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Perceptions and Protest: an Examination on the Rising Political Power of Eurosceptic Parties in the 21St Century

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Perceptions and Protest: an Examination on the Rising Political Power of Eurosceptic Parties in the 21St Century Perceptions and Protest: An examination on the rising political power of Eurosceptic Parties in the 21st Century Henry Gordon Professor Montero Comprehensive Exercise Fall 2014 Gordon 2 Introduction From the beginning, the architects of European integration focused on assuring democratic peace and stability through the creation of a greater economic union. The pinnacle came in 1999 with the creation of the Euro, a monetary linkage of fourteen different currencies and arguably the most symbolic example of European integration. Not soon after the fireworks had subsided, however, cracks began to appear in the foundation of Europe. Anti-EU populism, characterized by sharp declines in trust in European institutions and the emergence of radical anti-integration political parties on both the political left and the right (Torreblanca and Leonard 2013). Throughout the 2000’s, public efforts to integrate further were met with sharp resistance, as exemplified in the failure to create a constitution for Europe, as well as the ongoing European financial crisis. Most recently, these “Eurosceptic” parties that had remained on the fringes of European politics, made gains both in national legislatures as well as the European Parliament. These realities raise the empirical question of what contributes to the rise of Euroscepticism, especially as it pertains to Eurosceptic political parties. Specifically, as the salience of European issues has increased with the expansion of a centralized European Union, the proportion of support for Eurosceptic parties has continued to increase. As these parties fundamentally reject the legitimacy of the European Union and its organs, their recent gains in the European Parliament needs to be understood, especially as Europeans have arguably benefitted from a more integrated common market. Additionally, most of the Eurosceptic parities have an explicitly nationalist dimension. It is thus necessary to understand not only why they compete for power at the supranational level, but a greater focus on the sources of their political power. Gordon 3 In this paper, I argue that increased media coverage and public discussion of European integration and the European polity can explain the rise in political power of Eurosceptic parties. Additionally, I posit that efforts to expand the European public sphere have been more or less successful. In creating a space wherein citizens, using the media as a proxy, can discuss and debate pan-continental issues, proponents of further European integration laid the foundation for a popular backlash. Fundamentally, however, the most successful parties are able to translate the media attention into votes. This is a direct result of a much broader point that successful Eurosceptic parties are successful not because of their ideological orientation or public policy positions, but because they make their arguments on the basis of European political integration, thus shifting the focus of the debate onto ground more easily conceded by major political parties. I argue that this public space is available primarily as a result of the failure of the European Union to create a corresponding European identity to foster trust and build popular support. As a result of this disconnect, Eurosceptic parties are able to translate nationalistic and isolationist sentiments into votes for their anti-integration platforms. To support my claim, I rely on empirical analysis of European media coverage, as well as case studies to evaluate the qualitative aspects of my argument. Theoretical Background and Framework Euroscepticism as A Negative Policy Reaction Existing scholarship is divided on the question of which factors drive Euroscepticism, with some arguing that it is based in institutional support, while others disputing the legitimacy of the polity. While support for the EU and its organs, and support for European Integration are conceptually distinct, they have been found to be empirically close connected, further Gordon 4 complicating analysis (Boomgaarden et al. 2011). Wessels argues that while skepticism may start as specific and directed towards authority and regimes, it can diffuse and develop into negative attitudes towards an entire community (2007). This fundamental assumption, that Euroscepticism reacts to the policies of the EU, lies at the base of many integration theories. Drawing from this framing, scholars have sought to provide different explanations for rising anti-EU attitudes as a way to subsequently explain party behavior. One line of reasoning sees voter preferences providing an incentive structure that in turn dictates party positioning. Based in rational-choice theory, the central idea is that voters have stable and transparent attitudes that affect their vote choice (Hooghe 2007). Parties react to the public mood on the European Union and this constrains decisions to those that do not stray too far from the median voter. Scholars operationalize this argument through the use of “hard” variables, such as economic performance, income inequality, and job status which craft the contexts in which voters form their attitudes (Gabel and Whitten 1997; Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, and De Vreese 2013). Euroscepticism as a Reaction to Identity Formation With the expansion through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 of EU competencies into distinctly non-economic areas more research has focused on “national identity” and other “soft factors” in order to explain public support for the EU. Carey (2002) argues that a strong national identity is an obstacle to European integration as it is likely to foster Eurosceptic attitudes. Others, however, argue that a strong national identity is fully compatible with pro-European attitudes (Bruter 2005; Citrin and Sides 2004). Serricho, Tsakatika, and Quaglia (2013) stress the different role of various components of national identity, arguing that a “cumulative national identity” allows citizens to see themselves as both European and members of the nation-state. Gordon 5 The civic component of this identity promotes pro-European attitudes, while the ascribed (or ethnic) component is positively correlated with Euroscepticism. As Hooghe and Marks (2005) argue, the real danger comes from an “exclusive national identity,” which rejects the existence of a European component. Since the establishment of the European Union, the European Commission has worked to promote its identity and public awareness, recognizing that Europe lacks the traditional aspects of nationality, such as a common language or shared experiences (Sassatelli 2002). The European Commission acknowledges that the absence of a European people and territory threatens the legitimacy of EU projects. As a result, each year over 500 million euros are spent on cultural policy, which aims to promote the richness and diversity of Europe’s shared cultural heritage. “Unity in diversity” has become the official slogan for this policy (Shore 2004). In this context, the goal of the EU, summed up in the Treaty of Rome, has been to “lay the foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 1957). For scholars who study identity formation, Euroscepticism can be understood as a reaction of national identities against European efforts to create a new primary idea with an active EU at its locus. Euroscepticism as a Reaction to Polity Creation As the era of the “permissive consensus” comes to a close scholarship has taken issue with the framing and focus of the EU debate. As Trenz and de Wilde (2012) argue, the best way to conceptualize this rise of Euroscepticism is not as a reaction against specific European policies, or the creation of European identities, but rather as a form of polity contestation. Although there is no agreement on what kind of political entity the European Union is in the traditional sense, there is broad scholarly consensus on the EU as a distinct polity (Hix 2008). As Gordon 6 Eriksen and Menédez (2004) note, integration has led to greater consent and agreement, but, in defiance of neo-functionalist theory, more disagreement. In this view, Euroscepticism functions as a debate over whether the polity should exist, what form it should take, what its competencies should be, and to what extent its citizens want to be a part of it. It fundamentally takes issue with the perspective that political parties react and organize around the EU response to certain issues, and instead emphasizes communicative exchange around the fundamental organization of a European polity. This point of view argues against the assumption that identities and political positions are relatively fixed. Political attitudes may be activated in certain situations and may remain dormant in others. My Framework I agree with the conceptualization of European integration as an ongoing discussion on the nature of a distinctly new polity. Moreover, I argue that Euroscepticism arises fundamentally as a public relations paradox. Namely, as the European Commission and political elites promote European institutions through communication and dissemination of information, trust in those institutions deteriorates. This sets off a vicious cycle wherein Eurosceptic parties, recognizing the opportunity for increased exposure, compete for power in the very European institutions they seek to dismantle. Due to the inherent political structure of the EU (with the elite-driven Commission and Council of Ministers having more power than the popularly-elected Parliament), political
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