NPT/CONF.2015/SR.5

2015 Review Conference of the Parties Distr.: General to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 26 May 2015 of Nuclear Weapons Original: English

Summary record of the 5th meeting Held at Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 29 April 2015, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Labbé (Vice-President) ...... (Chile) later: Mr. Biontino (Vice-President) ...... (Germany)

Contents

General debate (continued)

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be submitted in one of the working languages. They should be set forth in a memorandum and also incorporated in a copy of the record. They should be sent as soon as possible to the Chief of the Documents Control Unit ([email protected]). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org/). 15-06744 (E) *1506744*

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m. urged universalization of the Treaty, the conclusion of

a fissile material cut-off treaty, and the establishment General debate (continued) of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It had 1. Mr. Klimkin (Ukraine) said that his country had supported both General Assembly resolution 67/56, voluntarily renounced nuclear weapons and had which had established the open-ended working group eliminated its nuclear arsenal inherited from the former to develop proposals to take forward multilateral Soviet Union. However, the Ukrainian success story nuclear negotiations, and the conferences had been ruined by the recent Russian aggression, on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons held in which blatantly violated the 1994 Memorandum on Oslo, Nayarit, Mexico, and Vienna. Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 5. Violation by the Russian Federation of the Budapest Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum). In Memorandum demonstrated that negative security crushing overnight the positive vision of global assurances could not be relied on. What was needed was a security embodied in the Ukrainian model, the Russian legally binding document on security assurances for Federation had violated the Charter of the United non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference must also Nations and severely undermined the Treaty. Russian adopt a document on the modalities for the aggression against Ukraine would lead States to implementation of article X of the Treaty on conclude that political and legal agreements were not Non-Proliferation on procedures for withdrawing from sufficient to guarantee the inviolability of State the Treaty. Ukraine supported efforts to bring the Russian borders. He expressed gratitude to those States that had Federation back into the legal framework of the Charter supported the territorial integrity of Ukraine, but called of the United Nations, the IAEA Statute, the Treaty and for more action from the international community. related documents such as the Budapest Memorandum, and hoped that the situation regarding the territorial 2. Over the previous year, the Russian Federation integrity of Ukraine would be taken into consideration in had turned the Autonomous Republic of Crimea from a the Conference’s final document. resort location into a military base that could well be used for the deployment of nuclear weapons. He 6. Mr. Pedersen (Norway) said that the use of expressed concern about unilateral actions by the weapons of mass destruction during the civil war in Russian Federation that violated the Agreement Syria, nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the People’s Republic of Korea and the illegal Russian status and conditions of deployment of the Black Sea annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern fleet of the Russian Federation in the territory of Ukraine were clear violations of various international Ukraine, of 28 May 1997. Statements by Russian obligations. Nevertheless, there had been some positive officials asserting the right of the Russian Federation developments, including the Nuclear Security to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine Summits, progress in the negotiations on the Iranian were a threat to the non-nuclear status of Ukraine. nuclear programme, and the establishment of a nuclear- weapon-free zone in Central Asia. While the continued 3. The Russian Federation was occupying territory implementation of the Treaty between the United containing nuclear facilities, notably the Sevastopol States of America and the Russian Federation on National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry in Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Crimea, and Russian ceasefire violations were posing a Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) was threat to installations in eastern Ukraine. Even in the welcome, progress on article VI of the face of the Russian aggression, his country remained Non-Proliferation Treaty calling for general and committed to the Treaty. It supported the safeguards complete disarmament had been slow. He urged the system of the International Atomic Energy Agency Russian Federation to respond positively to the United (IAEA) and called on States that had not done so to States proposal to reduce the number of strategic conclude safeguards agreements and additional nuclear warheads by an additional one third. protocols with the Agency. 7. The international community should work 4. Ukraine had been a member of the Global constructively to reach agreement on a number of Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism since 2007. It points that would strengthen the Non-Proliferation

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Treaty and its three pillars: the New START Treaty strengthen the safety and security of that country’s must be regarded as a first step in a process of nuclear nuclear power plants. arms reduction that would eventually include all types 11. Mr. Kmentt (Austria) said that the Treaty on the of nuclear weapons and prohibit the development of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was seriously new ones; disarmament should be pursued based on the challenged in several aspects, with the prospect of principles of transparency, verification and universalization becoming more remote. His irreversibility; the process of reducing the role of Government regretted that the Helsinki conference that nuclear weapons in security policies must be was supposed to launch the process for the accelerated by, among other measures, enhancing establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass negative security assurances; existing nuclear-weapon- destruction in the Middle East had not yet been held, free zones must be strengthened and new ones created; and hoped that one of the outcomes of the Review and progress should be made toward establishing a Conference would be a renewed impetus to convene zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of that conference as early as possible. mass destruction in the Middle East. 12. His Government was gravely concerned at the 8. Real progress must be made towards entry into continuing build-up of a nuclear weapons and ballistic force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty missiles programme in the Democratic People’s and negotiations must begin on a fissile material cut- Republic of Korea. It therefore called on that country to off treaty; IAEA must be strengthened, on the cease its provocative policies and dangerous rhetoric understanding that its comprehensive safeguards and and to engage in serious denuclearization negotiations, additional protocols protected the world as a whole and which would benefit not only the rest of the world but facilitated the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and all also its isolated population. Recent progress in fissile materials must be secured. In that connection, it negotiations over the Iranian nuclear programme was was encouraging that a growing number of civilian encouraging, and a successful conclusion would be an research nuclear reactors were being converted from important gain for the Treaty’s credibility. The high-enriched to low-enriched uranium. His country, verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- for example, had also discontinued the use of highly Ban Treaty had been impressively validated in recent radioactive sources in its hospitals. Lastly, the years, notably through the on-site inspection exercise in Conference should reaffirm the right to peaceful Jordan. He urged all Annex 2 countries to sign that nuclear power applications. Treaty without delay so that it could enter into force. 9. To strengthen its support for the work of IAEA and 13. It was unfortunate that the violation of the the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, his country Budapest Memorandum and the rhetoric emerging had decided to provide financial support to the Agency’s from the crisis in Ukraine had brought nuclear Peaceful Uses Initiative. It had participated in the brinkmanship back to the European continent. Austria international conferences on the humanitarian impact of strongly opposed the view that nuclear weapons, held in Oslo, Nayarit, Mexico, and and arms control efforts should be halted completely Vienna, and signed the joint statements on the owing to that crisis. It also believed that nuclear humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons issued weapons and nuclear deterrence were not the answer to following those conferences. He encouraged nuclear- the security concerns in Europe. weapon States in particular to sign those documents. 14. The action plan contained in the Final Document 10. His delegation also hoped to see the humanitarian of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the perspective reflected in the outcome document of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference. Jointly with that of the United (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) was supposed to have Kingdom, his Government was sponsoring an initiative restored credibility to the Treaty after the disappointing on nuclear warhead dismantlement, and supported the results in implementing the principles and objectives for International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreed to in Verification launched by the of America. 1995 and the 13 steps for nuclear disarmament agreed to In conjunction with , Norway had also in 2000. The lack of progress on the implementation of established a long-term partnership with Ukraine to article VI of the Treaty and the disarmament part of that

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NPT/CONF.2015/SR.5 action plan was a cause for serious concern. Instead of a 17. By illegally annexing Crimea and taking move away from reliance on nuclear weapons, there had aggressive actions against Ukraine, the Russian been increasing talk of nuclear weapons being necessary Federation had clearly violated, among other for national security, and large budget allocations had international agreements and norms, the Budapest been made for the modernization of nuclear weapons Memorandum. The strategic decision by the Ukrainian and infrastructure. While not in direct violation of the Government to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a letter of the Treaty, such plans were contrary to the spirit non-nuclear State in return for security assurances had of article VI and the commitments made at the 1995, been the right one. The Russian Federation should 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. When the very therefore refrain from the threat or use of force against same permanent Security Council members whose the territorial integrity and political independence of responsibility it was to uphold the Treaty promoted the Ukraine, end its illegal annexation of Crimea and take value of nuclear weapons to their own security, a immediate and concrete steps to fully implement the credibility deficit was created. Minsk agreements. 15. His country had been involved in past review cycle 18. With respect to treaty-based nuclear disarmament efforts to take the disarmament agenda forward. It had and arms control, there was a need for renewed promoted the restart of negotiations in the dysfunctional multilateral efforts to revitalize multilateral negotiating Conference on Disarmament after the 2010 high-level bodies, in particular the Conference on Disarmament. meeting of the General Assembly devoted to revitalizing Global concerns about that body’s agenda should be that body, and had worked to establish an open-ended negotiated on a non-discriminatory, transparent and working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral basis, with wider participation by multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the interested States. Estonia reiterated its request to achievement and maintenance of a world without participate fully and equally in disarmament nuclear weapons, as envisioned in General Assembly discussions as a full member of the Conference on resolution 67/56. It had hosted the December 2014 Disarmament, and called for the early nomination of a Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of special rapporteur to review the issue of the future Nuclear Weapons, where it had issued a national pledge enlargement of that body. to cooperate with all stakeholders to identify and pursue 19. The universalization and entry into force of the effective measures to fill the legal gap for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a top prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, and in priority, and States, particularly those whose adherence efforts to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear was required for that Treaty to enter into force, should weapons in light of their unacceptable humanitarian sign and ratify it without further delay. Estonia also consequences and associated risks. That pledge had been supported the universality and implementation of the endorsed by nearly 80 States. The humanitarian International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile perspective provided a powerful set of arguments for Proliferation as the only multilateral, transparent and disarmament and non-proliferation alike. confidence-building instrument against ballistic missile 16. Mr. Kolga (Estonia) said that the Non-Proliferation proliferation. Treaty was indeed the cornerstone of the global efforts to 20. Various international export control regimes had pursue nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the done important work on nuclear trade and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Estonia fully supported non-proliferation, and all States should make use of the three pillars of the Treaty and the implementation of multilaterally agreed guidelines and principles in all commitments assumed under it or during previous developing their own national export controls. All Review Conferences and of the 2010 action plan. All States members of the European Union should consider States parties without exception had a shared joining the Missile Technology Control Regime, since responsibility to implement the action plan and to they all met the highest non-proliferation standards and contribute constructively to strengthening each pillar of membership criteria of that Regime. the Treaty. The current Review Conference provided them with both an opportunity and a responsibility to renew 21. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) their commitments in that regard. was playing a leading role in supporting the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

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Weapons, and its system of safeguards was essential 25. The Russian Federation and the United States for the implementation of the Treaty, benefitting all should continue discussing nuclear weapons reduction States parties and creating confidence that facilitated through the START process, which should include the fullest possible international cooperation in the non-strategic nuclear weapons as well. However, peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Over the years, nuclear disarmament was not the duty of those two Estonia had contributed to the IAEA Technical States alone, but also that of the other nuclear-weapon Cooperation Fund and benefitted from its projects. States. All States should adhere to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional 22. Building a climate of confidence and trust was protocols as soon as possible. The Agency should essential to achieving progress on total nuclear continue and further develop the State-level concept, disarmament in a universal and inclusive manner. Such which would strengthen both its safeguards system and trust should be built through the demonstrated the international community’s joint non-proliferation implementation of concrete disarmament measures by efforts. A reference to the importance of that concept all nuclear-weapon States and an ongoing commitment should be included in the outcome document of the to non-proliferation by all non-nuclear-weapon States. current Review Conference. The progress in implementing the New START Treaty was welcome, as was the dialogue among nuclear- 26. His Government condemned the non-compliance weapon States, which had been recently enhanced with the Treaty by the Democratic People’s Republic through conferences held by the permanent five of Korea and Syria and hoped that a final agreement on members of the Security Council and recent the Iranian nuclear programme could be reached by the developments on a comprehensive solution that would end of June 2015. On the issue of the peaceful use of enable Iran to enjoy its right to nuclear energy for nuclear energy, all States parties had an inalienable peaceful purposes. right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful and civilian purposes. 23. Mr. Logar () welcomed the recent Slovenia supported, contributed to and benefitted from agreement which defined the key parameters of a joint the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including comprehensive plan of action between the international the Technical Cooperation Fund, and supported the community and Iran, an important step in the process Peaceful Uses Initiative. to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme and a comprehensive lifting of 27. Lastly, his delegation regretted that the conference sanctions. He hoped that a final plan of action would on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass be adopted before the third quarter in 2015. destruction in the Middle East had not yet been convened and encouraged States in the region to reach 24. The principle of balanced progress on all three agreement on the agenda of that conference. It also pillars of the Treaty should guide States parties believed that, in the future, the humanitarian impact of throughout the Review Conference and towards the nuclear weapons should be streamlined into the adoption of a substantive final document. Although framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and not less progress had been made on nuclear disarmament elsewhere. since the 2010 Review Conference than expected, Slovenia continued to share the vision of a world free 28. Mr. Khiari (Tunisia) said that the Treaty on of nuclear weapons and believed in treaty-based Non-Proliferation remained the keystone of the global disarmament. In that connection, future global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the crucial basis on which disarmament endeavours should include the to pursue nuclear disarmament. Multilaterally agreed universalization of both the Non-Proliferation Treaty solutions, in line with the Charter of the United Nations, and the Test-Ban Treaty and the commencement and were the best way to find lasting solutions to the many early finalization of negotiations on a fissile material international security and disarmament questions. cut-off treaty. The work of the group of governmental 29. Nuclear-weapon States should undertake experts on such a treaty and the new draft treaty negotiations on a gradual process for the complete presented in the Conference on Disarmament by France elimination of their arsenals within the framework of a were welcome developments in that regard. nuclear weapons convention. They should fulfil the commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference in

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NPT/CONF.2015/SR.5 that regard, without delay and through an accelerated credibility of the Treaty in the immediate term. Her negotiation process aimed at implementing the Government was working closely with other States 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament. States members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations parties should use their best judgment to strike the to further strengthen the South-East Asia Nuclear- right balance between their mutual obligations and Weapon-Free Zone and looked forward to further their mutual responsibilities under the Treaty. consultations between the Association and the nuclear- weapon States with a view to the latter signing the 30. In the meantime, effective assurances should be Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty as soon as possible. provided against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. It seemed 34. States had a right to use of nuclear technologies that the goal of strengthening security in the Middle for peaceful purposes. Developing States in particular East remained out of reach owing to the failure of should be assured the right of access to nuclear Israel to adhere to the Treaty, despite repeated calls technology and material, in accordance with relevant from the international community. All relevant parties obligations and standards. The International Atomic should take urgent and practical measures to establish a Energy Agency played a valuable role in ensuring zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. nuclear safety and security and providing technical assistance to developing States; efforts should 31. All three pillars of the Treaty should be applied in therefore be made to strengthen the Agency’s capacity a comprehensive and non-selective manner. None of and resources. Viet Nam welcomed the recent the Treaty’s provisions posed an obstacle to States’ agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme and looked right to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful forward to the successful conclusion of the upcoming purposes, especially as that acquisition was more often negotiations among the relevant parties on a a necessity than a choice, and as the financial and comprehensive plan of action. energy crises had highlighted the need to rethink nuclear energy and focus on its usefulness rather than 35. Over the past five years, Viet Nam had ratified an on the undeniable risk of owning such weapons. Lastly, additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, his delegation congratulated the State of Palestine for acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection acceding to the Treaty. of Nuclear Material and ratified the Amendment thereto, participated in the activities of the Joint 32. Ms. Nguyen Phuong Nga (Viet Nam) said that Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management States parties should reiterate the significance of and and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management their commitment to the continued implementation of and strengthened its legal and regulatory framework on the Treaty, owing to the risk of nuclear catastrophe that nuclear safety and security. It had also stepped up its still faced humankind. The three pillars of the regime cooperation with a number of international partners on should be implemented in a balanced manner. The the development of its nuclear infrastructure; commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive successfully implemented the core conversion from convention on nuclear weapons would represent a high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium fuel at strong signal of States parties’ firm commitment to its Dalat research nuclear reactor in 2011; and had all nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of legally spent high-enriched uranium fuels repatriated to the binding negative security assurances and the start of Russian Federation in July 2013. negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty should also be advanced. States that had not yet done so 36. Lastly, her country was an active member of the should ratify the Test-Ban Treaty for it to enter into Nuclear Security Summit process, had joined the force as soon as possible. Proliferation Security Initiative and successfully fulfilled its responsibilities as Chair of the Board of 33. Viet Nam welcomed the establishment and Governors of IAEA for the term 2013-2014. The 2015 consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones around the Review Conference should build upon the achievements world and the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia, of the 2010 Conference, with additions on long-pending and called for an early convening of an international and emerging issues, to arrive at a comprehensive, conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone balanced outcome document that would provide a road free of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of map for States parties’ collective efforts over the next mass destruction, as a crucial building block for the five years.

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37. Mr. Dapkiunas (Belarus) said that the Treaty on consultative expert assistance of IAEA, had considerably Non-Proliferation was essential to international security. enhanced the country’s energy security and had given Despite efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons, the impetus to its development in the technology and threat of their use continued to exist. The international manufacturing sectors. Belarus was committed to rhetoric of peace and cooperation contrasted with the complying with IAEA standards and to strictly observing growing mistrust between Governments. Some 20 years its international obligations in nuclear matters. in the past, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had 41. Mr. Biontino (Germany), Vice-President, took the rejected, freely and without conditions, the presence of Chair. nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Belarus in particular attached great importance to the elimination 42. Archbishop Auza (Observer for the Holy See) of such weapons; it was unfortunate that a proposal said that the Treaty was anchored in the dignity of the made by his country in the 1990s to establish a central human person and in the collective recognition that and eastern European zone free of nuclear weapons had nuclear weapons were inhumane and unethical and that failed to garner the necessary support. Belarus continued a nuclear detonation would generate catastrophic to fight against the development and production of new humanitarian consequences. The failure to translate in weapons of mass destruction. Yet a number of countries good faith the obligations contained in the Treaty were modernizing their existing nuclear arsenals and constituted a real threat to the survival of humankind seeking to develop new types of weapons of mass as a whole. Concrete and effective steps should destruction. Belarus had a zero tolerance policy with therefore be taken to collectively renew the regard to nuclear weapons, including nuclear research commitment to the core principles of the Treaty. The with a view to modernizing nuclear weapons; a nuclear safest and most effective path towards non-use was the arms race; and nuclear tests. mutual and total renunciation of those weapons and the effective dismantling of the infrastructure on which 38. The most effective way to eliminate the threat of they depended. The theory of nuclear deterrence was nuclear weapons was to adopt practical measures to too ambiguous to be a stable and global basis for world build confidence and foster cooperation, based on the security and international order and had not delivered principles of non-threatening conduct and good- the sort of peace and stability expected. neighbourly relations. Such an approach should not seek merely to appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to reject 43. The Treaty’s discrimination between countries their privileged status, but judiciously to establish with and without nuclear weapons, which was meant to conditions for the elimination of the nuclear threat. be provisional, had been turned into a permanent solution, a situation that was unsustainable and 39. The IAEA safeguards system was crucial for undesirable. If it was unthinkable to imagine a world building trust. Belarus supported its continued where nuclear weapons were available to all, it was development and was taking the necessary steps to reasonable to imagine, and to work collectively for, a ratify an additional protocol to its agreement with the world where nobody had them. That was the letter and Agency on the application of safeguards. The the spirit of the Treaty. The resources spent on nuclear safeguards system should be improved on the basis of weapons could, and indeed should, be put towards the an open dialogue with all concerned countries, and development of societies and people. The world faced cooperation between the IAEA secretariat and enormous challenges, and it was only through Governments should take place solely within the cooperation and solidarity among nations that it would framework of the relevant international legal be able to confront them. To continue investing in instruments. An objective and fair safeguards system expensive weapon systems, in particular the production and its support by all Member States would strengthen and modernization of nuclear weapons, was a waste of the non-proliferation regime, taking as its basis the resources and in contradiction with the spirit of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. Treaty. 40. The Treaty was important also for its recognition of 44. The possession of nuclear weapons and reliance the inalienable right of all States parties to the peaceful on nuclear deterrence had a very negative impact on uses of nuclear energy. Since the 2010 Review relations between States. The concept of national Conference, Belarus had built its first nuclear power security should not be used in a partial or biased plant. That strategic project, which had benefited from the

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NPT/CONF.2015/SR.5 manner — with different standards being applied to Weapons in December 2014, because it confirmed its firm nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States — and never belief that nuclear weapons must never be used again. It in contradiction with the common good. It was also commended IAEA for its ongoing efforts to monitor artificial and simplistic to ignore the other elements implementation of the Treaty. Non-proliferation must be necessary for security, including socioeconomic pursued through multilateral, peaceful and diplomatic development, political participation and respect for means; the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament fundamental human rights. The definition of national was a source of concern, and multilateral disarmament security advanced by States, especially nuclear-weapon mechanisms, which had delivered very little, must be States, should urgently be revisited in a transparent revitalized. Furthermore, non-States parties to the manner. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must sign and ratify that instrument at the earliest opportunity with a 45. A world without nuclear weapons would not be view to facilitating its entry into force. easy to achieve, but that was neither a reason nor an excuse to not fulfil Treaty obligations. All energies and 49. His delegation welcomed the understanding commitments in this area were necessary — and all the reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the more so in times of international tensions — and the five permanent members of the Security Council and role of international organizations, religious Germany, and encouraged all the relevant parties to communities, civil society and academic institutions continue their efforts to conclude by the end of June was vital to not let hope die, nor cynicism and 2015 a comprehensive agreement on the Iranian realpolitik take over. Only an ethic of cooperation, nuclear programme that would provide for the lifting solidarity and peaceful coexistence, and not one based of the sanctions imposed on that country. In particular, on the threat of mutually assured destruction, was a it commended the emphasis placed in that project worth undertaking for the future of humanity. understanding on IAEA inspections and transparency modalities. It also welcomed the agreement by Iran to 46. Mr. Grima (Malta) said that his country remained implement the additional protocol to its safeguards committed to the fundamental objectives of the Treaty agreement and to allow greater access and information on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which on its nuclear programme to the Agency. was still the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and called on all non-States parties to accede to 50. Malta also called upon Syria to cooperate fully the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Malta with IAEA to remedy its non-compliance with its welcomed the progress towards implementation of the safeguards agreement and implement in full the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 additional protocol to that agreement. It condemned the Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), but nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People’s called upon all States to respect all their obligations and Republic of Korea in February 2013 and the country’s commitments in that regard. threat of further nuclear testing, which constituted a violation of its international obligations. The 47. A world free of nuclear weapons remained a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must abandon distant prospect that would be realized only if its nuclear weapons programme and return to the concerted efforts were made to that end. Moreover, the Treaty and its IAEA safeguards agreement. risk of continued to threaten international peace and security and there was an 51. Lastly, his delegation welcomed the signing by increasing risk that individuals or terrorist groups the nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. The on a Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Central Asia, and proliferation of those weapons and their delivery the ratification of that Treaty by France and the United systems could have dire consequences on international Kingdom, and called for the conference on establishing security and stability, while their use would have a a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East to be devastating impact on human health, the environment convened at the earliest opportunity, on the basis of and the climate. arrangements agreed to by the States of the region. 48. Malta had therefore endorsed the pledge made by 52. Mr. Mamabolo () said that his the Austrian Government following the Vienna country remained committed to the Treaty and its three Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear equally important pillars, namely nuclear disarmament,

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NPT/CONF.2015/SR.5 nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of commitment to all three pillars of the Treaty. However, nuclear energy. The year 2015 marked not only the while there had been significant progress in the area of twentieth anniversary of the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation, many agreed-upon actions Treaty, but also the seventieth anniversary of the concerning nuclear disarmament had not been nuclear bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima implemented. The entry into force and indefinite and Nagasaki. In the light of those key milestones, the extension of the Treaty, and the outcomes of the 2000 international community must consider whether it had and 2010 Review Conferences had established the indeed made every effort to avert the devastation of necessary conditions for nuclear disarmament. Indeed, nuclear war, and must adopt measures to safeguard the progress in that area could and should have been security of peoples. achieved since 2010, including with regard to reductions in the number of nuclear weapons deployed 53. Although the Final Document of the 2010 Review outside the territories of nuclear-weapon States. Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) contained an Instead, those States and their allies continued to rely extensive action plan, that did not mean that States parties on nuclear weapons as integral elements of their were satisfied with the progress made in the military and security doctrines and some 1,800 nuclear implementation of previous agreements or that warheads remained on high-alert status. confidence among States parties had been restored. In fact, most States parties remained seriously concerned 57. Retaining those weapons was irresponsible and about the lack of urgency and seriousness in respect of encouraged proliferation, thereby undermining the very previous undertakings, particularly with regard to nuclear Treaty that States claimed to uphold. There were no disarmament. The success of the current or any other right hands for wrong weapons, and no justification for Review Conference would be determined by the extent to spending vast sums to upgrade nuclear weapons which States parties fulfilled those undertakings. systems, particularly when the world was struggling to meet the basic needs of billions of people and achieve 54. Nuclear weapons were inhumane and had agreed-upon development goals. While nuclear-weapon unacceptable humanitarian consequences, and it was States were implementing commendable mutual inconceivable that their use could be consistent with confidence-building measures, they must also build international law under any circumstances. Nuclear trust with non-nuclear-weapon States. The international disarmament was not only an international legal community could no longer afford to conclude hollow obligation, but a moral and ethical imperative. In that agreements every five years that merely seemed to connection, South Africa welcomed the outcomes of perpetuate the status quo, but must bring a decisive end the three international conferences that had been held to what amounted to “nuclear apartheid”. on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which were integral to advancing action 1 of the 2010 58. His delegation urged the Review Conference to action plan. It had also endorsed pledge made by the commit to a thorough consideration of all possible Austrian Government following the Vienna Conference options for a framework of effective measures for on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, achieving a world without nuclear weapons, in line with which reflected long-standing South African policies. article VI of the Treaty. It also supported a systematic, step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, including 55. The humanitarian consequences of nuclear through a framework agreement of mutually reinforcing weapons represented a powerful argument against the legally binding instruments, and called for an open, retention of nuclear weapons by certain States because multilateral process with clear benchmarks and of what they perceived were their security interests. timelines that would provide for transparent, verifiable The Treaty could not succeed unless it focused on and irreversible nuclear disarmament measures. enhanced security for all the world’s peoples, and security could only be achieved through the total and 59. It was encouraging to see the large number of irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons, which was States that had concluded safeguards agreements and the only means by which the threat of catastrophe and additional protocols with IAEA since 2010. Such mass annihilation could be averted. agreements facilitated the transfer of nuclear technology to and the use of nuclear energy by developing 56. The establishment and maintenance of a world countries. IAEA was the only internationally recognized without nuclear weapons required a collective competent authority responsible for verifying and

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NPT/CONF.2015/SR.5 assuring compliance with the safeguards agreements of 63. Nuclear-weapon States should therefore fulfil, in States parties. His delegation called for the good faith, their long overdue legal obligations under establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis article VI of the Treaty, and comply with their of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the undertakings in line with the practical steps set forth in region concerned. Such zones enhanced global and the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference. regional peace and security and strengthened the nuclear Negotiations should begin at the earliest opportunity in disarmament and non-proliferation regime. the Conference on Disarmament for the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear 60. Peaceful nuclear cooperation and access to the weapons, in accordance with General Assembly benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, one of resolution 68/32. Nuclear-weapon States must pursue the core objectives of the Treaty, could accelerate the nuclear disarmament in a time-bound manner and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear and further the post-2015 development agenda. Indeed, weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology was of particular importance in attaining 64. Bangladesh supported the establishment of sustainable and accelerated economic growth in Africa. nuclear-weapon-free zones in all parts of the world, South Africa highly valued the IAEA Technical and welcomed the understanding reached on the key Cooperation Programme, which made a significant parameters of a comprehensive agreement on the contribution to addressing the socioeconomic needs Iranian nuclear programme. That understanding would and sustainable development challenges of developing foster regional peace and stability and reaffirm the countries, and enabled the Agency to meet its statutory importance of dialogue in the peaceful resolution of objective of accelerating and enlarging the contribution disputes. of atomic energy to global peace, health and prosperity. 65. The entry into force of the Comprehensive The Programme must therefore be allocated adequate Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which Bangladesh ratified in and predictable funding. 2000, was an essential step towards achieving a world 61. Lastly, his delegation had taken note of proposals free of nuclear weapons. All States that had not yet to elaborate a common understanding of the ratified that Treaty were therefore strongly urged to do withdrawal provision of article X and believed that a so. Negotiations must also begin, without any further similar approach should be taken with regard to other delay, on an effective, non-discriminatory, legally articles of the Treaty. For instance, a systematic binding and internationally verifiable fissile material analysis of articles I and II could lead to a common cut-off treaty that, inter alia, addressed existing stocks of understanding on issues such as nuclear-sharing fissile material. Full, effective and non-discriminatory arrangements, while an analysis of articles IV and VI implementation of article IV of the Treaty on the could help determine whether the core objectives of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was of the Treaty had been met and what remained to be done. essence, particularly since it emphasized the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production 62. Mr. Ahsan (Bangladesh) said that his country and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. condemned the use of nuclear energy for destructive purposes and deplored the fact that vast sums of money 66. Bangladesh was building a nuclear power plant in were spent on nuclear arms. It was important to accordance with the safeguards agreement it had remember, however, that nuclear energy could also be concluded with IAEA in 1982 and believed that IAEA used peacefully to promote development. The current safeguards and verification regimes were effective Review Conference must address both nuclear mechanisms for verifying States parties’ commitments disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation with equal to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. All States parties importance and urgency, since the continued existence must engage in multilateral diplomacy and implement of nuclear weapons meant that there was an ever- appropriate confidence-building measures to increase present risk that, whether by accident or by design, trust among States with a view to achieving universal they could be used; reducing the number of deployed adherence to the Treaty. weapons and lowering the operational readiness of 67. Ms. Tan (Singapore) said that the legitimacy and nuclear weapons systems was no substitute for their relevance of the Treaty as a non-proliferation instrument complete elimination.

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NPT/CONF.2015/SR.5 was increasingly being called into question. There had nuclear weapons would spur greater commitment by been only limited progress towards implementation of States parties to uphold their Treaty obligations. the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, 71. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones particularly by nuclear-weapon States, while certain would strengthen global peace and security. Her States steadfastly refused to accede to the Treaty. Government therefore urged all nuclear-weapon States Discourse regarding the three pillars of the Treaty had to sign and ratify the protocols to treaties establishing become increasingly political, divisive and characterized such zones, without submitting any reservations or by complaints of non-compliance and bias, while the unilateral interpretative declarations in that regard, and conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone to withdraw any existing reservations or declarations. In free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass particular, nuclear-weapon States should sign and ratify destruction had been indefinitely postponed. As a result, without reservations the Protocol to the Treaty on the there was growing mistrust between nuclear-weapon and Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States. It was therefore crucial that that it entered into force at the earliest opportunity. all States parties should reaffirm their commitment to Moreover, the failure to convene a conference on the the Treaty and fully comply with their Treaty establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear obligations. weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction had 68. With regard to nuclear disarmament, despite threatened to derail the current Review Conference. ongoing engagement by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear- Singapore strongly encouraged all relevant stakeholders weapon States on various issues, including the to reaffirm their political support for that conference and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, a voluntary ensure that it was held as soon as possible. moratorium on nuclear detonations and the New START 72. The mandate and operational capacity of IAEA Treaty, little concrete progress had been made on the must be strengthened so that the Agency could more implementation of article VI of the Non-Proliferation effectively encourage non-proliferation. In particular, Treaty by nuclear-weapon States, some of which appeared IAEA must seek to enhance the security of fissile material particularly reluctant to contemplate substantive cuts to that was destined for both civilian and non-civilian their nuclear arsenals. That would only reinforce the purposes. All States parties to the Treaty that had not yet perception that those States believed that nuclear concluded and implemented comprehensive safeguards deterrence must remain an integral part of their long-term agreements and additional protocols with the Agency national security doctrines. should do so without delay. Furthermore, a mechanism 69. Accordingly, nuclear-weapon States must commit was needed to encourage non-States parties to the Treaty to significantly reduce their nuclear arsenals in a that possessed capabilities to abide by the transparent, irreversible and verifiable manner, same rules and safeguards as States parties. including within the framework of the New START 73. Ways must also be found to address the issue of Treaty, and refrain from testing or upgrading their Treaty non-compliance. In that regard, the nuclear nuclear weapons. All countries, particularly all programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of remaining Annex 2 countries, should sign and ratify the Korea and the implications of that country’s withdrawal Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest from the Treaty remained key areas of concern. Her opportunity. Progress also needed to be made in the Government strongly urged the Democratic People’s Conference on Disarmament on negotiations regarding Republic of Korea to return to the Treaty. Robust global a fissile material cut-off treaty. The 2015 Review export control regimes were also needed to combat Conference must explore ways to engage illicit trafficking of nuclear material, without at the same constructively with non-States parties to the Treaty on time, impeding legitimate trade. Her country was a the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with a view global transportation hub and was committed to to facilitating its universalization. fulfilling its non-proliferation obligations while 70. Singapore welcomed the fact that two nuclear- safeguarding its position within global supply chains. It weapon States had attended the Vienna International stood ready to share its experience in that area, Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear including within the framework of the Proliferation Weapons, held in December 2014, and hoped that a Security Initiative and the Asian Senior-Level Talks on stronger focus on the humanitarian consequences of Non-Proliferation.

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74. Lastly, every State party to the Treaty enjoyed the VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. In that inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It connection, the Heads of State and Government at the was important, however, that all States should reassure CELAC summit held in Costa Rica in January 2015 the international community of the peaceful nature of had endorsed the pledge made by the Austrian their nuclear programmes and adhere to relevant IAEA Government following the Vienna Conference on the safeguards and norms. In that regard, Singapore warmly Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. welcomed the recent agreement reached on the 78. He noted with regret that even as the United parameters of a joint plan of action on the Iranian Nations was finalizing the post-2015 development nuclear programme, and hoped that follow-up agenda, nuclear-weapon States continued to invest negotiations would lead to a comprehensive agreement heavily in maintaining and modernizing their nuclear guaranteeing the exclusively peaceful character of that arsenals. Nuclear disarmament was a socioeconomic programme by the June 2015 deadline. imperative for the international community; he urged 75. Mr. Lasso Mendoza (Ecuador), speaking on behalf nuclear-weapon States to allocate more resources to of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean developing countries for the promotion of peace and States (CELAC), reaffirmed the Community’s pride in sustainable development. being the world’s first nuclear-weapon-free zone to have 79. CELAC remained firmly in favour of the full, been established in a densely populated area, through the balanced and non-discriminatory implementation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin three main pillars of the Treaty — namely, nuclear America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). The disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of commitment of CELAC to nuclear disarmament and nuclear energy — and, referring to article VI of the non-proliferation had been confirmed from its very Treaty, reiterated its concern at the failure of States to foundation, in 2011, at which time relevant Heads of State make progress towards nuclear disarmament. and Government had adopted a special communiqué on Furthermore, the Treaty must be made universal: States the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The region had that had not yet done so should accede to it as also been proclaimed as a zone of peace at its second non-nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear-weapon States summit held in Havana in January 2014. must comply with their commitments towards the 76. He expressed deep concern at the humanitarian complete elimination of nuclear weapons: specifically, impact of the use of nuclear weapons, a matter which he urged them to implement, without further delay, the should be addressed in every discussion on nuclear 13 steps to disarmament agreed at the 2000 Review weapons, and welcomed the successful conclusion of Conference and the action plan contained in the Final the three conferences on that topic held in Norway in Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the 2013 and Austria and Mexico in 2014. The conferences Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of had highlighted, inter alia, that nuclear weapons were a Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). serious threat to security and development; that no 80. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, State or international organization had the capacity to on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among provide sufficient humanitarian assistance in case of a the States of the region concerned, constituted an nuclear blast; and that the detonation of nuclear important contribution to the achievement of nuclear weapons, whether by accident or by design, was an disarmament and to the strengthening of international ongoing risk. peace and security and the non-proliferation regime. 77. In that context, CELAC supported the start of a The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the experience of the multilateral diplomatic process for a legally binding Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in instrument that would prohibit and eliminate nuclear Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) in that weapons in a transparent, irreversible and verifiable regard remained political, legal and institutional manner, within a multilaterally agreed time frame. To reference points for the establishment of other nuclear- that end, he was in favour of the proposal made by weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. Cuba at the third conference on the humanitarian 81. CELAC urged nuclear-weapon States to withdraw impact of nuclear weapons. Such an instrument was all interpretative declarations to the Protocols to the necessary to achieving nuclear disarmament and would Treaty of Tlatelolco, as they constituted factual fulfil the obligation of all States parties under article

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NPT/CONF.2015/SR.5 reservations prohibited by that Treaty, and to respect 85. A common understanding of the steps needed to the denuclearized nature of the Latin American and advance nuclear disarmament would require an inclusive Caribbean region, thus helping to prevent the and comprehensive dialogue, with the substantive introduction, and eliminate the possible use, of nuclear participation of nuclear-weapon States. Creating weapons against the countries of the region. CELAC conditions for a world without nuclear weapons must regretted the failure to hold a conference on the take into account both humanitarian and security establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear considerations. Bulgaria supported a constructive, weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and realistic and gradual approach to eliminating nuclear called for the conference to be convened as soon as weapons, involving such steps as overcoming the possible. current impasse in the Conference on Disarmament, including through its expansion, and starting 82. The step-by-step approach to nuclear negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. In disarmament had failed to achieve the objectives of the addition, the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Treaty or the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was crucial for furthering the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, or to initiate negotiations for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 86. All obligations under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation (fissile material cut-off treaty). He called on all States, should be fulfilled in good faith. In that regard, the breach particularly those with nuclear weapons, to eliminate of the Budapest Memorandum had been a serious blow to the role of nuclear weapons in their strategic doctrines, the negative security assurances that were keys to the security policies and military strategies and to reduce viability of the Treaty. Those security assurances must be the operational readiness of such weapons. Likewise, restored without delay. he urged those countries that had joined extended 87. Bulgaria welcomed the political understanding nuclear deterrence policies in the framework of reached on 2 April 2015 between Iran and the military alliances to renounce their reliance on the permanent members of the Security Council and nuclear weapons of other States for security. Germany and hoped that a mutually acceptable, long- 83. The international community could not continue to term comprehensive solution would be reached by the tolerate the existence of nuclear weapons after banning all deadline of 30 June 2015. Unfortunately, the nuclear other weapons of mass destruction. Further, the indefinite and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic extension of the Treaty agreed at the 1995 Review and People’s Republic of Korea remained a source of major Extension Conference did not confer the right to concern. He urged that Government to abandon its indefinitely possess nuclear weapons. The current Review nuclear weapon programme and to re-establish Conference must forge an ambitious path forward, taking compliance with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation and into consideration the developments since the 2010 with IAEA safeguards as soon as possible. There was a Review Conference. Simply rolling over previously clear need to tighten the withdrawal provisions of the agreed plans of action was unacceptable, especially given Treaty so as to prevent abuse by States that were found the lacklustre implementation of most of the to be in non-compliance. The international community disarmament-related actions. should be alerted to the fact that some countries might misread article X in in such a way that they felt 84. Mr. Raytchev (Bulgaria) said that as the cornerstone encouraged not to fulfil their obligations under the of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation Treaty. regime, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation had made the world a significantly safer place. The current security 88. Efforts to convene a conference on the environment, however, was complex and it was important establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear for States parties to renew their commitment to the weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction implementation of the Treaty and to the further should continue, despite the complex situation in that strengthening of its regime. While progress on the action region of the world. Bulgaria welcomed the tireless plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review work of the facilitator in that regard. Conference had been slow, it was the collective 89. The operation of the Treaty was ensured by the responsibility of all States parties to ensure its application of the IAEA safeguards system. Bulgaria implementation across the three pillars of the Treaty.

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NPT/CONF.2015/SR.5 fully supported the Agency and called upon any States required not just the control of weapons, but also that had not yet done so to negotiate and ratify climate control, the reduction of inequality, the additional protocols to their respective safeguard elimination of poverty, and democracy. agreements. Bulgaria, as a State party that had 93. The paralysis in the Conference on Disarmament, developed nuclear energy for peaceful uses for over 40 which was not representative of the total membership years in compliance with the highest safety, security of the United Nations, had motivated many States, and non-proliferation standards, reaffirmed its support including Costa Rica, and a range of other stakeholders for the inalienable right of all States parties to the to demand the initiation of negotiations on a fissile Treaty to do the same. material cut-off treaty and progress towards a legally 90. His Government welcomed the Vienna binding instrument that would prohibit the Declaration on Nuclear Safety, aimed at strengthening development, production, storage, possession, transfer, nuclear safety and increasing transparency, and urged deployment and use of nuclear weapons. all States parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety 94. The issue of the humanitarian impact of nuclear to fulfil the objectives of the Declaration. The weapons was gaining recognition and related international nuclear non-proliferation regime was an discussions had created momentum in the international important framework for the development of nuclear community to find ways to rid the world of nuclear applications for peaceful purposes. The States parties weapons. Further proof of that momentum had been the of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation should agree on a successful experience in 2013 of the open-ended set of specific measures for ensuring the responsible working group to develop proposals to take forward development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy under multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the the best safety, security and non-proliferation achievement and maintenance of a world without conditions. nuclear weapons. 91. Mr. Mendoza-García (Costa Rica) said that the 95. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons current Review Conference must not accept modest violated international law, particularly international results or be satisfied with maintaining the status quo. humanitarian law, as had been recognized by the State security was an outdated paradigm that International Court of Justice. Such weapons did not nevertheless remained the basis for maintaining 16,000 respect the principle of proportionality or the nuclear warheads, many of which were on high alert obligation to refrain from causing harm in an and susceptible to cyberattacks. Instead, collective indiscriminate or needless manner. In the past, the human security should be placed at the centre of recognition of the unacceptable humanitarian policymaking, in which peace and security should be consequences of the use of such weapons had preceded considered a global public good. Unilateral or bilateral their prohibition and eventual elimination. The Model reductions that were not verifiable, transparent and not Nuclear Weapons Convention, the updated draft of under the supervision of IAEA did nothing to which had been submitted to the United Nations by contribute to that goal; nor did delaying the convening Costa Rica, together with Malaysia, could be of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East negotiated as a stand-alone agreement or as part of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of package of agreements. One interim agreement of great mass destruction. potential value would be a universal, legally binding 92. True peace and security were achieved by instrument on negative security assurances in order to preventing the horizontal and vertical proliferation of build and strengthen mutual confidence between weapons of mass destruction and by insisting on nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. compliance with all the obligations arising from the 96. Lastly, he called on all States to endorse the relevant treaties. They required States to deliver on pledge made by the Austrian Government following the their commitments under article VI of the Treaty, in Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of particular, steps 6, 8 and 9 of the Final Document of Nuclear Weapons, which CELAC Heads of State and the 2000 Review Conference and action 5 of the action Government had recently endorsed, and to negotiate an plan contained in that Final Document. Peace and instrument to ban nuclear weapons. security also involved honouring the Charter of the United Nations, especially Articles 10 and 26, and

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97. Mr. Zerbo (Executive Secretary, Preparatory States. Some progress was noteworthy: China had Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban connected its monitoring stations to the Preparatory Treaty Organization) said that nuclear weapons Commission’s system; the United States Government proliferation was a truly transboundary threat that put was engaged in an education campaign with all States at risk. A system of laws and treaties ratification of the Treaty as the end goal; and there established to counter that threat helped to ensure the were indications that Israel could be the next Annex 2 rule of law. It was generally recognized that the State to sign the Treaty. indefinite extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation 101. He welcomed other evidence of progress, such as in 1995 had been achieved through a set of political the personal commitment expressed by Pope Francis to a conditions, one of which had been the conclusion of a nuclear-weapon-free world; the pledge by the Russian Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty no later than Federation to complete the international monitoring 1996. Good-faith compliance with the obligations system stations on its territory within two years and to under article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation promote the Treaty at the highest political levels; and included ratification by all States parties of the the vital support provided by the United Kingdom Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which was aimed at towards universal ratification of the Comprehensive strengthening the non-proliferation and disarmament Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Preparatory Commission regime as a whole. It was difficult to understand for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty therefore the failure of States parties to bring the Organization provided an organizational framework to Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force. enable the remaining Annex 2 States to pursue 98. It was important to recognize that the ratification in accordance with their constitutional Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had processes. The Treaty’s operational verification regime strengthened the international norm against nuclear had been demonstrated in late 2014 through the full- testing: every test conducted since its adoption had scale simulation of the on-site inspection in Jordan. been met with universal condemnation. It had been 102. Determined leadership was needed now, both demonstrated that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- from the remaining Annex 2 States, to move towards Ban Treaty was internationally and effectively ratification, and from the States having already ratified verifiable. The international monitoring system the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to make provided a detection capability far better than what had that Treaty a top priority. Bringing that Treaty into been thought to be attainable 20 years previously. The force was the responsibility of all States parties to the deterrent value of the system was such that no State Treaty on Non-Proliferation. Just as importantly, if could confidently carry out a clandestine test. action was not taken, all States parties would bear the 99. Furthermore, the monitoring technologies under the responsibility for letting the Comprehensive Nuclear- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had proven their Test-Ban Treaty fail. value in civil and scientific areas, as demonstrated by the The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m. essential role played by the noble gas network in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its monitoring assets were at the disposal of the international community to support national security needs; to contribute to regional stability as a significant confidence-building measure; to reinforce non-discriminatory and participatory multilateral arms control; and to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 100. Expressions of support for the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty continued to be made and Member States had invested heavily in that Treaty’s verification regime, yet the reality was that the Treaty would not enter into force without ratification by the remaining Annex 2

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