often la- ernments in Central Asia dominated human mented that it had no significant influence rights concerns in 2000. The democratic de- over Russia, but squandered real opportuni- feat of Slobodan Milosevic, who had laid ties for leverage or sanctions in favor of waste to democracy in Serbia and instigated political expediency. During one of the war’s the deadly Balkan wars, held out hope of a bleakest moments the World Bank refused to new hope for peace and rule of law in the withhold credit payments to the Russian Balkans. But the international community’s general budget. The U.S. government and selectivity in using leverage hindered efforts other member states refused even to entertain for positive change in human rights in the the notion of conditionality. A U.N. Com- region, especially in the crises in Chechnya mission on Human Rights resolution might and Central Asia. While the victory of Vojislav have had a positive impact, but the member Kostunica over Milosevic was strongly sup- states who so commendably sponsored it ported by the lifting of international sanc- stood idle as Russia ignored the resolution’s tions, governments were reluctant to take a requirements. Chief among them was that strong position on the need to bring Milosevic, Russia establish a national commission of an indicted war criminal, before the Interna- inquiry that would lead to prosecutions for tional Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugo- abuse. In a more principled move, the Council slavia (ICTY), as well as the broader issue of of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly voted cooperation with ICTY. to suspend Russia’s delegation. The international community lacked the The blatant impunity for war crimes in political will to exercise leverage with Russia Chechnya cried out for accountability, but to press for a halt to the massive abuses there was none. This failure quickly became perpetrated by Russian forces in Chechnya. obvious, but governments were unwilling to This stood in stunning contrast to interna- take up a more robust commitment to inter- tional engagement in other crises in the world, national justice as they had in other parts of notably East Timor, but was regrettably the world. No member state of the Commis- consistent with the international community’s sion on Human Rights had the courage to response to the 1994-1996 war in Chechnya. insist, for example, on an international com- The pattern of impunity for abuse that so mission of inquiry, which would have neces- easily prevailed in that war persisted in the sarily invoked higher standards of rigor and current war, as Russia clearly sensed it had impartiality than the wan Russian effort. nothing to lose by prosecuting the war with- Council of Europe member states declined to out thought to civilian costs or to the conse- lodge an interstate complaint at the European quences of wanton brutality. Court of Human Rights. Unlike the Kosovo Russian forces’ violations of humanitar- conflict, where the international community ian law in the current war, which began in late responded quickly to the needs of ethnic 1999, caused some thousands of civilian ca- Albanian refugees, security concerns and a sualties, the result of indiscriminate bombing. lack of international interest meant that many The capital of Chechnya, Grozny, was razed of the needs of displaced Chechens went to the ground. At least 125 civilians were unmet. Food, safe water, medical care, gas, summarily executed in three massacres. Thou- wood supplies, and electricity were provided sands of Chechens were detained arbitrarily haphazardly and often ran out. Most children on suspicion of rebel collaboration, and once had their education disrupted, and during the 252 EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA OVERVIEW early days of the war, disease and exposure credible evidence of torture. claimed the lives of some displaced persons. Symbolic of the Uzbek government’s As corruption and grinding poverty wors- confidence that concern about terrorism ened in Central Asia, fighting terrorism and trumped its human rights obligations was its “religious extremism” was an overwhelming decision in October not to appear to defend concern both to national governments other- its initial report to the U.N. Human Rights wise intent on maintaining their grip on power, Committee on the day it convened. The and to the international community. This government’s explanation was that officials came at the expense of human rights and a needed to prepare for a conference on terror- long-term vision for the rule of law in the ism. region. Uzbekistan’s unrelenting crackdown Governments in other parts of Central against political and religious dissenters con- Asia continued the drift toward worsening tinued unabated, and authoritarianism deep- authoritarianism by manipulating elections, ened in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and harassing the media, and jailing political rivals Tajikistan. on trumped-up charges. The government of For the second time in two years, vio- Kyrgyzstan employed these with a ven- lence erupted in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. geance this year, which sobered those who In August pitched battles erupted between still considered that country to be Central armed insurgents and government troops in Asia’s “island of democracy.” The Kyrgyz southeastern Uzbekistan and neighboring government jailed prominent opposition can- Kyrgyzstan. Thousands were displaced from didates before the October presidential elec- their homes by the clashes. The group re- tions, persistently harassed the opposition sponsible, the so-called Islamic Movement of media, and drove some nongovernment orga- Uzbekistan, demanded that the Uzbek gov- nization activists into exile. The government ernment release what the group claimed were of Kazakhstan, firmly entrenched after last an estimated 100,000 wrongfully jailed Mus- year’s deeply flawed elections, continued to lim prisoners and allow for the observance of harass opposition media and political figures. Islamic law precepts, including permission The Tajik government flagrantly manipu- for Muslim women to wear the veil. lated the February ballot to guarantee the Some observers viewed the August vio- election of a parliament dominated by the lence as the self-fulfilling prophesy of the ruling party. In November 1999, government’s multi-year campaign against Turkmenistan, one of the most repressive “religious extremism,” the product of fierce countries in the world, held utterly hollow and violent repression of thousands of Uzbek parliamentary elections, followed by an in- citizens. This year the government’s cam- definite extension of the president’s term in paign to stop the spread of “religious extrem- office. ism” expanded and caused pervasive fear. Once again, the international commu- Hundreds more independent Muslims who nity chose not to use available policy tools to chose to study Islam or worship outside effect change or take a principled stand. This government-controlled religious institutions was particularly true of the United States joined thousands imprisoned in previous government, which was concerned about los- years. Many were sentenced to long prison ing its influence in Central Asia to Russia by terms, for alleged membership in illegal reli- putting too much emphasis on human rights. gious organizations, or distributing religious Yet the U.S. and its European allies were in leaflets not approved by the state. They were unique positions to deliver the economic often arrested on trumped-up charges of assistance that Central Asian countries badly illegal possession of narcotics, weapons, or want, whereas Russian influence served to religious literature, held incommunicado and weaken these countries’ independence. The denied legal counsel, and convicted in grossly U.S. government declined to interpret the unfair trials at which judges routinely ignored crackdown in Uzbekistan as one targeting EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA OVERVIEW 253 people for their religious convictions, and for who became head of the Federal Security this reason did not name Uzbekistan as a Service, the KBG’s successor. Despite nu- country of particular concern in the area of merous public assurances of support for religious freedom under the 1998 Interna- democratic values, Putin’s conduct of the war tional Religious Freedom Act. By contrast, in Chechnya and his impulse to stifle critical Serbia was considered a country of particular media coverage fuelled fears of growing concern. The U.S. Department of State certi- authoritarianism in Russia. fied Uzbekistan as eligible for U.S. security Political developments in Serbia and assistance, available under U.S. law only to Croatia toward the rule of law were con- countries committed to upholding interna- trasted sharply, and positively, with those in tional human rights standards. the former Soviet Union. Perhaps the most The European Union (E.U.), for its part, dramatic event of the year was the deposing resisted using its lucrative trade agreements of Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic with Central Asian countries to press for and the election of Vojislav Kostunica as human rights improvements. And the Orga- president. Milosevic had attempted to re- nization for Security and Cooperation in main in power by staging early presidential Europe (OSCE), the chief regional organiza- elections on September 24. The stakes were tion with a mandate to strengthen human high, as Milosevic no doubt wanted to avoid rights, emphasized economic and security facing trial by the ICTY. For the first time cooperation instead, an approach that failed facing a united opposition, the government to yield any progress on human rights. OSCE had engaged in an unparalleled effort to ensure missions in Central Asia did not engage in victory by intimidating, at times violently, regular, frank, public reporting on the human opposition members and movements, and rights situation in the region; this was a glaring brazenly rigging the electoral process.