Review of Shaul Stampfer, Families, Rabbis & Education

Review of Shaul Stampfer, Families, Rabbis and Education: Traditional Jewish Society in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe by Marc B. Shapiro The continuation of my last post will be ready soon, but in the meantime I am posting my short review of Shaul Stampfer’s new book. It appeared on the H-Judaic listserv, but since most readers of Seforim Blog probably did not see it, I am posting it here as well. For many years, Shaul Stampfer has been recognized as an authority in all things dealing with nineteenth-century Jewish Eastern Europe. In his newest book, we have a collection of numerous essays representing more than twenty years of his scholarship, including one essay published for the first time (“The Missing Rabbis of Eastern Europe”). Stampfer’s focus is not on the purely intellectual debates between rabbinic elites. He is more interested in social history, how average people and in particular women lived. Even his discussions of rabbis emphasize such matters as inheritance of rabbinic positions and the rabbi’s role in communal life. His sources are quite broad: traditional rabbinic works as well as Hebrew, Yiddish, and Russian texts and newspapers. I could write extensively about every essay, each of which taught me a great deal. (And I never imagined that an entire essay could be written on the pushke and its development.) Yet to remain within the word limit for this review, let me just mention some of Stampfer’s most important points, the major theses of the book. People have generally assumed that marriages in Jewish Eastern Europe were very stable, with divorce being quite rare. Stampfer, however, provides evidence to demonstrate that divorce was common and not shameful. Based on his evidence, he is fundamentally correct. In addition to citing statistics, Stampfer also refers to memoir literature that mentions divorce. Yet I also think that Stampfer (and ChaeRan Y. Freeze before him) exaggerates the frequency of divorce. For example, one of his statistics of marriage and divorce is from the 1860s in the city of Berdichev where for every three to four marriages, there was one divorce. He cites similar statistics for Odessa (p. 46). Stampfer goes so far as to claim that “it may well be the case that there were thirty divorces for every hundred weddings in the nineteenth century” (p. 128). However, these numbers are certainly skewed for the simple reason that while marriages took place in every town, to obtain a divorce couples had to travel to a larger city where there was a beit din and scribe. Thus, divorces from any one city do not reveal a ratio of marriage to divorce. The situation is identical to what happens today. Couples get married anywhere they want, but must come to a central location for their divorce. Stampfer also argues that contrary to another popular stereotype, early teenage marriage was not at all common in traditional Jewish society. While it occurred among the economic and intellectual elite, and is immortalized in memoirs of the latter, early teenage marriage does not reflect the life experience of the average young Jew. Similarly, the lower class, which encompassed most Jews, did not have much use for matchmaker services, and indeed, romance was a factor in their marriages. Tied to the points made so far is the place of women in society. Many of us are accustomed to think of traditional society as one in which men had all the power and made all the decisions, and in which the husband went out to work while the wife served as a homemaker. Yet Stampfer shows that while this perception fits in very well with contemporary “family values,” it is not how East European Jewish society functioned. Women generally worked, were involved in business ventures, and were thus “out of the home.” Unlike today, the stay-at-home wife and mother was not necessarily an ideal. Stampfer also notes that many Jewish names were created from women’s names, which he thinks “reflects a reality in which both men and women could be in the centre” (p. 133). Adding to these arguments, Stampfer includes the following suggestive comment: “Another indication of the place of women in Jewish society can be found in the aesthetics of Jews in Eastern Europe. Males were regarded as attractive if they were thin, had white hands, and wore glasses. These were all reflections of lives devoted to study and perhaps to asceticism. On the other hand, attractive women had full bodies and were strong and active. Their appearance promised work and support. Different ideals are expressed here, but the image of the ideal woman is not one of weakness” (p. 133). In short, East European Jewish society was not what we would regard as a patriarchy. Conservative views on the importance of women staying in the home to raise children might be sound social policy, yet we should not assume that this is how East European Jews ever actually lived. Another fact noted by Stampfer, which will no doubt be surprising to readers, is the existence of coed heders. This is certainly not the image that people have of this institution. Yet while the coed aspect is interesting, especially, as Stampfer states, “given the contemporary concern (or obsession) in certain very Orthodox Jewish circles regarding co-educational education even in elementary grades,” even more significant is what this says about education for girls (p. 169 n. 11; see also p. 32). Contrary to what many think, there were East European Jewish girls who were educated just like their brothers, and Stampfer thinks that the ratio of girls to boys in heder was approximately one to eight (p. 170). As for education in general, while some people like to imagine Eastern Europe as a placenwhere Torah study always thrived, Stampfer notes that “one can safely conclude that by the mid-1930s there were far more young Jewish males in secondary schools than in yeshivas” (p. 272). Also worthy of note is Stampfer’s point that the kollel (a school of rabbinic studies for married men) system developed because there were no longer many rich fathers-in-law willing to support a son-in-law who was studying. In addition, he argues that the shrinking of the job market for rabbis also had a share in the development of the kollel. Let me conclude with some minor comments and corrections. On page 69, note 39, the proper reference in Pithei Teshuvah is Even ha-Ezer 9:5, and the rabbi cited should be R. David Ibn Zimra (Radbaz), not R. Jacob Willowski (Ridbaz).On page 181, Stampfer discusses the famous description by R. Barukh Epstein of his aunt, Rayna Batya, the wife of R. Naphtali Zvi Judah Berlin. While acknowledging that some have doubted the veracity of Epstein’s story, Stampfer states that “the account seems plausible.” Here I must disagree. While there can be no doubt that Batya was an unusual woman, Epstein’s account of his conversations with her, as with much else in his autobiography, cannot be relied on. I have discussed this at length elsewhere, and readers can examine my arguments at the Seforim Blog here. On page 285, Stampfer refers to the Moscow crown rabbi Jacob Mazeh (1859-1924) as having been martyred. Yet this is incorrect as Mazeh died a natural death. On page 326, note 6, regarding the Vilna Gaon’s attitude toward R. Jonathan Eibeschuetz, see Sid Z. Leiman, “When a Rabbi Is Accused of Heresy: The Stance of the Gaon of Vilna in the Emden- Eibeschuetz Controversy,” in Ezra Flescher, et al, eds., Meah Shearim (2001). Finally, on page 327, Stampfer offers evidence of criticism of the Vilna Gaon during his lifetime. In my September 12, 2009, post at the Seforim Blog, available here, I offer another example of such criticism. This is reported by R. Hayyim Dov Ber Gulevsky who heard it from his grandfather, R. Simhah Zelig Rieger, the dayan of Brisk. (Incidentally, Gulevsky is quoted by Stampfer on page 353.) As mentioned at the beginning of this review, there is much more that can be said about Stampfer’s careful scholarship, which is a treat for all readers. I know that many share my wish to soon see in print the English edition of his classic work on the Lithuanian yeshivot. * * * Let me now add a few additional comments especially for the benefit of those who had already read the review before I posted it here. 1. Stampfer’s book is published by my favorite press, Littman Library. I want to call readers’ attention to another recent and wonderful book published by Littman: Sharon Flatto, The Kabbalistic Culture of Eighteenth-Century Prague. Interestingly, two dissertations were written at the same time on the Noda bi-Yehudah. The other was by David Katz, which bears the interesting title “A Case Study in the Formation of a Super-Rabbi: The Early Years of Rabbi Ezekiel Landau, 1713-1754 (University of Maryland, 2004). Although Katz’ dissertation has not yet appeared in print, there is definitely room for the two as they focus on different areas and are both works of great learning. (Yet I hope that when Katz publishes his book, he changes the title. It is bad enough that today we have people writing about how they “consulted Daas Torah” as if there is such an individual so named. The only thing worse would be to hear people recount how “I asked the Super-Rabbi his opinion” or to have Yated tell how how “The Super-Rabbi has issued his Daas Torah.” That will surely leave the religious Zionists reaching for their kryptonite.) Regarding how Landau was indeed a “Super-Rabbi,” to use Katz’ expression, I found interesting testimony in R. Shraga Feivish Shneebalg, Shraga ha-Meir, vol. 2, no. 76. He states that he heard from R. Dov Berish Wiedenfeld, who heard from R. Meir Arik, that the Noda bi-Yehudah was the posek ha-dor. Assuming there is such a position, I don’t know of anyone more qualified for it than Landau. I must admit, however, that this is an Ashkenazic-centered perspective, because it is unimaginable that a Sephardic scholar would ever come into consideration by most of those who like to speak of the gadol ha-dor. Thus when people refer to R. Yitzhak Elhanan Spektor, R. Hayyim Ozer Grodzinski, etc. as the gadol ha-dor. they never wonder if perhaps there was a great sage in the Sephardic world who fit the bill. When people speak about the gadol or posek ha-dor, it really means the gadol or posek of their world. Returning to Arik, he said that after the Noda bi-Yehudah the Hatam Sofer held that role. Here again, I don’t think there will be much argument. But the names he gives after this show how Arik, a Galician scholar, sees matters differently than a Lithuanian. He claimed that R. Solomon Drimer was the next posek ha-dor, yet I don’t think most people reading this post have even heard of him. For the next period, he gave the Hungarian posek R. Solomon Leib Tabak of Sighet (died 1908), author of Erekh Shai. Again, I don’t think most people reading this post have ever heard of Tabak. Yet Arik regarded him as the posek ha-dor. As a Galician, not a Lithuanian, Arik had a different perspective on who the great poskim were.[1] Yet a Lithuanian hearing this would laugh. If you asked him who the posek ha-dor was for the period of Tabak, he could give all sorts of names: R. Yitzhak Elhanan Spektor, R. Naftali Zvi Judah Berlin, R. Jehiel Michel Epstein, R. Joseph Zechariah Stern, and the list goes on, but Tabak wouildn’t even make it to the top twenty. This different perspective was recognized by R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg. In one responsum (Kitvei R. Weinberg, vol. 1, no. 11), after quoting a position of a Hungarian posek, Weinberg writes: ודאי שרבני ליטא ופולין ילעגו על דברים אלה ואולם המחבר הנ”ל הי’ גאון וצדיק מפורסם וחלילה לבטל דבריו בתנופת יד גרידא. כתבתי כל הנ”ל כדי להוכיחו שצריך הוא להיות זהיר ומתון ולא להמשך אחרי הקולות של רבני ליטא ופולין שהם גדולים וחכמים בהלכה אבל בהוראה למעשה עולה עליהם רבני אונגארן וגאליציען ומובחרי השו”ת בהוראה למעשה שיצאו בזמן האחרון נתחברו על ידם. Earlier in this responsum Weinberg writes: כבר רמזתי לכת”ר שבעינים כאלו יש לסמוך יותר על רבני אונגארן הקרובה לאשכנז ויודעים מצב הדברים באשכנז יותר מרבני פולין וליטא. ובכלל נוטה אני מדעת חברי ורבותי רבני פולין וליטא שאינם משגיחים הרבה ברבני אונגארן. גם אני הייתי סבור כן קודם בואי לכאן, אבל אח”כ ראיתי כי בעניני הוראה עולים הם על רבני פולין וליטא, כי יש להם חוש מיוחד להוראה מעשית וכמעט כולם נתחנכו בבית מדרשו של רבינו שבגולה החת”ס ז”ל שהוא הי’ עמוד ההוראה כידוע ומפורסם. These words are amazing because Weinberg is admitting that before he came to Germany, he too shared the feeling of superiority that he describes here. Before then it was unimaginable to him that a posek outside of Lithuania or Poland would have had much of value to add. 2. In a previous post, available here, I wrote about rabbis who began writing books at a very young age. I was asked if there are additional examples of this. There are indeed a number, and in a future post I will discuss one in more detail. For now, here is the title page of R. Aaron Friedlander’s Avrekh, where it tells us that part of the book was written when the author was nine years old! See also the approbations to this volume. Here is the title page of R. Hezekiah David Abulafia’sBen Zekunim. If you read the introduction you will see that the first part of this book was written when the author was thirteen years old.

R. Yitzhak Arieli reported being told by R. Kook that the latter authored a book on Song of Songs when he was only eleven years old. You can find Arieli’s testimony here. As I am writing this people are once again outraged by something R. Ovadiah Yosef said, in that he attributed the fires in Israel to lack of Sabbath observance. Obviously, this is not the sort of comment that appeals to those with a modern temperament, but in traditional societies it is an expectation of the people that the leading rabbis will find some spiritual reason to explain tragedies. So why I am mentioning this now? Because in the document from Arieli, no. 38, he quotes R. Kook as saying something that people will find even more shocking than anything R. Ovadiah has ever said. (I don’t think you will find the students of R. Kook ever repeating it.) R. Kook wondered if the 1929 pogrom in Hebron was perhaps due to the fact that the Hebron Yeshiva brought in their “modern” ways to Israel, by which he means their way of dressing, hair style and beardless faces. בהפרעות (בשנת תרפ”ט) בחברון מצאתיו ביום ראשון יושב ובוכה והבליט מפיו שמא מפני שהכניסו תלבושת והנהגה חדשה בארץ (היה מתנגד לגלוח הזקן (כמובן במכונה או בסם) ובלורית ואולי גם בגדים קצרים, ובישיבה העיר כ”פ ע”ז ( אבל קשה היה לשנות ההרגלים שבחו”ל). I agree that this sounds shocking and offensive to modern ears, especially to those who lost family members in this event. I mean, can you imagine telling someone whose child was killed that it was because certain yeshiva students were dressing in a modern fashion? But again, the traditional mind works differently than the modern mind. I say this not to recommend that we all reprogram our minds so that these sorts of explanations are once again appealing, any more than I would wish that, as with Jews in medieval Germany, we once again believe that demons are all around us causing all sorts of problems. I mention it only to add some context and help explain how the most influential rabbinic mind of the twentieth century could say something which to modern ears sounds outrageous. Just as it wrong to judge pre-modern science negatively because it didn’t have access to modern technology, so too we must be careful about being prejudiced against traditionalist explanations because we might no longer share the same assumptions as our predecessors 3. With regard to R. Baruch Epstein’s discussions about his uncle the Netziv in Mekor Barukh, the irony is that the Netziv thought that there was no good purpose in reading the biographies of great Torah sages. He thought that this was nothing less than bitul Torah. See the letter from R. Hayyim Berlin printed at the beginning of his father’s Meromei Sadeh. The Netziv’s concern with bitul Torah was such that when his wife (I presume his first wife, Rayna Batya) had to have an operation and the students wanted to say Tehillim for her, the Netziv refused to stop the learning for this. After the students continued to push, he agreed to allow five minutes of tehillim. This was reported by R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, who must have heard it from his father. See R. Hayyim Avihu Schwartz, Be-Tokh ha-Torah ha-Goelet (Beit El, 2006), p. 201. In an e-mail discussion with one reader, he contrasted the Netziv to R. Chaim Soloveitchik and R. Velvel ,saying that the Netziv was so “normal”. I don’t want to use words like that, and while R. Chaim had many unique qualities, I don’t think the stories told about him are any more unusual than those told of other gedolim. Most of these stories are, in fact, quite inspiring. The stories about R. Velvel are, I admit, of a different flavor. I mentioned two such examples here.

Yet lest one thing that these type of stories are unique to R. Velvel, let me mention a story about the Aderet “brought down” (to use the yeshiva lingo) in the book I just referred to, Be- Tokh ha-Torah ha-Goelet, p. 324. R. Zvi Yehudah told how one of the Aderet’s sons died right after birth, just as Shabbat was starting . The Aderet told his wife that she should perpare the Shalom Zakhor as if everything was normal, for there is no avelut on Shabbat and the community does not need to know that anything is wrong. When the Rebbetzin began to cry the Aderet replied to her that she is acting this way because she doesn’t study Talmud. If she studied Talmud she would know that there are often times when we are left with questions, and the same is true in life. 4. Stampfer’s point about the frequency, and lack of shame, of divorce in Eastern Europe was an eye-opener to me. In Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy, p. 22, I mention that divorce was very uncommon in traditional Lithuanian Jewish society, and almost unheard of among the rabbinate. I now see that I was mistaken in this assumption (which was based on my general impressions, not on the sort of evidence Stampfer makes use of). For examples of rabbinic figures who got divorced, see here. 5. I referred to Daas Torah above, and since someone asked me if I could write up what I said about it in a recent lecture, I will do so now. In this lecture I quoted what appears in R. Yitzhak Dadon’s new book, Rosh Devarkha. This is the follow-up to his earlier book, Imrei Shefer, both of which record the teachings of R. Avraham Shapiro, Rosh Yeshiva of Merkaz ha- Rav. On p. 10 one finds R. Avraham’s very harsh comments against Daas Torah. He would refer to it as Ziyuf ha-Torah. Here are some of his words: האם התורה עוברת רק דרך אדם אחד?! בחו”ל לא היה כדבר הזה! זה אמר כך, וגדול פלוני חלק עליו וחשב אחרת, מישהוא אמר שהפלוני הזה הוא נגד “דעת תורה”?! מהיכן הביאו את הדבר הזה? אם ה”חפץ חיים” סבר כך ורבי מאיר שמחה אחרת ופלוני גדול אחר חלק עליהם, יש מי מהם שהוא נגד “דעת תורה”? איזו הנהגה היא זו? .זו השתלטות על דעת הרבנים, ולא היה כזאת בעם ישראל

As for the practice of declaring what the Daas Torah is through the newspaper or through placards, without any sources to support this, here are R. Avraham’s strong words (and apologies if any wives are offended): כלפי רבנים המוצאים חוות-דעת ותלמידיהם מפרסמים זאת תחת הכותרת: “דעת תורה”, בלי שום אסמכתאות ומקורות נאמנים היה מרן זצ”ל אומר: “איזו מין דעת תורה היא זו? כשאדם אומר “דעת תורה” בלי שום מקורות, אז הכוונה היא כזאת: זה קצת מבוסס על מה שהוא למד, והרוב .זה מה שאשתו אמרה לו, זה הפירוש דעת תורה

Anyone who is honest will admit that the current practice of Daas Torah is completely phony. My proof of this is very simple. If tomorrow R. Elyashiv would declare that everyone has to say hallel on Yom ha-Atzmaut, would the Lithuanian yeshiva world listen to his Daas Torah? Of course not. They would simply replace him with another gadol whose Daas Torah is more palatable to them. In other words, the gadol only has Daas Torah because the masses, or the askanim, let him have it, and only when they like what he says. (I am curious. Has R. Elyashiv’s ruling that fashionable sheitls are forbidden had any effect on his supposed followers?). Try to imagine what would happen if someone in the haredi world discovered a letter from the Hazon Ish, the ultimate Daas Torah authority, in which he said that only the best and the brightest in the State of Israel should devote themselves to Torah study. However, everyone else should go to work. Does anyone think that this letter would ever see the light of day? Of course not! We all know what would happen. The letter would be kept hidden, and if by chance some rebel did publish it, the haredi world would find a way to justify why they don’t accept the Hazon Ish’s viewpoint. 6. In this post I referred to a mistaken point by R. Ezriel Tauber in his recent book Pirkei Mahashavah al Yud Gimel Ikarim le-ha-Rambam. I was asked if my negative comment relates to the entire book, or just the one point I referred to. My answer is that I wasn’t referring to the entire book, and I am sure that people will find things that are valuable in it. Yet I have to say that I don’t find it helpful when an author like Tauber asserts, p. 428, that people who claim to be atheists are really not. Rather, they just don’t want to believe, but deep down they know the truth. Contrary to Tauber (and he is not the only one to express himself this way), the only intellectually honest position is to take people like Christopher Hitchens at their word and deal with it. Claiming that the atheist really believes is no better than the atheist saying that the believer really knows the truth that there is no God. Furthermore, from my perspective I can’t take an author seriously when he says things like how in the Far East there are people who have the power to use black magic, and their knowledge is part of a tradition that goes back to Abraham. P. 133: ואכן במזרח הרחוק יודעים שמות של טומאה, ויש להניח ששורש הידיעה היא מאברהם אבינו. ואף על פי שהם כוחות אמיתיים, אסור לנו להשתמש בהם. * * * I want to take this opportunity to invite all Seforim Blog readers on what I know will be an amazing Jewish heritage tour to Central Europe this summer. Details can be found here. They are still working on the price, and it will be posted soon. Those who want further details are invited to contact me. With Christmas Eve almost upon us, I also invite readers to watch, or listen to, my lecture “Torah Study (or Lack of It) On Christmas Eve: The History of a Very Strange Practice.” It is available here. The few dollars (Canadian) that it costs go to support a very worthy organization, Torah in Motion. Notes

[1] Wiedenfeld, who is the source for the information from Arik, actually had a special place in the eyes of the Lithuanian yeshiva world. Haym Soloveitchik writes (TUMJ 7 [1997], p. 144): Intellectually, the Lithuanian approach to talmudic study (derekh ha-limmud) has triumphed. One could scarcely imagine a Hungarian rosh yeshiva being considered as a candidate to head a Lithuanian yeshiva. Nor is it accidental that with one early, minor exception (the Tchebiner Rav [Wiedenfeld]), all the embodiments of da’at Torah, both in America and Israel, have been Lithuanian.

New Writings from R Kook Part 1 by Marc B. Shapiro

New Writings from R Kook and Assorted Comments, part 1 by Marc B. Shapiro 20 Marheshvan,[1] 5771 I now want to return to R. Kook and discuss some of his writings that have recently appeared. This is the first of what will be a five part post. It will be followed by at least one other multi-part post also dealing with R. Kook’s new writings. For those who have never read R. Kook and don’t understand why there is such excitement every time a new collection is published, I suggest you do the following: Take one of the volumes and sit with it for an hour, just going through it, page after page. Odds are that you will be hooked. The originality that you find, and the power of his writing, is just breathtaking. It is impossible not to sense the power of his spirit, and it draws you in. Books will be written on R. Kook, focusing on the insights found in the recently published volumes. They will analyze what is original in these works and the evolution of his thought. My purpose is more limited as I just want to call attention to some passages that caught my attention and which I think are significant, not just in the context of R. Kook’s writings, but also for anyone interested in Jewish thought. In 2006 R Kook’s Kevatzim mi-Ketav Yad Kodsho appeared, and we can thank Boaz Ofen for this. Included in this volume is what is referred to as the last notebook from Bausk, which was where R. Kook served as rabbi from 1901 until his aliyah in 1904. On pp. 66-67 we find what I think is R. Kook’s first discussion of evolution. Unlike his other writings, here R. Kook mentions that he is relying on Maimonides on how to deal to deal with it. He mentions that Maimonides assumes the eternity of the world when he seeks to prove the existence, unity, and incorporeality of God. Maimonides adopts this model so that his proof will be acceptable to everyone. R. Kook states that this is also how we should deal with the issue of evolution. In other words, even if we don’t accept it, we should, for the sake of argument, assume that evolution is correct and explain the Torah based upon this. This will mean that even people who accept evolution will see the truth of Torah. By rejecting evolution, and declaring that it is in opposition to the Torah, right from the start you are stating that Judaism has no place for those people who accept one of the major conclusions of modern science. It is noteworthy that this text does not have any of R. Kook’s later thought, which speaks of the theory of evolution as being in accord with kabbalistic truth. Another early statement of his with regard to evolution is found in Shemonah Kevatzim 1:594. Here he says that it is very praiseworthy to attempt to reconcile the Creation story with the latest scientific discoveries. He says that there is no objection to explaining the Creation, described as six days in the Bible, to mean a much longer period. He also states that we can speak of an era of millions of years from the creation of man until he came to the realization that he is separate from the animals. This in turn led to the beginning of family life, in other words, “civilization”. What R. Kook is saying is that the entire story of the creation of Adam and Eve is not to be viewed as historical. Rather, it is a tale that puts in simple form a long development of man’s intellectual and spiritual nature.[2] He doesn’t see this development as random, for he says that at the end of the long period it was a vision, or perhaps we should call it an epiphany, that offered man the perception that it was time to establish family life. It is, I think, referred to by R. Kook as beginning אדם obvious that the civilized life is not an actual historical man (i.e., Adam), but rather humanity as a whole.[3]

אין מעצור לפרש פרשת אלה תולדות השמים והארץ, שהיא מקפלת בקרבה עולמים של שנות מליונים, עד שבא אדם לידי קצת הכרה שהוא נבדל כבר מכל בעלי החיים, ועל ידי איזה חזיון נדמה לו שצריך הוא לקבע חיי משפחה בקביעות ואצילות רוח. R. Kook also explains that the deep sleep God placed Adam in (Gen. 2:21) can be understood as representing the length of time it took for humanity to come to the awareness of the idea of “bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh”. In other words, R. Kook sees the opening chapters of Genesis as representing a long period of development of the most important ideas of civilization, that of the dignity of man and the importance of family and the bond of marriage. Nothing here is as it appears, and literalism is out of the question. We find in R. Kook’s most recently published book, Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor, more passages that relate to what I have been discussing.[4] This is an early work which was being prepared for publication and was released on the internet against the wishes of the editor. It has now been widely distributed and there is no reason not to cite it. R. Kook saw this book as a modern day Guide for the Perplexed, so obviously there is a great deal we can learn from it. Shortly after the work was “released,” another edition of the book was published by the folks at Merkaz ha-Rav. They called it Pinkesei ha-Re’iyah, vol. 2, and like everything else produced by these people, it is heavily censored.[5] (Parts of Pinkesei ha-Re’iyah have been included in the new Humash ha-Re’iyah that was just published. Here is a sample.

Although it would have been better had the editors used Li- Nevokhei ha-Dor, this new Humash is still a wonderful book to take to shul. You can find out more about it here.) Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor begins (ch. 2) by arguing that it is the “obligation of the true sages of the generation” to follow in the path of the medieval greats who were always concerned about those suffering religious confusion. While the contemporary spiritual leaders must respond to the concerns of modern Jews, R. Kook points out that since the issues confronting people today are so different than those of the medieval period, the works of the rishonim are of only limited value in confronting the current problems. In ch. 3 R. Kook states that the medieval approach of trying to “prove” religion will not work in our day, and that in place of this, religious leaders should stress justice and righteousness, i.e., the humane values of Judaism.[6] He recognizes that the real problem for modern Jews is not the scientific or philosophical challenges to Torah, but the ethical ones, and that Torah scholars must explain those concepts that appear to stand in contradiction to modern ethical values. He sees this task as just like what the medievals did in dealing with the physical descriptions of God in the Bible, which contradicted the philosophical notion that God has no form. These sages showed the way out of this problem and in the end the truth of the Torah was understood. R. Kook says that contemporary sages must do the same thing with regard to ethical challenges. If not, people will reject the Torah because they view its message as contradicting what they know to be ethical, that which R. Kook refers to as “the .(חקי המוסר הטבעיים) ”laws of natural morality With this in mind, let me quote an amazing passage of R. Kook that I have referred to before. It appears inShemonah Kevatzim 1:75 and the translation is by David Guttmann.[7] Yir’at Shamayim—fear of heaven—may not supplant the natural sense of morality of a person, for in that case it is not a pure Yir’at Shamayim. The signpost for a pure Yir’at Shamayim is when the natural sense of that is extant in the (המוסר הטבעי) morality straightforward nature of man is improved and elevated by it more than it would have been without it. But if one were to imagine a kind of Yir’at Shamayim that without its input, life would tend to do well and bring to fruition things that benefit the community and the individual, and furthermore, under its influence less of those things would come to fruition, such a Yir’at Shamayim is wrong. The upshot of this passage is that some (much?) of what passes for piety today is really nothing more than a corrupted religiosity.

This natural morality that R. Kook spoke of was not only in nature, but also in people. This led R. Kook to a unique understanding of the relationship between scholars and masses. Anyone who has studied in a yeshiva knows that it inculcates a certain amount of condescension for the masses. For what could the masses, the typical am ha-aretz, possibly have to offer the scholar? Yet R. Kook saw matters differently, and recognized that there was an element of natural Jewish morality in the masses that was no longer to be found among the scholars, and the scholars ignored this to their own detriment. And let us not forget that the masses that R. Kook was referring to were not like many of our masses who go to day school, yeshiva in Israel, and attend daf yomi before going to work. The East European Jewish masses never opened a Talmud after leaving heder. They were pious and recited Psalms and came to a shiur in Ein Yaakov or Mishnayot, but without having studied in yeshiva, and lacking an Artscroll, the Talmud was closed to them. Incidentally, the rabbis had no problem with this arrangement, unlike today when Talmud study has become a mass movement. Had the masses in R. Kook’s day had any serious learning, then he couldn’t have said what he did, because his point is precisely that learning “spoils” some of the Jew’s natural morality. Here are R. Kook’s words in Shemonah Kevatzim 1:463: האנשים הטבעיים שאינם מלומדים, יש להם יתרון בהרבה דברים על המלומדים, בזה שלא נתטשטש אצלם השכל הטבעי והמוסר העצמי על ידי השגיאות העולות מהלימודים, ועל ידי חלישות הכחות וההתקצפות הבאה על ידי העול הלימודי. This is a an anti-intellectual passage, in which we see R. Kook favoring the natural morality and religiosity of the simple Jew over that of his learned co-religionist. (It was precisely this sort of sentiment that was expressed by Haym Soloveitchik at the end of “Rupture and Reconstruction.”) Can anyone be surprised that this passage was not published by R. Zvi Yehudah? He recognized all too well the implications of these words, which I am only touching on here. R. Kook continues by saying that the masses need the guidance of the learned ones when it comes to the halakhic details of life. That we can understand, since the masses can’t be expected to know, say, the details of hilkhot Shabbat. But in a passage quite subversive to the intellectual elite’s self- image, R. Kook adds that the learned ones also have a lot to learn from the masses. In fact, if you compare what each side takes from the other, I don’t think there is any question that what the masses give the learned is more substantial than the reverse. והמלומדים צריכים תמיד לסגל לעצמם כפי האפשרי להם את הכשרון הטבעי של עמי הארץ, בין בהשקפת החיים, בין בהכרת המוסר מצד טעביותו, ואז יתעלו הם בפיתוח שכלם יותר ויותר In ch. 4 of Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor, R. Kook comes to evolution and here he speaks of the billions of years of history identified קטני by modern science. He says that this is a problem for the who think that evolution is a rejection of God, but those דעה who hold such a position are making a great error. The true believer will be led to even greater wonder at the ways of God when he sees how long it has taken for species to evolve. As for the Creation story, R. Kook begins ch. 5 by telling us that it is not to be understood literally, as Maimonides had already taught. Knowing that some might nevertheless be tied to a literal reading of the opening chapters of Genesis, R. Kook insists that this is not one of the principles of the Torah. (Until a few years ago this was not a principle in the haredi mind either.) In ch. 5 we see R. Kook’s preference for the evolutionary scheme over the traditional story of creation at one time, and he sees this understanding as bringing us closer to God. Just as we are amazed by the growth of a baby inside the womb, so too we will be in awe at the development of the physical world. He is absolutely clear that the creation story is not a scientific description but is directed towards a moral end: ויסוד הדבר, שלא דברה תורה כי אם במה שנוגע לכדור ארצינו, וגם זה רק לפי התוכן שיובן הצד המוסרי שנוגע להישרת דרכי האדם הליכותיו החיצוניות ורגשותיו הפנימיים יפה יפה This is a strong rejection of the neo-fundamentalist hermeneutical acrobatics of people like Gerald Schroeder (and to a lesser extent Nathan Aviezer).[8] They start with the assumption that the Torah’s Creation story is indeed describing scientific reality, yet until they explained it, no one in history had understood the meaning of the verses. From R. Kook’s perspective, this is a great misinterpretation of what the Creation story is telling us. As for the “young earthers’” objection (which I admit to having never understood) that Shabbat depends on seven 24 hour days of creation, R. Kook disposes of that without much ado: אין כל מניעה בזה לא מצד הכתובים, ולא מצד חובת קדושת השבת שמכוונת כפי הציור הפנימי של האדם He continues by saying that other parts of the Creation story can also be explained in a non-literal fashion: ואפילו אם נפרש עוד יותר על פי משל את הסידור של בריאת האדם, שימתו בגן עדן, קריאת השמות, בנין הצלע, אין דבר מתנגד ליסודי התורה . . . ואין קפידא אם נצייר הנחש כולו ציורי, וכן עץ הדעת על התגלות הנטיה לצאת ממצב המנוחה והתמימיות העדינה Crucial for R. Kook’s understanding is that that there came a point in human development when man was able to recognize the Divine. Only then could he be described as created in the image of God. Even before the recent publications, these thoughts of R. Kook were not unknown. Here is what he writes inIggerot ha- Re’iyah, no. 134: אין לנו שום נפ”מ אם באמת היה בעולם המציאות תור של זהב [=גן עדן], שהתענג אז האדם על רב טובה גשמית ורוחנית, או שהוחלה המציאות שבפועל מלמטה למעלה מתחתית מדרגת ההויה עד רומה, וכך היא הולכת ומתעלה The last part of this quotation refers to the evolutionary understanding, in that existence works its way “from the bottom up”. Returning to Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor, ch. 5, as an example of how the allegory works, R. Kook refers to Eve being taken from Adam’s rib, which cannot be understood literally if we are dealing with an evolutionary scheme. He sees this as a vision, designed to show that family life can only succeed if both husband and wife join together. The wife cannot be a helpmate alone, but has to be joined with her husband. A surface read of this passage might lead one to think that according to R. Kook this “vision” was an actual event that occurred with the historical “first man”, which would means that this first man had a relationship with God. Yet from Shemonah Kevatzim 1:594, which is a parallel passage to the one in Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor, we see that this is not the case. להשוות סיפור מעשה בראשית עם החקירות האחרונות הוא דבר נכבד. אין מעצור לפרש פרשת אלה תולדות השמים והארץ, שהיא מקפלת בקרבה עולמים של שנות מליונים, עד שבא אדם לידי קצת הכרה שהוא נבדל כבר מכל בעלי החיים, ועל ידי איזה חזיון נדמה לו שצריך הוא לקבע חיי משפחה בקביעות ואצילות רוח, על ידי יחוד אשה שתתקשר אליו יותר מאביו ואמו, בעלי המשפחה הטבעיים. התרדמה תוכל להיות חזיונית, וגם היא תקפל איזה תקופה, עד בישול הרעיון של עצם מעצמי ובשר מבשרי. והודיע הכתוב שקדושת המשפחה קדם להבושה הנימוסית בזמן, וכן במעלה, שאחר ההתעוררות מהתרדמה הוחלט דבר זאת הפעם, ומכל מקום היו שניהם ערומים ולא יתבוששו. According to R. Kook’s portrayal of humanity’s development in the direction of a stable family unit, there is only one word to describe the story told in Gen. 2, and that is “myth.” While in the popular mind myth often is identical with fairy tale, this is not how scholars understand myths. For them, myths communicate cosmic truths in non-historical story form, and they are not synonymous with legends. My dictionary explains myth as “a usually traditional story of ostensibly historical events that serves to unfold part of the world view of a people or explain a practice, belief, or natural phenomenon.” This explanation is a perfect description of what R. Kook writes in the passage just quoted fromShemonah Kevatzim. The problem is, where do you draw the line? Is it only the stories at the beginning of Genesis that can be interpreted in a non-historical fashion, or has the door been opened to other sections of the Torah as well? R. Kook already confronted this issue in one of his classic letters to his student, Moshe Seidel (Iggerot ha-Re’iyah, vol. 2, no. 478), whom he had encouraged to study Semitic languages.[9] R. Kook admitted that there was no clear dividing line, but that the Jewish people as a whole would come to a proper insight. ואם אין כל יחיד יכול להציב גבול מדויק בין מה שהוא בדרך משל בתורה ובין מה שהוא ממשי – בא החוש הבהיר של האומה בכללה ומוצא לו את נתיבותיו לא בראיות בודדות כי אם בטביעות עין כללית. Following this, R. Kook raises the issue of what to do if it can be proven that the Torah’s description of matters is not entirely accurate. Often when R. Kook spoke about these matters, he was referring to the Torah’s description of creation vs. what science tells us. Yet I don’t think that this is what he is referring to in this letter. To begin with, he doesn’t speak about issues of science here. He is talking generally about matters described in the Torah that conflict with research (hakirah). These would also include historical descriptions found in the Torah. We must remember that the letter is to Seidel, who was involved in academic Bible study and was struggling with this. I think it is pretty clear that his concern was not with science and creation but with the larger issue of what the Torah recorded vs. what the critical scholars were saying. (Unfortunately, I am informed that Seidel’s letter to R. Kook, which R. Kook is in turn responding to, is not found in the R. Kook archive.) R. Kook tells Seidel that even if the Torah’s descriptions (“the commonly accepted description”) are not accurate, there must be an important and sacred purpose for these matters to have been presented in this way, rather than being described in an exact fashion. In order to show that this is a proper approach, R. Kook brings two amazing parallels. The first one is the law of yefat toar. In my earlier post dealing with developing morality, available here, I quoted R. Kook’s other recently published comments about yefat toar. Here is making a different point. He refers to the Talmud inKiddushin 21b which states that this entire law is a concession to human passions, but it is not proper. The proper thing would be for a Jewish soldier never to do this, but since in the real world this sort of thing will happen, the Torah provides a context for it to be done in a more civilized manner.[10] The parallel R. Kook sees is that just like the morality described in the law of yefat toar is not perfect, but rather a concession to human weakness, so too descriptions of various things in the Torah need not be “perfect”, that is, historically accurate. There are times when for its own purposes the Torah needs to describe matters in ways that will accomplish certain goals, even if the descriptions are not “true,” i.e., historically true. The next parallel he offers is Ex. 18:19, which describes Mt. Sinai at the time of the Revelation and states that “its smoke ascended like the smoke of the lime pit.” Rashi, based on the Mekhilta, comments that this reference to the smoke being like a lime pit was “to explain to the ear that which it can In other words, it wasn’t really ”.(לשבר את האזן) understand like a lime pit but this description is used to accomplish a larger goal. R. Kook develops this concept, and refers to this Rashi. Here is the passage in full: ואם נמצא בתורה כמה דברים, שחושבים אחרים שהם לפי המפורסם מאז, שאינו מתאים עם החקירה של עכשו, הלא אין אנו יודעים כלל אם יש אמת מוחלטת בחקירה הזמנית, ואם יש בה אמת, ודאי יש גם מטרה חשובה וקדושה שלצרכה הוצרכו הדברים לבא בתיאור המפורסם ולא המדויק, כמו שהוא פשוט במושגים הרוחנים ובכמה יסודי מעשה, ש”דבר תורה כנגד יצה”ר” או “לשבר את האזן.” Elsewhere, in Eder ha-Yekar, pp. 37-38, R. Kook explains that the Torah can describe events in a way not in accord with the astronomical or geological (i.e., historical) truth. This is done in order for the Torah to accomplish its goal, which is not focused on such matters but rather on ידיעת האלהות והמוסר וענפיהם בחיים ובפועל, בחיי הפרט, האומה והעולם In words very similar to those in his letter to Seidel, R. Kook writes there: כבר מפורסם למדי שהנבואה לוקחת את המשלים להדרכה האנושית, לפי המפורסם אז בלשון בני אדם באותו זמן, לסבר את האוזן מה שהיא יכולה לשמוע בהוה, “ועת ומשפט ידע לב חכם”, וכדעת הרמב”ם וביאור הרש”ט במורה נבוכים סוף פרק ז’ משלישי, ופשטם של דברי הירושלמי שלהי תענית לענין קלקול חשבונות של תשעה בתמוז. What R. Kook is saying here is that prophecy uses what is “widely accepted”, even if mistaken, as well as the forms of speech current among contemporary listeners.[11] With this conception, one can’t be disturbed if the Torah or other prophets describe matters not in accord with the facts as we know them today, because the immediate audience of the prophet did think that these were the facts. So, for example, the Torah does not describe a universe billions of years old because that was not part of the mental conception of the ancient Israelites. What is new in this passage is R. Kook’s reference to Maimonides and Shem Tov’s commentary. He doesn’t explain what he has in mind when he refers to Maimonides, but by examining Shem Tov’s commentary to Guide 3:7, which R. Kook also refers to, all is revealed. Here Shem Tov is discussing Maimonides’ view of Ezekiel and a scientific error the prophet made. Shem Tov concludes his discussion with the following revealing words: ידבר הנביא בענינים העיוניים במשפט החכם ולא ידבר בהם כמו נביא אם שאמרם הנביא What this means is that when the prophet is speaking about philosophical or scientific matters, he is speaking from his own wisdom, not prophetic insight. Shem Tov’s point is that the prophet will assimilate his prophetic message to his own words, and the latter, based as they are on his own life experience and knowledge, could also contain error. This is all based on what Maimonides himself writes in Guide 2:8. Here he explains that there is a dispute if the heavenly spheres emit sounds. The Sages believe they do, and Aristotle rejects this. Maimonides adopts Aristotle’s view and explains that the Sages were mistaken. InGuide 3:3 Maimonides identifies the wheels (ofanim) in Ezekiel’s vision with the spheres, and if you examine Ezekiel 1:24 and 10:5 you find that the prophet describes the wheels (=spheres) as producing sounds. The upshot of this is that according to Maimonides Ezekiel’s prophecy incorporated a mistaken scientific view, a view which he points out was later shared by the Sages of Israel. This explanation of Maimonides, quoted from Narboni, is recorded by Shem Tov in his commentary to Guide 3:7.[12] As mentioned, this is what R. Kook refers the reader to. Ralbag, commentary to Gen. 15:4 and to Job, end of ch. 39, also refers to Maimonides’ view that the prophets could be in error about scientific matters. He refers in particular to Ezekiel’s scientific error, and expresses his agreement with Maimonides’ position. In his commentary to Job he explains: ספר זה עם ספורו שאר הדברים הנעלמים להיות זה נעלם לאיוב כי בנבואה יבואו כמו אלו הענינים לפי המקבל . . . שכבר יגיע לנביא דבר כוזב בעת הנבואה, במה שאין לו מצד שהוא נביא מצד הדעות אשר לו בענינים ההם. In other words, prophetic books might record mistaken ideas because that is what the prophet thought. Ralbag gives another example of this. In Gen. 15 Abraham was told to look at the sky and just as he could not count the stars of heaven so too his children will be so numerous. According to Ralbag, this is an example of a prophet receiving false information in accord with his mistaken conception. Since Abraham falsely believed that there are many stars, his prophecy contained this false conception, while in reality according to Ralbag there are actually a limited number of stars. Ralbag further explains his view of the stars in Milhamot ha- Shem 5:1:52, which has not yet been published and is quoted from manuscript in the Birkat Moshe edition of Ralbag on Genesis, pp. 222-223. Here Ralbag rejects the view of those who thought that there were many unseen stars and asserts that the only stars are those that can be seen. (Maimonides, Guide 1:31, states that the number of the stars is unknown.) He mentions that others had assumed that there were unseen stars because otherwise the prophecy of Abraham would not make sense. If you look up at the stars there aren’t so many of them, and therefore, what type of promise is it that Abraham’s descendants will be as many as the stars? Unlike in his commentary to Genesis, here Ralbag does not claim that Abraham’s prophecy was incorrect when it came to the number of stars. Instead, he states that the meaning of the verse is not that Abraham’s descendants will be so many that they can’t be counted. Rather, just like it is difficult to count the stars, so too it will be difficult to count the descendants of Abraham because they will be so many. His proof for this contention is Moses’ words to Israel, Deut 1:10: “The Lord your God hath multiplied you, and, behold, ye are this day as the stars of heaven for multitude.” Moses says this even though he had already counted the Children of Israel. Yet because they were so many that it was difficult to count them, he refers to them as “the stars of heaven”. According to Ralbag, this proves that the comparison with the stars does not mean “too many to count”, but only “difficult to count”. Ralbag also cites a talmudic passage Berakhot( 32b) which speaks of an enormous number of stars (three hundred and sixty five thousand myriads). This contradicts his own view that the number of stars are quite limited. Yet Ralbag is not troubled and declares, in words that would get him banned today: שבכמו אלו הדברים לא נרחיק שיהיו לקצת חכמינו אז דעות בלתי צודקות, כמו שיזכרו שחכמי ישראל היו אומרים שהגלגל קבוע ומזלות חוזרים ומה שדומה לזה. In his commentary to Genesis 15:4 he writes: לא יחוייב שיהיו אצל הנביא כל הדעות האמיתיות בענין סודות המציאות Obviously, if you are prepared to say that great prophets such as Abraham and Ezekiel were wrong in scientific matters, it is only natural to assume the same thing when it comes to the Sages. Of course, we know today how wrong Ralbag was. In fact, it is only in modern times that one can really appreciate Abraham’s prophecy. Later, in Gen. 22:17, he is told that his descendants will be as numerous as the sand and as the stars in the heaven. Centuries ago I think many people must have wondered about this verse. They could understand the promise that his descendants would be like the sand since the sand is so numerous it can’t be counted. Yet how is this comparable to the stars, since anyone can look up at the sky and see that there aren’t that many stars at all? Thus, pre-modern man should have been troubled since the two parts of the verse don’t correspond, even though they are supposed to. It is only with the invention of telescopes that people could see that the two parts of this verse, the sand and the stars, are really saying the same thing. Scientists now believe that the amount of stars runs into the sextillions and that there are more stars than grains of sand on the earth! Returning to R. Kook’s letter to Seidel, he also refers to the end of Ta’anit in the Jerusalem Talmud. What is this about? According to Jeremiah 39:2 the Jerusalem city walls were breached on the ninth day of Tamuz. Yet JTa’anit 4:5 states that this occurred on the seventeenth of Tamuz. How to make sense of this contradiction? The Jerusalem Talmud answers as follows: קלקול חשבונות יש כאן

Korban Edah explains: מרוב הצרות טעו בחשבונות ולא רצה המקרא לשנות ממה שסמכו הם לומר כביכול אנכי עמו בצרה In other words, the book of Jeremiah records mistaken information, but that is because it chooses to reflect the mistaken view of the people, rather than record the accurate facts. As the final words of Korban Edah explain, there are more important considerations for the prophet than to be accurate in such matters. R. Kook sees the lesson of this talmudic passage as applicable to elsewhere in the Bible, namely, that absolute accuracy in its descriptions (both scientific and historical) is not vital and can therefore be sacrificed in order to inculcate the Bible’s higher truths. R. Kook does not tell us how far to take this principle, and no doubt he himself was not sure.[13] The only thing he could say was that these matters would be settled by, as mentioned החוש הבהיר של האומה ,already Another example of a biblical book containing incorrect information is found in Nehemiah 7:7, as explained by the medieval commentary attributed to Rashi. After noting that the numbers given in Nehemiah ch. 7 are not always the same as those mentioned in the book of Ezra, “Rashi” states: ולא דקדק המקרא בחשבונות כל כך אבל הכלל שוה . . . ועל זה הכלל סמך כותב הספר ולא דקדק בחשבון הפרטיות כל כך. What this means is that the author of the book of Nehemiah was not careful in the details he recorded, as long as the big picture—in this case, the total number of people—was correct. How many other places in the Bible can we apply this insight to? The fourteenth-century R. Eleazar Ashkenazi ben Nathan ha- Bavli has an even more radical approach, as he believes that there are inaccuracies in the Torah itself.[14] It is true that at times he is quite conservative. For example, he rejects Ibn Ezra’s assumption that there are post-Mosaic elements verses in the Pentateuch.[15] He also strongly rejects the aggadah that the Land of Israel was not included in the Flood,[16] because the verse tells us that all life on ואין לחוש על דבר משמכחיש גופי התורה :earth was destroyed Yet his more “liberal” side is seen many other places. For example, he assumes that the extremely long lifespans found at the beginning of Genesis are not to be taken literally (p. 29). וימי חייהם אז היו כימי חיי אנשי דורנו לא פחות ולא יותר כי לא היו אז מזהירים כשמש ולא חזקים כנחושה, אבל היו מבשר ודם ומזרע אשה ומדם נדותה ככל אשר אנחנו עושים פה היום If people never lived so long, why were these number included in the Torah? R. Eleazar claims that Maimonides’ approach is to regard the lengthy lifespans as simple figures of speech, not meant to be taken literally any more than the statement that the Land of Israel was flowing with milk and honey or that the cities in Canaan were “fortified up to Heaven” (Deut. 1:28).[17]

He also offers another explanation for the lengthy lifespans, namely, that the Torah recorded what the popular belief was, no matter how exaggerated, and Moses was not concerned about these sorts of things. In other words, just like today people say that the Torah is not interested in a scientific presentation of how the world was created, R. Eleazar’s position is that the Torah is not interested in a historically accurate presentation. In his mind, this has nothing to do with the Torah’s goals, and therefore there was no reason for the Torah not to present matters as they were believed at the time, even if these perceptions were inaccurate. The important thing, he says, is that the people would know that from the creation of the world until Israel stood at Sinai was close to three thousand years. This would help solidify belief in creation. The records of lifespans are just a means to illustrate this information.[18] He adds that when it came to events closer to Moses’ time, Moses was careful in preserving a more accurate accounting, while leaving the stories of the distant past cloaked in legend. There are other ways rationalists have dealt with the lengthy lifespans. For example, R. Nissim of Marseilles regards these years not as indicating an individual life, but rather the “lifespan” of the way of life (i.e., laws, customs) instituted by the figure in question, or the time until another one like him arose. He also assumes that when the Torah says that someone bore a son, it doesn’t have to mean a literal son. Here is what he writes in Ma’aseh Nissim, p. 274: יש מי שפירש שהכונה בחיים ההם קיום נמוסיו והנהגותיו הזמן [בזמן] הנזכר, בין בחייו בין אחר מותו. כי אלו, אפשר שהיו אנשי שם, מחקים חוקים ונימוסים, ומנהגים במידותיהם, גם במאכלם ומשתיהם ובמלבושיהם, ואחר הזמן ההוא אפשר שנשתכח הכל ובחרו דרך אחרת. או תאמר, שלא קם כמוהו עד זה הסך מן השנים במעלת ידיעת ההנהגה לבני דורו. ובזמן ההוא קם כמוהו במעלה, נמשך לדעתו וכונתו, ונחה רוחו עליו כאשר נחה רוח אליהו על אלישע. ואם לא ראה הראשון זה שקם אחריו ולא היה בזמנו, אפשר למד מספריו או התבונן בדבריו המקובלים, ועל זה כתוב: “ויולד” שהוליד בדמותו במעלה, כאלו הוא הוליד האיש ההוא מאשר הוא בעל הדעת ההוא שלמדוהו. In support of this approach, he refers to Va-Yikra Rabbah 21:9 which cites an opinion that Scripture intimated to Aaron that he would live 410 years. Although the Torah tells us that he only lived to 123 (Num. 33:39), the Midrash says that the righteous High Priests in the First Temple are called by Aaron’s name. In other words, they represent the spirit of Aaron, so in that sense it can be said that he lived so many hundreds of years. So too, R. Nissim thinks, when Scripture speaks of other people living so many hundreds of years it is to be understood in this fashion. Another approach was suggested by R. Moses Ibn Tibbon, who is quoted by R. Levi ben Hayyim.[19] According to Ibn Tibbon, the years given for people’s lives are actually the years of the dynasties they established.[20] (His other suggestion is the same as that of R. Nissim, mentioned above.): והחכם ר’ משה פירש, כי כל אחד מאלו היה מלך או הניח נימוס, וכל זמן התמדת מלכותו ומלכות זרעו, או כל ימי המשכות נימוסו, קרא דור אחד, כאלו היה המלך או מניח הנימוס חי, וטעם “ויולד בנים ובנות” כי לאורך הזמן רבו ועצמו בני מלכותו או אנשי דתו, ושלחו קצתם אל ארץ אחרת. R. Levi ben Hayyim offers basically the same approach (p. 326): ונראה לי כי הדורות הנזכרים היו ראשי אבות, וזרע כל אחד נקרא בשמו כפי מספר השנים ההם. כי כל אחד, כמו שנאמר, הוליד בנים ובנות, כמו שנראה היום, עד שנשקע השם מהדורות הבאים אחריו, וקח מאתו זרע איש אחד מפורסם, וקראו בני זרעו ומשפחתו על שמו זמן מה, וכן התמיד עד שנתחדש דור אחר, נקרא [!] בניו ובני בניו על שמו [צ”ל שם] חדש. והורה ספור הדורות ההם מאדם ועד זמן משה על חדוש העולם. To be continued * * * The new semester of Torah in Motion has just begun. The first figure I am dealing with is R. Elijah Benamozegh. You can sign up to participate in the classes here. You can also sign up for the classes of Moshe Shoshan, Abe Katz, R. Daniel Feldman, and William Gewirtz. Dr. Gewirtz, who has published on the Seforim blog, will be giving three FREE special classes dealing with various aspects of time in Jewish law. This is a topic that few have been able to master and the classes promise to be a treat. Even if you can’t watch the classes live, videos and audio are sent to you so that you can watch or listen at your convenience. Also from Torah in Motion, information will soon be coming about the July trip to Central Europe that I will be leading. [1] For the proper explanation of the etymology of Marheshvan, see Ari Zivotfsky’s article in Jewish Action, Fall 2000, available here. See also Abraham Epstein, Mi-Kadmoniyot ha- Yehudim (Vienna, 1887), pp. 23ff. Zivotofsky does not offer any sources for the mistaken etymology that Heshvan is bitter (mar) because it has no holidays in it. I don’t know the first appearance of this notion, but it already is found in R. David Meldola, Moed David (Amsterdam, 1740), p. 64a. [2] Among rishonim, Ibn Caspi had already stated that Adam was not the first man. See Matzref ha-Kesef, pp. 16-17 (contained in Mishneh Kesef, vol. 2). In order to understand what Ibn Caspi is saying in this passage, one needs to be attuned to his elusive style. See also his commentary toGuide 1:14, where he understands Maimonides to be saying that the Adam of Genesis is really referring to Moses. in Gen. ch. 2 האדם Rishonim already proposed that the word [3] refers to humanity, rather than an individual person. See e.g., Ibn Ezra to Gen. 2:8, who states that this interpretation is a secret, i.e., not designed for the masses. See also his commentary to Ex. 3:15. R. David Kimhi also felt that this “truth” should be kept from the masses, who should instead be taught a different “truth”, namely, the Adam and Eve story in a literal fashion. See his esoteric commentary to Genesis, printed in Louis Finkelstein, ed., The Commentary of David Kimhi on Isaiah (New York, 1926), p. LIV: עתה אשוב לפרש הנסתר אשר מפסוק וייצר ה’ א-להים את האדם (בראשית ב, ז) עד זה ספר תולדות אדם (בראשית ה, א) ותחלה אומר כי האדם הנזכר מפסוק זה עד זה ספר תולדות אדם הנגלה הוא על אדם הראשון והנסתר הוא על שם המין ושניהם אמת אך הנגלה הוא להמון והנסתר הוא ליחידים שהם סגולת ההמון. Here is how he understands the Garden of Eden (ibid.): עדן הוא משל לשכל הפועל הוא העדן האמתי הרוחני והא-ל נטע בו גן מקדם בראש בריותיו כשברא השכלים הנבדלים. [4] You can find the book here [5] See Eitam Henkin’s post here. For another post by Henkin on this book, see here. English readers are probably unaware of Henkin, the son of R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin. In the last few years he has really created a reputation for himself as he has authored a number of important articles which show an incredible amount of knowledge on the history of Torah Judaism in modern times. He has also written a sefer, soon to be published, which deals with the halakhot of bugs in food. Unlike the rage today, he rejects the extreme positions, one of which is that due to bug infestation, strawberries are no longer permitted to be eaten. See e.g., here. Henkin’s book will carry the following haskamah of R. Meir Mazuz.

[6] R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg would later argue against trying to “prove” Judaism in the medieval fashion. In the post-Hume and post-Kantian world I thought that this was pretty much agreed upon by everyone. How wrong I was can be attested to all who attended my lecture on Maimonides at the 2008 New York Limmud conference and recall the dispute that took place afterwards. An individual who is involved in kiruv adamantly insisted that the major doctrines of Judaism can be proven to the same degree of certainty as a mathematical proof, and that these truths can thus be proven to non-Jews (who if they don’t accept the proofs are being intellectually dishonest). In this conception, there is no longer room for “belief” or “faith”; since the religion has been “proven” we can only speak of “knowledge”. The notion that Judaism could not be proven in this fashion was, I think, regarded by him as akin to heresy. I have had a lot of contact with “kiruv professionals” and had never come across such an approach. Yes, I know that people speak about the Kuzari proof for the giving of the Torah. However, I always understood this to be more in the way of a strong argument rather that an absolute proof, with the upshot of the latter being that one who denies the proof is regarded as intellectually dishonest or as a slave to his passions. I also know R. Elchanan Wasserman’s strong argument in favor of the viewpoint expressed by my interlocutor (seeKovetz Ma’amarim ve-Iggerot, pp. 1ff.), but before then had never actually found anyone who advocated this position, lock, stock and barrel. So the question to my learned readers is, is there a kiruv “school” today which does outreach based on the “Judaism can be proven” perspective? [7] See here. [8] In his latest book, God According to God, Schroeder—who according to his website teaches at Aish ha-Torah— “goes off the haredi reservation” in a much more serious way than Slifkin. Here is how his website describes the book: “In God According to God, Schroeder presents a compelling case for the true God, a dynamic God who is still learning how to relate to creation.” See here. I daresay that one would be hard-pressed to find even a Modern Orthodox rabbi who would not regard this view of an imperfect God as a heretical position. In a future installment I will deal with Aviezer who unlike Schroeder, has real Judaic learning. Unfortunately, despite his scientific expertise, Schroeder makes numerous errors when he deals with the Jewish side of things. From what I see on the internet, it appears that a majority of his readers are non-Jewish, so these errors will not be noticed by them. Yet they are bound to be annoying to educated Jewish readers. Let me give just a few examples from his new book, God According to God. P. 11: “The Hebrew word for ‘slave’ is ‘worker’ with all the connotations that differentiate the modern concept of slave from that of a worker.” He then apologetically describes the laws of slavery without distinguishing between the Hebrew slave and the Canaanite slave, and apparently without realizing that the latter was indeed a real slave. See Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 158:1, where R. Moses Isserles writes:

מותר היה לנסות רפואה בעבד כנעני אם תועיל P. 11: “Returning an escaped slave to the master was absolutely forbidden (Deut. 23:15-16).” Yet we are not Karaites and a glance at Rashi will show that this is not as “liberal” a law as he makes it out to be. P. 22: [T]he ancient biblical commentators, those whose writings predate by many centuries the discoveries of modern science (writers of the Talmud, ca. 400; Rashi, ca. 1090; Maimonides, ca. 1190; Nahmanides, ca. 1250), learned from the detailed wording of Genesis that the universe is young and old simultaneously. These ancient commentators actually discuss what science has only recently discovered, that the flow of time is flexible.” P. 23: “Moses Maimondes refers to a madah teva, the science of nature.” P. 195: “The [biblical] Hebrew word le’olam has three root meanings: “forever,” “hidden” and “in the universe”. Nothing I have said should be taken to imply that Schroeder does not have what to offer. However, before he publishes anything it should be reviewed by a Torah scholar, much as I would expect a talmid chacham writing on science to have his writing reviewed by a professional scientist. [9] See Iggerot la-Re’iyah, vol. 1, no. 108. Seidel would later teach at Yeshiva College where some of the Roshei Yeshiva were upset with his views. See Ari Shvat, “Hahlatato shel ha-Rav Kook le-Tzamtzem et Hazono le-Limud Mehkari-Madai bi-Yeshivat Merkaz ha-Rav,” Talelei Orot 15 (2009), pp. 149-174. [10] In a recent issue of Iturei Yerushalayim (Sivan 5769, pp. 9-10), R. Shlomo Aviner responds to a soldier who in all seriousness wanted to apply the law of yefat toar today with regard to Palestinian women. The soldier had in mind the understanding that rape of a yefat toar is permitted during battle. Complete details can be found in theEncyclopedia Talmudit entry for yefat toar. There is a lot in this entry which will distress any reader, and according to the Sages, that is the way people should feel, for the entire law was a concession to human weakness. That is, it was a necessary evil, not something that people should strive for or feel proud of. This is how the entry in the Encylopedia Talmudit begins: היוצא למלחמה וראה בשביה אשה נכרית וחשק בה, מותר לו לבא עליה – על כרחה. In other words, it is permitted to rape a captive woman, and it was based on this understanding that R. Aviner was asked the question. Yet it is probably also the case that this view is not held by all. I say this since the Encyclopedia Talmudit entry itself records that there are those who require the woman to be converted before sex, and there are also those who state that the woman cannot be converted against her will. Although I haven’t compared all the positions, it is likely that there is some overlap here, i.e., authorities who require the woman to be converted and also hold that the conversion has to be an act of her free will. Yet it is also the case that plenty of authorities do permit rape of a yefat toar (including a married woman), either on the battlefield or later. In his commentary to Gen. 34:1, Nahmanides writes: כל ביאה באונסה תקרא ענוי, וכן לא תתעמר בה תחת אשר עניתה. I have no doubt that today, when everyone would be horrified by this behavior, and it is forbidden in all civilized societies (and even uncivilized ones), such an action would not be permitted even as a concession to human weakness. I can’t imagine that anyone in our day would condone rape, no matter what the circumstances, and certainly no one would defend the following opinion quoted in theEncyclopedi a Talmudit: היתה השבויה קטנה, כתבו אחרונים שביאה ראשונה – לסוברים שהיא לפני גירות – מותרת אף בקטנותה. From R. Aviner’s reply we see that he doesn’t believe that the yefat toar law has any applicability today: בוודאי שאין דין יפת תואר נוהג בימינו, ואני תמה על השאלה הזאת שהנך שואל למעשה, שכידוע לא דיברה תורה אלא כנגד יצר הרע, והרי אדם צריך להלחם ביצר הרע ולא לחפש היתרים ליצר הרע. וכבר כתב רבי יהודה החסיד בספר חסידים [סי’ שעח] שיש דברים שהתורה התירה אבל אם יעשה אותם האדם הוא יבוא לדין עליהם שהרי התורה רק התירה בגלל יצר הרע. ואם אדם נותן שחרור ליצר הרע, הוא ייתן את הדין . . . לגופו של עניין, כל הדין הזה הוא בשביה, ולא שאדם ילך לבתים של אויבים ויעשה שם נבלות, והרי נשים אינן שבויות צה”ל, וגם אם יש שבויה, בוודא שצה”ל לא ירשה כזו נבלה . . . בסיכום, זה לא שייך כלל וכלל. הרחק ממחשבות אלו, אלא אדרבה למד הרבה בספר מסילת ישרים. In this, R. Aviner is following the approach of R. Kook who speaks of the need to rise above the law of yefat toar. In my previous post dealing with developing morality, referred to in the text, I quoted R. Kook as follows: כל לב יבין על נקלה כי רק לאומה שלא באה לתכלית חינוך האנושי, או יחידים מהם, יהיה הכרח לדבר כנגד יצר הרע ע”י לקיחת יפת תואר בשביה באופן המדובר. ומזה נלמד שכשם שעלינו להתרומם מדין יפת תואר, כן נזכה להתרומם מעיקר החינוך של מלחמת רשות. and not Torah תכלית חינוך האנושי Note that R. Kook speaks of education. We have recently seen the publication ofTorat ha-Melekh (which I will discuss in a future installment of this post). When I told a friend about the question of the soldier to R. Aviner, he commented, only half-jokingly, that we will probably soon see a book on how Israeli soldiers can institute the law of yefat toar in modern times. Finally, I would be remiss in not mentioning that R. Meir Simhah of Dvinsk basically turns the entire law of yefat toar into something completely theoretical, much like ben sorer u- moreh. I say this because R. Meir Simhah assumes that the law is not applicable in a war where the enemy could be holding Jewish prisoners, which in the real world is always the case. Here are his words in Meshekh Hokhmah, Deut. 21:10: נראה דהוא תנאי בהיתר יפת תואר, שדוקא אם ה’ נותן האויב ביד ישראל. אבל כדרך המלחמות שאלו שובים מהם, והאויב שובה מהם, והדרך כשעושים שלום או בתוך המלחמה, מחליפים שבויים שאינם ניאותים עוד למלחמה. אם כן יתכן כי עבור היפת תואר שמגיירה ונושאה לאשה בעל כרחה, יעכבו ישראל חשוב ונכבד, על זה לא הותר היפת תואר. [11] The exact same point is made by the Gaon R. Shlomo Fisher, Beit Yishai (Jerusalem, 2004), p. 361: . . . העיקר גדול שהשרישו לנו הקדמונים שדברה תורה כלשון בני אדם. והכונה היא לאותו לשון שדברו בו בני אדם באותו הדור שבו נאמרו הדברים. שבעת אלה :Fisher uses this insight to explain Zechariah 4:10 עיני ה’ המה משוטטים בכל הארץ According to Fisher—and this is an incredible insight for a traditional interpreter (although it is already noted in the International Critical Commentary)— this verse alludes to the These are the seven heavenly bodies identified .שבעה כוכבי לכת already by ancient Babylonian astronomers: Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, moon, and sun. Yet with the invention of the telescope we now know that there are more planets, meaning that Zechariah’s prophecy was based on a scientific error. But as Fisher explains, this is not a problem because as mentioned, prophecy is given in accord with the knowledge of the generation. Fisher adds that prophecy is also given in accord with the knowledge of the prophet, which in this case as with Ezekiel was based on a scientific error. כי הנבואה תבא לו לנביא לפי תמונת העולם שבלבו As an aside, I wonder why no one has tried to put Fisher’s book under a ban. While Slifkin stated that the Sages didn’t know everything about science, Fisher goes further and says that even the prophets didn’t know it all. He adopts the same approach to explain why classic Kabbalistic texts are based on outmoded scientific assumptions: שחכמת הקבלה מיוסדת על תמונת העולם וחוקי הטבע שלפי חכמי יון, כגון, מציאות הגלגלים, ז’ כוכבי לכת, וד’ יסודות, וחומר וצורה. וההנחה שכל דבר נמשך למקורו. Since I deal with R. Eleazar Ashkenazi ben Nathan ha-Bavli in this post, it is worth calling attention to his original He sees it as related to the .שבועה understanding of the word word seven, meaning that one who breaks an oath sins against God who controls the seven heavenly spheres. SeeTzafnat Paneah, ed. Rappaport (Johannesburg, 1965), p. 69 (I think he means the seven spheres each of which contains a heavenly body, as opposed to the eighth sphere which contains the so- :(or fixed stars ,כוכבי שבת called כי שם נשבעו בשבועת האלה. כי מי שיעבור על הברית ירבצו בו אלות מכח השבעה הגלגלים וזה סוד שם שבועה כי חלל שם ה’ המנהיג השבעה הגלגלים. [12] Fisher, Beit Yishai, p. 361, accepts this interpretation of Maimonides. Ibn Caspi, Commentary to Guide 2:8, does not believe that Ezekiel’s actual prophecy could contain error. Rather, the error came during a dream of Ezekiel, not an actual prophecy. He also distinguishes between Sages who can err, as they are using their wisdom, and prophets who during actual prophecy do not err. However, when they are not prophesying they are susceptible to error like anyone else. [13] Shalom Carmy took note of R. Kook’s comments and raised the following questions, without offering any answers: It seems obvious that Rabbi Kook doesn’t advocate wholesale rejection of biblical statements. To do so would render Tanakh useless as a source of history. Under what circumstances would he countenance “deconstruction” of the text? Only where biblical texts contradict each other or rabbinic statements? Whenever the text appears to contradict well-attested Near Eastern documents? When the exact historicity is immaterial in the judgment of the exegete, to the import of the text? When the exegete detects rhetorical elements in the biblical text itself that point toward such interpretation?

See “A Room With a View, but a Room of Our Own,” in idem, ed., Modern Scholarship in the Study of Torah (Northvale, 1996), pp. 23-24. [14] As Epstein, Mi-Kadmoniyot ha-Yehudim, pp. 125ff., has shown, Abarbanel used R. Eleazar’s commentary, even though he does not mention him by name (a characteristic that Abarbanel shows at other times as well). [15] Tzafnat Paneah, p. 46. [16] Ibid., p. 36. I think one can call this a conservative position with regard to biblical interpretation, but the is quite ,הבל הוא ,language he uses to reject the aggadic view provocative. [17] In Guide 2:47 Maimonides says that the people mentioned in the Bible who lived so long were exceptional in this respect, either because of their diet, mode of living, or due to a miracle. R. Eleazar obviously does not see this as reflecting Maimonides’ true view. [18] He writes (p. 30): ואל תתמה על זה ואל יקל בעיניך זאת התחבולה הנכבדת שנתכוון אליה כדי לאמץ האמנת החדוש . . . ולזה הוצרך ע”ה לספר לנו חשבון השנים שעברו מזמן חדוש העולם עד זמננו, וזה היה עיקר גדול וצורך נפלא. [19] Livyat Hen, ed. Kreisel (Beer Sheva, 2004), pp. 324ff. Here is the place to congratulate Howard Kreisel on the publication of the two volumes of Livyat Hen as well as R. Nissim of Marseilles’ Ma’aseh Nissim. As long as people study Jewish philosophy, they will use these editions. R. Joseph Kafih spent the last night of his life studyingMa’aseh Nissim. See Avivit Levi, Holekh Tamim (n.p., 2003), p. 226. [20] R. Eleazar Ashkenazi, Tzafnat Paneah, p. 29, cites this approach in the name of Ibn Ezra, but he does not tell us where it is to be found in Ibn Ezra’s Torah commentary or other works. אבל המשמע מדברי החכם ראב”ע ז”ל שהזקנים היו ראשי האבות לא שחיו המה כל כך.

Some More Assorted Comments, part 1

Some More Assorted Comments, part 1 by: Marc B. Shapiro 1. Following my last post, a number of people have corresponded with me about the issue of anti-Semitism and how it it sometimes self-inflicted because of Jewish actions that cause a hillul ha-Shem, meaning that we can’t always claim As many readers know, R. Jehiel .ידינו לא שפכו את הדם הזה Jacob Weinberg already pointed out that some anti-Semitism arises for precisely this reason. He was not the first. R. Israel Moses Hazan (Kerakh shel Romi, p. 4a), speaks of the bad impression given non-Jews by Jewish texts (and obviously also Jewish behavior): שאנחנו מצד אמונתנו אנחנו מחוייבים להיות משחיתים הקיבוץ המדיני See also the words of R. Solomon Alami, Iggeret ha-Mussar, ed. Haberman (Jerusalem, 1946), pp. 11-12: עם היותנו עבדים נכבשים להם התלנו בם וחיללנו שם קודש א-להינו בקרבם כי הלכנו אתם באונאה ובמרמה וקבענו אותם בחוקים לא טובים בערמה עד אשר מאסונו והחזיקונו כגנבים ורמאים מנאפים עצרת בוגדים. See also Maharsha to Ketubot 67a, which so accurately describes what we often face[1]: ורבים בדור הזה שמקבצין עושר שלהם שלא באמונה ובחילול השם כגזילת עכו”ם ואח”כ מתנדבים מאותו ממון להיות להם כבוד בכל שנה ולתת להם ברכת מי שברך להיות להם שם ותפארת, ואין זה אלא מצוה הבאה בעבירה, ואין לעושר הזה מלח וקיום (מלח ממון חסר :To understand the last words, see Ketubot 66b) But there are limits to what we can do, and even if we were all complete tzadikim, it would not mean the end of anti- Semitism. Yet listen to a youthful passage recorded by Gershom Scholem in his diary in 1913. It is certainly an exaggeration, but in speaking of Jews living in the modern world (as opposed to the Shtetl) there is also some truth to it: “If Judaism were as Samson Raphael Hirsch thinks it should be, there wouldn’t be any such thing as anti-Semitism.”[2] As Hirsch taught, it is incumbent on us to show that we are a great benefit to society, and we cannot behave as if the rules, and the consequences of violating these rules, only apply to .ודי בזה .everyone else 2. In my review of Gurock’s book (see here) I referred to Aish HaTorah honoring intermarried people at its events. In fact, they were not the first Orthodox organization to do so, as one can see from R. Avraham Weinfeld’s Lev Avraham, no. 134, which dates from the early 1970’s.

If anyone knows which institution he is referring to, please share it. For some earlier comments of mine with regard to Orthodox views of intermarriage, see here. In general, there have been some real changes in how Orthodoxy deals with the non-Orthodox, and Adam Ferziger has recently published a valuable article on the topic.[3] In reading the article, I was surprised to learn how even haredi Orthodoxy has begun to expand the boundaries in dealing with non- Orthodox movements and institutions. It appears that the Reinman-Hirsch book was only one aspect of this change. Here is some of what Ferziger reports: ASK [Atlanta Scholars Kollel], however, has demonstrated a willingness to meet its constituency on its own terms by running a biweekly introductory prayer service in one of Atlanta’s largest Reform houses of worship, Temple Sinai of Sandy Springs. To be sure, the meetings take place in a social hall rather than in the synagogue sanctuary, but this is a clear departure from the guidelines set down by Feinstein. Similarly, members of the Phoenix Community Kollel have taught classes at the community sponsored Hebrew High that is housed at the Reform Temple Chai. . . . [T]he head of Pittsburgh’s Kollel Jewish Learning Center, Rabbi Aaron Kagan, meets on a regular basis with his local rabbinic colleagues from Reform and Conservative synagogues to study Torah together. . . . Based in Palo Alto, California, the Jewish Study Network—one of the most dynamic and rapidly expanding of these kiruv kollels—does not limit its interdenominational contacts to private study. Its fellows work together with Conservative and Reform representatives to create new Jewish learning initiatives throughout the Bay Area and to offer their own programming in non-Orthodox synagogues. Rabbi Joey Felsen, head of the Jewish Study Network and a veteran of five years of full-time Torah study at Jerusalem’s venerable Mir yeshivah, made clear that he was not opposed to presenting Torah lectures in a non-Orthodox synagogue sanctuary, although he preferred to teach in the social hall. Indeed, according to Rabbi Yerachmiel Fried, leader of the highly successful Dallas Area Torah Association (DATA) Kollel and a well-respected halakhist, insofar as Jewish religious institutions were concerned the only boundary that remained hermetically sealed was his unwillingness to teach in a gay synagogue. . . .

3. Here is the link to my recent article in Milin Havivin in which I published R. Eliezer Berkovits’ responsum permitting one to enter churches.[4] (R. Jeremy Rosen agrees with Berkovits. See here.) In addition to the figures I mentioned who are known to have entered churches, the young scholar Chaim Landerer called my attention to the famed bibliophile, Judah David Eisenstein, who in his autobiography, Otzar Zikhronotai, testifies to entering churches on a few different occasions. These are mentioned by R. David Zvi Hillman in his article in the most recent Yerushatenu 4 (2010) as part of his effort to delegitimize Eisenstein, both from a scholarly as well as from a religious standpoint.[5] The article is actually twenty pages of excerpts from Eisenstein’s writings designed to accomplish this objective. There is no question that Hillman accomplishes at least one of his goals, which is to show that Eisenstein often misinterpreted rabbinic texts. Yet for the life of me I can’t figure out what possible objection Hillman could find in some of what he records. For example, what is wrong with Eisenstein mentioning, in his autobiography, that as a young man he learnt to play the ,(בית דין של שנים עשר) served on a jury piano, to ride a horse, to swim [!], to sail, to fence and to play billiards? What does Hillman expect, that Eisenstein is supposed to say that his entire life was spent in a beit midrash, never once venturing out to enjoy what the world has to offer? Hillman also finds objectionable that Eisenstein mentions that he played chess on Shabbat and Yom Tov and that in general he liked sports as they strengthened his body. Hillman even notes that Eisenstein tells the reader how much he weighed at various times of his life, and here too, I can’t figure out what the sin. In my opinion, the craziest of Hillman’s criticisms focuses on the following passage in Eisenstein’s autobiography: בשנת 1886 הייתי בין הראשונים שעלו במדרגות לראש פסל החרות ובשנת 1928 עליתי שם ע”י המכונה נושאת אנשים עד הראש ועד מאתים מדרגות עד הלפיד של החשמל שהוא גדול בכמות רבבות אלפים נרות. Is it possible that Hillman has never heard of the Statue of Liberty and instead thinks that Eisenstein made a pilgrimage to some pagan temple? Here is another of the passages Hillman strangely cites in order to criticize Eisenstein: תרפ”ב ברלין. ציר ארה”ב ואשתו הושיטו ידם לי לברכני But if you really want to see Hillman’s extremism, look at the following passage which he finds objectionable: עין חרוד בעמק והוא מקום הטומאה לחיי המשפחה . . . שאכלו חמץ בפסח להכעיס . . . אנחנו מקוים כי גם החלוצים יטיבו את דרכם במשך הזמן ובפרט כי הורגלו לדבר עברית ויש בכח הלשון הקדש ובמאור שבה לבדה להחזירם תחת כנפי השכינה There is no question that Eisenstein was naive in his hope that the Hebrew language would help bring people back to religion, but does this make him a bad person? Citing this passage to disqualify Eisenstein says more about Hillman than it does about Eisenstein. (I will return to Hillman in a future post.) Here is another of Hillman’s criticisms, but this time of a scholarly nature: “חוה”מ נקרא מועד קטן”. היש לזה מקור הוא [!] שהוא סברת כרסו של בעל האוצר? We all know that Tractate Moed Katan deals with Hol ha-Moed. The reason the tractate is called such is presumably to distinguish it from the Order Moed. In fact, there is evidence that the original name of the tractate was Moed “and throughout this tractate the intermediate days are referred to as Mo’ed and not as hol ha-mo’ed.”[6] It is because of this that Hillman is so dismissive of Eisenstein’s suggestion that Moed Katan can be understood as the “lesser holiday” and refer to hol ha-moed. Yet Hillman spoke too fast in this case, because the great R. Aryeh Zvi Frommer, Eretz Zvi (Bnei Brak, 1988), pp 351ff, also assumes that hol ha-moed is referred to as Moed Katan. Here are two pages from his derashah.

Here is an article in R. Eliyahu Schlesinger’sAreshet Sefatenu (Jerusalem, 2005), vol. 1, pp. 16-17.

It is obvious that Schlesinger’s piece is taken from Frommer. In the introduction to Areshet Sefatenu, he tells the reader that he is going to be quoting ideas found in other sources, and that he is careful to acknowledge them, but if on occasion he forgets to do so we should excuse him. This doesn’t sit well with me. How can one copy another person’s words, include them in his book, and then forget to mention where he got it from? We are not talking about a source or two that someone saw in another’s book (and about which we can debate if one needs to cite the book that led him to these sources). Here we are talking about copying another rav’s hiddush.[7] Returning to Eisenstein, he mentions how he was a member of the Freemasons. Hillman, of course, points to this as another of Eisenstein’s religious defects. Yet the issue of Freemasonry and traditional Judaism needs to be examined carefully to see if there is any conflict between the two. (To this day, the Church forbids all Catholics from becoming Masons.) Interestingly, Chief Rabbi Israel Brodie of the United Kingdom was a well-known Mason (as was an unnamed nineteenth-century Orthodox rabbi in New York, who was even head of a lodge[8]). Rabbi Louis Jacobs told me about the time Brodie visited Manchester, where Jacobs was then the young rabbi of the city’s Central Synagogue. Jacobs and some of the other rabbis decided to play some mischief on Brodie. They told Rabbi Isaac Jacob Weiss, who was then serving as a dayan in Manchester (later he headed the Edah ha-Haredit), all about the strange practices of the Masons that Brodie took part in. Weiss was understandably shocked, and Jacobs told me how they later watched Weiss quiz Brodie about this, and how Brodie was put on the defensive and forced to explain how all the various Masonic practices were symbolic and had nothing to do with Avodah Zarah. There is actually a responsum about Freemasonry in R. Isaac Akrish, Kiryat Arba (Jerusalem, 1876), no. 14. He only has negative things to say about it and sees it as “complete idolatry.” He also believes that the special terms used by the .משמות הטומאה מהסט”א Masons are Akrish himself was quite an interesting character. Although we are not used to seeing real religious fanaticism in the Sephardic world, he was an exception. When someone in Constantinople opened a school that also had secular studies, Akrish burst into his house and, accompanied by shofar blasts, placed the man under herem. Understandably, this created enormous controversy, and led to the chief rabbi R. Chaim Palache placing Akrish in herem. This forced Akrish to leave the city and travel to the Land of Israel.[9] If people today were aware of this story, I think it could help defuse the current controversy taking place in Israel. As I am sure all are aware, we have a situation where some Ashkenazic haredi schools are reluctant to accept Sephardim.[10] But the case of Akrish shows that there is no need for this discrimination, as we see from here that Sephardim can also be extreme and intolerant. If these schools would allow the Sephardim to enter, and if they are given the proper education, one can assume that they too can be properly molded. Many of them would even become real Sephardic Uncle Toms (to use the expression coined by one of my friends). You know the type, the ones who are so embarrassed by their heritage that they that can’t wait to speak Yiddish with Moroccan accents and to change their last names, the ones who instruct their sons not to wear a tallit until they are married, the ones who insist on having a yichud room at their wedding, and the list goes on. They have been recently referred to as “anusei Sefarad shel yameinu.”[11] The truth is, and anyone who examines the writings of young Sephardic rabbis can testify to this, that there already is a great deal of extremism out there. For every R. Hayyim Amsalem, who tries to preserve the old Sephardic approach,[12] there are rabbis who write as if they are part of the Edah Haredit. To give just one example of many, here is the title page of a recent responsa volume by R. Eleazar Raz, Mi-Tziyon Orah (Jerusalem, 2007). In Even-ha-Ezer no. 2, Raz discusses if a woman is permitted to attend parents’ night at her son’s school. In case people are wondering why she would have any interest in doing so, well, she is a mother and normally mothers want to know how their children are doing. The problem, of course, is that by attending she would be forcing the teacher to look at her, and unlike other poskim, Rabbi Raz holds that דמצד עיקר ההלכה הסתכלות אסורה אפילו שאין מתכוין להנות ואין לו שום הרהור In other words, only a quick glance at a woman is permitted, but not actually looking at her.[13] But Raz is even uncomfortable with this heter: מיהו אעפ”כ אין ראוי לאדם לראות פני אשה “כלל”. והמחמיר במקום שאפשר ולא מקל אפילו בראיה בעלמא, “קדוש” יאמר לו. ובפרט שלדעת איזה פוסקים אסור אף ראיה בדרך העברה With this type of attitude, there isn’t much hope that he will permit a mother to come to parents’ night. Here is his conclusion: זאת תורת העולה, שנכון מאוד למנוע הנשים שלא תבאנה ל”אסיפת הורים”. וכבר יפה עשו ויפה נהגו בכמה ת”ת וביה”ס, ששירטו וביקשו: ש”לא יבואו אלא האבות” Raz’s book was added to hebrewbooks.org in a recent update. Coincidentally, another of the books added at this time was Livyat Hen by Rabanit [14] Hena Kossowski. Here is the title page.

This book records her Torah thoughts. What interests me at present is the preface which mentions how she spoke before a large gathering in Volozhin at the establishment of a girl’s school. We are told that she was congratulated after her talk by one of the rabbis. In other words, she was not only speaking before the women. The preface also records that R. Joseph Kahaneman, Rosh Yeshiva of Ponovezh, liked to talk Torah with her. He even said “that he enjoys speaking with her in Torah matters more than with many well-known rabbis.” I find this all very interesting: Raz doesn’t think that a mother is permitted to briefly speak to her son’s teacher to see how he is doing in school, while R. Kahaneman enjoyed his many conversations with Rabanit Kossowski. Haredi Orthodoxy has two directions in front of it when it comes to how women will be treated. Which way will it go?[15] In reading Raz I wondered why he doesn’t suggest a simple solution, namely, to allow the mother to have a telephone conference.[16] Perhaps he also views this as forbidden. If so, he could have cited one of my favorite commentators, Joseph Ibn Caspi. (Are there any Twersky students who didn’t fall in love with Ibn Caspi?) In Mishneh Kesef, part 2, p. 55 (to Gen. 18:13), Ibn Caspi raises the question why the verse says that God spoke to Abraham and not to Sarah. He replies: “It is not proper for one who is exalted and holy to speak to women.” Perhaps we can identify a little medieval misogyny here, but what I find most fascinating about this passage is what comes directly after this: “And therefore, I have guarded myself from this all my life.” Before anyone starts associating Ibn Caspi with the Vaad le- Tzeniut, let me disabuse you of this notion. Ibn Caspi avoiding women has nothing to do with halakhic humrot, but with a desire to remove himself from the “matter” that women represent, so that he can concentrate on the spiritual realm. As I have often explained, there is a reason why the Torah had to command procreation. Some people find this a strange commandment because certainly people would have done so without a specific mitzvah. Yet this commandment was not given for the average person but for those like Ibn Caspi, and I daresay Maimonides. Had it not been for the commandment then Judaism would also have developed an elitist class that thought, much like in Christianity and Buddhism, that avoidance of physical pleasures and the burden of parenthood is the way to get close to God. The philosophy of Ibn Caspi (and Maimonides) leads directly to at least the first assumption, and perhaps also the second. Therefore, by making procreation a commandment, the Torah ensures that even those who would choose to remove themselves from physicality so as to be bound to the spiritual, they too are still forced to be part of the physical world. The Torah is making sure that there is no spiritual caste system in Judaism, between those who succumb to the weakness of the flesh and marry, and those who are more “holy” and devote themselves only to spiritual things. For us, the spiritual can only be found together with the physical. Nevertheless, where there is a will, there is a way, and Jews have a lot of ingenuity. Judaism therefore saw the development of its own form of asceticism which acknowledged that procreation had to be fulfilled, yet once the husband had fathered children the door was left open for real asceticism.[17] And if you are wondering, well doesn’t the husband have to satisfy his wife sexually? The answer given is that this is not applicable if the woman is agreeable to ending sexual life, in part or even in whole. As you can imagine, this opened up the door for all sorts of ascetic practices (think of Gerrer hasidim) on the assumption that the wives don’t mind, and when they married they agreed to this. Those who have read Gandhi’s autobiography will find this all familiar, and as with Gandhi’s wife, I can’t imagine that the wife of one of these Jewish men who chooses to live an ascetic life really has much of a say in the matter. After all, are they supposed to complain and by doing so show how selfish and lustful they are, while their husbands are trying to reach great spiritual heights?[18] The pressure on them to support their husbands in their spiritual path is enormous. It is precisely because of this that the Steipler had to write his famous letter on this matter, as he saw the contemporary ascetics as completely undermining Jewish sexual values and selfishly seeking to raise themselves in holiness at the expense of their wives.[19] R. Yitzhak Abadi’s new sefer, Or Yitzhak vol. 2, has just appeared, and he too deals with this issue. (For those who know Abadi’s brilliance and originality, they will not be disappointed. I think the most radical responsum in the book is Orah Hayyim no. 166, where he permits one who forgot to turn off the refrigerator light before Shabbat to open and close it throughout Shabbat without doing anything special, not even a shinui.) Abadi is hardly a liberal when it comes to relations between the sexes. He does not even believe it is permitted to kiss an adopted child of the opposite sex Or( Yitzhak, vol. 1 Even ha-Ezer no. 4). In this responsum he also says that one can’t make a yeshiva dinner in which there will be mixed seating and you also cannot go to someone’s house for Shabbat if the wife and daughters sing zemirot. In his new volume, p. 250, he states that it is not permitted for a male photographer to take pictures of the women dancing at a wedding, and you must make sure to have a women photographer do that. He also tells us, vol. 2 p. 253, that he asked the Hazon Ish about shaking a woman’s hand. The Hazon Ish told him that it is yehareg ve-al ya’avor, and this is the viewpoint Abadi adopts. Yet Abadi is also sensitive to the problems of intimacy for modern people. As he states, this was the motivating factor for his famous and controversial responsum in which he declares that today very few newlyweds need concern themselves with the issue of dam betulim (Or Yitzhak, vol. 1, Yoreh Deah no. 33. Abadi’s conclusion is rejected by R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin, Bnei Vanim, vol. 4 no. 14, in a responsum addressed to So it is not surprising to see him deal with this .(חוקר אחד a in his new volume, Orah Hayyim no. 95. Here he shows that he is opposed to any sort of asceticism in marriage and asks why the modern day ascetics have to be more pious than the rabbis איפה :of the Talmud. As he states elsewhere in this responsum Most fascinating is the end of the responsum .היא שמחת העונה where he rejects the common view that the reason for washing one’s hands after sex is to get rid of the ruah ra’ah. Such a conception, which itself leads to a negative view of sex, is, as Abadi shows, a fairly recent development. Despite Abadi’s efforts, we must admit that asceticism has a long tradition in Judaism. In a future post I will cite many more examples of it, as well as examples from the non-ascetic tradition. One that falls into the latter category is the story told in R. Shlomo of Karlin, Shema Shlomo (Jerusalem, 1956), no. 58 (p. 96). Here we read of a pious young hasidic man who as part of his conditions for marriage tells the woman suggested to him by the Maggid of Koznitz that he needed to have sex every day: שהוא צריך תמיד בכל יום לאשה ואינו פרוש להמתין משבת לשבת

Needless to say, the woman was shocked, and all who are interested can consult the book to see how the Maggid convinced her that despite the man’s unusual demand, she should nevertheless agree to the match.

3. JOFA recently published Women and Men in Communal Prayer. This contains a complete translation of Daniel Sperber’s book on the subject, as well as the famous article of Mendel Shapiro and the responses of Eliav Shochetman and Shlomo Riskin. On p. 322, Shochetman writes: Among other sources R. M. Shapiro finds a basis for permitting women’s aliyyot outside the synagogue in an anonymous opinion quoted in Sefer ha-Batim. . . . Indeed, here we find a clear statement that one opinion considers women’s aliyyot problematic only in the context of public reading in a synagogue, whereas when a group prays at home, women may receive aliyyot.

In fact, there is also another source that permits women’s aliyot if done in a private minyan, yet none of the scholars who have dealt with the issue have mentioned it. Here is what the sixteenth-century R. Samuel Portaleone writes (Asupot 3, p. 199-200): ולא נהגו היתר בינינו באשה כלל משום כבוד הצבור והצניעות, דלא אכשור דרי עכשו כבתחילה. ונערה שאין מקפידין להביאה לב”ה של אנשים, מותר להעלותה לס”ת ולהפטיר, אלא שלא נהגו כן. נפקא מינא בב”ה של יחידים שמותר. ואולי גם בזה לא נהגו משום שעכשו הנשים אינן נזהרות בכל מילי דצניעותא שהיה להן ליזהר, ומרבות שיחה עם האנשים, וסייג יש בדבר. לכן המקל יהיה מן המתמיהין. Despite his final words, he leaves no doubt that women are permitted to receive an aliyah and read the haftarah. I was happy to write a blurb for this book, but it was not included in its entirety. So here it is. The proper role of women in the synagogue is an issue that Modern Orthodoxy has been struggling with for over forty years. While everyone agrees that halakhah has to guide all changes in synagogue practice, women’s changing self- perception and religious sentiment must be central to any discussion of synagogue life. In recent decades many avenues for Modern Orthodox women have been opened, and have achieved widespread communal support. Yet when it comes to a fuller participation in public prayer and reading of the Torah great conflict has ensued. In this provocative book, Rabbi Prof. Daniel Sperber, using his characteristic erudition, makes the case that in the twenty-first century it is time for women to be given their halakhic right, and be permitted to read from the Torah. Together with the responses of Rabbi Shlomo Riskin and Prof. Eliav Schochetman, this book is Torah study on the highest level, by scholars who thankfully choose to be engaged in an important issue affecting the Modern Orthodox world.[20]

4. In a previous post I quoted from the recently published writings of R. Kook. In the next post (or maybe the one after that), I will deal with more of these writings, and also discuss in detail R. Kook’s Li-Nevokhei ha-Dor. A number of people were curious as to how much from R. Kook still remains in manuscript. That is a great question, and I don’t have any definitive answer. Some years ago R. Avraham Shapiro spoke of 200,000 pages that hadn’t appeared in print. I am certain that this was a great exaggeration on R. Shapiro’s part, but hopefully not. For a long time the people who were in charge of R. Kook’s writings were able to stop publication of some of the most provocative material, as they held the position of the Gaon R. Yaakov Ben-Nichol that the people couldn’t handle the truth.[21] Thankfully, in recent years the embargo has been broken. In the next post on R. Kook I hope to also respond to some comments I was sent about R. Kook and sacrifices. For now, however, let me just say that when it comes to R. Kook’s ideas on vegetable sacrifices and vegetarianism in general, some of the most opposed to R. Kook’s views expressed themselves very similarly to the Daas Torah of R. Avraham Bunker.[22] I am sure this will make them very happy. For those for whom every word from R. Kook is precious, you must get a hold of R. Moshe Tsuriel’s recently published Peninei ha-Rav, especially as it contains excerpts from an unpublished book of the Rav (which is how R. Kook is referred to in Israel). Tsuriel’s book is almost 800 pages long and is full of important material, in particular his hundreds of pages of articles (and there are also great pictures). I know I am going out on a limb to say this, and some might object and offer the name of Rabbi X or Professor Y, but I don’t think that there is anyone else in the world who knows the works of R. Kook as well as Tsuriel. I am not commenting here on his interpretations of R. Kook and comparing him in this regard to other scholars. I am only speaking of sheer mastery of the Rav’s works. Tsuriel has also published more of R. Kook’s writings than anyone else in our time. If that was all that Rav Tsuriel worked on, it would be an incredible achievement, but there is so much more. His other writings will, however, have to wait for a future post. 5. In a previous post (see here), I dealt with the “inflation” that is often seen in rabbinic titles. Among the sources I mentioned in this regard, I neglected to call attention to R. Yehudah Herzl Henkin’s Bnei Vanim, vol. 2, no. 35. While there are many sources that discuss the phenomenon, Henkin’s responsum is noteworthy for it has a practical aspect that concerns Jewish books, the focus of this blog. But before getting to that, Henkin points out that there is a distinction in that the former is reserved for הרה”ג and הג”ר between someone whose essence is that of a gaon, while the latter is for one whose essence is that of a rav. In other words, While not .הג”ר but only a few get הרה”ג everyone gets actually adhered to by all authors, if you pay attention you will find that this is indeed a common practice. In fact, I first noticed this years ago in the responsa of R. Ovadiah it is a ,הרה”ג Yosef. When R. Ovadiah gives someone the title sign that he does not regard him as one of the outstanding authorities. R. Yitzhak Ratsaby also picked up on this. In Ner Yom Tov, p. 76, he writes: ותמהני טובא נמי על הרב הטוען שליט”א, שכתב על בעל שושנת המלך הרב הגאון מלא, ועל מהרי”ץ בראשי תיבות הרה”ג, ואין ספק בעיני המבין והיודע, שאין זה במקרה. וכי יציבא בארעא וגיורא בשמי שמיא. Returning to Rabbi Henkin’s responsum, he says that while it is understandable in writing to someone to use all sorts of exalted descriptions, even if undeserved, writing this way for publication is improper and causes people to regard someone as much greater than he really is. Henkin even states that this sort of exaggeration sometimes causes financial loss, since if a rabbi is described as a great gaon people will be led to buy his books. [23] In other words, this is false advertising, no different than if Toyota would tell the world that they make the safest cars. If I go out and buy a book because I am told that the author is a great scholar, and then I find out that the book is nothing special, who is going to reimburse me for the wasted money? It will certainly not be the person who passed out the high praise, and obviously not the publisher (as we saw when Rav Tzair tried to return a flawed book, see here). In fact, long before Rav Tzair tried this, we are told that R. Eizel Harif (died 1873) stated that after he died he was going to take R. Ezekiel Landau to a heavenly beit din for causing him monetary loss. It turns out that in his responsa(Noda bi- Yehudah, Even ha-Ezer, I, no. 74) R. Ezekiel gives all sorts of exalted titles to R. Isaac ben David of Constantinople, the author of a work entitled Divrei Emet. Here is its title page. Upon reading what the Noda bi-Yehudah wrote, R. Eizel bought the book. Yet after examining it a bit, he realized that he had wasted his money, as there was nothing of value in this work. R. Hayyim Soloveitchik, however, pointed out that in one responsum the author made a valuable point, and that R. Eizel therefore had no case against R. Ezekiel.[24] This reminds me of something said by Jacob Neusner, when he was responding to attacks that he published too much and that in some of his books there was nothing of value. He replied that in every one of his books there was at least one significant thought. There might not be more than that, but there was at least one. In other words, if you learn even one thing from a book it has some value. Rare indeed are the books from which there is literally nothing to be learnt (but sometimes we come across these books also). 6. In a previous post, see here, I discussed the way some in the haredi world try to cover up R. Yerucham Gorelik’s association with YU, where he was a Rosh Yeshiva for so many years.[25] We recently saw another example of this. R. Yerucham’s son unfortunately passed away recently, and here is the way his death was reported on the haredi website Matzav. It is with great sadness that we report the petirah of Rav Tzvi Abba Gorelick zt”l, rosh yeshiva of Yeshiva Gedolah Zichron Moshe of South Fallsburg, NY. Rav Gorelick’s most noted accomplishment was his leadership of Yeshiva Gedolah Zichron Moshe of South Fallsburg, where thousands of bochurim and yungeleit have grown in Torah and yiras Shomayim. The yeshiva was founded in 1969 in the Bronx and later relocated to South Fallsburg. Rav Gorelick was a son of Rav Yeruchom Gorelick zt”l, a talmid of the Brisker Rov zt”l who founded an elementary boys school and later a girls school, Bais Miriam, in the Bronx, and combined had an enrollment of over 800 students. The boys’ school was named Zichron Moshe after Moshe Alexander Gross z”l, a young man who was drafted into the Navy during World War II and whose ship sank during the D-Day invasion in 1944. As the neighborhood began to decline, Rav Gorelick looked for other places to move. The Laurel Park Hotel in South Fallsburg, NY, was available and Rav Gorelick decided to buy the property with money that he had from the yeshiva. In 1970, Rav Elya Ber Wachtfogel, a friend of Rav Gorelick, joined the hanhalla as rosh yeshiva. The rest is history, as the yeshiva grew and grew, becoming one of the most respected yeshivos in the world. To this day, bochurim from across the globe come to learn at Yeshiva Zichron Moshe. The yeshiva’s mosdos, under the direction of Rav Gorelick, burgeoned and currently consist of the yeshiva gedolah and mesivta, a premier kollel, as well as a cheder and Bais Yaakov elementary school. The passing of Rav Gorelick is a blow to the entire South Fallsburg Torah community and the greater Olam Hatorah. The levaya will be held tomorrow at 11 a.m. at Yeshiva Gedolah Zichron Moshe, located at 84 Laurel Park Road in South Fallsburg, NY. The aron will leave South Fallsburg at approximately 1:30 p.m. to JFK Airport, where the levaya will continue (exact time to be determined). Kevurah will take place in Eretz Yisroel.

In omitting any mention of R. Yerucham’s primary activity throughout his life, that of Rosh Yeshiva at RIETS, we have another example of the Big Lie seen so often in the haredi press. As with all such lies, if you repeat it enough times, eventually some people will begin to accept it. Unfortunately, there are many examples that can be brought to show that the Big Lie has been quite successful in the creation and popularization of numerous haredi myths, especially when it comes to issues relating to Zionism, the State of Israel, and especially R. Kook. Here is a picture of R. Yerucham from his youth. It has appeared in a number of places. (I also thank David Eisen for sending me a copy of it.) The rabbi in the middle is R. Baruch Ber Leibowitz and the one on the right is R. Hanoch Eiges, the Marheshet. [1] These last two sources are cited in H. Z. Reines, “Yahas ha-Yehudim le-Nokhrim,” Sura 4 (1964), p. 197. [2] Lamentations of Youth (Cambridge, 2007), p. 25. See the index to locate other positive references to Hirsch. In later years Scholem had a much more negative view of Hirsch’s philosophy, referring to it as a “ghastly accomodation theology.” See The Messianic Idea in Judaism (New York, 1971), p. 329. [3] “From Demonic Deviant to Drowning Brother: Reform Judaism in the Eyes of American Orthodoxy,” Jewish Social Studies 15 (Spring/Summer 2009), pp. 56–88. [4] For my article from this journal on pilagshim, see here. For my article on the Frankfurt rabbinical dispute, see here. [5] I will deal with R. Chaim Kanievsky’s criticisms of Eisenstein in the next post. [6] Encyclopedia Judaica, s.v. Moed Katan. [7] In a future post I will deal extensively with the phenomenon of plagiarism in seforim, an issue that goes back to medieval times. In the meantime, see this hilarious example of plagiarism from the internet age (called to my attention by David Assaf). [8] See Yosef Goldman, Hebrew Printing, no. 1115. The book referred to by Goldman is David Moses Hermalin, Ha-Yehudim ve- ha-Bonim ha-Hofshim (New York, 1899). [9] The story is briefly recounted in Shmuel Glick, Kuntres ha-Teshuvot he-Hadash (Jerusalem, 2007), vol. 2, no. 3482, who also provides references. This is not the only time that Palache came to the aid of one who was persecuted by extremists. After the rabbis of Aleppo burnt R. Elijah Benamozegh’s commentary on the Torah, Palache wrote to Benamozegh offering his support. See Ha-Levanon, July 3, 1872, p. 351. Interestingly, on this page in Ha-Levanon, Benamozegh states that according to Ibn Ezra there are post-Mosaic additions to the Torah, and he strongly rejects this viewpoint. I mention this because every now and then I get an e-mail from someone citing his rosh yeshiva or some other talmid chacham that it is impossible, and even laughable, to assert that Ibn Ezra believed this. For some of them, even to suggest this approaches heresy. If these people would simply disagree with the widespread assumption that Ibn Ezra held these radical views, that is fine, and I would very much like to hear their arguments. But generally, the people claiming as such have no idea what the issue is and make it seem like only an idiot (or a heretic) could accuse the great Rabbi Ibn Ezra of such an assumption. I already discussed how this is R. Yosef Reinman’s tactic. See here. At the risk of being repetitive, let me say again that to assert that no one with any Torah knowledge could conclude that Ibn Ezra had these “critical” views not only shows an ignorance of the relevant literature, but also degrades numerous great Torah scholars. In Limits of Orthodox Theology I cite 26 rishonim and aharonim who understand Ibn Ezra as advocating a “critical” position, and we can now add Benamozegh to the list. There can also be little doubt R. Ezra of Gerona is referring to Ibn Ezra when he writes Kitvei( Ramban, p. 548): והנה השמר על נפשך להיות מין, לאמור כי עזרא הסופר הוסיף בה בלבו [מלבו] בהעתקתו כמו והכנעני אז בארץ, והנה ערשו ערש ברזל כי זו היא כפירה גמורה This passage was brought to my attention by Bezalel Naor, Ma’amar al Yishmael (Spring, Valley, 2008), p. 26. Another source that can be added to the list is R. Judah Halawa (fourteenth century), for he too identifies Ibn Ezra as holiding critical views. See his Imrei Shefer, ed. Hershler (Jerusalem, 1993), p. 335. Halawa doesn’t agree with Ibn Ezra in this matter, and writes: וזה הדעת רחוק מדעת רבותינו שדעתם שכל התורה כלה מפי הש”י למשה See also R. Solomon Judah Rapoport, Iggerot Shir (Przemysl, 1885), pp. 25-26. While on the topic of Benamozegh, and since a recent post of mine dealt with Maimonides’ view of sacrifices, readers might find the way Benamozegh characterizes Maimonides’ approach interesting (Eimat Mafgia, vol. 1, p. 11a): והטעם המדומה והמגונה לעבודת הקרבנות [10] R. Yaakov Yosef was at the forefront of this issue, and encouraged the Sephardi parents to take their case to the secular courts. For a relevant video, see here See also here for a video taken on June 23, 2010, which shows R. Yaakov’s supporters. At this event, one of the Sephardic rabbis from Emanuel appeared together with R. Yaakov. He attacked the Slonimer hasidim and said that there was no choice but to take the case to the Supreme court. According to one source, see here, he even stated that the Slonimers are worse than the Nazis! R. Yaakov how now (June 25, 2010) given his first radio interview explaining his position. See here. [11] See Ha-Absurd: Al ha-Absurd ha-Gadol she-be-Yahasei Sefaradim ve-Ashkenazim u-Mah she-Beinehem (Ashkelon, n.d.), p. 16. [12] For Amsalem’s latest “bombshell,”, this time in opposition to “Torah only” as a lifestyle choice, see here. In R. Meir Mazuz’ just published Arim Nisi: Gittin, p. 109 (first pagination), we see that he agrees with his student Amsalem. כן מ”ש הרמב”ם שצריך להיות לת”ח מלאכה המפרנסת, אילו שמעו בקולו כמה צער היה נחסך לאברכים בזמננו, המצפים בכל חודש למילגה עלובה של נערי האוצר

It was only a matter of time before the haredi gedolim attacked Amsalem, and this has now come. Here is the placard that went up against him, and relates to his new bookZera Yisrael which argues for a more liberal approach to the concept of kabbalat mitzvot in conversion. See here for the report in Yated Neeman, which even removes the title “rabbi” from Amsalem. See here where R Binyamin Lau argues that if R. Ovadiah Yosef sacks Amsalem, it will be the end of the Shas party and R. Ovadiah’s Sephardic revolution. For Amsalem’s website, see here. Zera Yisrael appeared with haskamot from, among others, Rabbis Meir Mazuz (whom I regard as the gadol ha-dor), Zalman Nehemiah Goldberg, Shlomo Dichovsky, Shear Yashuv Cohen, Dov Lior, Yaakov Ariel, and Nachum Eliezer Rabinovitch. I am certain that the rabbis who condemned Amsalem have never seen his book, the second volume of which contains numerous responsa from great sages who, according to the placard, have the status of eino bar hora’ah. Unfortunately, the attack on Amsalem is just the latest example of haredi verbal assaults—others will call it bullying—on those who don’t “toe the line.” These attacks have become very popular in recent years, and the list of those targeted is already quite long. Since, to mention only Sephardic gedolim, R. Mazuz, R. Amar, R. Bakshi-Doron and even R. Ovadiah have been subjected to this, the attack on Amsalem was certainly not unexpected. [13] Regarding looking at women, I think most people will be surprised by what Maimonides writes in his Commentary to Sanhedrin 7:4 ואשה שאינה נשואה מותר למי שאינה ערוה עליו ליהנות בהסתכלות בצורתה, ואין איסור בכך אלא בדרך הצניעות והפרישות מן המותר כדי שלא יכשל באסור [14] This is how she is described on the title page. Incidentally, R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai has an entry for “rabbanit” in his Shem ha-Gedolim. He lists there a few learned women. When Azulai uses the term rabbanit, it does not mean “rebbetzin” but “female rabbi”. I am sure that there are those who would object to Hida that these women were never “ordained”. Yet Hida also includes many others who were not ordained, but I don’t think anyone would take the title of “rabbi” away from them. One such figure was Moses ben Maimon. I know that some in the Modern Orthodox world do not like the modern title “rabbanit” or “rebbetzin.” It bothers them that rebbetzins have a title which comes to them only by virtue of whom they married, and yet learned women who are not married to rabbis are not given any title. However, the practice of calling a woman by her husband’s title actually has biblical precedent. See Isaiah 8:3: “And I was intimate with the prophetess and she conceived.” Here Isaiah is speaking about his wife. As Radak and Ibn Ezra point out, the wife of a prophet is called a prophetess even if she herself never received prophecy. (Rashi, Is. 7:14, disagrees, but I think the peshat is in accord with Radak and Ibn Ezra.) Also, let us which in modern times ,אשת חבר כחבר not forget the notion that I assume works in reverse as well. (As to why there is no obligation to stand up for a rebbetzin, as is done with her husband, see R. Yitzhak Yosef’s recent Shulhan ha-Ma’arekhet, vol. 2, p. 248, ma’arekhet heh no. 17. Here R. Yosef states is only midat אשת חבר that all agree that standing up for an hasidut and that there is no halakhic obligation. He also quotes that Hida that after the death of a rebbetzin’s husband, it might not even rise to midat hasidut. Yet in his Kitzur Shulhan Arukh 242:19, R. Yosef states the exact מצוה לקום מפני אשת חבר, ואפילו אחר מות בעלה מצוה :opposite (לקום מפניה Would it be so hard for Modern Orthodoxy to come up with a title recognizing those women who are talmidot hakhamim? I am not referring to a title that has anything to do with the practicing rabbinate, as we have seen how divisive that is, but simply a way to acknowledge achievement (which would also bring the recipients certain practical benefits). The RCA has recently reaffirmed its support for women’s Torah study: “In light of the opportunity created by advanced women’s learning, the Rabbinical Council of America encourages a diversity of halakhically and communally appropriate professional opportunities for learned, committed women, in the service of our collective mission to preserve and transmit our heritage.” I am curious as to how this will work in the real world. Before this statement was issued, I was told by a learned woman that a Modern Orthodox high school refused to hire her to teach Talmud. They told her that they thought these positions should only be held by men. I wonder, would the typical Modern Orthodox high school, where girls are taught Talmud and halakhah by men, ever hire a woman to do this as well? And if yes, would she ever be allowed to teach these subjects to boys or to a co-ed class? If the answer is no, I think that this should be made very clear. It is not fair to encourage all these women to study advanced Talmud and halakhah if at the end of their studies they find that there is a glass ceiling. If it is true that there will be no jobs for them, then they should be told this up front. The RCA should also explain what positions are “communally appropriate”. Is it ever appropriate for a woman to give a shiur in Humash to the community (men and women)? If yes, what about a shiur in Talmud or halakhah? If yes, can such a woman answer halakhic questions? The purpose of the advanced Talmud study programs for women at Stern and elsewhere should also be explained. Are they only Torah li-Shemah, or is there some expectation that these women will be given the opportunity to make use of their knowledge in the Jewish community? (For R. Nachum Eliezer Rabinovitch’s recent defense of the Yoatzot Halakah, see his Siah Nahum, no. 60. He even has no problem with the Yoatzot actually “poskining” she’elot) Basically, Modern Orthodoxy opened up a can of worms when it sanctioned advanced Jewish education for women. It has not yet found the way to make this work without creating controversy on the one side and dashing expectations on the other.

[15] For sources on the permissibility of hearing a woman lecture, see the outstanding young scholar R. Yonatan Rosman’s Taher Libenu (Staten Island, 2009), pp. 138-139. Hardal Orthodoxy has many of the same issues as the haredim. I was surprised to see that R. Shmuel Eliyahu, Chief Rabbi of Safed and one of the leaders of the hardalim, who is extremely stringent in matters of tzeniut (to the extent that he holds that women’s pictures should not be published), actually sang before hundreds of young women. He did this during sefirah no less. Even though the event took place on Rosh Hodesh Iyar, since when does Rosh Hodesh affect the sefirah restrictions? Presumably, the heter was for kiruv purposes. See his performance here. [16] He also doesn’t deal with Moed Katan 3:9, which shows that in Mishnaic days a woman led the wailing: “The woman speaks up and all respond after her.” Along these lines, it is very interesting to see how haredi and hardal authors deal with Ta’anit 4:8, which describes how young women in search of husbands would dance in front of the young men. (In a future post I will discuss whether they did so also on Yom Kippur or only on the 15th of Av.) Many assume that this didn’t raise any tzeniut problems, because in the days of the Second Temple the young men were at a much higher level than today. They could be trusted not to set their eyes on beauty but on spiritual traits, which were somehow best conveyed through the women’s dancing . . . According to R. Shimon Schwab, in ancient days the women danced in circles, which was more modest than what occurs today. It was therefore permitted for the men to gaze upon them. See R. Yitzhak Abadi, Or Yitzhak, vol. 2, p. 251. You can be sure that today, no matter how modest the dancing, it would be regarded as a violation of tzeniut for the men to watch the women. [17] To give just one example, see R. Hayyim Eleazar Wachs, Shem ve-She’erit le-Nefesh Hayah, no. 13, who discusses a “holy man” who was completely celibate with his wife for the last fifteen years of her life. [18] Regarding how women were viewed as lustful, the Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 22:18, states: אלמנה אסורה לגדל כלב מפני החשד Rashi, Avodah Zarah 22b s.v. lo, explains the underlying שמא תתאוה ותרביענו עליה :Talmudic passage This is, to put it mildly, not a very sympathetic view of woman’s nature, and I daresay that of the mentally deranged people who are into this stuff, a much higher percentage are men (as seems to be the case with all such perversions). Tosafot, Bava Metzia 71a s.v. lo, completely disregards Rashi’s reason, and assumes that there is no actual prohibition. According to Tosafot, there is a concern not with what the woman will actually do, but what people will say about her. From our perspective, this too is strange. We assume, with good reason, that when it comes to matters of sexual morality, the generations have declined, and yet today no one would ever dream of insinuating anything improper about someone who has a dog, even if the person is regarded as completely dissolute. I also can’t imagine any rabbi suggesting to a widow that she get rid of her dog, because what woman wouldn’t be insulted by such a request? Hundreds of years ago, R. Yitzhak Lampronte already noted that this law of the Shulhan Arukh was ignored. See Pahad Yitzhak, s.v. almanah, p. 73a: והאידנא לא ראיתי מוחים באלמנה מלגדל כלב, אולי דעתה לא נחשדו ישראל על כך Yet see R. Haggai Levy, Ginat ha-Egoz, no. 79, who rejects Lampronte, and states that even a female divorcee is forbidden to have a dog. I am curious, however, why there is no distinction made between owning a male or female dog. [19] The letter is found in Orhot Rabbenu, vol. 5 pp. 29-31. Portions of it first appeared in print in R. Nathan Drazin’s 1989 book, Zivug min ha-Shamayim, pp. 110-111. Since Drazin is trying to present what he regards as a healthy attitude towards sex, it is understandable that he quotes the Steipler’s letter. Yet Drazin’s discussion is not entirely accurate. For example, in dealing with the somewhat ascetic approach of the Kitzur Shulhan Arukh, Drazin states that is directed towards גדולי תורה אשר הגיעו לדרגה גבוהה ויכולים למצוא את סיפוקם במישור הרוחני, וכל זה בהסמכתה המלאה של האשה ובמחילה בלב שלם אך לא לאנשים בינוניים. When confronted with the approach of the Kitzur Shulhan Arukh, the proper answer by Drazin should have been that this work represents a tradition that is not suitable for modern people, or that other gedolim disagree. But to state that something in the Kitzur Shulhan Arukh is directed towards gedolei Torah and not the masses is simply a distortion. TheKitzur Shulhan Arukh is the halakhic work for the masses par excellence, and has been printed hundreds of times in various languages. If there is any work which is not directed towards the gedolim, it is the Kitzur Shulhan Arukh. With regard to the Kitzur, we can see a reflection of the decline in Jewish learning in that abridgements of the Abridged Shulhan Arukh were published. One such example is R. Israel Kanovitz, Hayyei ha-Yehudi (New York, 1929. This book תמצית הס’ קצור ש”ע מהר”ש גנצפריד :describes itself as In fact, this book was itself abridged. SeeVe-Hai ba-Hem (Montevideo, 1956). [20] Since it is a shame for anything written to go to waste, here is what I wrote in 2003 for the website hebrewbooks.org when it was still in its infancy. In those days the site only focused on American rabbis. Shortly after writing the letter, the focus of the website changed, meaning my piece was no longer suitable. I publish it here for the sake of posterity The history of Orthodox Judaism in the United States in the years before World War II still awaits careful study. Many, in fact, are under the misconception that until the 1930’s the United States lacked great Torah scholars. The truth is that already at the turn of the twentieth century, there were many outstanding Torah scholars who had settled here. Had they remained in Europe it is likely that some of them would now be well known in the Torah world.

For a variety of reasons these rabbis were forced to leave Russia and Europe and travel to a new land. They ended up in communities throughout the country. Although it is hard to imagine it today, there were world-renowned scholars in such places as Omaha, Nebraska, Burlington, Vermont, and Hoboken, New Jersey. These were men who lived in the wrong place at the wrong time, and their communities did not appreciate the greatness that dwelled within them. The challenges of the new land were indeed difficult and unfortunately, many of these rabbis’ children did not follow the path of their fathers.

The works of these rabbis, in addition to being major contributions to Torah literature, are also priceless historical documents. They reflect a time, unlike today, when Orthodoxy was on the defensive, appearing to many to be on its way out. After their deaths, these rabbis were forgotten as were their books. Thanks to the miracles of modern technology, and the indefatigable efforts of Chaim Rosenberg, this situation is being rectified. The Torah writings of these forgotten American rabbis are now being made available. Those who peruse these works will see the learning and dedication of our American sages. They will see how these rabbis grappled with challenging halakhic problems, and how they attempted to offer religious inspiration to their congregants. It is they, the “Gedolei America,” who laid the groundwork for Orthodoxy in the United States, and for this we are all grateful.

[21] See here. [22] See here. [23] For R. Yuval Sherlo’s recent pesak (which should have been obvious to anyone) that it is not regarded as lashon hara to negatively review a book, see here. [24] See R. Zvi Schachter, Nefesh ha-Rav, pp. 234-235. [25] In this post I quoted R. Mark Urkowitz’ recollection of how R. Gorelik viewed the importance of YU. Subsequently, Urkowitz wrote to me that he recalls just about verbatim the language of Gorelik. R. Yerucham prefaced the remark with something to the effect that he always makes negative comments about YU. He then added: אבער איר זאלט וויסען אז דאס איז די איין אונד איין איינזיגער מקום תורה אין אמריקא ווייל נאר פון דא גייען די בחורים ארוים צו זעהן אז עס זאל בלייבען ידישקייט אין די לאנד Further Comments by Marc Shapiro

Further Comments By Marc B. Shapiro I had thought that this would be my last post of the current batch, but it turned out to be too long. So I have divided it into two parts. Here is part no. 1. The volumes Shomrei Mishmeret ha-Kodesh, by R. Natan Raphael Auerbach, have just appeared. Here is the cover. This book is devoted to the Auerbach family, which was one of the great rabbinic families in Germany. They were the “A” in what was known as the ABC rabbinic families (the others being Bamberger and Carlebach). Over 150 pages are devoted to R. Zvi Benjamin Auerbach, who was the most prominent of the Auerbach rabbis. He was also the publisher of Sefer ha-Eshkol, to which he added his commentary Nahal Eshkol. In a number of posts I dealt with Auerbach’s edition ofSefer Ha-Eshkol, and discussed how both academic scholars and traditional talmidei hakhamim have concluded that the work is a forgery.1 Readers who are interested in the details can examine the earlier posts. In this newly published volume, which was called to my attention by Eliezer Brodt, the author speaks briefly about the Sefer ha-Eshkol controversy and responds to those who, in his words, continue to defame a gadol be-Yisrael (p. 382): הממשיכים לבזות גדול בישראל ולהכפישו באופן אישי In the note the author refers to Moshe Samet, who earlier had dealt with Sefer ha-Eshkol, and also to one of my posts on the Seforim Blog. While Seforim Blog posts have been cited in English scholarly writings, as far as I know this is the first time that there has been citation in a Hebrew volume. I understand why members of the Auerbach family might feel obliged to defend him. (Yet one of my college suitemates was a descendant of Auerbach, and it didn’t seem to trouble him when I told him about the controversy.) Why a respected rabbi would forge a book is not something I want to get into now. In the earlier post I assumed that he was schizophrenic, as when it comes to Sefer ha-Eshkol I can’t think of any ideological reason for his actions. (Samet, He-Hadash Assur min ha-Torah [Jerusalem, 2005], p. 152 n. 235, identifies as one of .(מגמה אורתודוקסית :Auerbach’s motivations As for the argument that since he was a leading rabbi we must therefore assume that he couldn’t have done such a thing, this is disproven by all the recent examples of well-known rabbis who were involved in a variety of types of improper behavior. Before they were exposed, no one could ever have imagined what we learnt, and everyone would have been 100 percent sure that these rabbis could not possibly have been involved in such activities. This simply shows that that just because someone is a well-known rabbi we don’t have to automatically conclude that he is innocent no matter what the evidence says. In many of the recent cases, at least the ones dealing with sexual abuse, the rabbis no doubt suffered from some sort of mental illness, as I can’t imagine that men who did so much to influence people positively and help them were complete frauds. I think that Auerbach must also have had some psychological issues, and this is actually the bestlimu d zekhut. For once we assume this, it means that we don’t have to view the rest of his illustrious career and achievements as fraudulent. In short, he had a problem and it manifested itself in his forgeries. Yet I admit that I can’t prove my supposition, and at the end of the day we will probably never be able to explain definitively why Auerbach would forge the text any more than we can explain how another great figure, Erasmus, forged a patristic work and attributed it to Saint Cyprian.2 Anthony Grafton, who has written an entire book on the subject, sums up the matter as follows: “The desire to forge, in other words, can infect almost anyone: the learned as well as the ignorant, the honest person as well as the rogue.”3 Unfortunately, Shomrei Mishmeret ha-Kodesh does not seriously deal with any of the evidence that has led to the conclusion that we are dealing with a forgery. (For reasons I can’t get into now, I find it completely implausible that someone in medieval times forged the work and Auerbach was duped. But let me make one point: Auerbach claimed to be working from a very old manuscript, and yet this “manuscript” contains material from the 17th and 18th centuries.). Since the author mentions Sefer ha-Eshkol vol. 4, which was published in 1986 together with the Nahal Eshkol, I once again renew my call for this manuscript to be made public and for some explanation to be given as to where it comes from, since Auerbach’s many defenders were unaware of it. The fact that a portion of Auerbach’s manuscript (i.e. his copy of the supposed medieval manuscript) mysteriously surfaced so many decades after Auerbach’s death, and that we are told nothing about it or even shown a picture of it, certainly raises red flags. As I noted in one of my previous posts, the Nahal Eshkol published here has a reference to a book that only appeared after Auerbach died. This means that quite apart fromSefer ha- Eshkol, we also have to raise questions about whether the Nahal Eshkol published here is itself authentic. It could be that it is indeed genuine, and the reference to the later book is an interpolation, but that is why we have to see the manuscript. After all, if the manuscript is written in one hand, and it includes the reference to the later book, then there is no doubt that it too is a forgery. So let the evidence about Sefer ha-Eshkol vol. 4, together with the manuscript, be placed on the Seforim Blog for all to see. Perhaps then we can begin to understand the mystery of this volume. As long as the topic has been brought up, let me call attention to Shulamit Elitzur’s new book,Lamah Tzamnu (Jerusalem, 2007). On p. 115 n. 2, she gives an example where the Sefer ha-Eshkol forgery was perpetrated by using a quotation from the Shibolei ha-Leket, and cites a comment in this regard from the noted scholar Simhah Emanuel. On p. 235 n. 3,8 she mentions another example of forgery in the Auerbach Sefer Ha-Eshkol. For further instance, see Israel Moshe Ta- Shma’s posthumously published Keneset Mehkarim, vol. 4 (Jerusalem, 2010), p. 183 n. 28.4 In an article in Atarah le- Hayyim (Jerusalem, 2000), p. 292, Neil Danzig also points to a non-authentic interpolation in Auerbach’s Sefer ha-Eshkol. Yet I am surprised to see that he follows Ta-Shma in thinking that R. Moses De Leon might have had something to do with this. In terms of traditional Torah scholars, I came across a comment by R. Avigdor Nebenzahl in R. Yaakov Epstein’s recently published Hevel Nahalato, vol. 7, p. 157. (Epstein is the grandson of Prof. Jacob Nahum Epstein.5) Nebenzahl comes from a German Orthodox background, so one might expect him to come to the defense of Auerbach, as did a number of prominent German Orthodox figures. Yet that is not what we find. Epstein had cited a passage from Auerbach’s Sefer ha- Eshkol to which Nebenzahl added that it is well known that some question the authenticity of this edition and claim that it is a forgery. In case you are looking for any non-scholarly motivations for this comment, I should mention that Nebenzahl’s sister was Plia Albeck (died 2005), the daughter-in-law of Hanokh Albeck and a significant person in her own right. (She paved the way for most of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank.) Hanokh Albeck, together with his father, Shalom Albeck, published the authentic Sefer ha-Eshkol, and were both very involved in exposing Auerbach’s forgery. In other words, Nebenzahl’s comment shows that families stick together. (Just out of curiosity, does anyone know if there have been any marriages between the two important families, the Auerbachs and the Albecks?) In a previous post, I mentioned R. Yehiel Avraham Zilber’s belief that the Auerbach Sefer ha-Eshkol is forged. To the sources I referred to, we can add Birur Halakhah, Orah Hayyim 75. Also, R. Yisrael Tuporovitz, who has written many volumes of Talmudic commentaries, is not shy about offering his opinion. Here is what he writes inDerekh Yisrael: Hullin (Bnei Brak, 1999), p. 8: וכבר נודע שספר האשכול הנדפס עם ביאור נחל אשכול הוא מזוייף ואין לסמוך עליו כלל

He repeats this judgment on pages 38, 53 and 345. In one of the earlier posts I mentioned that R. Yitzhak Ratsaby denies the authenticity of Auerbach’s edition. I also quoted from his letter to me. At the time, I was unaware that portions of this letter also appear in his haskamah to R. Moshe Parzis’ Taharat Kelim (Bnei Brak, 2002). Another new source in this regard from Ratsaby is his Shulhan Arukh ha- Mekutzar (Bnei Brak, 2000), Yoreh Deah 138:3 (p. 287), where he accuses Auerbach of taking something from the Peri Hadash and placing it in Sefer ha-Eshkol. Ratsaby discussed the Sefer ha-Eshkol in his haskamah to Parzis’ book because the latter had called attention to the defense of Auerbach in Tzidkat ha-Tzaddik. Here is the title page of the latter work. Among the defenders of Auerbach was R. Jacob Schorr of Kuty, Galicia. Schorr was a genius and is best known for his edition of the Sefer ha-Itim.6 He also wrote the responsa volume Divrei Yaakov (Kolomea, 1881), and a second volume, culled from various sources, both published and manuscript, appeared in 2006. Here is his picture, taken from Aharon Sorasky’s Marbitzei Torah me-Olam ha-Hasidut, vol. 3, p. 11. It is an unfortunate oversight that this incredible scholar does not have an entry in the Encyclopaedia Judaica. A list of all of his works can be found in the introduction to his Mavo al ha-Tosefta (Petrokov, 1930). This introduction also contains R. Zvi Ezekiel Michaelson’s biography of Schorr. As with everything written by this amazing bibliophile,7 one learns a great deal, not only about the subject he focuses on, but about all sorts of other things.8 Michaelson was killed in the Holocaust and numerous unpublished manuscripts of his were lost. His grandson was Prof. Moshe Shulvass, and a responsum is addressed to him in Michaelson’s Tirosh ve-Yitzhar, no. 158. Schorr’s son was Dr. Alexander Schorr, who translated many classic Greek and Latin texts into Hebrew.9 Alexander Schorr’s grandson is the well-known Israeli film director, Renen Schorr.10 Since Prof. Leiman has just written about the Maharal, it is worth noting that Schorr tells an incredibly far-fetched story, which he actually believed, about the Maharal and Emperor Rudolph. According to the tale, Rudolph’s biological father was a Jewish man. What happened was that Rudolph’s mother, the queen, could not have children with the Emperor. She therefore asked a Jewish man to impregnate her or else she would unleash persecution on the Jews in the kingdom. Upon hearing this, the beit din gave the man permission to accede to her wishes. I don’t want to repeat any more of this nonsensical story, but those who are interested can find it in R. Abraham Michaelson’s Shemen ha-Tov (Petrokov, 1905), pp. 60a-b. (R. Abraham was R. Zvi Ezekiel’s son.) Returning to Schorr, one of the most astounding examples of self-confidence—others will no doubt call it arrogance or foolishness—ever stated by a rabbi (in print, at least) was penned by him. In his Meir Einei Hakhamim, reprinted in Kitvei ve-Hiddushei ha-Gaon Rabbi Yaakov Schorr (Bnei Brak, 1991), p. 177, we find the following: ואני מעיד עלי שמים וארץ כי לא היה ולא יקום עוד אחרי שום חכם אשר יהי’ בקי בטוב [!] בפלפול תנאים ואמוראים כמותי

This text is often quoted by R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer in his various works.11 This is not the only time Schorr expressed himself this way. On page 129 he writes ודע דהופיע רוח הקודש בבית מדרשי (This expression can also be found in other books, and originates in Rabad’s hassagah to Hilkhot Lulav 8:5. But to see this type of language in a sefer written by a someone very young [see below], even a genius like Schorr, is a bit jarring.) Sofer, Shem Betzalel, p. 28, also points to Meir Einei Hakhamim, p. 209, where Schorr writes about one of his ideas: וזה נכון יותר מפירוש רש”י (On this page, Schorr alludes to R Zvi Hirsch Chajes, Sofer claims that Schorr’s .אחד מחכמי הזמן referring to him as general practice is to not mention Chajes by name. Sofer wants the reader to think that he doesn’t know why Schorr acts this way. Yet the reason is obvious, and Sofer himself certainly knows that some talmudists were not fans of Chajes.) Perhaps we can attribute Schorr’s over-the-top comments to his own immaturity. After all, as Sofer, Shem Betzalel, p. 29, points out, Schorr began writing the book I am quoting from at age thirteen, and completed it by the time he was sixteen. A genius he certainly was, yet I think we should assume that his excessive comments were the product of youthful exuberance. Sofer sees Schorr’s youthfulness as also responsible for the very harsh way he criticizes the writings of various gedolim, which is something that is more understandable, and forgivable, in a teenager than in a mature scholar. I think all writers are embarrassed of things their penned in their youth, and that is to be expected.12 An example I often mention in this regard (when not referring to myself) is Hirsch’s harsh criticism of Maimonides. This appeared in Hirsch’s first book, theNineteen Letters, published when he was 28 years old. Never again in Hirsch’s many writings does he ever express himself this way. My assumption is that he regretted what he wrote, and in his mature years he would not have used such strong language. Similarly, I wonder if in his mature years R. Soloveitchik would have commented to R. Weinberg—as he did in his twenties—that his grandfather had a greater understanding than even the Vilna Gaon. (I have printed Weinberg’s letter where this appears in a few different places, most recently on the Seforim Blog and in the Hebrew section to myStudies in Maimonides.) In terms of young achievers in the Lithuanian Torah world, I wonder how many have ever heard of R. Meir Shafit. He lived in the nineteenth century and wrote a commentary on the Jerusalem Talmud, when not many were studying it. Here is the title page of one of the volumes, where it tells us that he became rav of a community at the age of fifteen. The Hazon Ish once remarked that the young Rabbi Shafit would mischievously throw pillows at his gabbaim!13 Returning to Schorr and Sefer ha-Eshkol, Ratsaby is not impressed by Schorr’s defense. He notes that in R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer’s Torat Yaakov, Sofer states that the ideas of ”.צריכים בדיקה“ Schorr I found the comment in Torat Yaakov (2002 edition) p. 880. Here Sofer claims that despite his brilliance, Schorr often puts forth unsustainable suppositions, and he calls attention to R. Reuven Margaliot, Ha-Mikra ve-ha-Mesorah, ch. 12. Here Margaliot cites a suggestion by Schorr that the text of is not גחון Kiddushin 30a should be emended because the vav of the middle letter of the Torah. Schorr further states that the editor of Masekhet Sofrim was misled by the error in the Talmud. The implication of Schorr’s comment is that all of our sifrei Torah are mistaken, for they mark this letter as special. Margaliot responds: ותמה אני על תלמיד חכם מובהק כמוהו איך הרשה לעצמו לחשוב על מסדר מסכת סופרים שהוא טועה ומטעה וגם בודה מלבו מנהגים בכתיבת ס”ת. ב”הגהות” כאלו יכולים לעשות כל מה שרוצים, וכאשר כתב הגר”א [אליהו] פוסק בפסקי אליהו שם: רעדה אחזתני לעשות טעות כזה בגמרא ולחשוב על כל הס”ת שגיונות בדקדוקים דו’ דגחון ודרש דרש. With regard to Ratsaby, I should also note that his dispute with R. Ovadiah Yosef continues unabated. In his recent Ner Yom Tov (Bnei Brak, 2008), pp. 20-21, he goes so far as to accuse R. Ovadiah of plagiarism. He also states, with regard to R. Ovadiah (p. 100): שכבוד התורה אצלו, הוא רק למי שמסכים לדבריו Ratsaby’s book was written to defend the Yemenite practice of not making a blessing on Yom Tov candles against the criticism of R. Ovadiah. He also deals with R. Ovadiah’s larger point that the Yemenites must embrace the Shulhan Arukh’s rulings now that they are in the Land of Israel. The entire Yemenite rabbinate agrees with Ratsaby’s position, but upon seeing how he attacked R. Ovadiah, the condemnation of him from other Yemenite rabbis was swift. All I can say in defense of Ratsaby is that R. Ovadiah has been criticizing him in a less than respectful way for some time now. But in a sense, Ratsaby got what was coming to him, because for many years he has been writing very disrespectfully about R. Kafih. In this new book, p. 98, Ratsaby goes so far as to repeat the legend that when Kafih was appointed a dayan in Jerusalem he swore to R. Ovadiah that he accepted the Zohar, and Ratsaby claims that Kafih swore falsely. Kafih, however, denied that he ever took such an oath.14 For a long time Ratsaby has been proclaiming that it forbidden to use Kafih’s books, as he is a member of the kat, i.e., the Dardaim who don’t accept the Zohar or Kabbalah in general. Yet R. Ovadiah has declared that the Dardaim are not to be regarded as heretics.15 This is in contrast to R. Chaim Kanievsky who holds that the Dardaim are heretics who cannot be counted in a minyan.16 R. David Teherani states that since the Dardaim reject the Zohar, their wine is yein nesekh.17 According to Aaron Abadi, R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach also ruled that rejection of the Zohar and Kabbalah is heresy.18 I can understand those who assert that one must believe that the Zohar was written by Rashbi or at the very least that it was written be-ruah ha-kodesh, and if you deny this it is heresy. Yet what is one to make of the following statement, which greatly enlarges the realm of heresy (R. Menasheh Klein, Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 7, no. 160): ואם הוא אינו מאמין שהמ”ב [משנה ברורה] נכתב ברוה”ק אזי הוא בכלל אפיקורוס וכופר בתורת ה’ . . . יש בזמן הזה שאין מאמינים שגם בדורינו אנו ישנם חכמי הזמן שיש להם רוה”ק . . . ומי שלא מאמין בזה הרי הוא אפיקורוס וכופר בלי ספק.

Based on this definition, I think the entire Lithuanian rabbinate until World War II would be regarded as heretics. Would such a statement even have been imaginable before twenty years ago? It is, of course, no secret that the Lithuanian rabbinate has been transformed along hasidic lines. This change is undeniable and I can point to many examples of this. Here is one (which was sent to me by R. Yitzhak Hershkowitz). Would any Jew in Lithuania ever fall for such a thing as magic (or holy) wine? Anyone who tried to peddle this stuff would have been thrown out of the beit midrash. I was actually told an anti-hasidic joke with regard to this picture. I ask all Hasidim not to be offended as neither I nor the management endorse the joke. Yet it deserves to be recorded for posterity, for as we all know, jokes are simply jokes, but the history of jokes (even bad ones), well that is scholarship. The joke goes as follows: “It is incredbible. We now see great Lithuanian Torah scholars doing things that until now only hasidic rebbes did. But even more incredible would be to see the reverse, that is, to see hasidic rebbes write seforim on Shas and poskim.” With regard to the Zohar, I must mention an amazing point called to my attention by David Zilberberg, from which we see that R. Joseph B. Soloveitchik did not believe that R. Simeon bar Yohai wrote the Zohar, or at least that he didn’t write all of it. I always assumed as much, but as far as I know there was never any proof, until now. In The Lord is Righteous in All His Ways, pp. 206-207, the Rav discusses the Western Wall and says that there is no mention of it in Chazal and very little mention in rishonim. The Wall is mentioned in Shir ha-Shirim Rabbah 2:2219, where it states that the Kotel will never be destroyed, but the Rav says about this Midrash: I will tell you frankly that I am always suspicious about this midrash, because the classical sources, the Bavli and the Yerushalmi, do not mention the Kotel ha-Ma’aravi. The midrash cited earlier is, perhaps, a later insert. Apparently, Rabbi El’azar ha-Kalir knew the midrash. To my mind, this kinah of Rabbi Elazar ha-Kalir is one of the earliest documents to mention the Kotel ha-Ma’aravi.

Earlier in this book the Rav tells us when Kalir lived: I do not know why historians have to explore when Kalir lived when he himself states that nine hundred years have passed and the Messiah has not yet arrived. It means that Kalir lived in the tenth century.

Yet as Zilberberg correctly points out, the Western Wall is seen as quite significant in the Zohar (II, 5b), and is referred to as Rosh Amanah.20 The Rav knew the Zohar very well, and therefore, when he tells us that Chazal do not mention the Western Wall, and it is only during the time of the rishonim that we begin to see references to it, he is also telling us that the Zohar (or at least this section of the Zohar) was written in the days of the rishonim. Returning to Auerbach, let me add in conclusion that he is not the only great rabbi and Torah scholar who was involved in forgery. An earlier case is R. Benjamin Ze’ev of Arta (sixteenth century), author of the well known responsa volume Teshuvot Binyamin Ze’ev. Here is the title page from the first edition (Venice, 1539):

In the midst of a dispute he was involved in, he forged the signature of the Venetian rabbi, R. Baruch Bendit Axelrad, placing it on a document that supported himself. He also forged an entire letter in R. Baruch Bendit’s name. When all this was discovered, it helped lead to R. Benjamin’s downfall.21 Quite apart from the forgery, R. Solomon Luria,Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kamma, ch. 8 no. 72, also accuses R. Benjamin Zev of plagiarism. Here are some his words: כל דבריו גנובים וארוכים בפלפול שאינו לצורך וכנגד פנים מראה אחור . . . ושרי לי מרי אם הוא צדיק למה הביא הקב”ה תקלה על ידו הלא הוא היה הכותב ונתן לדפוס הספר מידו ומפיו. One big question that needs to be considered is how far removed is forgery from false attribution? When it comes to false attribution there is a long rabbinic tradition supporting it, and in the book I am currently working on I deal with this in great detail. If you can falsely attribute a position to a sage, perhaps you can forge a document in his name as well (assuming it is not done for personal gain). Could that be what was driving Auerbach? * * * A few people have sent me a question about my Monday night Torah in Motion classes, so I assume that there are others who have the question as well. Here is the answer: If you cannot be with us at 9PM and you are signed up, the classes are sent to you so that you can watch or listen at your convenience. This is much cheaper than downloading the classes individually. Notes

1 From my post here you can find all the links. 2 See Anthony Grafton, Forgers and Critics: Creativity and Duplicity in Western Scholarship (Princeton, 1990), pp. 44-45. 3 Ibid., p. 48. 4 As has been noted by many, Auerbach’s edition of Sefer Ha- Eshkol has misled countless talmidei hakhamim. There is another way in which Auerbach misled a scholar, but in this case it was accidental. In the introduction to his edition, p. xv note 9, Auerbach reports in the name of a supposedly reliable person that the Yerushalmi Kodashim was to be found in the Vatican library. This false report led R. Mordechai Farhand to travel there from Hungary in search of this treasure, and he describes his journey. See Farhand,Be ’er Mordechai (Galanta, 1927), pp. 154ff. Farhand was a gullible fellow. See ibid. p. 152, where even though it had been a number of years since Friedlaender’s Yerushalmi forgery had been established, he didn’t want to take sides. The legend that there was a copy of the Yerushalmi Kodashim in the Vatican had been disproven already in the nineteenth century. See R. Baruch Oberlander in Or Yisrael (Tamuz 5761), p. 220. 5 In his review of my edition of Kitvei ha-Rav Weinberg, vol. 2, R. Neriah Guttel, Ha-Ma’ayan (Nisan 5764), pp. 82-83, writes that it was improper for me to publish Weinberg’ judgment of Epstein (p. 430). Although they were friends, and Weinberg thought that Epstein was a great scholar, he also pointed out that that Epstein wasn’t a lamdan. What Weinberg meant is that Epstein wasn’t a traditional talmid hakham but an academic Talmudic researcher. As such, while his publications had great value, in Weinberg’s eyes they didn’t get to the heart of what Talmudic scholarship should be about. In Weinberg’s words: סוכ”ס אפשטיין אינו למדן, ואיננו אלא פילולוג בעל חוש חד. בלא לומדות אי אפשר לחקור לא את המשנה ולא התלמוד. Statements like these are vital for evaluating Weinberg’s approach to academic scholarship, and I never would dream of censoring such things. 6 In his Sha’ar Yaakov (Petrokov, 1922), no. 16, there is a responsum to “Abraham Joshua Heschel.” Shmuel Glick, Kuntres ha-Teshuvot he-Hadash, vol. 3, s.v. Sha’ar Yaakov, assumes that this is the famous A. J. Heschel, but I don’t think we can conclude this based only on the name, which was shared by a number of others. 7 Eleh Ezkerah (New York, 1957), vol. 2, p. 196 (repeated in the Encylopaedia Judaica entry on Michaelson), states that in Michaelson’s Degan Shamayim (Petrokov, 1901), there are responsa written when he was twelve and thirteen years old. This is a mistake. The earliest responsa dates from when he was seventeen years old. See pp. 10a, 11a. 8 On p. 23 he prints a letter that Schorr wrote to Michaelson’s son, who wanted to translate the Sefer ha-Hinukh into Yiddish. Schorr was strongly opposed to this. He explained as follows, using words that won’t make the women very happy: רבינו הרמב”ם והחינוך אחריו שהודיעו ברבים טעמי מצות וכו’ יכשלו בזה קלי הדעת לבטל המצוה כפי סכלות דעתם אשר לפי הטעם אין לחוש עוד בזמנינו וכיוצא שבטל בהם טעם זה וכו’ איך ניתן לגלות טעמי מצות גם בפני נשים ועמי הארץ אשר יקראו בו, חלילה לרו”מ לעבור על לפני עור. 9 See here 10 See here 11 Sofer often refers to a similar type of comment by R. Shlomo Kluger, Ha-Elef Lekha Shlomo, Orah Hayyim 367: אם הייתי זוכר כל מה שכתבתי מעולם לא הי’ שום הערה בעולם שלא הרגשתי בזה. (I cited both Schorr and Kluger in a footnote in my article on the Hatam Sofer in Be’erot Yitzhak: Studies in Memory of Isadore Twersky. Although other writers also cite this comment of Kluger, as with much else, I believe that I first saw the reference in one of Sofer’s writings.) Kluger wrote so many thousands of responsa, that it is not uncommon for him to contradict himself and forget what he wrote previously. See R. Yehudah Leib Maimon, ed., Sefer ha-Gra (Jerusalem, 1954), p. 99 in the note. R. Solomon Schreiber, Hut ha-Meshulash (Tel Aviv, 1963), p. 19, claims that R. Nathan Adler’s reason for not recording his Torah teachings was due to a belief that the permission to put the Oral Law into writing only applies if one is not able to remember this information. Since, according to Schreiber, R. Nathan claimed that he never forgot any Torah knowledge, he was not permitted to take advantage of this heter. 12 Regarding Schorr being a childhood genius, this letter from him to R. Shlomo Kluger appeared in Moriah, Av 5767. As you can see, the letter was written in 1860 (although I We are .(תר”ך can’t make out what the handwriting says after informed, correctly, that Schorr was born in 1853, which would mean that he was seven years old when he wrote the letter. This, I believe, would make him the greatest child genius in Jewish history, as I don’t think the Vilna Gaon could even write like this at age seven. Furthermore, if you read the letter you see that two years prior to this Schorr had also written to Kluger. Are there any other examples of a five- year-old writing Torah letters to one of the gedolei ha-dor? Furthermore, from the letter we see that the seven-year-old Schorr was also the rav of the town of Mariompol! (The Mariompol in Galicia, not Lithuania.) I would have thought that this merited some mention by the person publishing this letter. After all, Schorr would be the only seven-year-old communal rav in history, and this letter would be the only evidence that he ever served as rav in this town. But the man who published this document and the editor of the journal are entirely oblivious to what must be one of the most fascinating letters in all of Jewish history. Yet all this assumes that the letter was actually written by Schorr. Once again we must thank R. Yaakov Hayyim Sofer for setting the record straight. In his recently published Shuvi ha-Shulamit (Jerusalem, 2009), vol. 7, p. 101, he calls attention to the error and points out, citing Wunder, Meorei Galicia, that the rav of Mariampol was another man entirely, who was also named Jacob Schorr. 13 A. Horowitz, Orhot Rabbenu (Bnei Brak, 1991), vol. 1, p. 364. 14 See Avivit Levi, Holekh Tamim (Jerusalem, 2003), p. 133 n. 161. 15 See R. Yosef Pinhasi, Yefeh Toar, p. 116. 16 See his response in Mordechai Alemkayas, Va-Yikhtov Mordechai (Jerusalem, 2009), p. 340. 17 Yayin le-Nesekh (Betar Ilit, 1996), p. 70. 18 See here. According to Abadi, R. Shlomo Zalman’s decision was made with regard to a well-known scholar who is very involved with Artscroll. 19 The Rav doesn’t note that there is a mention of the Wall in Shemot Rabbah 2:2 as well, but his judgment would no doubt be the same. Contrary to the Rav, since these midrashim are found in so many parallel sources, I don’t think there is any question that they indeed originate with Chazal. 20 See Pinchas Giller, Reading the Zohar (Oxford, 2001), pp. 12-13. 21 The event is described in Meir Benayahu, Mavo le-Sefer Binyamin Ze’ev (Jerusalem, 1989), pp. 120ff. Once the dispute got going, all sorts things were said. R. Benjamin was even accused of purchasing his semikhah. See ibid., p.140. The source for this is R. Elijah ha-Levi, Zekan Aharon (Constantinople, 1534), no. 184. More on Chaim Bloch

More on Chaim Bloch By Marc B. Shapiro In a previous post I mentioned how the non-Jewish Austrian minister Leon Bilinski was descended from the rav of Posen, R. Samuel ben Moses Falkenfeld, the Beit Shmuel Aharon. More information about Bilinski’s Jewish roots is found in Chaim Bloch’s Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv (New York, 1943), p. 74 n. 1. In general, I have found that when Bloch is reporting about other people’s biographies and history in general, he is very reliable. It is only when he is somehow involved in the story that he is full of lies.1 His Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv is a good example. Here is the title page. In this book he makes up an entire story that he was asked by an important Catholic figure to answer questions from the Vatican dealing with Judaism. The whole story is a fiction, as is so much else he writes about himself. As for Bilinski, Bloch tells us that he is in possession of Bilinski’s 1146 page (!) unpublished diary. As Bloch himself notes, he provided various scholars (e.g.., N. M. Gelber) with selections of this diary which they then used in their own works, thus misleading the world. In these selections, Bilinski comes off as a strong anti-Zionist, who even warns Herzl about how the Arabs will never accept a Jewish state in Palestine.2 In an article in theHerzl Year Book, Bloch published what he claimed was an 1893 letter from Herzl and uses this to prove that Herzl was interested in the Jewish problem already in 1893, a year before the 1894 Dreyfus trial which is usually cited as having turned Herzl to Jewish matters.3 Various scholars have cited this letter, as they understandably regard it as significant in understanding Herzl, but of course it is a forgery. Another way Bloch misled scholars, in particular Gelber, is with regard to an anonymous booklet that speaks of a return of the Jews to the Land of Israel and the establishment of a state.4 According to Billinski’s diary, so Bloch tells us, the author of this booklet was Benjamin Disraeli. Bilinski would certainly have been in a position to know this information, and therefore a number of people have been misled by this, thinking the diary authentic Look how Bloch’s forgeries were able to have such an impact. I think, in the end, this is what gives the forger satisfaction, watching everyone taken in by his creation. In 1948 no one would have believed that Bloch was capable of this. In fact, if not for his blatant forgeries in Dovev Siftei Yeshenim, some people today would still assume that he is reliable. As the Talmud tells us, tafasta merubah lo tafasta! Bloch should have stuck with his smaller forgeries, because when he decided to publish complete volumes of forged material, that’s when people really began to take notice. It is therefore very surprising that no less a scholar than Robert S. Wistrich, who is aware of the accusations of forgery against Bloch, nevertheless cites material from Bloch’s Mi Natan li-Meshisah and states that in his opinion at least some of the material must be considered authentic. Why he thinks this he doesn’t tell us. The truth is that this book, likeDovev Siftei Yeshenim, is full of Bloch’s forgeries, and not only of rabbis but also of political leaders (including summaries of supposed letters from Bismark about Zionism!)5 Just to illustrate that you can’t judge people by appearances, here is a picture of Bloch, which previously appeared in Dr. Shnayer Leiman’s post on the Seforim Blog.6

Throughout Bloch’s various books, he quotes numerous letters from gedolim who were no longer alive, and none of these letters are found in his archives, currently kept at YIVO and the Leo Baeck Institute. In other words, he simply made up these letters, as he did with the entire volumes of anti- Zionist letters of gedolim that he published. The rule is that whenever Bloch cites a previously unpublished letter from someone, either addressed to himself or to another, and the author of the letter is no longer alive, you can assume that the letter is forged. We know this now, after Shmuel Weingarten’s exposé of Dovev Siftei Yeshenim.7 Yet the evidence was there all along, had people paid attention. But people had no reason to assumed that Bloch was not reliable. R. Joseph Elijah Henkin, however, who was involved in a terrible dispute with Bloch, did accuse Bloch of dishonesty, and pointed out that he would attribute quotes to rabbis who were no longer alive so that he couldn’t be contradicted. In the late 1930’s Bloch published a letter from R. Kook. R. Zvi Yehudah Kook was very skeptical of its authenticity and requested that Bloch send him a copy of it. Bloch replied that he was unable to do so since he had lost the original.8 This was Bloch’s pattern, and I assume that all of the many letters he published from leading rabbis and hasidic leaders, beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, are forgeries.9 Here is another example of Bloch’s tendency to fabricate things. It comes from hisHeikhal le-Divrei Chazal u- Fitgameihem (New York, 1948), p. 9. Everything he reports here is a fantasy. As with some of his other forgeries, Bloch is obviously motivated here by good intentions, but it is all complete nonsense. Ve-Da Ma she-Tashiv also contains forged letters. I am certain that the letter of R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski on pp. 52-53 is an example of this. Anyone can look at the style of R. Chaim Ozer’s many letters and see how he consistently used certain formulas in concluding his letters. Nowhere does R. Chaim Ozer conclude a letter with ונזכה כולנו לראות בישועת עמנו במהרה He does use the expression ועיניהם תחזינה בישועת עמנו במהרה and this is found in a letter that Bloch would have had access to, the letter of R. Chaim Ozer to Agudat ha-Rabbanim about the Louis Epstein proposal.10 I assume he used the concluding portion of this letter to help him create his forgery. But in other areas he wasn’t so careful. For example, in the supposed letter of R. Chaim Ozer to Bloch, he refers to the latter as a yet this expression does not appear in R. Chaim , צנא מלא ספרא Ozer’s other letters (based on Otzar ha-Hokhmah’s database, which only has the first edition of R. Chaim Ozer’s letters, not the expanded Iggerot R. Chaim Ozer.) We should assume the same for all of the other letters in this book from people who were not alive when the book was written. It is fascinating that on p. 44 n. 1 Bloch refers to the anti- Zionist letters he would later publish inDovev Siftei Yeshenim. Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv was published in 1943 and the first volume of Dovev Siftei Yeshenim didn’t appear until 1959, meaning that this forgery was very long in the making, and Bloch was setting the stage for it many years prior. There is more to say about this book, in particular his argument that there are passages in the Talmud that were inserted by heretics – a viewpoint earlier mentioned by R. Joseph Zvi Duenner, as I have pointed out elsewhere, see here. I will leave that for another time, but to give you an example of what I am referring to, here is a passage from p. 39 (emphasis in the original): אופינית היא “המעשיה” בר’ שמעון בן גמליאל “שהיה על גב מעלה בהר הבית וראה נכרית אחת נאה ביותר. אמר: מה רבו מעשיך ד'” (ע”ז כ ע”א) המאמר הזה זיוף . . . לא יעלה בדעתנו, שר’ שמעון בן גמליאל הביט על אשה, היינו הך, נכרית או ישראלי – לשם יפיה. ומצאתי עוד מאמר בשם רב, שזיופו עומד מחוץ לכל :ספק “בשעה שבקש נבוכדנצר לעשות לאותו צדיק (צדקיהו) כך, נמשכה ערלתו ש’ אמה והיתה מחזרת על כל המסבה כולה שנאמר: שבעת קלון מכבוד, שתה גם אתה והערל” (שבת קמט ע”ב). מלבד הנבול שבמאמר זה, הוא חסר טעם, ולא יתכן, שמפי רב יצאו הדברים. I don’t know which position is “frummer”? To defend the honor of the sages and therefore deny that these “obscene” passages are authentic, or to defend the Talmud as we have it and thus have to deal with these passages. Yet whatever the answer to this is, if Bloch were alive today, the haredi world would put him in herem for another reason. Here is what he writes on p. 38, with regard to how to view Aggadah in contrast to the halakhic sections of the Talmud. (What he says is nothing other than the Geonic and Spanish tradition, which is largely unknown in today’s yeshiva world.): היא אינה נחשבת ליסוד קיומה של היהדות ויש לה אופי של ספר עם . . . לחלק האגדה נכנסו דברי מוסר ודרך ארץ, מליצות ובדיחות, סגולות ורפואות, אזהרות ועצות, פתרון חלומות ואגדות, שלהרבה מהם יש ערך גם מחוץ להיהדות. יתכן שהרבה הושפעו בעלי התלמוד בזה מהעמים שכניהם. Also interesting is that in Ve-Da Mah she-Tashiv, p. 44 n. 1, he refers very positively to R. Henkin, something that would later change when their great battle began. Bloch claimed that he had a close relationship with the great R. Judah Leib Zirelson of Kishinev (Speaking for myself, Zirelson’s greatest achievement had to have been standing up to the extreme anti-Zionist elements in Agudat Israel, led by R. Elhanan Wasserman and R. Aaron Kotler. They wanted the Agudah to officially oppose the creation of a Jewish state. Zirelson, as president of the 1937 Kenesiah Ha-Gedolah in Marienbad, was able to convince the Moetzet Gedolei ha-Torah to agree with his own position, which was not to oppose a state but to attempt to bring Torah values into it. See Ha- Pardes, Oct. 1937, p. 8). In this book, Bloch cites a number of things from Zirelson of which, again, I have no doubt that he has made them up. For example, can anyone imagine that Zirelson would offer the following Haskalah-Reformist interpretation that Bloch puts in his mouth (p. 34)? יתכן שהיתה כוונתו של ר’ שמעון בן יוחאי, בחפשו יסוד במקרא שהנכרים אינם מטמאים באוהל, כדי שלא ימצאו הרומיים תואנות ואמתלאות חדשות על ישראל, ומאימת המלכות הורה כן. Although I can’t go into it in any detail now, the truth is that we do on occasion find Haskalah-Reformist types of interpretation even in traditional sources,11 but since these are very rare and we have no evidence that Zirelson ever said what is attributed to him, I assume it is another of Bloch’s forgeries. In other words, as he did so often, Bloch attributed his own understanding to one of the great Torah sages. In chapter fourteen of Ve-Da Mah She-Tashiv, where he stresses the need for honesty in one’s dealings with non-Jews, he claims that Zirelson told him about a Zoharic passage in parashat Lekh Lekha that states: כל מאן דמשקר בהאי עלמא בערל כמאן דמשקר בשמיה דקוב”ה This is a beautiful thought. The only problem is that it doesn’t exist anywhere in the Zohar. I am certain that Zirelson would never have misquoted the Zohar and that the mistake is Bloch’s. I assume that the mistake is unintentional, perhaps quoting from memory, since a great forger like Bloch would never have dared falsely attribute anything to the Zohar, the accuracy of which could easily be checked. Here is the actual Zohar text (vol. 1, p. 93a): דכל מאן דמשקר בהאי כמאן דמשקר בשמיה דקב”ה If you examine the entire passage you will find that it has here does משקר nothing to do with being honest, and the word not mean “to lie”, but “to betray”. The text is actually speaking about berit milah and how one is obligated to treat which ,דלא עייל ליה ברשותא אחרא it properly, especially certainly refers to refraining from having sex with non-Jewish women. What the text is saying is that if you have illicit sex you betray the mark of the circumcision, and this is like betraying God’s name. Since I mentioned Haskalah-Reformist interpretations in traditional texts, let me note one of the most famous of these. In Shabbat 140b, R. Papa’s states that if one can drink beer but instead drinks wine, he violates the prohibition on baal tashchit. Maharsha explains that R. Papa said this because he was a beer salesman! What this apparently means is that R. Papa lied about the halakhah in order to drum up more business for himself. How else to interpret Maharsha’s explanation? ורב פפא לטובת עצמו אמרה שהוא הי’ עושה שכר. This explanation is, to be sure, quite shocking. If you want to stretch things a bit you can say that according to Maharsha, R. Papa didn’t consciously alter the halakhah to benefit himself, but since he was a beer maker he was unconsciously led to this position, as it would benefit him. This explanation – which could easily have been offered by Jacob Katz – is suggested by the noted Yemenite posek, R. Yitzhak Ratsaby12: והנה כל העובר ישום וישרוק, היתכן כדבר הזה שרב פפא יפסוק הלכה משום ריוח ממונו?! . . . ובודאי גם לדעת מהרש”א לא יתכן שרב פפא יאמר פסקי הלכה רק מתוך נגיעה, חלילה לו. אלא היה זה כעין “שוחד סמוי”, שלא הרגיש בו הוא עצמו, שמתוך כך בא לידי טעות בהלכה זו. כמו שהכתוב צווח ואומר (שמות כג, ח): “כי השוחד יעוור פקחים ויסלף דברי צדיקים”, ועל דרך שמצינו בכתובות (קט, ב) בגדולי עולם שאמרו על עצמם שהשוחד היטה את ליבם. I think most people will tell you that this sort of explanation, which points to unconscious factors influencing halakhic decisions, was not how people thought in the days of the Maharsha. I myself do not see this as an anachronistic explanation, as the Talmud, Ketubot 105b, already discusses precisely this sort of unconscious influence.13 I believe that this is also how we are to understand all the discussions and how it applies even to the greatest ,נוגע בדבר about tzadikim. It is not that these people will consciously twist the truth, but that unconsciously this is what can happen. ישמעאל :Presumably, this is also the meaning ofHullin 49a כהנא מסייע כהני

I think this is also how we are to understand R. Moses Isserles, Yoreh Deah 242:36: תלמיד חכם שאמר דבר הלכה בדבר השייך לדידיה . . . אין שומעין לדידיה דלמא מדמי דברים להדדי שאינן דומים See also Ritva, Yevamot 77a: דחיישינן שמא מתוך שנושא ונותן בהלכה כדי לקיים את דבריו אמר בדדמי כסבור שקיבל מרבו I am not going to analyze the Maharsha in any depth, because either way you explain him, this is the exact sort of explanation that according to the Rav is heretical as it falls And it is not מכחיש מגידה. under the Rambam’s category of14 just the Rav who would be shocked by what Maharsha wrote. R. Yehoshua Heschel of Monistritch15 states: ועל מאמר המהרש”א הזה צווחי קמאי R. Abraham Vengrober16 says concerning the standard explanation of Maharsha (before offering a different understanding of his words): ופריצי עמנו מצאנו בקעה לדבר סרה על רז”ל . . . גם רבינו המהרש”א ז”ל לא כיוון בזה ח”ו להכוונה אשר העולם סוברים שבשביל זה שהי’ מסחרו שבח את הדבר לטובת עצמו. R. Samuel Strashun in his commentary to the passage takes strong issue with Maharsha, and R. Hayyim Hezekiah Medini17 is astounded by what Maharsha wrote: הדבר תמוה לפרש דנחשד רב פפא לדבר שקר חלילה לטובת עצמו. I assume it is only a matter of time before this explanation of Maharsha is deleted from a future printing. Here is another example (Ta’anit 14a-14b): In the time of R. Judah the Prince there was distress. He ordained thirteen fast days and their prayer was not answered. He thought of ordaining additional fasts but R. Ammi said to him, “Did not [the Sages] declare we should not trouble the community unduly.” Said R. Abba the son of R. Hiyya b. Abba, “R. Ammi [in saying this] was studying his own interests.”

Rashi explains R. Abba’s declaration: לעצמו דרש: דלא אמר אלא לפי שהוא לא היה רוצה להתענות If anyone other than Rashi wrote this, wouldn’t it be regarded ?מכחיש מגידה as an example of Here is another example, from the Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 6:1: R. Abbahu in the name of R. Yohanan, “It is permitted for a man to teach Greek to his daughter, because such learning is an ornament for her” Simeon bar Ba heard and said, “It is because R. Abbahu wants to teach his daughter such that he has assigned the teaching to R. Yohanan.” R. Abbahu responded quite sharply to Simeon bar Ba, proclaiming: “May a curse come upon me, if I did not hear it from R Yohanan.” But I am more interested in Simeon bar Ba’s accusation. He assumed that the great R. Abbahu would falsely attribute a halakhic ruling to an earlier sage in order that his daughter would benefit. When Geiger and Graetz said things like this, no one was surprised, and the Orthodox condemned them for these type of interpretations. Yet here you have a Haskalah-Reformist type of interpretation offered by one of the Sages. Returning to Bloch, another example where he deceived the world is found in his Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal u-Fitgemeihem, pp. 591-592. In line with his apologetic approach to Jewish sources, he claims that he saw an old version of the Passover prayer Shefokh Hamotkha, that went as follows: שפוך אהבתך על הגוים אשר ידעוך

Even a great scholar such as Naftali Ben-Menachem was taken in by Bloch (and if you search online you will find a number of others who assume that Shefokh Ahavatkha is a real text, rather than another Bloch forgery18). Ben Menachem’s article appears in Mahanayim 80 (1963), and here is the page where he refers to Bloch’s version.

Incidentally, in Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal Bloch claims that he wrote about this version at length in his 1935 bookDer Judenhass im Spiegel der Jahrtausende, and also printed a copy of the manuscript there. (In 1935 Bloch was living in Vienna.) Although he mentions this book in a couple of his other writings, there is no evidence that any such book ever appeared. Now we have the internet which allows us to check all the greatest libraries in a minute, yet in a prior era, simply mentioning that he had published such a book and that it contained a copy of the manuscript would have been enough to convince everyone. After all, it was not like people in the United States, England, or Palestine/Israel could easily check the holdings of libraries in Austria and Germany. Meir Hershkovitz, in his fine book on R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, also quotes Bloch a number of times. Bloch claimed to have seen unpublished material from Chajes and he included some of it in his Heikhal, but everything he mentions is fraudulent, and some of the comments are really outrageous. For example, on p. 565 he quotes Chajes as saying as follows about Rabbi Akiva19: ר”ע מבני בניו של סיסרא היה ולמרות קדושת התורה ששלטה בו נשאר בו משהו מאופיו של סיסרא (Some are probably wondering why I didn’t underline the first part as well, which states that R. Akiva was descended from Sisera. After all, in a few weeks Daf Yomi will reach Sanhedrin 96b and there you find the following, with no mention of R. Akiva: “Descendants of Sisera studied20 Torah in Jerusalem; descendants of Sennacherib taught Torah to the multitude. Who were these? Shemaya and Avtalion. Descendants of Haman studied Torah in Bnei Brak.” Yet numerous texts21 record a version of this passage that identifies R. Akiva as among the descendants of Sisera.) What motivated Bloch to invent this negative comment about R. Akiva? I think that this too can be attributed to anti-Zionist motivations (an anonymous commenter on Soferim u-Seforim offered a similar explanation; see the link in n. 1). R. Akiva was associated with Bar Kokhba’s rebellion, and in the popular mind at least, this was a matter of pride for twentieth- century Jews. The thrust of the comment attributed to Chajes is to see this “warlike” aspect of R. Akiva as a throwback to Sisera. In other words, this is not something good. We see another example of Bloch’s anti-Zionism in his attempts to argue that a passage in Maimonides’ Letter on Astrology is not authentic. In this passage, Maimonides states that the Temple was destroyed and the Jews exiled because instead of focusing on “the art of military training and conquering lands,” they involved themselves with astrology, thinking it would help them. (Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Sheilat, vol. 2, p. 480) This passage was too “Zionistic” for Bloch, and not surprisingly he argues that it is a forged interpolation. See his article in Ha-Pardes 34 (April 1960), pp. 39-42, where once again it is Bloch who is the forger, citing a supposed letter from a Christian scholar to Dr. [Daviid?] Kaufmann and also telling us about the support he supposedly received from the Tchortkover Rebbe. (This Rebbe, incidentally, happened to be a one of the leading Agudah supporters of settlement in the Land of Israel.) One of Bloch’s major proofs that Maimonides could not have written this passage is his assumption that Maimonides was not impressed with R. Akiva’s support of Bar Kokhba. He bases this argument onMishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 11:3. Yet Maimonides’ viewpoint in this matter is not enough for Bloch, and to achieve his purpose he has to actually find fault with R. Akiva’s character, something Maimonides would never do. Bloch even attacks some modern writers (such as Aaron Zeitlin and Hillel Seidman) who had stressed the contemporary significance of Maimonides’ words. In Bloch’s mind, by doing so they were showing the non-Jews that the Protocols of Elders of Zion were correct, namely, that Jews really did want to conquer the world! Bloch’s Neturei Karta side comes out very well in this article. As a way of covering himself, so that people will believe the manuscripts of Chajes are authentic, Bloch states that he assumes that the material he is quoting from has survived in Israel, either with the family or at the National Library (Heikhal, pp. 520, 560). Yet in Hershkovitz, this supposition is stated as fact (Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Chajes, p. 438). It is quite surprising that Hershkowitz, who wrote such a comprehensive biography of Chajes, didn’t attempt to track down these manuscripts. Had he done so, he would have realized that they don’t exist. * * * This is a blog about seforim, but with Dan’s permission, in a future post I am going to write about the various blogs and news sites, both haredi and Modern Orthodox, that focus on Jewish matters (halakhah, hashkafah, etc.). In the last six months I have visited them a good deal, left a number of comments (some quite provocative and opposed to my own outlook [e.g., dealing with sexual abuse, Zionism, Daas Torah, Torah mi-Sinai, etc.], and always under a pseudonym) and gathered the reactions. I also corresponded with people I met on the sites and with various anonymous baalei ha-blogs. I tried to be a bit of a reporter, gathering information, and just like a reporter sometimes has to hide his identify, I felt that in this circumstance it was permissible, especially as almost everyone I was dealing with was also anonymous. We all know that the ability to be anonymous is basic to the internet (and there has been a good deal of discussion recently about whether this is a good idea). I also felt that if I got involved in a debate on a haredi or Modern Orthodox site, my name would be recognizable to some of the people and they might respond differently than if I was some anonymous person. Most of the information is publicly available (as are my comments), but I won’t cite any names, as I am not interested in individuals but in some of the thought processes that I observed. As always, I will tie this in with seforim, especially the phenomenon of anonymous and pseudonymous (as opposed to pseudepigraphal) seforim and articles, and also discuss the modern anonymous halakhic questions that R. Yuval Sherlow has written about. (He has also published a couple of volumes of his answers to these questions.) How is Judaism perceived and portrayed when people can live in two worlds, the public one and the private anonymous world of the internet? What does it mean when most people who comment about controversial topics choose to do so under a pseudonym? I think that what I found also has implications to an issue I have been concerned with for a long time, namely, the value of private letters and conversations vs. published word in seeking to evaluate the personality of an individual. This directly relates to David Holzer’s book on the Rav and was also a topic that became a dispute between the late Prof. Twersky and myself when writing my dissertation on R. Weinberg–more on that to come. I mention all this because I have a request: If anyone is aware of a similar study with regard to Christian or political blogs and websites, please let me know. As a friend commented to me when I told him about my project, “we all know that there are registered Democrats on the Upper West Side who secretly vote Republican, but in order not to scandalize their friends, will only post their true opinions anonymously.” Yet has anyone written about this? There are serious methodological issues that must be dealt with in any such inquiry. * * * My new Torah in Motion class begins this Monday. I invite all who are free on Monday nights at 9PM Eastern to join us. This semester we are covering R. Eliezer Berkovits, R. Chaim Ozer Grodzinski, R. Elijah Benamozegh and R. Joseph Messas. You can sign up for it here If you want to watch or listen to previous classes, to get a sense of how they work, you can download them here. Notes 1 For a recent discussion of Bloch, see here which contains a number of informative comments. 2 See Bloch, Mi Natan li-Meshisah Yaakov ve-Yisrael le-Vozezim (Bronx, n.d.), pp. 54ff. 3 “Herzl’s First Years of Struggle: Unknown Episodes and Personal Recollections” Herzl Year Book 3 (1960), pp. 77-90. 4 The booklet is found in N. M. Gelber, Tokhnit ha-Medinah ha- Yehudit le-Lord Beaconsfield (Tel Aviv, 1947), pp. 35ff. Gelber’s book is devoted to this booklet. 5 “Zionism and its Religious Critics in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna,” in S. Almog, et al., eds., Zionism and Religion (Hanover, 1998), pp. 150, 157 n. 45. 6 See here. 7 Mikhtavim Mezuyafim Neged ha-Tziyonut (Jerusalem, 1981). 8 See Weingarten, Mikhtavim, pp. 164-165. In Ha-Posek 11 (1950), p. 802, Bloch published another letter from R. Kook. It is also found in Heikhal le-Divrei Hazal u-Fitgamehem, p. 614. Again he tells us that he only has a copy of the letter, as the original was lost, and here too the letter in unquestionably a forgery. Bloch had R. Kook sign the letter which he knew is found in numerous authentic , עבד לעם קדוש כל יקר ראתה letters. But the letter also contains the phrase and this does not appear in any of the almost 2000 , עיני letters and responsa of R. Kook, as can be determined from the new database of R. Kook’s writings 9 I don’t know whether this also applies to halakhic writings, e.g., the supposed manuscript from R. Shalom Schwadron that came from Bloch and is published in R. Isaac Liebes, Beit Avi, vol. 3 no. 157. Incidentally, a few responsa after this, in no. 161, Liebes discusses whether a rabbinic organization could publicly advocate the institution of the death penalty, since it might happen that a Jew would also be sentenced to death (sound familiar?). Liebes begins his reply: לא רק שמותר להתריע בכיוון זה רק מצוה לעורר את דעת העם את חומר הסכנה המרחפת על תושבי הארץ. During the discussions about the Grossman execution, I looked at some of the haredi websites (until the comments made me sick). What I found interesting was the incredible level of ignorance of most of the writers, all of whom had been in yeshiva and many of whom had studied there for years. They were able to declare that a murderer can’t be executed unless he was observed by two kosher witnesses and was given warning, which they thought settled matters. Had these people known a bit of responsa literature, there would have understood how things worked in the real world, and especially what was done in the days of the rishonim. Do these people think that if a guy stood up in shul and opened fire with a machine gun, killing 20 people, that a Jewish court couldn’t execute him because he was never given a warning? Let’s continue with R. Liebes: יש כח להבי”ד בזמן שרואין צורך השעה לענוש עונש מות אפילו בכל יום אפילו אם מן התורה פטורין הם כדי שעל ידי זה כל העם ישמעו וייראו ולא יזידון עוד. As for the possibility that a Jewish man will be executed: מצוה וחיוב לעורר את דעת הקהל להתריע את בתי המשפט שיראו להעביר בכל המדינה משפט מות ולענוש בכל החומר הרוצחים והפושעים ואת מדינתינו ארצות הברית אשר מאמינה בתנ”ך יכולים לשכנע אותה ולהראות לה עד היכן תוה”ק מקפידה לבער את רשעי הארץ בתור חיוב ומצוה. ומש”כ כת”ר לחשוש דלפעמים ימצא רוצח יהודי א”כ אנחנו נהיה אשמים במיתתו זה אינו כלום . . . מוכח מזה דהמחוייב מיתה עפ“י דין המלכות מותר למסרו להם מטעם דינא .דמלכותא מובן ממילא שכל דברינו מוסבים רק על המדינות שיש להם שוויון הזכויות לכל אזרחיה בלי שום אנטישמיות ושנאת ישראל ולכן אם ח”ו יהודי נתפס באיזה עון ופשע הרי הוא נידון כמו כל אזרחי המדינה. Many who commented on the various sites were people who never opposed the death penalty before and do not oppose it now, yet they were anti-death penalty in this case because, quite simply, they think the death penalty is just fine except when it is a Jew being executed. They vote for all the right wing candidates and then have the chutzpah to complain when their man actually follows through on his support of capital punishment and doesn’t share their view that a supposed baal teshuvah (whose last meal on earth was a non-kosher chicken sandwich bought from the prison canteen) should not be סנהדרי שראו כולן ,executed. Some of them citedSanhedrin 17a as if this had any relevance. First of , לחובה פוטרין אותו all, this passage only means that he is not executed in the normal fashion, but he can certainly be executed as an emergency measure. In addition, some understand this passage to mean that if on the first day of deliberations all conclude that he is guilty, he is not condemned to death immediately but the case is revisited on the next day. If then, all find him guilty, he is executed. None of the commenters who mentioned this law quoted the view of R. Meir ha-Levi Abulafia (cited in many sources) and the Tosafot Hakhmei Anglia that This . ממהרין אותו להורגו is פוטרין אותו the meaning of understanding is praised by the Reisher Rav, R. Aharon Lewin, Ha-Derash ve-ha-Iyun, Deut. no. 119:5, and R. Baruch Epstein, Torah Temimah, Ex. 23:2. Epstein is convinced that this היש לך חוטא גדול understanding is correct because otherwise ,For more on the subject, see Zorach Warhaftig . ונשכר מזה “Rov u-Miut be-Veit ha-Din,” in Itamar Warhaftig, ed., Minhah le-Ish (Jerusalem, 2001), pp. 100ff. See also R. Reuven Margaliot, Margaliyot ha-Yam, Sanhedrin 17a, no. 19, who cites the Tashbetz: שהם ז”ל לא אמרו ב”ד שהסכימו כולם לחובה פטור, חלילה להם שיאמרו , ככהואם על פי הרוב הורגים כל שכן ע”פ כולם ויותר טוב ויותר משובח הוא שיהיה הפסק דין מוסכם מהכל ולא שיהיה שום חולק. There is a good deal more to say on this topic, but in the interests of space I will leave it for another time. Suffice it to say that as in all such matters one can find a variety of viewpoints. See e.g., R. Yair Hayyim Bacharach, Havot Yair, no. 146. Some poskim have even ruled that when a murderer has been sentenced to death it is forbidden to try and save him. See R. Nathan Leiter, Tziyun le-Nefesh Hayah, no. 121. (Others disagree, see e.g., Teshuvot Hatam Sofer, vol. 6, no. 14.) Obviously, such a ruling has no relevance to people who oppose the death penalty on principle, but it does speak directly to those who normally support it—as I daresay includes most, if not virtually all of the people who were commenting so outrageously on the haredi sites. Let me close by citing a responsum of R. Meir Zak in Teshuvot Eitan ha-Ezrahi, no. 45. What he said in the seventeenth century, in a case involving a Jewish murderer, is just as relevant today, and it is incredible how this responsum speaks to the Grossman case (he even uses the term “hillul ha-shem”!). Notice how he also includes the manhigei ha-dor in his criticism. מאחר שניתן ביד גוים ערכאות הם יעשו בו משפט וידינו לא תהיה בו . . . ואפשר שעל נדון דידן נאמר מורידין מאחר שכתב הרב מהר”ד ה”ל האב”ד דק”ק ה”ל שדעתו לעשות כפרה והיה כל ימיו חוטא גדול ופושע, נאמר לישרי’ ביה גודא רבא ואף אם יאמר שרוצה לעשות תשובה ולפי דעתי על אלו אמרו חז”ל אין נחת רוח בתשובתן של רשעים להקב”ה כי ראה עצמו ביד גוים רוצה לרמות אותנו, אבל להפריז ממון לפדות אותו בשביל שאומר שרוצה לעשות תשובה זה הוא חילול השם שיאמרו אין עונש שפיכות דמים אצל יהודים נחשב חטאוהיה אם גוי יהרוג ח”ו ליהודי ג”כ לא ידונו לעשות נקמה. ותמיד אני צועק ככרוכיא על מנהיגי הדור שכל גנב או חוטא שבא למאסר עושין השתדלות לפדות אותו ע”י שחדים דבר זה בעו”ה מרבה פשעים וגניבותכל א’ עושה מה שלבו חפץ ורבו פריצי הדור כאלו אנחנו רואים בעו”ה רוב גנבי ישראל ע”כ שלא לתת פרוטה לפוטרו ממות. Isn’t it amazing that hundreds of years ago he was condemning the leaders who think that every thief or sinner who goes to jail should be the focus of pidyon shevuyim? From this responsum we learn that the warped values we have seen these last few years go back a long time. And what is one to make about his statement that the majority of thieves are Jewish? (using the language of Avodah Zarah 70a). I pray we never reach this point, although we probably have to do keriah over the fact that the Agudah spokesmen have been insistent in letters to the editor and in interviews that Orthodox Jews are not more dishonest than anyone else. In other words, no one, neither Jew nor non-Jew, even assumes anymore that being an Orthodox Jew means that you hold yourself to a high ethical standard. Their goal now is to convince the public that when it comes to obeying the law, Orthodox Jews (and their institutions) are simply no worse than everyone else. If that is not an indictment of our entire educational system, I don’t know what is. For those interested in pursuing further the topic of Jewish murderers, here is a nineteenth-century responsum by the Moroccan R. Joseph Berdugo (Divrei Yosef no. 381).

10 Le-Dor Aharon (Brooklyn, 1937), p. 36. In this letter R. and this , והנני חותם בברכה Chaim Ozer uses the expression also appears in his supposed letter to Bloch. 11 In my Studies in Maimonides, I tried to show that “academic” interpretations of Maimonides can also be found in the most traditional sources. The same thing can be done with regard to the Talmud, and Prof. Halivni has cited many examples of traditionalists who offered explanations of the sort he focuses on (Higher Criticism). When “academic” explanations are found in rishonim, even the most conservative will be hesitant to attack them. But that was not always the case a few hundred years ago. For example, R. Nissim writes as follows in his commentary on the Rif, Megillah 26a, s.v. zo divrei R. Menahem: ודאמרינן במעמדות לאו דוקא ומשום אשגרת לישן נקטיה (This same view is actually advocated by Ramban, as noted in Gilyon ha-Shas, Megillah 26a.) This was too much for R. David Pardo, Mikhtam le-David, Orah Hayyim no. 14: מלבד הלחץ זה הדחק שסובל הדבר בעצמו לומר דהש”ס וכל הפוס’ מעתיקי הש”ס נקטו באשגרת לישן מלתא דשקרא ממש דבר זר ורחוק. 12 Pa’amei Yaakov, Adar II 5768, p. 108. 13 The Talmud deals there with how even the desire of one of the parties in a dispute to give a gift to a rabbi who will rule on the case impairs his objectivity. This talmudic passage provides all the explanation one needs to understand how so many learned rabbis remained silent as the Tropper scandal played out. If amoraim admitted that they couldn’t properly judge a matter if they had only been offered a gift, certainly one in our day who actually received such a gift is not capable of judging the case of his benefactor. The Steipler refused to take as much as a cigarette from one of his admirers whose case he was to judge, and continued to refuse gifts from this person even after the case was concluded. See Avraham Yeshayahu Kanievsky,Toldot Yaakov (Bnei Brak, 1995), p. 208. With regard to the more troubling (and I believe rare) circumstance of rabbis who will actually lie to benefit themselves, I have a number of sources on this. For now, let me just cite the words of the Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 314:1: הכהנים חשודים להטיל מום בבכור אפילו אם הוא חכם ויושב בישיבה As for the sordid details of the Tropper scandal itself, and those who refused at first to believe what they heard with their own ears (not to mention the Elon scandal as well as others), here is what the hasidic master, R. Meshulam Feivish Heller (died 1794), had to say in an earlier era, a presumably holier era as yet uncontaminated by television and the internet (Yosher Divrei Emet [Jerusalem, 1974]), p. 113: והלא ידוע ומפורסם שיש בעוה”ר כמה לומדים שהם בעלי ניאוף רח”ל, ובעלי עבירות ידועים. R. Hayyim Eleazar Shapira, Divrei Torah 5:82, writes about הרבנים ובפרט האדמורי”ם הגונבים דעת ולבות הבריות, וכל כונתם אך לטובתם, בעצמם בגופם ובשרם וממונם ותאותם. This is what the Ropshitzer is reported to have said: דעו כי קודם ביאת המשיח יתרבה כ”כ השקר בעולם עד שרב העיר יסע יחדו עם אשה נכריה בעגלה אחת, ורבים מבני העיר יאמרו אחריו אין קדוש כמוהו. R. Isaiah Asher Zelig Margulies, Ashrei ha-Ish (Jerusalem, 1927), p. 49, who records the saying, assumes that the Gentile woman spoken of really means “heresy”, but I don’t know why it should not be understood literally. It is not like the Ropshitzer was confronted with many secularly educated rabbis that he would need to make such a statement. (I assume that Margulies was led to his assumption by Maimonides’ famous letter to R. Jonathan of Lunel, where he speaks of non-Torah נשים נכריות studies—which for Margulies equals heresy—as being . See Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Sheilat, vol. 2, p. 502.) Since a concern with kavod is also so often present in the various scandals, the following comment by R. Elimelech of Lizhensk is noteworthy (quoted in Or Elimelekh [Jerusalem, 2003], no. 75): מצוה עם כבוד גרוע יותר מעבירות ניאוף רח”ל. 14 See the text of the Rav’s lecture here. 15 See R. Aharon Perlow, Margaliyot ha-Shas al Masekhet Shabbat (Jerusalem, 2005), p. 471. 16 Likutei Avraham (Jerusalem, 1976), p. 319. 17 Sedei Hemed, ma’arekhet lamed, kelal 108. 18 See also Alan Brill’s recent post here. 19 For an example of genealogy in the reverse direction – i.e., from righteous to wicked, see Rashi to I Kings 10:1, where it very strangely states that Nebuchanezar was the son of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. This only appears in the later printed editions of Rashi, and is cited in the name of R. Isaac Luria. It is difficult to know what to make of this. I find it hard to believe that the passage ever could have been meant literally, since Solomon lived some three hundred years before Nebuchadnezar. Even legends, if understood literally, have to make chronological sense. Perhaps it means that the origin of the later disaster involving Nebuchadnezar can be traced to Solomon involving himself with foreign women such as the Queen of Sheba. In other words, not that Solomon is the literal father of Nebuchadnezar, but rather he is his “ultimate cause”. As for the ultimate origin of the notion that Solomon was Nebuchadnezar’s father, I have been unable to find any other source that records that this was stated by R. Isaac Luria. R. Menahem Azariah de Fano (1548-1620),Asarah Ma’amarot (Jerusalem, 2005), pp. 412-413 (Ma’amar Eim Kol Hai 2:23), states that Nebuchadnezar descended from Solomon. Two points are significant here. First, he does not say that Solomon is his father, and second, he does not attribute this to any source, which presumably means that it was a well-known kabbalistic idea. R. Jehiel ben Solomon Heilprin, Seder ha- Dorot, year 2935, states that according to a Midrash, Solomon fathered a daughter with the Queen, and Nebuchadnezar was her son. R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai, Midbar Kedemot, ma’arekhet yod, no. 47, claims that Nebuchadnezar was descended from this daughter. See also R. Joseph Palache, Yosef et Ehav (n.p., 2005), ma’arekhet bet, no. 17. , לימדו תורה This should probably be read as . למדו תורה 20 “taught Torah”, since in the parallel text in Gittin 57b it which means “taught children”. See also ,למדו תינוקות has Dikdukei Soferim, Sanhedrin 96b. 21 To give just one, here is a page from R. Nissim Gaon’s Sefer ha-Mafteah to Berakhot 27b. Note how Jacob Goldenthal, the editor, assumes that it is actually Haman from whom R. Akiva is descended! Jacob Reifman agreed with this. See Iggeret Bikoret, ed. Ben Menahem (Jerusalem, 1969), p. 17. Louis Finkelstein, Akiba, p. 321 speaks of the R. Akiva-Sisera connection as a “legend widely repeated in medieval works.” He doesn’t seem to realize that the medieval works were citing from their texts of the Talmud. See also Dikdukei Soferim, Sanhedrin 96b, which cites one such manuscript.

Marc Shapiro: R. Kook on Sacrifices & Other Assorted Comments

R. Kook on Sacrifices and Other Assorted Comments by: Marc B. Shapiro

1. At the beginning of my previous post (the Gurock review) I mentioned R. Solomon Isaac Scheinfeld (1860-1943). The source of the comment I quote is hisOlam ha-Sheker (Milwaukee, 1936), p. 77.1 Scheinfeld was the unofficial chief rabbi in Milwaukee, arriving there in 1902 and serving until his death in 1943. Here is his picture. He had a traditional education, having studied for three years in the Kovno Kollel under R. Isaac Elhanan Spektor, from whom he received semikhah.2 He also had a very original mind, and wrote a number of books and essays. One of his most fascinating works is the article he published under the pseudonym Even Shayish. In this article he argued that since sacrifices will never be revived, they are now irrelevant to Judaism and all references to them should be removed from the prayer book. R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg has a lengthy essay in which he critiques Scheinfeld’s position. A Hebrew translation of this essay appears in volume 2 of Kitvei R. Weinberg. Yet Weinberg himself leaves open the possibility that there won’t be a return to sacrifices (p. 255): אין דנים כאן על עצם הרעיון היסודי של הקרבנות. לו היתה היום קיימת אצלנו שאלה כזאת והיא דורשת פתרון דחוף – אין מספר מצומצם של יהודים בארץ אחת בני סמכות להכריע בענין זה, וכל שכן כאשר הם אינם מייצגים את כלל ישראל. שאלה זאת חייבים להביא לפני הבית דין של כלל ישראל. רק לבית דין כזה הרשות לקבוע אם להשאיר טקס מקודש בעם בתוקפו או לבטלו. היום שאין לנו ארץ ולא בית המקדש ולא כהנים הרי זה מגוחך ומצער כאחת להעלות תביעה לבטל עבודת קרבנות! Weinberg doesn’t mention Maimonides, but this is usually to where people turn when seeking to argue against a revival of sacrifices. According to the Guide 3:32, Maimonides thought that sacrifices were a concession to the masses’ primitive religious notions, developed in an idolatrous society. While Maimonides is explicit in the Mishneh Torah that there will be a return of the sacrificial order, his reason for sacrifices offered in the Guide led some people to assume that his true opinion was that there will not be sacrifices in the future. One example is R. Simhah Paltrovitch, Simhat Avot (New York, 1917), pp. 7-8, who offers a mystical approach: אמנם מה נעשה במה שדברי מורנו ורבנו הרמב”ם ז”ל שהוא בסברתו מתנגד לאלה הדברים, ואומר כי בימים הבאים עת קץ משיחנו, יבוטל עבודה בקרבנות ולא יהיה עוד . . . להעולם הזה נתנו הפשט והדרוש, ובעולם השני יקויים הרמז והסוד . . .וכן ממש הוא טעם של הרמב”ם ז”ל שיבוטל הקרבנות, כי אז יהי’ התורה על צד הרמז וסוד כמו שארי המצוות המבוארות בתורה, כי יתחלפון מן הפשט לרמז וסוד שמשונים מן הפשט. R. Joseph Messas also cites Maimonides’ reason for sacrifices and concludes that there will be no return of the sacrificial order (Otzar ha-Mikhtavim, vol. 2, no. 1305). לפי”ז יתבטלו לעתיד כל הקרבנות כי זה אלפי שנים משנעקרה ע”ז מישראל, וישראל גוי אחד, עובדים רק לאל אחד ועל ידי ישראל בגלותם נעקרה ע”ז גם מכל האומות. What about the problem that the abolition of sacrifices would mean a change in Torah law, which is a point that R. Kook will also deal with? Messas answers simply: ואין בזה שנוי בתורה חלילה, דזיל בתר טעמא What this means, I think, is that from the beginning sacrifices were only intended to be offered in a society in which people were attached to primitive religious notions associated with idolatry, and the animal sacrifices that went along with this. However, once this era has passed from the scene, then there will no longer be any obligation for sacrifices. A really shocking comment against sacrfices appears in a supposed letter from R. Yaakov of Lissa to R. Zvi Hirsch Kalischer (published in Ha-Posek, Kislev 5712). Responding to Kalischer’s advocacy of renewing sacrifices even before the coming of the Messiah, R. Yaakov claims that to do so would cause Jews to be a subject of mockery by the Gentiles and the non-religious Jews. לבי נוקף ונפשי מלא רטט ורעד כי אם ישמעו הגויים והקלים בישראל שאנחנו מקריבים קרבנות ימלאו שחוק פיהם ונהיה ח”ו ללעג ולקלס וה’ יודע כמה צרות וקלקולים יצמחו מזה It is very unlikely, to put it mildly, that a gadol be-Yisrael would give this as his reason for not fulfilling a mitzvah. When one realizes that the person who published this letter was the famous forger Chaim Bloch, then all doubts are removed: The letter, like so much else published by Bloch, is a complete forgery. Apparently Bloch had some negative feelings about sacrifices and transferred them to R. Yaakov. Interestingly, when this letter was republished inDovev Siftei Yeshenim, vol. 1, Bloch made a subtle change in the letter, which as far as I know, no one has yet pointed out. The letter’s authenticity had been attacked by Zvi Harkavy in Kol Torah (Nisan-Iyar 5712), and one of the things he pointed to was this line, and that R. Yaakov could never have written it. So when Bloch republished the letter, in an attempt to bolster its authenticity, he altered it to read as follows (I have underlined the newly added words): כי אם ישמעו הגויים והקלים בישראל שאנחנו מקריבים קרבנות בזמן הזה לפני ביאת משיח צדקנו ובטרם עומד בית מקדשנו על מכונו, ימלאו שחוק פיהם ונהיה ח”ו ללעג ולקלס

Had he been smart enough to have added these extra words in the first edition of his forgery, it would have been more believable. Now R. Yaakov is not speaking of the non-Jews and the non-religious mocking the offering of sacrifices, but only mocking the offering of them before the coming of the Messiah and the building of the Temple. Michael Friedlaender’s The Jewish Religion (London, 1891), was for many years regarded as a standard work of Orthodox belief. As far as I know, it was the first of its kind in English and can still hold its own against many more recently published books. You can see it here. On pages 162-163, 417-418, he speaks of the return of the sacrificial order in Messianic days, and how we should look forward to this, even if it is contrary to our taste. He says that we should not model Divine Law according to our liking, but rather model our liking according to the will of God. Yet despite these strong statements, he was also sensitive to those who were not comfortable with sacrifices. He writes as follows (p. 452): References to the Sacrificial Service, and especially prayers for its restoration, are disliked by some, who think such restoration undesirable. Let no one pray for a thing against his will; let him whose heart is not with his fellow- worshippers in any of their supplications silently substitute his own prayers for them; but let him not interfere with the devotion of those to whom “the statues of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart” . . . and who yearn for the opportunity of fulfilling Divine commandments which they cannot observe at present.

This passage is quoted by British Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz in his Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 532. Upon seeing this, R. Yerucham Leiner, then living in London, wrote a letter to the Jewish Chronicle (Dec. 17, 1943; I learnt of this from Louis Jacobs, Tree of Life, second ed., p. xxix). Before quoting from his letter, let me reproduce what Wikipedia says about this most incredible figure. Grand Rabbi Yerucham Leiner of Radzin, son of Likutei Divrei Torah, author of Tiferes Yerucham, Zikaron LaRishonim, Mipi Hashmua, Zohar HaRakiya. Moved from Chelm to London to America. Continuation of the Radziner line in America, and one of the last direct descendants of the Leiner family. After the war, he did not reinstitute the wearing of techeiles as other branches of Radzin did, even though his father, Grand Rabbi Avraham Yehoshua Heschel Leiner of Radzin-Chelm, wore them, as he was a chosid of his older brother, the Orchos Chayim, who had reinstituted the wearing of techeiles. Reb Yerucham believed that the original formula of his uncle was lost during the war. This is the reason that his family doesn’t wear techeiles today, only pairs that were left from pre-war Europe. Reb Yerucham was an expert in all areas of Torah and scholarship. There existed very few admorim/tzaddikim since the beginning of Chassidus who were also lamdanim in both the Polish and Lithuanian styles of learning, bibliographers, Jewish historians, very learned in Kabbalah works, philologists, and masters of both the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds. Reb Yerucham was very close with the Satmar Rebbe, Rabbi Yoelish Teitelbaum ZTVK”L. He always made sure to spend a few weeks vacationing with the him, specifically learning Midrashei Chazal, of which they were both masters. He studied and visited with Rabbi Yitzchok Hutner, and they were good friends in later life. They always treated one another with special respect. He established the Radziner shtiebel in Boro Park. Died 20 Av 5724 (1964). Buried in Beth Israel Cemetery, Woodbridge, New Jersey

Responding to the quote from Friedlaender, Leiner wrote: “This opinion was put forward by the founders of Reform Judaism, Holdheim and Geiger. But it is hardly in accord with Orthodox traditions of Judaism.” The editor of theJewish Chronicle responsed: “The words quoted with regard to the Musaph are those of the great and sainted scholar, Dr. Michael Friedlander, for 42 years Principal of Jews College: and it is certainly strange to class him with Holdheim and Geiger.” The most famous of our sages to speak of a Messianic era without animal sacrifices is, of course, R. Kook, who envisions vegetable sacrifices. He writes this in his commentary to the siddur, Olat ha-Reiyah, vol. 1, p. 292. In the preface R. Zvi Yehudah tells us that he began writing this commentary during World War I. I don’t need to go into any detail on this, as I have done so already in The Limits of Orthodox Theology, where I also mention passages in R. Kook’s writings that offer a different approach. The notion that there will only be vegetable sacrifices in Messianic days is, of course, a radical position, and many who don’t know R. Kook’s writings find it impossible to accept that he could have said this. This is what happened when R. Yosef Kanefsky of Los Angeles published an essay in which he mentioned R. Kook’s view.3 He was attacked by some prominent rabbis since they found it impossible to believe that R. Kook could say what was attributed to him. Yet it was Kanefsky who was right, not his opponents. In my book I dealt with R. Kook’s position on sacrifices, because positing that there will be no sacrifices in the future would seem to be in contradiction to Maimonides’ Principle that the commandments of the Torah are eternal. That consideration is precisely what makes his position so radical. A couple of years ago one of R. Kook’s notebooks dating from his time as rabbi in Bausk, which lasted until 1904, was published. We actually have two publications of this, one by Boaz Ofen called Kevatzim mi-Ketav Yad Kodsho, vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 2008), and the other, which comes out of the world of Merkaz ha-Rav, called Pinkesei ha-Reiyah (Jerusalem, 2008). This is not the first competing publications of the same material by these people, and as I will show in my forthcoming book, the Merkaz editions are tainted by censorship in that “problematic” passages are removed.4 Those who claim to be the greatest adherents of R. Kook have once again taken it upon themselves to save their master from himself, as it were, and decided which writings of R. Kook should appear and which should not. Yet in the passage I am interested in now (no. 8 in the Ofen edition and no. 6 in the Merkaz edition), the two books are identical. The passage is very significant since it shows you that even in his earlier years R. Kook had the same notion later expressed in Olat ha-Reiyah, that the future would only know vegetable sacrifices. (In case people are wondering, R. Kook was not a vegetarian. Yet he did see vegetarianism as part of the eschatological future. His great student, the Nazir, was a vegetarian, as was Nazir’s son-in- law, R. Shlomo Goren, and as is his son, R. Shear Yashuv Cohen.5) This passage gives us new insight into R. Kook’s view of sacrifices, and how things will change in the future era. He begins by speaking of the abandonment of meat-eating in the Messianic era, since this will not be something that people desire. Recall that in speaking of eating meat, the Torah which means “when ,כי תאוה נפשך לאכל בשר :(writes (Deut. 12:6 thy soul desires to eat meat.” The Messianic era is not a time when people will have this desire, as R. Kook also explains in his famous essay on vegetarianism, “Afikim ba-Negev”. What about the sacrifices that are required by the Torah? R. Kook offers a few possibilities. One is that sacrifices will still be necessary. Yet he also speculates that perhaps certain animals will be so spiritually advanced that they will on their own offer themselves as sacrifices, in acknowledgment of the great benefit that will come to them and the world through their actions.6 This solves the problem of people deliberately killing animals, which goes against his conception of the eschaton. What is most interesting for our purpose is another suggestion by R. Kook, namely, that the Sanhedrin will use its power to uproot a matter from the Torah in order to abolish obligatory animal sacrifices. Their reason for doing this will be that the killing of animals will no longer be part of the culture in Messianic days. R. Kook even shows how the Rabbis will be able to find support for this step from the Torah. What he is doing, I think, is imagining himself as part of the future Sanhedrin that abolishes sacrifices, and informing us of the derashah that will be used to support this. This is related to what I wrote in an earlier post, see here, and I repeat it now: As to the general problem of laws that trouble the ethical sense of people, we find that it is R. Kook who takes the bull by the horns and suggests a radical approach. The issue was much more vexing for R. Kook than for other sages, as in these types of matters he could not simply tell people that their consciences were leading them astray and that they should submerge their inherent feelings of right and wrong. It is R. Kook, after all, who famously says that fear of heaven cannot push aside one’s natural morality (Shemonah Kevatzim 1:75): אסור ליראת שמים שתדחק את המוסר הטבעי של האדם, כי אז אינה עוד יראת שמים טהורה. סימן ליראת שמים טהורה הוא, כשהמוסר הטבעי, הנטוע בטבע הישר של האדם, הולך ועולה על פיה במעלות יותר גבוהות ממה שהוא עומד מבלעדיה. אבל אם תצוייר יראת שמים בתכונה כזאת, שבלא השפעתה על החיים היו החיים יותר נוטים לפעול טוב, ולהוציא אל הפועל דברים מועילים לפרט ולכלל, ועל פי השפעתה מתמעט כח הפועל ההוא, יראת שמים כזאת היא יראה פסולה.

These are incredible words. R. Kook was also “confident that if a particular moral intuition reflecting the divine will achieves widespread popularity, it will no doubt enable the halakhic authorities to find genuine textual basis for their new understanding.” R. Kook formulates his idea as follows (Iggerot ha-Reiyah, vol. 1, p. 103): ואם תפול שאלה על איזה משפט שבתורה, שלפי מושגי המוסר יהיה נראה שצריך להיות מובן באופן אחר, אז אם באמת ע”פ ב”ד הגדול יוחלט שזה המשפט לא נאמר כ”א באותם התנאים שכבר אינם, ודאי ימצא ע”ז מקור בתורה.

R. Kook is not speaking about apologetics here, but a revealing of Torah truth that was previously hidden. The truth is latent, and with the development of moral ideas, which is driven by God, the new insight in the Torah becomes apparent. Ad kan leshoni in the previous post. In other words, R. Kook sees the Sanhedrin as able to actualize new moral and religious insights that have become apparent. That is why it is important for the Sanhedrin to use derashot when dealing with these matters, as this shows that the idea is not something new that has been developed, but something that was latent in the Torah, and only now has become apparent. So what derashah can be used to justify an abolishment of את קרבני לחמי :animal sacrifices? R. Kook points to Num 28:2 This is usually translated as “My food which is . לאשי לחמי presented to Me for offerings made by fire”. Yet the word actually means “my bread.” Right after this, in discussing the particulars of the sacrifice, the Torah states: “The one lamb thou shalt offer in the morning.” R. Kook’s proposed messianic derashah is: “Whenever animals are killed for personal consumption, you should use them for sacrifices, but when they are not killed for personal use, make sacrifices of bread.” I don’t think I am exaggerating in saying that this is one of the most provocative and radical texts in R. Kook’s writings. I say this not because of his advocacy of abolishing sacrifices, which I don’t think to be that significant in the larger scheme, but due to how he is envisioning the process by which the Rabbis will actually use derashot to create a Messianic Judaism. The Rambam, Hilkhot Mamrim 2:1, speaks of laws derived from the hermeneutical principles that can be altered by a future beit din ha-gadol (even one not as great as the one that established the original law). This was the great fear of the opponents of a reconstituted Sanhedrin, that the Mizrachi rabbis would take upon themselves to do precisely this. Since so many of our laws are based on derashot, Judaism as we practice it can be entirely reworked. R. Kook is showing us how this can be done, but he is going further than anything Maimonides envisioned, since sacrifices are not matters that have been established based on a rabbinic derashah but are commanded by explicit biblical verses. Basically, what R. Kook is doing is recreating the world of the Pharisees, before Judaism was bound to codes (beginning with the Mishnah). It was a time when Jewish law was developing and the biblical verses could be read—some would say “read”— in all sorts of ways. In the days of the Pharisees much of the halakhah as we know it was created, and to a large extent that can be done again in the Messianic era. ריח Here are R. Kook’s words (note also his exegesis with : (ניחוח שהסנהדרין אז ימצאו לנכון, ע”פ הכח שיש להם לעקור דבר מה”ת בשוא”ת, לפטור מקרבנות החובה של מין החי, כיון שכבר חדלה הריגת החי מן המנהג של תשמישי הרשות והמקרא מסייע, שקרא הכתוב לקרבן לחם, “את קרבני לחמי לאשי”, ואח”כ אומר “את הכבש אחד”, הא כיצד? כל זמן שבע”ח קרבים לתשמיש הרשות, עשה בע”ח לגבוה, אבל כשבע”ח אינם קרבים לרשות, עשה הקרבנות מלחם, ועל זה רמזו חז”ל: “כל הקרבנות בטלין וקרבן תודה אינה בטלה” שיש בה לחם . . . רק כעת עד זמן ההשלמה תאמר להם שיקריבו כבשים, ומותנה תמיד לריח ניחוח, וכיון שיבורר בזמן ההשלמה שהריגת הבע”ח [אינה ראויה] אי אפשר שתהיה לריח ניחוח.

R. Kook then cites the proof he mentions in Olat ha-Reiyah and in his essay “Afikim ba-Negev” (Otzarot ha-Reiyah [Rishon le- וערבה :Tziyon, 2002], vol. 2, p. 103), that Malachi 3:4 writes This . לה’ מנחת יהודה וירושלים כימי עולם וכשנים קדמוניות verse, in speaking of a sacrificial offering in Messianic days, mentions the minhah sacrifice, which is not an animal offering. As mentioned, the passage from R. Kook is so interesting because it shows that he was not merely thinking about the Messianic era, but also the actual functioning of the future Sanhedrin. He was imagining the derashot that could be used to “update” Judaism. I am unaware if this aspect of R. Kook’s thought was known before the publication of this latest volume. I also don’t know if any scholars have taken note of it even subsequent to the publication. However, in “Afikim ba- Negev” (Otzarot ha-Reiyah, vol. 2, p. 103), R. Kook also, in an offhand sentence, provides a possible derashah to justify the abolishment of sacrifices. He doesn’t develop the idea, but just puts it out there. Here is the sentence: והגביל “לרצונכם תזבחהו” (ויקרא יט, ה) שיהיה אפשר וראוי לומר “רוצה אני”. (רש”י על ויקרא א, ג).

The Talmud, Rosh ha-Shanah 6a, which is quoted by Rashi, Lev, 1:3, states that one cannot bring a sacrifice unless it arises from one’s free will. Now the Talmud, which is speaking of one particular sacrifice, actually says that we force him to bring it until he agrees, and this means that he is “willing.” But R. Kook is using this passage to hint at a different matter. In future times, when sacrifices will be so far from human sentiment, it will be impossible to do it willingly. The will then come into play. Since , לרצונכם תזבחהו ,derashah this teaches that one can only bring a sacrifice when one is willing, at a time when animal sacrifices are not considered acceptable, and thus not something people “want” to do, animal sacrifices will no longer be a requirement. Remember, R. Kook describes this future era as one in which the animals will be far advanced of what they are now. It is only when the animals are at the low state that they currently are, that we can offer them as sacrifices and eat them. He writes (Otzarot ha- Reiyah, vol. 2, p. 101), in a passage in which animals are compared to one’s children: מי לא יבין שאי אפשר להעלות על הדעת שיקח האדם את בניו, ברוח אשר יטפחם וירבה אותם להיטיב ולהשכיל, ויזבחם וישפך דמם? The texts we have seen are important in explaining how his viewpoint of the abolishment of sacrifices relates to the Ninth Principle of Maimonides. As mentioned, in my book I listed R. Kook’s view as being in opposition to the Principle. R. Kook is certainly great enough to disagree with Maimonides in this matter had he chosen to. Yet we see from his newly published writings that he would not have regarded himself in disagreement, because he understands the abolishment of sacrifices to be carried out in a purely halakhic fashion. Since the Rabbis have the exegetical authority to do such things, an authority given to them by the Torah, we are not speaking of a revision of Torah law. This case is then no different than any of the other examples where the Sages interpret Torah law different that the peshat of the verse. Returning to the newly published text, R. Kook’s imagination continues to run, and he doesn’t stop with sacrifices. In my book I called attention to R. Hayyim Halberstam’s view that in Messianic days the first born will take the place of the kohanim. R. Kook must have been attracted to this view for kabbalistic reasons, and here he provides a possible basis for how this too can be justified by the Rabbis. He also notes that since the change can be justified, “it is not uprooting a Torah matter, but rather fulfilling the Torah.”! In other words, built into the Torah is the notion that the kohanim would only be temporarily in charge of the divine worship. R. Kook argues that since the First Born were removed from their role because of the sin of the Golden Calf, it is impossible for the effects of this sin to last forever, as repentance is a more powerful force. Therefore, when the sin of the Golden Calf is atoned for there will no longer any reason for the First Born to be kept from the Avodah, and it will return to them. Following this, R. Kook offers another way of explaining why his view of sacrifices should not be seen as a “reform” or as evidence of the Torah changing (he obviously was sensitive to in other words, he is once ,ויש לדרוש this point). He says again providing the halakhic justification that can be used by a future Sanhedrin in abolishing sacrifices. His new exegetical reasoning goes as follows: The obligation of animal sacrifices was only intended for an era when the kohanim were in charge of the Avodah. This is how one is to understand the ושחט אותו על ירך המזבח . . . וזרקו בני אהרן (verse (Lev. 11:1 In other words, it is only to the descendants .הכהנים את דמו of Aaron that animal sacrifice is commanded, אבל כשיהיו כשרים ג”כ בכורות, אז מטעם העילוי של בע”ח וכלל המציאות אין הבע”ח נהוגים כ”א לחם ומנחה . . . וכך הוא המדה בכל מקום שנמצא פסוק בתורה וסברא ישרה שיש כח ביד ב”ד הגדול, מכש”כ כבצירוף הנביאים לפסוק הוראת גדולות כאלה. Note that R. Kook ties together a verse in the Torah with logic. When both are present, then the Beit Din ha-Gadol is able to act in order to make adjustments to Torah law. In this matter, the “sevarah yesharah” is the sense that animal sacrifices will not suitable for the future eschatological era, and the verses in the Torah that he cites give “cover” to the sevarah yesharah. That is, they provide the exegetical justification. (I wonder though, is R. Kook really correct when he implies that the only time the Sages could uproot a commandment was when they also had a biblical verse to justify this?) R. Kook concludes that all that he is speaking about is a long way off, and it is possible that the Resurrection will come before this and then all sorts of things will change. Yet all his prior ruminations here are about a pre-Resurrection era, when the Beit Din ha-Gadol is functioning and adjusting Torah law by means of derashot and sevarah yesharah. This is not the sort of thing that will be taking place post-Resurrection.7 Finally, lest anyone start using R. Kook’s thoughts in an antinomian fashion, he throws in the following for good measure: וזה היה מקור תרבות והרע ד”אחר”, שחזי שהמצות יש להן יחש מוגבל ותכליתי, חשב שבאמת אפשר להתעלות למעלה מהמעשים, גם בלא עת, ובאמת הכל אחדות יחיד היה הוה ויהיה, וכל עת וזמן את חובותיה נשמור, בלא נדנוד צל פקפוק.

Earlier in this post, I referred to the implications of R. Kook’s ideas with regard to Jewish law being adjusted because of new moral insights. In fact, I think it is R. Kook who provides the most comprehensive and satisfying approach to this issue. I don’t want to get into that subject at present, as I plan on returning to it, especially as a number of people have written to me about R. Kook’s views. In my future post I will illustrate my point by citing a number of examples of rulings and statements by mainstream halakhists from earlier centuries which could never be made today. The only way to explain this, I will argue, is that there has been a change in societal norms and this has made certain approaches not just practically impossible but simply wrong for our times. (See here where I cite in this regard R. Weinberg and R. Aviner.) However, I promised someone that I would give one example in this post, so here it is. R. Hayyim Benveniste, Keneset ha- Gedolah, Even ha-Ezer 154, Hagahot Beit Yosef no. 59, in discussing when we can force a husband to give a divorce, writes as follows: ובעל משפט צדק ח”א סי’ נ”ט כתב דאפי’ רודף אחריה בסכין להכותה אין כופין אותו לגרש ואפי’ לו’ לו שחייב להוציא. Can anyone imagine a posek, from even the most right-wing community, advocating such a viewpoint? I assume the logic behind this position is that even if the man is running after her with the knife, we don’t assume that he will actually kill her. He must just be doing it to scare her, and that is not enough of a reason to force him to divorce her. And if we are wrong, and he really does kill her? I guess the reply would be that this isn’t anything we could have anticipated even if we saw the knife in his hand, sort of like all those who have let pedophiles run loose in the yeshivot, presumably on the assumption that just because a man abused children in the past, that doesn’t mean that he will continue to do so.8 Notes

1 Among other interesting passages in this book, see p. 24, where he objects to people who write “ethical wills.” Quite apart from the frauds who wrote them, in order to show that they were really great people when they were in fact far from it, many tzadikim also wrote these wills. Yet Scheinfeld says that this was a mistake, since many of their children, and even more their grandchildren, assimilated among the Gentiles. He continues by lamenting how much worse things have gotten in his day: ובימינו אלה בודאי אינו מהראוי לכתוב צוואות, כמעט כל הבנים מתרחקים והולכים מדרכי אביהם, אינם רוצים ואינם יכולים ללכת בדרכיהם: “וכשם שמצוה לאמר דבר הנשמע, כך מצוה שלא לאמר דבר שאינו נשמע.” On pp. 82-83 he criticizes the “inflation” with regard to rabbinic titles that he saw in his day, and which has increased a great deal more since his time. Here is a very good example of this “inflation,” from responsa written by R. Moshe Malka, Ve-Heshiv Moshe, nos. 34-35. In this case I can guarantee you that the recipient is not deserving of the titles he has been given.

For another example of such exalted titles with regard to a non-rabbinic figure, see R. Michel Shurkin, Meged Giv’ot Olam (Jerusalem, 2005), vol. 2, p. 5, who is speaking of Prof. Samuel Soloveitchik: כיוצא בזה ראיתי מעשה, כשבשנת תשכ”ז נפטרו במשך תקופה קצרה אחיו של הגרי”ב זצ”ל, הגאון ר’ שמואל זצ”ל . . . In R. Weinberg’s letter to Samuel Atlas, published in Torah u- Madda Journal 7 (1997), pp. 107-108, he writes: “’Geonim’ sprout up there as grass in the field. Those who were emissaries of the yeshivot and unimportantmashgihim have overnight become outstanding geonim.” For more on the nonsense of elaborate titles of praise, see the many sources quoted by R. Pinchas Meyers, Nahalat Pinchas (Jerusalem, 1995), vol., 2, no. 41. See also R. Chaim Hirschensohn, Malki ba-Kodesh, vol. 1, p. 90, vol. 6, pp. 198, 200, 237-238. Returning to Scheinfeld, here is what he has to say on the topic (pp. 82-83): לרב פשוט מתארים “הרב הגאון”. לרב גדול בתורה באמת מתארים “מאור הגולה, בקי בכל חדרי התורה”. באמעריקא, ארץ החנופה והשקר, מתארים לכל דרשן פטפטן “הרב המטיף הגדול, פה מפיק מרגליות” ועוד. מגוזמים, מגוחכים עוד יותר תוארי-הכבוד של רביי החסידים: “אד”מור, סבא קדישא, בוצינא קדישא, צדיק יסוד עולם, בנן של קדושים, פרי צדיק, גזע ישישים, פטיש החזק, עמוד הימיני” ועוד ועוד. בעולם הקולטורי נוהגים: כשכותבים מכתב לאדם שקבל התואר Ph.D. מאיזה בית מדעים, מתארים אותו בתואר דר. ודי בזה. אפילו כשכותבים לדר. איינשטיין, לא היה שום אדם כותב: “כבוד הדר. החוזה בכוכבים, נהירין לו שבילי דרקיע” ועוד, דברים שהם ראויים לייחס לו באמת. After seeing what the term “Gaon” has become in our time, it is worth recalling what appears in R. Malachi ha-Kohen, Yad Malachi, Kelalei ha-Geonim 1. If we use the following definition of Gaon, you can count the living geonim on one hand, and perhaps still have some fingers not counted: ושמעתי אומרים שתנאי הגאון היה לידע ש”ס על פה גמ’ ומשניות. The Hatam Sofer states (She’elot u-Teshuvot Hatam Sofer ha- Hadashot, Yoreh Deah no. 33): ידע מעלתו מיום שהורגלו בני מדינתו בתואר “גאון אמיתי”, גילו ופרסמו שסתם גאון אינו אמיתי, אבל חוששני שגם אמיתי אינו אמת. The exaggerated titles are most often found in haskamot, and with this in mind see the haskamah published by Jacob Goldman in his book Peret ve-Olelot (Jerusalem, 1930). This is not the only example of an author giving himself a haskamah (the Aderet comes to mind), but I think it is the only example of an author giving himself a haskamah which tells the world how unqualified he is. 2 See Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee (Philadelphia, 1963), p. 209. 3 “Willingness to Sacrifice,” Jewish Journal, available here 4 Speaking of editions, I don’t understand why people continue to cite works such as Orot and Orot ha-Kodesh. Now that we are fortunate to have the Shemonah Kevatzim, and can cite R. Kook from the source, why would anyone continue to refer to writings that have been edited, and touched up, by R. Zvi Yehudah and the Nazir? 5 In an earlier post I called attention to Joseph Ibn Caspi’s incredible comments about how we are to treat animals, wherein he notes that “we are very close to them and we both have one father”! See here. Elsewhere in Caspi’s writings we see ambivalence towards eating meat. There too he explains that that an animal is אחינו בן אבינו החי

He also writes עיקר הכוונה שלא נאכל בשר, כי יספיקו לנו הצמחים. ולכן בבראשית לא הותר לנו רק עשב השדה, ואחר המבול נתפשט אכילת בעלי החיים שהוא כאילו נאכל אבינו [!] כי הוא סוגנו [סוג שלנו] הקרוב Both of these sources, from Caspi’s Gevia Kesef, p. 31, and Metzaref le-Kesef, p. 294, are cited in Hannah Kasher, “‘Eikh Yetzavenu ha-Shem La’asot Toevah ka-Zot:’ Bikoret Akedat Yitzhak al pi R. Yosef Ibn Caspi,” Et ha-Da’at 1 (1997), p. 41. For an opposing viewpoint to that of Caspi, see R. Gershon Ashkenazi, Avodat ha-Gershuni, no. 13: צער בעלי חיים לא שייך אלא בבעל חיים כשהוא בחיים חיותו . . . מי שנוחר את הבהמה במקום שיוכל לשחטה אין בזה משום צער בעלי חיים, וכי הבהמה אחינו הוא לברור לה מיתה יפה. R. Zvi Yehudah Kook, Or li-Netivati, pp. 245-246, expresses himself similarly to Caspi: בהשקפת האחדות השלמה לא נראה את עצמנו בתור דבר פרטי מיוחד בפני עצמו, וכן לא את כל אחד ואחד מכל יצורי עולם, לא את החי, לא את הצומח ולא את הדומם, אלא כולם וכולנו דבר אחד ממש. . . לא זה אוכל את זה כי אם הכל אוכל את הכל. For the view, expressed by a couple of rishonim as well as the Aderet, that before his sin Adam was permitted to eat meat, see R. Bezalel Naor, Ma’amar al Yishmael (Spring Valley, 2008), pp. 52ff. (first pagination; there is an enormous amount of learning in this book. In addition, it opens with a Hebrew letter to Naor from Prof. Isadore Twersky.). . 6 In the following section (no. 9 in the Ofen edition and censored from the Merkaz edition for reasons unclear), he offers another possible reason for the continuation of sacrifices: יתכן שימשכו הקורבנות גם בזמן התקופה של השלמת הבעלי חיים רק בתור עזר לתקן הנפשות המגולגלות בבהמות, וכפי המעלה הגדולה של הדעת אז תהי’ הדעת ברורה מי יבוחר לקרבן. 7 Regarding the authority of the Court to uproot a mitzvah from the Torah, see the interesting observation of R. Hayyim Hirschensohn, Commentary to Horayot, vol. 1, p. 3b (Hirschensohn’s numbering): אמר ר’ יוסי לא שהורו מותר לאכל חלב יודעין היו שאסור לאכול חלב והתורה נתנה רשות לב”ד להורות, וזה לא נקרא לדעת הירושלמי עקירת כל הגוף, שטעו שיש כח לב”ד לעקור דבר מן התורה אפילו בקום ועשה, וזה נקרא הגוף קים רק עקירת מקצת, לאמר שאין נצחיות ח”ו לחוקי התורה שיוכל הב”ד לעקרם כרצונם, כדעת רבני הרפארים היום החושבים שמפני צורך הזמן יכולים להתר איסורים מפורשים וקבועים בתורה, ולא נקראים בזה כופרים בעיקר, רק ב”ד טועים ולו הי’ בהם שאר תנאי פר העלם דבר היו חייבים עדת הראפרים בפר העלם דבר. 8 There is another theory as to why the sectarian hasidic world in particular has had so many cases of covering up and defending child sex abusers. It is that they simply do not regard these people as so terrible. The evidence for this appears obvious, in that in case of after case we see that they continue to allow sex abusers to teach and refuse to turn them over to the authorities and warn the parent body. Had they caught the rebbe eating at McDonald’s, you can be sure he would have been fired, but not so when it comes to fooling around with kids. The question is why do they have this outlook, and how come they don’t regard child sex abusers as so terrible? Here is a possible answer (which a wise person suggested). Look at where these societies get their information about human nature, the information that they regard as authentic and true. It does not come from modern psychology, but from Torah sources and folk beliefs. If you look only at traditional rabbinic literature, you won’t conclude that child sex abuse is as terrible as modern society views it. Yes, it is a sin and the person who commits it must repent as he must do with all sins, but there is nothing in the traditional literature that speaks to the great trauma suffered by the victim. How do we know about this trauma? Only from modern psychology and the testimony of the victims. Yet this type of evidence does not have much significance in the insular hasidic world (unless it is your own child who has been abused). Certainly modern psychology, which is often attacked by figures in that community, is not given much credence, especially not when they are confronted with an issur of mesirah. This theory makes a lot of sense to me and I am curious to hear what others have to say.