Report on Wilton Park Conference 944

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AT THE CROSSROADS? Monday 15th – Friday 19th December 2008

1. The past decade has seen a perceptible increase, quantitative and qualitative, in the challenges facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The emergence of India and Pakistan as nuclear powers made three such states outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which subsequently increased to four with the withdrawal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK); the revelations about the AQ Khan network demonstrated the scale of the nuclear black market; Iran is suspected of sheltering a nascent nuclear programme inside the NPT; and the revival of interest in nuclear energy carries clear proliferation risks. The regime itself suffers from structural difficulties: the failure of the 2005 NPT Review and the lack of progress in the subsequent PrepComs, continuing lack of movement at the Conference on , an apparent decline of commitment to the 13 Steps, and a noticeable loss of US-Russian momentum in arms reductions after the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and the Strategic Arms reduction Treaty (START), which expires at the end of 2009 unless action is taken, as well as disagreement on missile defense, all testify to the internal challenges.

2. These external and internal challenges have not gone unrecognised, of course. There is growing evidence that a global enterprise on nuclear zero may be emerging: the 2007 and 2008 Wall Street Journal article OpEds about 'A World Free of Nuclear Weapons' and ‘Toward a Nuclear Free World’ written by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn indicated a revival of interest in nuclear abolition in the US, while elsewhere the 7-Nation Initiative on verification, the establishment of initiatives such as the International Commission on Nuclear Non-

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Proliferation and Disarmament, and the UN Secretary-General's support for a nuclear weapons convention testified to the range of activities taking place.

3. With the 2009 NPT PrepCom imminent and the 2010 Review Conference not far away, it is necessary to decide how to focus the efforts. In doing this, it may be important to avoid too much rehearsal of familiar arguments and an over-emphasis on 'NPT theology'. In disarmament, this may mean that rather than emphasise Article VI and the case for going straight to zero, it can be productive to concentrate on reducing nuclear numbers, de-alerting, decommissioning and thereby reducing the role played by nuclear weapons. This may resonate more with security policy- makers, particularly in the States but also in India, Israel and Pakistan. The latter three states are highly unlikely to join the NPT in the foreseeable future; stressing NPT membership and nuclear abolition is not going to draw them further into the wider non-proliferation regime. The NPT may be the most important instrument in the global non-proliferation regime, but finding parallel processes for these states to supplement it is likely to be more productive than making it the sole instrument. The only way to heaven, so to speak, is not just through the NPT. Elsewhere, working on the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty (CTBT) and revitalising work on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), de- alerting will also pay medium-term dividends. Since getting all countries to zero simultaneously will be very difficult, the possibility of going to a lower level, e.g. 1000 for a period of time could be an option. The US is not winning the struggle against proliferation, and continued proliferation risks increase the possibility of nuclear war as well as of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon.

4. The key, and perhaps the most daunting challenge, will be to find a way to remove the value attached to nuclear weapons by the states that have them and those that may want to possess them. A distinction can be drawn between use and possession. The unacceptability of using nuclear weapons appears to be growingly accepted but there is no such consensus on possession. If the former of these can find universal acceptance then it can provide a sound basis for progress on the latter: global de-alerting and 'virtual arsenals', for example, become more realistic propositions. Realpolitik tends to dictate that complete abandonment looks an

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unattractive option in the near term, and the perception that nuclear weapons have kept the peace remains entrenched in nuclear-armed states. The argument can be made that if nuclear weapons kept the peace in Europe they can also do so in Southeast Asia. Building on a shared set of beliefs about use may provide the first steps in dismantling those perceptions.

5. A great deal of what is feasible in nuclear non-proliferation is contingent on the US: an active role on Washington's part will be vital to progress. The Obama Administration, rather than drawing up a 'laundry list' of items to be pursued, might be better advised to undertake a thorough review of strategic policy; bold approaches of a clear strategic vision may lay the ground for positive developments. If abolition is to be taken seriously, then some difficult issues need to be thought through: what are the strategic implications of a possibly-protracted period of very low nuclear numbers? Is zero necessarily safer than low nuclear numbers? Does modernisation of nuclear weapons make zero more feasible rather than a more distant prospect? What if zero should prove unworkable – what fallback options can be considered?

6. Perhaps it is also time for more overt proliferation prevention capabilities to be developed, particularly if a serious effort to drive down nuclear numbers is to be made. Proliferators might choose to use nuclear weapons in the face of the overwhelming conventional capabilities of the US, and the absence of any nuclear deterrent capability may need to be compensated for.

7. In more immediate terms, to what extent will the Obama Administration differ from its predecessor? The new team will inherit the legacy of eight years of the Bush Administration's policy, and it seems likely that some of the latter's policies will be maintained, some will be disliked but kept nonetheless, while others will be jettisoned completely. In the first category will be the Proliferation Security Initiative, the international components of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, a permanent Additional Protocol, and the existing elements of missile defence. The US-India nuclear deal is the outstanding policy in the second category; while the third category is likely to contain the Bush Administration's more trenchant rhetoric on arms control, a verifiable FMCT and the CTBT. Movement on the CTBT is a possibility, as the

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then President-elect Obama said he would approach the Senate on ratification as soon as possible, and Vice-President Biden and Secretary of State Clinton are also known supporters.

8. Strengthening the regime will probably be prominent, with greater weight placed on non-proliferation and disarmament and less on nuclear energy. The future policy on the 13 Steps is less clear, but a continuation of the commitment to deep reductions and de-alerting are to be expected. The 2010 NPT Review will receive strong rhetorical support from the Administration as will multilateral approaches to proliferation and disarmament. In this connection, it is noted that more than $50 billion is spent yearly on nuclear weapons, and relatively little on cooperative threat reduction.

9. Turning to the centres of proliferation concern, Iran’s nuclear programme is one of the oldest in the developing world, dating back to the Shah's regime of the 1970s. The programme was re-invigorated in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s, under Rafsanjani. Five facets of the programme stand out as decisive: firstly, factional politics are fundamental; secondly, scientific nuclear nationalism, or the sense of national pride in the achievement, is crucial, in addition to the desire to pursue nuclear energy, allowed under the NPT; thirdly, a wider nationalism linked to the idea of inalienable rights under the NPT is feeding public perceptions in Iran; fourthly, the Revolutionary Guards have become an increasingly powerful political factor; and fifthly the relationship with the US is a domestic issue in Iran and a tool in the hands of various factions.

10. The drivers of the programme tend to cluster around, first, a sense of encirclement and relative weakness, and a wish for regional power projection capabilities. The sense of threat comes largely from the encirclement by the US and its allies to the south, east and west of Iran, and the fear of regime change is a real one. The wish for power projection comes from an awareness of the region's strategic malaise and weakness and a sense that a nuclear capability will allow Iran to be the dominant actor in the area. Since 2005 some 13 other countries in the region also have expressed their desire for nuclear energy.

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11. For the international community, the policy of preventing Iran from acquiring uranium enrichment capability is not working. In a number of months it will have enough material for one nuclear weapon; this does not, of course, give a reliable deterrent, but it does attract attention. Having enough for one weapon is a key tipping point, but it is still important to be clear about what is meant by Iran having a ‘nuclear capability’: a latent weaponisation capability of having enriched uranium, or actually producing a bomb? The line between the two can be very thin.

12. How then can a barrier be constructed between enrichment and weapons programme? The best policy is tougher sanctions and export controls to ensure that dual-use materials do not end up in Iran’s hands. Engaging Iran in other ways (security assurances, lifting of sanctions, persuading it to ratify CTBT, etc) should also be pursued. It is possible that some agreement on enrichment can be reached. Khatami was prepared at least to suspend enrichment. If Iran continues to resist all offers, containment strategies and deterrence can be deployed, and at some later stage the employment of force may become necessary.

13. The threat of proliferation in the Arab Middle East remains, but there may be grounds for measured optimism. The three cases of proliferation that have been attempted are Iraq in 1980s, Libya under Qaddafi in early 2000s, and (if the facility at Dair Alzour was a plutonium production reactor intended to be clandestine nuclear weapons effort) Syria under the Assads in the early and mid-2000s. These three cases share some important attributes. All were dictatorships, relying on cults of personality to keep their legitimacy, all were isolated internationally but aspired to leadership in the Arab world, and all defied international non-proliferation norms by developing strong chemical weapons capabilities.

14. No other additional states in the Middle East have thus far pursued this pattern, and it thus appears as though economic and international proliferation norms are holding up fairly well. Any regional state will have to follow the path of Iraq, but this avenue is heavily restricted by improved export controls. The A.Q. Khan network has rolled up, and therefore availability of nuclear material on the market is

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considerably lessened, with Iran highly unlikely to be willing to supply any would-be nuclear powers in the Middle East.

15. Egypt has reserved the right to develop a fuel cycle, but this is not the same thing as a tangible plan to do. Another element is the important relations that most countries have with the US: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia rely on the US for military equipment, protection vis-à-vis Iran, and economic support. These relations would be jeopardised if they tried to develop nuclear weapons.

16. Thus there exists a strong combination of disincentives and disinclination on proliferation in the Middle East. A successful tempering of the Iranian programme will reduce still further the proliferation incentives in Arab countries. Thus, the decisive trends are not necessarily towards potential proliferation, and there are grounds for cautious optimism.

17. The Israeli attack on a Syrian facility alleged to be a weapons production centre raised concerns in the Arab world. With the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) only informed about Israeli concerns after the attack took place, this does raise significant questions about the legality of military counter-proliferation measures and the robustness of the international safeguards system; potentially, it may discourage some states in the region from accepting further measures on safeguards. If it is not for the IAEA and/or the UN Security Council to determine whether clandestine proliferation is taking place, how can states have confidence that taking on stronger IAEA safeguards will enhance their security credentials? The IAEA is still investigating the attack on what Syria stated was a non-military reactor and has not drawn conclusions. Some view a sense of complacency resulting from IAEA safeguards as well as frustration over access to sites not being granted. Yet, if each country were to determine what was a threat without recourse to the UN, chaos and an arms race in the region could result. In addition, regional components must e considered in security efforts such as the five plus one talks on Iran; thus it would behove the actors to include a Middle Eastern country in the discussion.

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18. What may be required in the Middle East is a concerted process to change the nuclear lifestyle of the region, for NPT members and non-members alike, with the aim of ensuring that at the end of the process all have the same rights and responsibilities. This might be started with a two-stage process: the first to gain regional commitment on immediate steps such as ratification of the CTBT, a prospective FMCT, and also sustained assurances and international guarantees against attacks on nuclear facilities for those states subscribing. This can be followed by two sets of negotiations, the first to develop the technical and legal agreements necessary to create a nuclear weapon-free zone or a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) free zone, the second would be to determine the circumstances when these treaties or treaty would enter into force. An alternative perspective for a FMCT would be facility-based rather than material-based. In this configuration, countries would close or multilateralize their facilities in a verifiable way.

19. The Six Party Talks process with the DPRK appears to have stalled once again. Two key agreements (the closing of the Yongbyon reactor and the declaration of all nuclear programmes) are in place, and the US quid pro quo of economic assistance has been forthcoming. In October 2008, the US finally removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea’s plutonium holdings that can be used in nuclear weapons have been capped.

20. The path ahead is steeper, with the principal challenge being how to verify the declaration. It is vital to determine that the declaration is accurate, and a great deal of confidence in the denuclearisation process will be contingent on the level of confidence in the declaration. This appears to be where the Six Party Talks have grounded. The DPRK is likely to want to limit the scope of verification as much as possible, and the main battle is likely to be over this ‘rollback’ phase, involving dismantling of facilities and removal of fissile material and explosive devices. The ultimate goal is to remove all fissile materials and explosive devices, and disable or dismantled proliferation-prone nuclear facilities.

21. [In the wake of the break-up of the Six Party Talks in December, denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula is at a crossroads. The DPRK’s intentions

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are opaque, but it would be naïve to assume that it has given up on nuclear weapons entirely; no clear-cut evidence for this exists. With its failures in economic and social development becoming increasingly apparent, the regime’s legitimacy now depends almost solely on defiance of the , and the possession of the nuclear weapons is the ultimate expression of this defiance.] The DPRK regards the US ‘hostile policy’ as the root cause of their nuclear armament, and consequently will require a package of military and economic incentives to abandon it. It views normalisation of relations with the US as an assurance of security. The dilemma is that the DPRK will demand normalisation of relations with the US before denuclearisation, while US insists on the reverse. It does not appear that the DPRK has yet made a strategic decision to the end of denuclearisation, although it may have committed to the process.

22. While the US-DPRK interactions will continue to be the main driving force behind denuclearisation efforts, a multilateral framework is indispensable for two reasons. First, the United States cannot provide all the incentives needed to drive the process forward. At the final stage of denuclearisation, for example, the DPRK will demand as compensation light water reactors (LWRs) or an equivalent means of energy production and it is unlikely that the US will be willing to provide this alone. When it is necessary to put serious pressures on the DPRK, a concerted front involving all the major regional players, China in particular, is needed. Second, denuclearisation poses a serious dilemma for the DPRK with the risk of undermining the legitimacy of the regime. Economic and energy assistance could prove helpful in alleviating the North Koreans’ inherent sense of insecurity; the freezing of DPRK assets at the Banco Delta Asia was a serious blow to the country’s small and fragile economy and thereby an indicator of what may happen should the denuclearisation process stall for too long or fail altogether. But other factors, could bring the desired change include the formal cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a new peace regime; the normalisation of relations between the DPRK and the US and between the DPRK and Japan; and the drawing up of a roadmap for reunification.

23. The Six Party Talks remain the best vehicle available for denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula; as we try to move from disablement to dismantlement the

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going is bound to get tougher, and it is to be hoped that the incoming Obama Administration will continue to support this process. The appointment of a senior coordinator on North Korean policy will be a welcome gesture to demonstrate the new Administration’s commitment to this issue. Some lament that the issue has not been handled collectively under the NPT and IAEA safeguards rather than in six- party talks.

24. US agreement to provide a light water reactor, should that be forthcoming, would probably be the decisive moment in the transition, though the DPRK may come up with further demands. The insistence on the light water reactor is only partly driven by a desire to extract a visible concession from Washington. The DPRK’s need for indigenous energy supply and thereby energy independence is also an important motivation.

25. Elsewhere in the world, the proliferation challenges posed by the use of nuclear energy are likely to increase substantially. Currently, more than 30 countries are operating nuclear power plants, but projections suggest that by 2030 another 20 states can be expected to use nuclear power for the first time. It is also anticipated that there could be 60% more reactors and 45% more fuel cycle facilities. There will also be higher volumes of nuclear trade and increasing numbers of suppliers, buyers and transactions in growing numbers of places around the world. Wider availability of knowledge and materials leads to greater possibility for diversion to non-civilian purposes.

26. Thus, the IAEA will have the nonproliferation commitments of many more states and facilities to verify. It is a technical organisation working in an increasingly politicised environment. To respond to these challenges, the IAEA needs good verification tools: the necessary legal authority to acquire information and conduct inspections, state-of-the-art technology, high level personnel and sufficient financing. Comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol will be critical, particularly for states new to nuclear energy. One hundred and fifty states have comprehensive safeguards, but 30 do not. Ten years after the adoption of the

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Additional Protocol (which some have argued should be the standard), 100 states have not yet brought it into force.

27. If all states were to sign up to the Additional Protocol, by 2030 the evaluation work of the IAEA activities will increase 50% because of the growing number of states and facilities to be verified, and the possible spread of sensitive nuclear material and technology. The Agency already needs additional resources to conduct safeguards, improve its laboratory capabilities in particular in environmental sampling, and keep up with new technologies. The verification process will be heavily dependent on information supplied by states, augmented by what can be obtained from other sources. Nonetheless, it is important to avoid a cartel of only a few states possessing enrichment facilities to the exclusion of other states which are in full compliance with their safeguards obligations. An assured supply of low-enriched uranium could be backed up by suppliers, and the production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment could be limited to multilateral facilities. A number of initiatives have been proposed for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle, some of which include the IAEA as the nuclear fuel bank.

28. This all points to an urgent need for a new architecture for nuclear energy use. Nearly 3000 tons of fissile material, enough for 250,000 bombs, is currently stored in more than 40 countries, and large amounts of nuclear material are not safeguarded. The new architecture will need to include a new multinational framework for the fuel cycle, universal application of comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol, concrete progress towards non-proliferation and disarmament, beginning with the entry into force of the CTBT and later a verifiable FMCT.

29. In the US, hopes for ratification of the CTBT were raised after both Presidential candidates spoke favourably of the Treaty, and Barack Obama stated that he would seek ratification “at the earliest practical date”. He also said he would work with India and Pakistan to achieve entry into force. As with the Senate debate in 1999, verifiability may be central to the debate in the US, so it is significant that the installation of stations and the technologies involved in the treaty’s verification system are considerably more developed than a decade ago. Around 250 stations are

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sending verification information to the CTBT offices in Vienna, and the system performed well during the DPRK’s 2006 nuclear test. Rapid progress since 2004 means that detection capability is now below 1 kiloton in many parts of the world, and can be as low as a few hundred tons. Combined with an on-site inspection system, the verification process is sufficiently well-developed that there is a high probability that a nuclear test anywhere will be discovered, and therefore no country can be confident of evading inspection.

30. Another 9 states need to ratify the Treaty before it enters into force. Ratification by the US may very well bring a new momentum here, and a ‘domino effect’ for the other 8 needed may be a possibility. China, for example, might well follow the US into ratification; Beijing has delayed this for some years now. The delay is partly due to US non-ratification, but also to unanswered technical questions for example the National People’s Congress has enquired how it is possible to have a reliable weapon with 44 tests when the US and Russia have conducted around 1000 each.

31. If US policy is now in favour of ratification, then this could be included in the Six Party Talks as a part of a package of measures to be taken by the DPRK. Iran is harder to judge, but ratification would demonstrate that it is developing nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. Israel will likely follow Iran; Egypt might follow. In South Asia, Pakistan has voted in favour of the CTBT at the UN and would probably follow India, which in turn has pledged not to stand in the way of the treaty. Both have test moratoria in place (as do the P-5) , so the Treaty will only institutionalise what currently exists.

32. Political leadership is required, and the US is well-placed to provide this. Obama will need to take time to build a domestic constituency. Ratification before the 2010 NPT Review will pay large dividends, but this should not be regarded as an absolute priority: rushing the process may bring about failure of ratification and probably a closing of the ‘window’ for some time to come. The Senate debate is likely to be a difficult one, and there are concerns about the Treaty’s long-term impact on those US allies who attach considerable importance to the nuclear guarantee, as

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well as more immediate concerns about verifiability of detecting a nuclear-weapon explosion below 1kt. The argument is likely to carry the most weight that the CTBT will enhance non-proliferation.

33. If the US ratifies, others are likely to ratify and thereby secure the Treaty’s entry into force. It is sometimes argued that, in the presence of a de facto global moratorium on testing, entry into force may matter less than might be thought. There are, however, sound reasons for rejecting this argument. Entry into force will ‘close the door’ and make a de facto ban a legally binding one, as well as operationalising verification, consultation and clarification procedures, and on-site inspections. The latter cannot be requested until the treaty has entered into force. Looking beyond operational aspects it can be a catalyst for , and also be central between US and Russian arms reductions. The CTBT is also a strong instrument for non-proliferation, as testing is essential for technical development of nuclear weapons.

34. The recent resurgence of interest in nuclear abolition, particularly in the US and the UK, will need to generate firm policy prescriptions if the interest is to produce tangible results. A number of short-run steps may add momentum to this process: the nuclear-armed states (all of them, rather than only the P5) might be brought into a formal dialogue to report annually on plans and progress on nuclear reductions to the UN. A Group of Technical Experts, possibly also under UN auspices, could be set up to investigate verification procedures between these states. Other significant measures would be a commitment to internationalisation of the nuclear fuel process and ratification of the Additional Protocol; a revamping and revitalisation of the arms control machinery in the Conference for Disarmament; and a revision of NATO’s strategic posture to exclude tactical nuclear weapons.

35. Israel, India and Pakistan remain outside the NPT: do they have any legal obligations to nuclear disarmament? All three have wanted to be seen as responsible members of the non -proliferation regime (as distinct from the NPT itself); and India and Pakistan have both outlined potential disarmament steps. Israel has not been as articulate on this issue. How then might these three states be drawn into

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a reductions and disarmament process, assuming that if all P5 states move towards nuclear zero these three would not wish to be the last states in the world possessing nuclear weapons? Potential mechanisms could be widening the nonproliferation regime to include the FMCT and CTBT; nuclear weapon-free zones, security assurances, conduct, another UN special session on disarmament or a UNSG study. An enhanced NPT plus ad hoc arrangement to relate to the other three countries is much more likely to produce results than persuading the three to join the NPT or to draw up a new treaty altogether. Similarly, a regional framework on the Middle East to deal with arms control would be useful.

36. Whatever view a state takes on Article VI, the essential premise behind that and the NPT itself is that, one way or another, all roads lead to zero eventually. What political challenges remain there? If international policy is to move towards the road of nuclear abolition, what actions can be taken to overcome or avoid intractable problems? It should be possible over the course of many years to reduce the reliance on and salience of nuclear weapons, though they may still exist in small numbers. This would entail a radical restructuring of nuclear doctrine among the existing nuclear powers, but not elimination.

37. The new momentum behind thinking about how this might be achieved has been driven by a number of recent trends. For example there is a real danger of a continuing downward slide in US-Russian relations, and a continuation of the downward spiral could lead to a political-military confrontation with a renewed salience of nuclear weapon in military doctrine. Elsewhere, there is good reason to be concerned that Iran’s leaders are trying to produce nuclear weapons in a very short period of time and break out of the NPT, with very probable knock-on proliferation in the region. China’s uncertainty about US missile defence and global conventional capabilities and US concern about China’s nuclear modernization plans have similar potential to renew nuclear tensions.

38. How can a desirable strategic future be set out and attained? It will require, most of all, cooperative security activities built on the principles of common interest and mutual accommodation. This is particularly true in the case of US-Russian

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strategic relations. Both need to ask what kind of strategic relationship they want and how to achieve it. There is a need for a reinvigorated strategic dialogue with traditional nuclear arms control having a role, but also creative new approaches to build windows into each other’s thinking to get a better sense of their concerns and doctrines. Elsewhere among the P5, the first building block might be to regularise and extend nuclear relations among these states, not as an alternative to the bilateral format but as a complement. The P5 could, for example, agree to twice-yearly meetings to study what is meant by abolition, explore the potential for joint activities, implement UN Resolution 1540, plan how to respond to a terrorist incident, and negotiate a P5 nuclear code of conduct.

39. Reductions and nuclear ‘zero’ (which may require definition) options are inherently technical processes, as is their verification, and this is perennially one of the trickiest aspects of arms control and disarmament. It should be noted, of course, that absolute verification will never be achieved through technical means, though it will be a large part: complete confidence is a political condition. Preconditions such as transparency, confidence-building measures and trust are required for the technical work to begin. The paradox and challenge of verifying nuclear reductions is that the process necessitates transparency and information sharing about some of the most sensitive and secret technology a state can possess. This is particularly the case with multilateral nuclear disarmament, in which a state possessing nuclear weapons wishes to demonstrate to a non-nuclear state that disarmament is underway.

40. The technology that can be developed will go a long way to facilitating political confidence. Past experience with verification shows that these technologies are likely to be accepted if the measurements they take cannot reveal classified information; and that simple and/or familiar technology tends to be preferred to complex and/or unfamiliar technology. A Britain and Norwegian project is examining how a multilateral disarmament process might work and what technologies can be developed. Two key areas for research are information barrier technology to provide a robust but simple way to prevent ‘leakage’ of sensitive information; and on-site inspection procedures to enable managed access to nuclear sites.

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41. It is far from clear when nuclear disarmament will be a near-run, or even foreseeable, outcome in international politics. On the other hand, the global numerical trend is still noticeably downwards, and President-elect Obama has pledged to maintain a deterrent while still working towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. This therefore means that the US will have a reliable and secure nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future while moving to nuclear and general disarmament.

42. How then is it possible to maintain that deterrent and move towards disarmament? If we assume a minimum stockpile for the US would be 1000-2000 deployed weapons, five steps are possible. The first is to ratify the CTBT, thereby demonstrating commitment to the NPT and reducing nuclear danger. The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) has met its milestones, meaning that the risks to the US stockpile of ratification are much lower than a decade ago. The second is to eliminate ‘hedge’ weapons. This should demonstrate US commitment to a minimum stockpile of nuclear weapons. Third, end secondary production such as through the proposed new uranium processing facility. Preserving capabilities through research and development at the national weapons laboratories ought to ensure the US has the capacity to resume should it become necessary. Fourth, eliminate all warheads with conventional high explosives. This means trading yield for safety and security in the stockpile. Finally, minimise the production of pits by foregoing a pit factory in favour of ‘trickle production’. This will come at a cost, although it is not an insurmountable one. The major scientific milestones must be put in place by 2015; the essential work will, of course, have to be funded, and the vital personnel and their skills must not only be sustained but advanced. Achieving ignition at the NIF is key to the steps above.

43. The NPT remains the foundation of the global non-proliferation regime: new initiatives are almost always discussed in terms of the impact on the Treaty and its effectiveness. The Treaty does possess a number of strengths: it is of indefinite duration, it has virtually universal membership, and its process of PrepComs and Reviews gives it a dynamic character of debate that also compels members to keep

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NPT issues at the top of their agendas. It is a norm-setting institution beyond its own membership and there is little question that it has prevented proliferation of weapons.

44. It is of course, the weaknesses are a principal cause for concern. However, some are also strengths: it can be argued, for example, that indefinite duration can be a weakness because it means the Treaty has remained unchanged while the world around it has moved on, sometimes rapidly. The original 25-year duration may have been a driver for success by forcing member states to work to implement it fully. Similarly, near-universality can also be a weakness by making consensus very difficult to achieve. While the IAEA, through its safeguards agreements, verifies that nuclear material declared by States has not been diverted, the NPT has no verification system and arguably the Article VI bargain also involves built-in discrimination. Article IV, which provides for the “inalienable right” of all Parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, presents potential challenges, and States have discussed strengthening the Article X provisions on withdrawal. Nonetheless, if the NPT is perhaps not ‘fit for purpose’ at the moment, the potential for it to be so remains undimmed.

45. Ultimately, it is effectiveness that will determine the long-run future of the NPT and the short-run success or otherwise of its process. How then can it be made more effective? The principles for achieving this would be attaining universal adherence, internationalising the fuel supply, and strengthened IAEA capabilities. Openness and transparency within the P5, with sustained progress towards disarmament, including a reporting process, would also be significant steps. Enablers for this could be inter-sessional work (including a scientific technical advisory body, facilitated by an NPT secretariat charged with monitoring, coordinating, and reporting). Success must be regarded as a shared endeavour among Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) alike: a common ground for taking action can be established. Echoing an initiative put forward by the UK Foreign Secretary recently, the debates at this conference tended to regard six short, medium and long-run measures as central. First, securing the entry into force of the CTBT, in which ratification by the US will be vital. Second, make progress in US-Russian nuclear arms reductions; as the states holding by far

Wilton Park Conference WP944 16 Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Crossroads? December 2008 Page 16 of 17 the largest nuclear arsenals, these two states can set the tone for reductions elsewhere. Lack of progress between the two, similarly, will almost certainly be mirrored in other nuclear-armed states. The perceived superiority of US conventional weapons should not provide an obstacle to reductions in nuclear weapons. Third, stronger international measures to prevent and rollback proliferation in Iran and the DPRK. Fourth, negotiations, preferably without conditions, on an FMCT need to be instigated. Along with the CTBT, this is a vital component in preventing proliferation. Fifth, the proliferation risks inherent in the nascent nuclear energy ‘renaissance’ must be ameliorated. Finally, the recent momentum in substantive work on the political and technical challenges of nuclear disarmament, as well as securing nuclear weapons and materials, must be maintained and augmented.

Jenifer Mackby and Mark Smith Wilton Park (January 2009)

Wilton Park Reports are brief summaries of the main points and conclusions of a conference. The reports reflect rapporteurs’ personal interpretations of the proceedings – as such they do not constitute any institutional policy of Wilton Park nor do they necessarily represent the views of rapporteur.

Wilton Park Conference WP944 17 Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Crossroads? December 2008 Page 17 of 17