HENRIK SALANDER
Interview
Ambassador Henrik Salander on the 2002 NPT Preparatory Committee
CONDUCTED BY WILLIAM C. POTTER, MARY BETH NIKITIN, AND TARIQ RAUF1
BACKGROUND measures to further enhance the strengthened review pro- cess. Comprising more than 150 paragraphs and covering he first session of the Preparatory Committee all aspects of the NPT, as well as certain regional issues (PrepCom) for the 2005 Review Conference of the (including the Middle East and South Asia), and the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of T strengthened NPT review process, the 2000 Final Docu- Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held at United Nations head- ment represented the latest collective word of the 187 NPT quarters from April 8-19, 2002, under the chairmanship states regarding legally or politically binding guidelines for of the representative of the Western and Other States the future implementation of the NPT and the conduct of Group, Ambassador Henrik Salander (Permanent Repre- the strengthened NPT review process. Coming in the af- sentative of Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament termath of the body blows delivered to the NPT regime (CD)). Ambassador Salander headed the Swedish delega- by the South Asian nuclear tests of 1998, and the 1999 tion to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in which Swe- decision of the U.S. Senate not to give its advice and con- den, as a member of the New Agenda Coalition,2 played sent to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty a key role in achieving the adoption of a Final Document (CTBT), the 2000 Final Document was regarded as a re- by consensus. He thus brought considerable experience, newed commitment to and a vote of confidence for the credibility and negotiating skills to his chairmanship. continuing vitality of the world’s pre-eminent nuclear non- The 2002 PrepCom session was the first of at least three proliferation and disarmament norm. sessions leading up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Clarification of the purposes of the Preparatory Com- The 2002 PrepCom meeting provided the first opportu- mittee3 occupied much of the time of the PrepCom par- nity to implement and test the effectiveness of an agree- ticipants. The 2000 Review Conference had reaffirmed, ment made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to clarified, and enhanced the mandate of the PrepCom as enhance the strengthened review process for the treaty, set out in the decision from the 1995 NPT Review and originally agreed at the 1995 Review and Extension Con- Extension Conference. The 2000 Review Conference ference. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Con- specified that the first two sessions of the PrepCom (start- ference inter alia included an unequivocal undertaking ing in 2002), as well as its following sessions, should con- to the total elimination of nuclear weapons as one of an sider: specific matters of substance relating to the agreed set of practical steps for further progress in nuclear implementation of the NPT and of the 1995 Review and disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation, along with Extension Conference decisions, as well as the Resolu-
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 1 HENRIK SALANDER
tion on the Middle East adopted there; the outcomes of bassador László Molnar (Permanent Representative of subsequent Review Conferences; and developments af- Hungary to the United Nations), representing the Group fecting the operation and purposes of the treaty.4 of East European States, was unanimously selected as the According to the 2000 Review Conference Final Docu- chairman of the 2003 PrepCom. The chairman of the third ment, the 2002 PrepCom deliberations were to be factu- session and the president of the 2005 Review Conference ally summarized and the results transmitted in a report to would be nominated by the Non-Aligned Movement the next PrepCom session for further discussion. The same (NAM) States. process is to be followed at the second PrepCom session. Following two days of general debate comprising open- At its third, or as appropriate fourth session, the PrepCom, ing statements, the PrepCom held a total of 11 meetings taking into account the deliberations and results of its pre- for substantive discussion.7 The substantive discussion vious sessions, is to make every effort to produce a con- was structured according to an indicative timetable, which sensus report containing recommendations to the 2005 provided equal time for the consideration of three clus- Review Conference. ters of issues and three specific blocks of issues. Furthermore, the 2000 Final Document5 required con- The pattern for the following three clusters of issues sideration of reports by all States Parties on the imple- was developed at previous review conferences, where the mentation of Article VI (nuclear disarmament) and related substantive issues are divided into three main committees measures contained in the “Principles and Objectives” addressing:8 (a) Implementation of the provisions of the adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. treaty relating to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, dis- These regular reports within the framework of the armament, and international peace and security; (b) imple- strengthened NPT review process logically would be con- mentation of the provisions of the treaty relating to sidered by the PrepCom and by the 2005 Review Con- nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards, and ference. The 2000 Final Document6 also called upon the nuclear-weapon-free zones; and (c) implementation of the PrepCom and the 2005 Review Conference to consider provisions of the treaty relating to the inalienable right of reports on the steps undertaken by States Parties to pro- all parties to the treaty to develop research, production mote the achievement of a Middle East zone free of and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without nuclear weapons as well as of other weapons of mass discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II. At destruction and the realization of the 1995 Middle East the PrepCom, these issues were discussed by the plenary, Resolution. These reporting requirements, rather unex- as were three more specific blocks of issues: (a) imple- pectedly, became a major matter of contention at the 2002 mentation of nuclear disarmament;9 (b) regional issues, PrepCom, at one stage even threatening to scuttle the in particular with respect to the Middle East and imple- entire meeting. mentation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East;10 and (c) safety and security of peaceful nuclear programs. Outcome of the 2002 PrepCom The indicative timetable originally proposed by the chair- The first session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT man set aside a block of time for the consideration of dis- Review Conference was attended by 140 of the current armament and regional issues that included discussion of 187 States Parties. Cuba, a non-State Party, seven inter- the reports that were mandated in the 2000 NPT Final governmental organizations, and 62 non-governmental Document. Both the United States and France strongly organizations (NGOs) attended the open meetings of the objected to the allocation of a specific bloc of time for PrepCom. Ms. Hannelore Hoppe (Chief, Weapons of discussing reports11 and refused to accept any reference Mass Destruction Branch, Department for Disarmament to “reports” in the indicative timetable, claiming that the Affairs, United Nations) served as Secretary of the 2000 Final Document did not explicitly state that the PrepCom. Among the procedural decisions taken, it was PrepCom should consider reports. Underlying this con- decided that the second session of the PrepCom would cern was the desire to avoid a rancorous debate over U.S. be held in Geneva from April 28 to May 9, 2003; the third actions since 1998, including U.S. Senate rejection of the session would be held in New York from April 26 to May CTBT and the Bush administration’s declared opposition 7, 2004; and the provisional dates for the Review Con- to that treaty, as well as the U.S. withdrawal from the ference in New York would be May 2 to 27, 2005. Am- Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This deadlock on the
2 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 HENRIK SALANDER
issue of reports continued throughout the first week of nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, safeguards, export the PrepCom and was only resolved when the chairman controls, nuclear-weapon-free zones, regional issues agreed to delete any specific reference to reports on the (DPRK, Iraq, South Asia and the Middle East), strength- understanding that States Parties were free to present their ened physical protection of nuclear material, and report- reports. In connection with the indicative timetable, the ing. chairman made the following statement: “Nothing in the Following the presentation of the factual report, sev- indicative timetable of which we have just taken note al- eral States Parties voiced their concern that the report did ters the status of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT 12 not accurately or comprehensively capture either their re- Review Conference.” spective positions or the range of views expressed during Given the terrorist attacks in the United States in Sep- the PrepCom. However, no State Party objected to the tember 2001, States Parties were reluctant to criticize factual summary being annexed to the PrepCom report. strongly the United States, and by extension the other How the second session of PrepCom will deal with the nuclear weapon states, for their failure to implement ele- 2002 factual summary remains an open question. ments of the “13-practical steps” toward nuclear disar- 13 The following interview was completed at a workshop mament agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Several on assessing the 2002 PrepCom session organized by the States Parties addressed the issue of reporting and pre- Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, sented their reports on nuclear disarmament and on the in Annecy, France, on July 14-15, 2002. Comments in implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. brackets below were added by the editor and did not ap- Canada proposed inter-sessional work prior to the next pear in Ambassador Salander’s replies. PrepCom meeting on reporting, and a meeting on this subject is likely to be held soon in Geneva. PREPARATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS The issue of tactical nuclear weapons was taken up by a number of states, who called for negotiated legally bind- NPR: During the period between your nomination as ing limits on this class of nuclear weapon, which are cur- 2002 NPT Preparatory Committee Chairman desig- rently not subject to any formal or negotiated restraints. nate and the start of the 2002 NPT PrepCom, what The matter of restoration of compliance with the treaty preparations and consultations did you undertake? by DPRK and Iraq was raised by many States Parties. In What messages, for example, did you convey and what an “Informational Session”—an innovation introduced by advice or recommendations were given to you during the chairman—the International Atomic Energy Agency your extensive consultations? (IAEA), in addition to its usual statement on safeguards, made two additional statements at the request of the chair- Salander: Since my nomination in November 2001, I man, on the evolution of its strengthened safeguards sys- undertook quite a number of consultations. I had around tem and on the security and safety of nuclear material. 75 meetings of different kinds from January to April 2002, The informational sessions could serve a useful purpose most of them in Geneva and New York but also in sev- at future sessions of the PrepCom, as these could pro- eral capitals. Earlier, during November-December 2001, vide a relatively non-controversial venue for reviewing I had conducted informal discussions in Geneva and New certain substantive matters. York, but delegations and capitals did not really focus on the upcoming PrepCom until after the start of 2002. The chairman prepared a factual summary14 of the committee’s consideration of the issues, which was con- The discussions principally centered on the changes in the tained in Annex II to the Report of the 2002 PrepCom. review process decided in 2000, and how to implement (The summary is reprinted as an appendix to this article.) them most effectively. The topics recurring most often in Ambassador Salander produced the Chairman’s Factual these discussions were the process of shaping the Summary under his own responsibility, and its content PrepCom outcome and the nature of that outcome, the was not open for negotiation or change. This document program of work (i.e., the allocation of time for different comprises 37 paragraphs of text capturing the chairman’s issues during the two-week long PrepCom), and how to factual distillation of the views expressed by States Par- address the reporting requirements decided by consensus ties on a number of substantive matters, including nuclear in 2000.
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 3 HENRIK SALANDER
My messages during these consultations were originally focus of greater discussion than I had anticipated. On the of a general and fairly self-evident nature. I enumerated other hand, the Middle East received less attention at the all the problems States Parties had to solve under my guid- PrepCom than was expected, and it did not affect the pro- ance, such as: the product or outcome of the PrepCom; cess as much as was anticipated. In addition, the issue of the balance between different demands regarding the work negative security assurances generated less discussion than program; the role of NGO’s; etc. Later in the process, I had expected. when I had started to form my own opinions about how NPR: What international and U.S. domestic political to conduct the work of the PrepCom, I gave more fo- developments prior to the PrepCom affected its at- cused and concrete messages. These pertained to my plans mosphere and outcome? about how I would prepare the factual summary on my own responsibility, how I would allocate time among dif- Salander: Of course September 11th was the first and ferent topics during the PrepCom, etc. I received advice foremost issue affecting the PrepCom in that States Par- that was generally converging, and I think the consulta- ties were much less ready to press the United States on tions in general went quite well. The problems that came sensitive issues such as its withdrawal from the ABM later were of such a nature that they had to be solved Treaty, reluctance to ratify the CTBT and other aspects directly between States Parties, but under my guidance of the administration’s perceived “unilateralist approach.” of course. These problems could not have been resolved The sympathy for the United States was genuinely felt solely through my bilateral consultations, but required and expressed by many States Parties. September 11th political compromises between the parties directly con- obviously had a profound impact on U.S. policy as well. cerned. The developments in the Middle East also played a role, as did the debates in the United States and internationally NPR: What were your initial expectations about the about the future of missile defense. The U.S. Nuclear outcome of the PrepCom? Were these expectations Posture Review and its implications for U.S. nuclear weap- met, and if so, why and how were they met? If they ons policy also cast a shadow over the meeting. were not met, what accounts for the discrepancy? Salander: My overall expectations, in an optimistic sce- PROCEDURAL ISSUES nario, were to be able to craft a Chairman’s Factual Sum- NPR: What procedural issues remained to be resolved mary and to get it accepted in some way or another by prior to the start of the PrepCom? the PrepCom. Since that is what transpired, I must say that my expectations were met in a general way. On the Salander: None, really. I thought I had secured agree- other hand, one never knows beforehand what will hap- ment on the program of work when I arrived in New York pen in such processes, and I was mentally prepared for a a week in advance of the PrepCom, and there was very much rougher ride—even though it was difficult enough nearly a consensus that a chair’s summary should be is- as it was. I am pleased that the PrepCom ended with a sued on his own responsibility rather than to be negoti- result and not a breakdown, which many thought was a ated among States Parties. During the last few days before real risk. What I did not expect was the prolonged con- the PrepCom, however, it became apparent that there was troversy over the definition, in the program of work, of not agreement on how the time allocated for disarmament the time segments allowing discussion of States Parties’ and regional issues should be defined in terms of the dis- reports (see more below). Thus, on the whole, my initial cussion of “reports” provided for under those two blocs expectations were generally met. of time. NPR: What, if any, surprises were there with respect NPR: Many delegations were surprised by the inten- to the issues that were or were not raised at the Prep sity of the behind the scenes debate over your pro- Com? posed indicative timetable. Can you provide some background on how and why the issue emerged? To Salander: With one exception (i.e., the issue of report- what extent was it principally a procedural matter or ing), there were no really big surprises. Compliance came did it reflect a deeper divide over substantive issues up somewhat less than I had expected, whereas the re- including the nature of the strengthened review pro- porting issue in the timetable took more time than fore- cess? What other steps were you prepared to consider seen. Also tactical weapons became an issue that was the
4 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 HENRIK SALANDER if it had proved impossible to resolve the issue of the in the process and to facilitate the “anchoring” of the sum- indicative timetable by Monday, April 15? mary into the report of the PrepCom. Salander: The proposed timetable was my own effort to NPR: You took a very firm line on the nature of the achieve a compromise between proposals that were mu- “chair’s factual summary” and its relationship to the tually exclusive. I thought that I had reached a compro- report of the PrepCom. What led you to the approach mise between those wanting special time allocated for you adopted? Did you ever seriously consider attempt- discussion of reports and those not wanting any such dis- ing to produce a negotiated factual summary and was cussion. Then, a couple of nuclear weapon states [the their much support for that approach? What resis- United States and France] objected to the use of the word tance did you meet in implementing your approach “reports” in the indicative timetable. In order to keep the and how did you overcome it? PrepCom working on track, I arranged behind the scenes Salander: Further to my response to the previous ques- negotiations on the timetable and how the reporting seg- tion, I might add that about halfway into my consulta- ment would be defined. The deadline for the resolution tions, I came to the conclusion that I should not attempt of the timetable problem that I set for Monday, April 15, to “negotiate” the factual summary. Any such negotiation was somewhat arbitrary. But it gave delegations the week- would in fact probably have been against the intention of end to sort out their problems. I expected to have alterna- the decision taken in 2000 on improving the effectiveness tives to suspending the meeting proposed to me by of the strengthened review process for the Treaty. Fortu- delegations by Monday morning, in the event a timetable nately, I did not meet much resistance to my approach, could not be agreed upon. but I also remained quite firm and confident regarding my NPR: How did you manage the process of consulta- conclusion not to engage in negotiation of the factual sum- tions with key delegations in the absence of an infor- mary. In the final analysis, everybody seemed to agree mally constituted “friends of the chair”? Did you ever that this was the best way forward. feel the need for such a mechanism, as was employed The “anchoring” of the text took place during only a few in the past by some Review Conference presidents and hours over cups of coffee, at the very end in the margin Prep Com chairs? Why did you decide not to utilize of meetings. Once one goes beyond that, one is into a that kind of a body? negotiation. I believed that I had to do this kind of “an- Salander: I consulted widely and on an on-going basis. I choring”, that is, building some degree of support for the had decided early on not to set up a “friends of the chair” summary, but I am completely aware that this was a some- group or formal chair’s consultations. Many delegations what problematic approach and I am not sure that it could feel that they are locked out in such an arrangement [as be repeated another time [e.g., at the next session of the necessarily such groups in the past have included between PrepCom]. 22 to 35 states] and they do not accept or like that ap- About halfway into my consultations, say six to seven proach. In fact, I did not really feel such a need, because weeks before the PrepCom, I became convinced that I I had relied heavily upon my own delegation and its wide- would invite enormous trouble in trying to negotiate a fac- ranging contacts to engage in informal behind the scenes tual summary. The incentive to conclude negotiations discussions on matters of interest. I also delegated the dis- would not have been there [as States Parties probably cussions on the resolution of time-table problem to the would have found it difficult to compromise under the Canadian and Belgian Ambassadors when I did not have prevailing international conditions]. We would have left enough time myself. [Normally, the chair of a PrepCom with piles of unfinished papers [as in 1997 and 1998], can delegate such work to the vice-chairs, but this is not and we would probably have had much less time for ex- possible at the first session as the vice-chairs have not changes on matters of substance. Also, the drafting of the been selected.] Had the chair’s summary been opened for improvements in the strengthened review process in 2000 negotiation, it would have to have been in an open-ended made it rather clear, I believe, that negotiation on a fac- format [where all interested States Parties can have their tual summary was to be avoided that early in the process say]. Since the factual summary was issued on my own [i.e. at the first two sessions of the PrepCom]. responsibility, I showed only a few paragraphs to a very few key delegations in order to enhance their confidence Regarding the “status” of the factual summary, once it became clear that it would be a chairman’s summary, I
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 5 HENRIK SALANDER
noticed rather late in my consultations that this would in- tries and could not have been handled very differently. vite another kind of negotiation if I were to open a dis- As I have said, the “anchoring” of my factual summary cussion about its formal link to the Report of the PrepCom. extended over only a few hours in the margin of the meet- Proposals were given to me that the PrepCom ought to ings and over a few cups of coffee. Once one goes be- “take note of” or even “welcome” the factual summary, yond that one is into a negotiation, and that was nobody’s but I decided to establish the summary as a practical fact; intention at that time. on the floor of the PrepCom, so to say, and to play down NPR: It has now become tradition for NGOs to re- the formal links to the report (which is now only a simple serve one morning or afternoon for NGO presenta- reference to the relevant paragraph from the 2000 Final tions. Do you believe it is desirable or feasible to Document). Once I announced that the factual summary expand NGO access to the Rev Con/PrepCom delib- would simply be annexed to the Report, the debate on eration process? this issue died down. So, I think my strategy succeeded, although it is also possible to argue that the summary lacks Salander: I myself personally, and of course Sweden, formal “status.” On the other hand again, it is not its for- support broader NGO access. There is some resistance mal status that will decide if it will be useful next year, among States Parties, but in fact somewhat less than I and thereafter, or not. had expected. In a couple of years’ time, it might be more a question of practicality. NPR: How do you envisage the “factual summary” from the 2002 session to be factored into the work of NPR: You were blessed with a very able delegation to the 2003 session? assist you in your work. Are the established practices of the NPT review process, especially as they pertain Salander: Well, that is the big unknown. The factual sum- to the PrepCom, adequate to the tasks faced by the mary gives a snapshot of the situation regarding the imple- chair? What, if any, changes would you recommend mentation of the treaty and the outcomes of the 1995 and with respect to established practices that might en- 2000 NPT conferences and it provides guidelines to the hance the work of the committee/conference (e.g., the issues on the table. It is definitely not the start of a nego- financing formula, rules of procedure, and the absence tiated product. It may be of some use as a description of of an intersessional secretariat)? the difficulties that will have to be overcome prior to the 2005 Review Conference. The Chairman’s Factual Sum- Salander: It is definitely a big drawback for the first chair mary registers the pulse of the treaty’s status and its well- not to have the two others to work with. Continuity is being. In this sense, it constitutes a building block for the extremely important, and the three need to work as a team Final Report of the PrepCom to the 2005 NPT Review all through the process. Perhaps States Parties should also Conference. discuss some arrangement that takes care of travel costs and certain logistics in connection with the consultation NPR: Prior to the PrepCom, the United States indi- process. [This point has also been made by Ambassador cated its desire to have time allotted for “informa- Jayantha Dhanapala and Ambassador Abdallah Baali, re- tional sessions.” How did you address this request? spectively presidents of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Confer- Salander: There was skepticism toward that proposal from ences, but States Parties have remained reluctant to a number of countries. I tried to direct the idea toward consider additional funding or support mechanisms.] The what later became the two presentations by the IAEA, question of an intersessional secretariat is of course con- both of which were very well received by delegations. troversial, but it should be possible to set up some simple NPR: Were you content with the degree of transpar- arrangements. ency maintained during the PrepCom? Could it have been increased without jeopardizing the outcome of POLITICAL GROUPINGS your deliberations? NPR: Do the traditional political groupings (Western Salander: One always wants better and more transpar- Group, Eastern Group, and the Non-Aligned Move- ency, and rightly so. I cannot really be content, but at the ment) still fulfill useful functions? How did these same time, I could not have done much more than I did. groupings contribute to the work of the PrepCom and The discussions on the timetable involved only few coun- how or in what way did they facilitate a positive out- come?
6 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 HENRIK SALANDER
Salander: No, they are not very useful any longer, and meetings on the timetable problem with the NWS and some they did not contribute as groups to the outcome of the others, including some NAC members. PrepCom. The Western Group and the NAM fulfill a cer- tain function, however, in the sense that members can ASSESSMENT apply some pressure on other members, and allies can NPR: What were the important turning points in the put some pressure on other allies. The line of division now PrepCom, other than the adoption of the indicative goes more along nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon timetable, that made possible the smooth outcome? States (NWS/NNWS), but I believe that should not be more institutionalized than it already is. Salander: There was quite a lively debate on how to for- mally “anchor” the factual summary on to the Report of NPR: Does the Eastern Bloc play a role other than the PrepCom. But once I made clear that I would just the selecting of a candidate for the chairmanship of annex it, those who had wanted it to be “taken note of” the second session of the PrepCom? or even “welcomed”, accepted my decision. Otherwise, Salander: Not much before and during this PrepCom. we would have had a separate negotiation only on that. NPR: The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) was widely And, shortly before the PrepCom, there was general ac- regarded as playing a vital role at the 2000 NPT Re- ceptance of the concept of the chair’s responsibility for view Conference. Did it play a similar or different role the factual summary, which was also important. at the 2002 PrepCom? NPR: What were the most consequential new issues Salander: The situations were very different. At the 2000 that received attention at the PrepCom? NPT Review Conference there was a negotiation between Salander: The issues which in my view made the most the five NWS and the NAC, whereas there were no such headway at the PrepCom were tactical nuclear weapons negotiations at the PrepCom. The NAC did play an im- and reporting. Tactical nuclear weapons were mentioned portant role at the PrepCom, in their substantive input and for the first time in a consensus document at the 2000 also with their constructive participation, as individual del- NPT Review Conference. At the PrepCom, a large num- egations, and in the discussions about the program of work. ber of countries endorsed the 2000 Final Document and NPR: A number of NAC members who traditionally moved the issue forward. These countries had different have been major exponents of disarmament during affiliations in terms of security policy—they were Eurpean the NPT review process, were conspicuous by their Union members, NATO members, members of NAC and silence during the cluster debate. What factors may others. It was positive that some nuclear weapon states account for their reserved behavior? Does the exist- showed engagement on this issue as well. The Russian ence of a political grouping such as NAC affect sig- statements which demonstrated a willingness to discuss nificantly the assertiveness of national delegations? the issue in the NPT context were perhaps the most note- worthy. Salander: You will have to ask individual delegations. But normally the NAC position constitutes a framework and Second, reporting on Article VI was first mentioned in a individual members can take the floor and expand on that, consensus document at the 2000 NPT Review Confer- which also happened to some extent. But probably most ence. Reporting was an issue that many states parties members thought that the position papers from NAC ad- wanted to discuss at the PrepCom. Since the aforemen- equately reflected their positions up until the second tioned controversy developed, there was much more fo- PrepCom. As Chair, I had hoped for more interactive ex- cus on the reporting issue than had been expected. In total, changes. eighteen interventions were made on the issue during the cluster and special time debates. The different proposals NPR: Did you meet with the five NWS as a group dur- put forward at this PrepCom will help develop effective ing the Prep Com and/or with the NAC? and useful reporting. The delegation of Canada’s proposal Salander: No, I met with neither as a group. I also dis- for intersessional work in the form of open-ended con- continued my work as Swedish ambassador within the sultations to take place in the period leading up to the next NAC a couple of months before the PrepCom, in order PrepCom and subsequently up to the 2005 Review Con- not to mix the different roles. A couple of times I had joint ference, was supported by many countries. It is clear that reporting from now on will be high up on the agenda.
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 7 HENRIK SALANDER
NPR: Some participants observed that the PrepCom curity. Furthermore, I believe that NGOs can play an im- had a surreal quality in that some of the potentially portant role in opening a dialogue, especially with India. more contentious issues such as compliance, imple- NPR: Do you believe the outcome of the 2002 NPT mentation of disarmament commitments, and evolv- PrepCom is indicative of the successful implementa- ing nuclear weapons postures did not figure tion of the strengthened review process as envisaged prominently in the cluster debate. How would you by the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference? comment on the relationship between what transpired at the PrepCom and the urgency of proliferation chal- Salander: Partly yes and partly no. I think that this first lenges that exist today? PrepCom after the improvements agreed in the strength- ened review process at the 2000 NPTRC generated quite Salander: I do not entirely agree with the observation. a lot of substance, in terms of positions, papers, views, Those issues figured in the deliberations, but there was and policies. Procedure took up relatively less time than not a significant exchange on them. The urgency was in previous years. Also, the factual summary must be seen there, but a bit below the surface, because there was no as something along the lines of what States Parties were negotiation. We must remember that this is a new pro- thinking of when they improved or enhanced the strength- cess. I agree that there should be more interaction and ened review process two years ago. But there was also a more give and take between delegations. And, it will surely lack of true dialogue and genuine interaction among del- come in later PrepCom sessions when negotiations start. egations. That is something which is difficult to fix through NPR: A number of analysts attributed the successful more enhancements of the process—it requires genuine conclusion of the 2000 Review Conference to the will from governments to enter into such a dialogue. It is readiness of most States Parties to put aside the most difficult for governments to improvise and debate freely, difficult issues. Is that a fair characterization of what but they ought to be able to comment upon each other’s transpired at the 2002 PrepCom? positions and papers after some reflection. For example, Salander: The two situations are very different. Had the in the next PrepCom session, more thorough comments NPT Review Conference taken place this year, it would ought to be given on positions presented in this year’s have looked dramatically different than the PrepCom. session. There was a certain willingness among key delegations in NPR: What are the limitations and strengths of the this first PrepCom to have a successful (relatively speak- strengthened review process and how can it be made ing) outcome and not to put up ultimatums for the inclu- more relevant to NPT challenges today? sion of certain issues in the final product. Salander: The limitations are not the fault of the five- NPR: How should NPT holdouts be engaged in a dia- year cycle. They emanate from the political will, or some- logue? times lack of it, of governments. That said, the formats Salander: How to approach the fact that India, Israel, and that were devised in 1995 and again in 2000 have some Pakistan continue to stand outside the NPT is a very dif- problems built into them—for example, preparatory meet- ficult problem. There generally is a lack of good ideas ings shall not be and cannot be mini-review conferences, about this crucial issue. For several years now, States and the five-yearly conferences therefore take on enor- Parties have merely urged the three States to accede to mous importance and generate lots of tension and con- the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States, which they of flict. Whatever deficiencies we think there are in the course will not do for the time being. Also, the develop- process at present, I believe we must work through a full ments after September 11th have not strengthened the review cycle in the new format to see which changes and nuclear nonproliferation norms in relation to the three improvements will be desirable and possible after 2005. countries. Perhaps a start of a dialogue could address ideas NPR: What lessons have you derived from the 2002 such as having them agree to abide by NPT obligations PrepCom that may be relevant for the next one in without formally joining in the foreseeable future and with- 2003? Is there any counsel, in particular, that you out giving them any status as “nuclear weapon states,” would provide Ambassador Molnar and States Par- which of course is not possible under the provisions of ties as they prepare for the 2003 PrepCom? the NPT. Alternatively, or additionally, a dialogue could address aspects of nuclear safety and fissile material se-
8 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 HENRIK SALANDER
Salander: First, broad and transparent consultations need Part I and II), 25 May 2000. 5 Under paragraph 12 of paragraph 15 under Article VI of the 2000 Final Docu- to take place in advance. In addition to consultations be- ment: “Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review tween the chair and the States Parties and among States process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and para- Parties, national delegations should also dedicate time to graph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,’ and recalling the Advisory Opinion of their own internal preparations. This is particularly im- the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.” portant since key players on a number of delegations will 6 Sub-paragraph 7 of paragraph 16 under Article VII in the 2000 Final Docu- change in the coming year. Second, time management in ment. 7 According to agenda item 6, entitled “Preparatory Work for the Review of the meeting itself is very important, as is control of the the Operation of the Treaty in Accordance with Article VIII, Paragraph 3, of the handling of the two or three most contentious issues. Treaty, in Particular, Consideration of Principles, Objectives and Ways in Or- der to Promote the Full Implementation of the Treaty, as well as its Universal- ity, Including Specific Matters of Substance Related to the Implementation of the Treaty and Decisions 1 and 2, as Well as the Resolution on the Middle East Adopted in 1995, and the Outcome of the 2000 Review Conference, Including 1 Dr. William C. Potter is Institute Professor and Director of the Center for Developments Affecting the Operation and Purpose of the Treaty.” See Prepa- Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and the Center for Russian and Eurasian Stud- ratory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty ies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS). He has attended on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Report of the Preparatory Com- all NPT review meetings since 1995 as a member of Kyrgyzstan’s delegation, mittee at its First Session, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/21, paragraph 12, p. 5,
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 9 HENRIK SALANDER
APPENDIX sal norms and enlarging their scope. Strong support was expressed for the enforcement of existing multilateral trea- Chairman’s Factual Summary ties. The need to seek treaties and other international agreements that meet today’s threats to peace and stabil- 1. States parties reaffirmed that the Treaty on the ity was underlined. Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was the corner- stone of the global non-proliferation regime and the es- 7. The view was expressed that the Treaty should sential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. be seen in its larger context of coherent commitments and In the current international climate, where security and credible progress towards nuclear disarmament. Without stability continued to be challenged, both globally and re- the fulfillment of Article Vl over time, the Treaty, in which gionally, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- non-proliferation and disarmament were mutually inter- tion and of their means of delivery, preserving and dependent and reinforcing, would lose its true value. strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty was vital to 8. The importance of increased transparency with peace and security. regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the imple- 2. States parties stressed their commitment to the mentation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, voluntary confidence-building measure to support further the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and progress on nuclear disarmament was stressed. It was Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 emphasized that accountability and transparency of nuclear Review Conference, adopted by consensus. disarmament measures by all States parties remained the main criteria with which to evaluate the Treaty’s opera- 3. States parties further stressed that continued sup- tion. port to achieve universality of the Treaty was essential. They called on the four States remaining outside the 9. States parties remained committed to implement- Treaty—Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan—to accede un- ing article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of conditionally to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, the 1995 Decision on “Principles and objectives of nuclear particularly those three States that operated unsafeguarded non-proliferation and disarmament” and the Final Docu- nuclear facilities. Concern was expressed about the ongo- ment of the 2000 Review Conference. Disappointment ing development of nuclear weapons and missile was expressed in the progress made in implementing the programmes in different regions, including those of States practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts not parties to the Treaty. to implement article VI of the Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and objec- 4. It was stressed that the best way to strengthen tives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, as the non-proliferation regime was through full compliance agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. It was also noted by all States parties with the provisions of the Treaty. that the goal of nuclear disarmament could best be achieved 5. It was generally felt that the terrorist attacks of through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing 11 September 2001 had given an even greater sense of steps. urgency to the common efforts of all States in the field of 10. The nuclear-weapon States informed the States disarmament and non-proliferation. The view was held parties of their respective measures taken in accordance that further strengthening and reinforcing the non-prolif- with Article VI of the Treaty, for example, reductions of eration regime was imperative to prevent the use of nuclear nuclear weapons arsenals, reduced reliance on nuclear materials and technologies for criminal/terrorist purposes. weapons, and that new nuclear weapons were not being The enhancement of the non-proliferation regimes cov- developed. ering all weapons of mass destruction, including efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was 11. Concern and uncertainty was expressed about considered to be the most important integral part of com- existing nuclear arsenals, new approaches to the future bating terrorism. role of nuclear weapons, and the possible development of new generations of nuclear weapons. 6. There was emphasis on multilateralism as a core principle in the area of disarmament and non-prolifera- tion with a view to maintaining and strengthening univer-
10 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 HENRIK SALANDER
12. Strong support was expressed for the Compre- a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and hensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty, as reflected in the Fi- effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fis- nal Declaration adopted at the Conference on Facilitating sile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo- the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test sive devices and to establish a subsidiary body to deal with Ban Treaty held from 11 to 13 November 2001. The im- nuclear disarmament. The Conference was urged to agree portance and urgency of the early entry into force of the on a programme of work. States that have not yet done Treaty was underscored. States which had not ratified the so were called upon to declare a moratorium on the pro- Treaty, especially those remaining 13 States whose ratifi- duction of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other cation was necessary, and in particular those two remain- nuclear explosive devices. ing nuclear-weapon States whose ratification was a 17. The importance of arrangements by all nuclear- prerequisite, for its entry-into-force, were urged to do so weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile without delay. States reaffirmed the importance of main- material designated by each of them as no longer required taining a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions for military purposes, under IAEA or other relevant inter- or any other nuclear explosions. States parties noted the national verification and arrangements for the disposition progress made by the Preparatory Commission for the of such material for peaceful purposes was stressed. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization in establishing the international monitoring system. 18. Several States parties endorsed the work being carried out under the Trilateral Initiative—involving the 13. Concern was expressed that the decision by the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States—in United States of America to withdraw from the Anti-Bal- developing techniques and methodologies for placing ex- listic Missile Treaty, and the development of missile de- cess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons perma- fense systems, could lead to a new arms race, including nently under IAEA safeguards. States parties were in outer space, and negatively affect strategic stability and informed that the United States had already placed some international security. Hope was expressed that the bilat- of its fissile material under IAEA safeguards and that both eral negotiations between the United States of America the United States and the Russian Federation were work- and the Russian Federation to create a new strategic frame- ing to develop practical measures for the monitoring and work would further promote international stability. inspection of fissile material, including verification by 14. States parties welcomed the announcement in IAEA. Some States parties also noted the safeguards ex- December 2001 that the United States and the Russian perience of IAEA in verifying nuclear materials and ex- Federation had completed reductions in their nuclear ar- pressed the view that the Agency could play an important senals required under START I. They further welcomed role in verifying nuclear disarmament agreements. the continuing US-Russia bilateral negotiations on strate- 19. The view was held that the attainment of a gic nuclear arms reductions, and many expressed the hope nuclear-weapon-free world should be accompanied by the that such efforts would result in a legally binding instru- pursuit of other effective arms control agreements at a ment with provisions ensuring irreversibility, verification global and also particularly at a regional level. and transparency. 20. States parties recalled that regular reports should 15. The importance of further reductions in non-stra- be submitted by all States parties on the implementation tegic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and of Article VI as outlined in paragraph 15, subparagraph as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and dis- 12, of the 2000 Final Document. It was stressed that such armament process, was emphasized. There were calls for reporting would promote increased confidence in the over- the formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of all non-proliferation regime through transparency. Views 1991 and 1992 on reducing non-strategic nuclear weap- with regard to the scope and format of such reporting dif- ons. It was stressed that non-strategic weapons must be fered. Some States parties suggested that such reports further reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner. should be submitted, particularly by the nuclear-weapon Negotiations should begin on further reductions of those States, at each session of the Preparatory Committee, and weapons as soon as possible. should include detailed and comprehensive information, 16. States parties expressed regret at the inability of e.g. in a standardized format. Several States parties ex- the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on pressed interest in open-ended informal consultations on
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 11 HENRIK SALANDER reporting to prepare proposals for consideration for sub- ence and of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non- sequent sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Other Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been indefinitely States parties advocated that the specifics of reporting, extended without a vote in 1995. States parties reiterated the format and frequency of reports, should be left to the their support for the establishment of a Middle East zone determination of individual States parties. free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass 21. States parties recalled the 2000 Final Document destruction. States parties noted that all States of the re- and the request that all States parties, particularly the gion of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, were nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. States Par- other interested States, should report through the United ties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as Nations Secretariat to the President of the 2005 NPT possible and to place its nuclear facilities under compre- Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the hensive IAEA safeguards. Some States parties affirmed Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance the importance of establishing a mechanism within the of that Conference, on the steps that they had taken to Non-Proliferation Treaty review process to promote the promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and 24. States parties expressed concern at the increased objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. tension in South Asia and the continuing retention of nuclear weapons programmes and options by India and 22. Support was expressed for the concept of inter- Pakistan. States parties urged both States to accede to the nationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States (NWFZs) established on the basis of arrangements freely and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehen- arrived at among States in the regions concerned. The con- sive IAEA safeguards. States parties noted that both States tribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional have declared moratoriums on further testing and their peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear willingness to enter into legal commitments not to con- non-proliferation, was emphasized. It was noted that the duct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying number of States covered by the nuclear-weapon-free the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty. States par- zones has now exceeded 100. The establishment of ties called upon both States to sign the Comprehensive nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the Treaties of Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty. States parties noted the willing- Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba was con- ness expressed by both States to participate in negotia- sidered as a positive step towards attaining the objective tions on a treaty banning the production of fissile material of global nuclear disarmament. The importance of the for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. entry into force of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zone Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, States par- treaties was stressed. Efforts aimed at establishing new ties urged both States to commit to a moratorium on the nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the production of such fissile material. The importance of the world were welcomed. It was also stressed that assurances full implementation by both States of Security Council reso- against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all lution 1172 (1998) was emphasized. States of the zones should be provided by the nuclear- weapon States. Support was expressed for the efforts 25. The importance of full compliance by all States among the Central Asian countries to establish a nuclear- parties with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty weapon-free zone in their region. States parties noted that was stressed. States parties remained concerned that IAEA no progress had been achieved in the establishment of continued to be unable to verify the correctness and com- nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, South Asia pleteness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made and other regions. by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The 23. On the issue of universality, States parties reaf- Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was urged to come firmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East into full compliance with its Safeguards Agreement with adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference the IAEA. States parties expressed concern over the lack and recognized that the resolution remained valid until its of implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework. goals and objectives were achieved. The resolution was 26. States parties noted that since the cessation of the an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Confer- IAEA inspections in Iraq in December 1998, the Agency
12 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 HENRIK SALANDER had not been in a position to provide any assurance of sideration by the General Assembly at its fifty-seventh Iraq’s compliance with its obligations under Security Coun- session during autumn 2002 was commended. cil Resolution 687 (1991). Many States parties expressed 29. States parties recognized IAEA safeguards were grave concern and called for the full implementation of a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation re- relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution gime and commended the important work of the IAEA in 1284 (1999), and for the re-establishment of an effective implementing the safeguards system to verify compliance disarmament, ongoing monitoring and verification regime with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty. in Iraq, and hoped that UN inspectors would be able as soon as possible to resume their work in Iraq. Iraq reiter- 30. States parties welcomed the efforts of IAEA in ated that it was in full compliance with its Treaty obliga- strengthening safeguards and the Agency’s completion of tions and maintained that IAEA had successfully carried the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards. The out inspections in 2000, 2001 and 2002 pursuant to Iraq’s importance of the Model Additional Protocol was under- Safeguards Agreement with the Agency. lined. Some drew attention to the fact that States parties must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement 27. It was recalled that both the 1995 Review and and an additional protocol in place for IAEA to be able to Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference provide an assurance of both non-diversion of declared had underscored the importance of security assurances. material and the absence of undeclared activities or mate- It was emphasized that negative security assurances, a key rial. The goal of universality was stressed. States that had basis of the 1995 extension decision, remained essential not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements and should be reaffirmed. Many States parties reaffirmed with IAEA were called upon to do so without delay. Many that non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be effec- States parties called upon those that had not yet signed or tively assured by nuclear-weapon States against the use ratified the Additional Protocol to do so as soon as pos- or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Reaffirmations were sible. expressed of commitments under Security Council reso- lution 984 (1995). Many States parties stressed that ef- 31. It was reiterated that export controls were a key forts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally element of the non-proliferation regime under the Non- binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear- Proliferation Treaty. The important work of the existing weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. export control regimes was noted, in particular their func- Some States parties were of the view that this could take tion in guiding States parties in setting up their national the form of an additional protocol to the Treaty, without export control policies. The importance of transparency prejudice to the legally-binding security assurances already in export controls was widely recognized. It was reaffirmed given by the five nuclear-weapon States in the framework that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affect- of the treaties regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones. Pend- ing the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to de- ing the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon velop research, production and the use of nuclear energy States were called upon to honour their commitments for peaceful purposes. under the respective Security Council resolutions. Con- 32. Many States parties noted both the importance cern was expressed that recent developments might un- of combating nuclear terrorism and the many instruments dermine commitments taken under the respective Security available for doing this, including the physical protection Council resolutions. A view was held that the issue of se- of nuclear material and export controls. The IAEA’s ac- curity assurances was linked with fulfillment of the Treaty tion plan on the prevention of nuclear terrorism was widely obligations. Several States parties, including one nuclear- noted and supported. The Agency’s work in support of weapon State, emphasized the importance of a no-first States’ efforts to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and use policy. other radioactive material was also commended. 28. Education on disarmament and non-proliferation 33. States parties called for the strengthening of the was considered important to strengthening disarmament physical protection of nuclear material, inter alia, through and non-proliferation for future generations. In that con- a well-defined amendment of the Convention on the Physi- nection, the ongoing work of the group of governmental cal Protection of Nuclear Material. Many States parties experts which was expected to submit its report for con- called upon States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002 13 HENRIK SALANDER
Material. Support was expressed for the IAEA Interna- ference on safe transport of radioactive materials in July tional Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS). 2003 was welcomed by many. 34. The importance of strengthening nuclear safety, 36. States parties reiterated their strong support for radiation protection, the safety of radioactive waste man- article IV of the Treaty, which provided a framework for agement and the safe transport of radioactive materials cooperation and confidence for the peaceful uses of nuclear was stressed. The efforts of IAEA in the promotion of energy. In this context, States parties expressed wide sup- safety in all its aspects were welcomed. States parties that port for the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA. had not yet acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, It was underlined that technical cooperation plays an im- as well as the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent portant role in further developing the application of nuclear Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste energy for peaceful purposes, including human health, pest Management, were encouraged to do so. eradication, food and agriculture, and the environment. The importance of aligning technical cooperation 35. States parties emphasized that transportation of programmes with development goals and needs of the radioactive material, including maritime transportation, country concerned was emphasized. Several States par- should be carried out in a safe and secure manner in strict ties stressed the importance of providing the Agency with conformity with international standards established by the adequate resources for those activities. relevant international organizations, such as IAEA and the International Maritime Organization. Some States parties [Source: “Report of the Preparatory Committee on its First called for effective liability arrangements, prior notifica- Session, Annex II,” United Nations document NPT/ tion and consultation. Some States parties noted the con- CONF.2005/PC.1/21, April 18, 2002,
14 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2002