Perceptions and Protest: An examination on the rising political power of Eurosceptic Parties in the 21st Century

Henry Gordon Professor Montero Comprehensive Exercise Fall 2014

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Introduction

From the beginning, the architects of European integration focused on assuring democratic peace and stability through the creation of a greater economic union. The pinnacle came in 1999 with the creation of the Euro, a monetary linkage of fourteen different currencies and arguably the most symbolic example of European integration. Not soon after the fireworks had subsided, however, cracks began to appear in the foundation of Europe. Anti-EU populism, characterized by sharp declines in trust in European institutions and the emergence of radical anti-integration political parties on both the political left and the right (Torreblanca and Leonard

2013). Throughout the 2000’s, public efforts to integrate further were met with sharp resistance, as exemplified in the failure to create a constitution for Europe, as well as the ongoing European financial crisis. Most recently, these “Eurosceptic” parties that had remained on the fringes of

European politics, made gains both in national legislatures as well as the European Parliament.

These realities raise the empirical question of what contributes to the rise of Euroscepticism, especially as it pertains to Eurosceptic political parties. Specifically, as the salience of European issues has increased with the expansion of a centralized European Union, the proportion of support for Eurosceptic parties has continued to increase. As these parties fundamentally reject the legitimacy of the European Union and its organs, their recent gains in the European

Parliament needs to be understood, especially as Europeans have arguably benefitted from a more integrated common market. Additionally, most of the Eurosceptic parities have an explicitly nationalist dimension. It is thus necessary to understand not only why they compete for power at the supranational level, but a greater focus on the sources of their political power. Gordon 3

In this paper, I argue that increased media coverage and public discussion of European integration and the European polity can explain the rise in political power of Eurosceptic parties.

Additionally, I posit that efforts to expand the European public sphere have been more or less successful. In creating a space wherein citizens, using the media as a proxy, can discuss and debate pan-continental issues, proponents of further European integration laid the foundation for a popular backlash. Fundamentally, however, the most successful parties are able to translate the media attention into votes. This is a direct result of a much broader point that successful

Eurosceptic parties are successful not because of their ideological orientation or public policy positions, but because they make their arguments on the basis of European political integration, thus shifting the focus of the debate onto ground more easily conceded by major political parties.

I argue that this public space is available primarily as a result of the failure of the European

Union to create a corresponding European identity to foster trust and build popular support. As a result of this disconnect, Eurosceptic parties are able to translate nationalistic and isolationist sentiments into votes for their anti-integration platforms. To support my claim, I rely on empirical analysis of European media coverage, as well as case studies to evaluate the qualitative aspects of my argument.

Theoretical Background and Framework

Euroscepticism as A Negative Policy Reaction

Existing scholarship is divided on the question of which factors drive Euroscepticism, with some arguing that it is based in institutional support, while others disputing the legitimacy of the polity. While support for the EU and its organs, and support for European Integration are conceptually distinct, they have been found to be empirically close connected, further Gordon 4 complicating analysis (Boomgaarden et al. 2011). Wessels argues that while skepticism may start as specific and directed towards authority and regimes, it can diffuse and develop into negative attitudes towards an entire community (2007). This fundamental assumption, that Euroscepticism reacts to the policies of the EU, lies at the base of many integration theories.

Drawing from this framing, scholars have sought to provide different explanations for rising anti-EU attitudes as a way to subsequently explain party behavior. One line of reasoning sees voter preferences providing an incentive structure that in turn dictates party positioning.

Based in rational-choice theory, the central idea is that voters have stable and transparent attitudes that affect their vote choice (Hooghe 2007). Parties react to the public mood on the

European Union and this constrains decisions to those that do not stray too far from the median voter. Scholars operationalize this argument through the use of “hard” variables, such as economic performance, income inequality, and job status which craft the contexts in which voters form their attitudes (Gabel and Whitten 1997; Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, and De

Vreese 2013).

Euroscepticism as a Reaction to Identity Formation

With the expansion through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 of EU competencies into distinctly non-economic areas more research has focused on “national identity” and other “soft factors” in order to explain public support for the EU. Carey (2002) argues that a strong national identity is an obstacle to European integration as it is likely to foster Eurosceptic attitudes.

Others, however, argue that a strong national identity is fully compatible with pro-European attitudes (Bruter 2005; Citrin and Sides 2004). Serricho, Tsakatika, and Quaglia (2013) stress the different role of various components of national identity, arguing that a “cumulative national identity” allows citizens to see themselves as both European and members of the nation-state. Gordon 5

The civic component of this identity promotes pro-European attitudes, while the ascribed (or ethnic) component is positively correlated with Euroscepticism. As Hooghe and Marks (2005) argue, the real danger comes from an “exclusive national identity,” which rejects the existence of a European component.

Since the establishment of the European Union, the European Commission has worked to promote its identity and public awareness, recognizing that Europe lacks the traditional aspects of nationality, such as a common language or shared experiences (Sassatelli 2002). The

European Commission acknowledges that the absence of a European people and territory threatens the legitimacy of EU projects. As a result, each year over 500 million euros are spent on cultural policy, which aims to promote the richness and diversity of Europe’s shared cultural heritage. “Unity in diversity” has become the official slogan for this policy (Shore 2004). In this context, the goal of the EU, summed up in the Treaty of Rome, has been to “lay the foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (Treaty establishing the European

Economic Community 1957). For scholars who study identity formation, Euroscepticism can be understood as a reaction of national identities against European efforts to create a new primary idea with an active EU at its locus.

Euroscepticism as a Reaction to Polity Creation

As the era of the “permissive consensus” comes to a close scholarship has taken issue with the framing and focus of the EU debate. As Trenz and de Wilde (2012) argue, the best way to conceptualize this rise of Euroscepticism is not as a reaction against specific European policies, or the creation of European identities, but rather as a form of polity contestation.

Although there is no agreement on what kind of political entity the European Union is in the traditional sense, there is broad scholarly consensus on the EU as a distinct polity (Hix 2008). As Gordon 6

Eriksen and Menédez (2004) note, integration has led to greater consent and agreement, but, in defiance of neo-functionalist theory, more disagreement.

In this view, Euroscepticism functions as a debate over whether the polity should exist, what form it should take, what its competencies should be, and to what extent its citizens want to be a part of it. It fundamentally takes issue with the perspective that political parties react and organize around the EU response to certain issues, and instead emphasizes communicative exchange around the fundamental organization of a European polity. This point of view argues against the assumption that identities and political positions are relatively fixed. Political attitudes may be activated in certain situations and may remain dormant in others.

My Framework

I agree with the conceptualization of European integration as an ongoing discussion on the nature of a distinctly new polity. Moreover, I argue that Euroscepticism arises fundamentally as a public relations paradox. Namely, as the European Commission and political elites promote

European institutions through communication and dissemination of information, trust in those institutions deteriorates. This sets off a vicious cycle wherein Eurosceptic parties, recognizing the opportunity for increased exposure, compete for power in the very European institutions they seek to dismantle. Due to the inherent political structure of the EU (with the elite-driven

Commission and Council of Ministers having more power than the popularly-elected

Parliament), political gains in the parliament by Eurosceptic parties pushes the other institutions to promote EU organs more, as well as creating a positive incentive for national-level media outlets to cover the rise of Eurosceptic attitudes. In this line of reasoning, the increased effort on the part of the European Union to promote Europe creates the breeding grounds for Gordon 7

Euroscepticism. As long as further integration is proposed and discussed, Eurosceptic parties will bargain for power.

I argue that it is the communicative exchange fostered by an emerging European public sphere (EPS) that fuels this vicious cycle. While some scholars have argued that an EPS cannot emerge due to the lack of a common language or strong continental media, the general scholarly consensus is that a public sphere exists to varying degrees, depending on the definition used. In relation to European public opinion, spikes in public opinion on European integration correlate with the media attention cycle (Vliegenthart et al. 2008). This observation supports the claim that political attitudes are not always fixed, and may be activated by news coverage. I extend this argument to voting behavior and expect that more negative coverage of the EU in the weeks prior to the European Parliamentary elections will bolster vote totals for declared Eurosceptic parties.

While Trenz and de Wilde dismiss the importance of identity formation in understanding attitudes towards the EU, I argue that identity politics still have a role to play in electoral outcomes. First, many Eurosceptic parties are either explicitly or implicitly nationalistic. Parties use messaging and nationalist appeal in order to curry favor with voters. Thus, it should not be surprising that the strength of an exclusive identity is an important factor in determining political support. Second, just as the EU was created through the transfer of power from member states to a central body, the EPS exists only as a function of the transnationalization of national public spheres. National actors, who have a primary national identity, control national level mass media. Thus, understanding the interplay between national and European identities in the media especially remains important for understanding how parties mobilize. Gordon 8

In order to establish the necessity of my analysis in the first place, the first step is to show a definitive difference among EU member states in terms of both Euroscepticism and media coverage. If there is not a significant difference across states then an argument could be made in favor of a singular European public sphere in the style of Switzerland that transcends language barriers. A basic Chi-Square test for association shows notable differences across member states.

One item of particular note is the overall level of media coverage in the continent. In

2009, 38 percent of the news coverage dealt with either Europe or the EU and its institutions.

This varies by state, from a low of 14.2 percent in Italy, to a high of 65.7 percent in Greece.

Across time, there has also been an unquestionable rise in the media coverage of the EU in the

EU15, rising from around 7% in 1999 to 16% in 2009 (figure 1).

There is a similar amount of variance in the question of EU membership. Consistent with past research, certain countries exhibit high levels of Euroscepticism (Great Britain and Austria in particular), while others remain much more optimistic or neutral on their countries membership (the Netherlands and Germany). Across time periods, there is little variation in the measured level of Euroscepticism on the whole, besides a slight decrease prior to the economic crisis (figure 2). The first finding is quite clear: consistent with more recent findings, there is a definite presence of European issues in national media. These are the most relevant indicators for the visibility of Europe in the national media and the level of attention paid to the EU and its organs is significant and growing. Although there is some variation, during recent election periods, European articles account for nearly 20% of media coverage in national media and in some cases much higher. Notably, my sample only includes national newspapers, magazines, and television networks in EU15 countries. It does not include global media outlets such as CNN, the

International Herald Tribune, or BBC World which account for a fair amount of media coverage, Gordon 9 almost all of which is European in nature. It also does not take into account social media, which is a growing source of news for Europeans, and also breaks down geographic boundaries to communication (Goonasekera, Servaes, and Wang 2004). Additionally, it does not take into account media coverage in the entire EU-27, which is much more Eurocentric (and also more eurosceptical).

This shows that there is a broad interest on the part of the national media in European coverage. This is not surprising, as EU articles are the mirrors through which national public spheres can follow the agendas of the EU. This does involve a necessary sacrifice of primacy of a EU identity to the national level in order to assure that a minimum degree of information about the policy processes in Brussels is embedded in the background of these national polities. This provides the justification for the focus by European actors on increasing the knowledge of

European citizens through further engagement with the media.

Data and Methodology

I use longitudinal content analyses of mass media from the European Election Study carried out over the weeks prior to the European Parliamentary Elections of 1999, 2004, and

2009. Each wave includes television news broadcasts and at least one national daily broadsheet.

The first time period represents attitudes at the end of the 20th century. The effects of the

Maastricht treaty were being felt and most of the important external events of the 21st century

(9/11, and the London and Madrid bombings) had not occurred yet. By contrast, 2004 represents a period of relative stability in the EU. By this period, most European policies had developed and many factors shaping public opinion had occurred. Finally, the elections of 2009 represent a turning point for the EU with the onset of the European Financial Crisis and the impact of the Gordon 10 passage of the Lisbon treaty being felt. These three time points allow us to compare the periods and detect any systematic difference between them.

The 15 countries in the sample are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,

Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. All attained membership in the EU since at least 1995, so membership duration will not be an influencing factor.

The Dependent Variable

Although the primary unit of analysis is party performance, for a number of reasons it is not feasible to use country-level vote totals for Eurosceptic parties as a dependent variable. First, there is a distinct lack of consensus over what constitutes a Eurosceptic party. Second, political parties across the political spectrum espouse Eurosceptic viewpoints. As different factors affect different outcomes for left and right parties, it is nearly impossible to isolate those that drive

Euroscepticism. Finally, in many countries the actual parties do not stay constant across all time periods, thus introducing potential sources of error as old parties fall and new ones arise. For these reasons, I opt to use the Eurobarometer question “Generally speaking, do you think that

(your country’s) membership of the European Community (Common Market) is a good thing (0), neither good nor bad (1), or a bad thing (2)?” as my main dependent variable. Extant scholarship operationalizes Euroscepticism in the same manner (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Carey

2002; Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, and De Vreese 2013; McLaren 2002). By using

Eurobarometer data collected during the period leading up the EP elections, I expect this is a reasonable approximation of anti-EU sentiment.

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The Independent Variables

The primary independent variables come from the European Election Study media surveys. Using the raw content analysis as my starting point, I create a number of variables measuring the total amount of coverage, the overall stance of the coverage (whether it is pro-EU or not), as well as the relative amount of EU coverage compared to other news. Additionally, for articles that have a distinct stance on European integration, I create a number of variables to determine which political party/actor/state the root cause is attributed to. In order to understand the leanings of national-level media, I create a variable that compares the primary actor in the article, to who, according to the story, should be responsible. In doing so, the proportion of stories where the EU is seen as “overstepping” its authority provides a proxy for understanding the sentiment of national level media. As the data are gathered in the three weeks prior to each election, they provide a good picture of what would be influencing voters at the time they cast their ballot.

Other Variables

In order to test my hypothesis that increased coverage of the EU and its institutions increases the performance of Eurosceptic parties against other explanations, I include a number of control variables. First, noting that soft factors alone may drive the Eurosceptic vote, I incorporate variables taken from the Eurobarometer survey measuring the level of perceived national identity, exclusivity of identity, and amount of immigration (seen as a threat to national identities). To account for the hard factors explanation, I include variables measuring the economic position of the country, unemployment rates, and GDP change.

Methodology

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I test for my hypothesis by using panel analysis regression. In this approach, I create three different models to understand within-group effects and then one combined model to compare between-group effects. Van Kilgaren et al use a similar approach, but instead use two

OLS regressions and compare the results. However, following Hsiao, its clear that the panel analysis is a more methodologically rigorous and robust approach (2003)1. The first model accounts for the economic effects (unemployment, GDP growth, and financial perceptions). A second model is added to test for the primary identity controls. The third model adds the variables of interest, the level of media coverage and the attitudes of the media. I then combine models, and assess the total predictive value in one final combined model.2

To supplement the results of my quantitative model, I turn to case studies to illustrate two main points. First, although there is a link between the media cycle and fluctuations in public opinion around Euroscepticism, there is comparatively less literature on how political parties are able to capitalize on Eurosceptic attitudes and subsequently translate them into electoral success.

Second, the 2014 elections saw Eurosceptic parties gaining nearly 25% of the available seats in the European Parliament, by far their largest share to date. In a number of cases, Eurosceptic parties also won seats in their national elections. Party performance alone cannot be aggregated for statistical analysis due to the issues of party diversity. Thus, this raises the question about the effectiveness of Eurosceptic parties. Can the improvement in performance from 2009 to 2014 be interpreted as a burst of popularity to bring voter sentiment inline with Eurosceptic attitudes, or is the electoral success purely it a function of the recent financial crisis and distinct policy decisions made at the EU level?

To approach these questions, I examine the performance of Eurosceptic parties in three countries: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. These countries are selected as Gordon 13 representatives of four distinct groupings of European countries. The first group, represented in my analysis by the United Kingdom, is represented in the European Parliament by the Europe of

Freedom and Direct Democracy party group (EFD), and includes members not only of UKIP, but also Italy’s Five Star Movement. These parties focus on independence from Europe, and although they have other policy positions, they are not seen as being on one side or the other of the political spectrum. The second group, represented by Germany and the new Alternative für

Deutschland (AfD), but also including the nationalistic Finn’s Party of Finland and Belgium’s

New Flemish Alliance, represents a more moderate form of Euroscepticism that has risen in countries that historically have demonstrated high amounts of support for the EU. Finally, the last group, represented by France and the National Front, represents an approach to the EU more akin to a social movement and includes Austria’s Freedom Party, Hungary’s Jobbik, and Golden

Dawn in Greece. These parties are not affiliated with any party group in the EU parliament, and are generally viewed as fringe movements. Of particular interest with these groups is how their political views were moderated and translated into electoral success. Through the examination of these three cases, I will show broadly how growing Euroscepticism and increased attention to the contestation of the European polity through the media has allowed different parties operating in different political contexts to gain political power.

Results

Moving to the quantitative model, the first block of variables (table 1) tests for the conventional explanation that hard factors determine the level of Euroscepticism. The coefficients are generally small and insignificant. The exception is with the perceived economic situation of the country, which is strongly positively correlated with European membership.

Holding all other variables constant, an increase of one point in the economic evaluation (the Gordon 14 equivalent of moving from a “don’t know” to “positive” answer) corresponds to a .32-point decrease in the measure of Euroscepticism. GDP growth and unemployment rates are not statistically significant in this model. These findings are consistent with other research that has shown that perceptions of economic performance matter more than the actual aggregated data.

The next model (table 2) tests the identity explanation. In this model, I test for the difference between the perceived threat to national identity and immigration flows. This model includes exclusive national identity, strength of European identity, and immigration. None of the variables in this approach are found to be significant

The third model (table 3) tests for media effects. In this model, I use the two media variables as well as an interaction term to account for the possibility that the level of negative media attitudes depends on a baseline level of EU media coverage in national level newspapers.

By using this term, I control for “house effects” or the biases of different national level media outlets. Using this approach, total coverage is significant while the amount of negative coverage is not. Accounting for variation in the level of negative coverage, an increase in the percent of national media coverage of the EU or EU actors/issues decreases the amount of support for political integration by 1.66 points. This is the equivalent of moving from having a positive attitude on integration to becoming neutral or slightly negative. The interaction term is also found to be significant. This suggests that the degree to which total media coverage impacts

Euroscepticism varies with the amount of negative media coverage. Generally, as coverage of the EU increases in national level media, support for EU membership decreases.

The final step is to combine the three primary models and compare the results. Shown in table 4, the most important explanatory factor is the perceived European identity (coefficient of

2.69). Perceived economic situation is also significant and positively correlated at a level similar Gordon 15 to the first model (a coefficient of .547). With the inclusion of the other country level controls, the media terms are no longer found to be statistically significant. I address this effect in the following section.

In order to understand the larger country-level differences, I extract the fixed effects for each model. The results are presented in table 5. These values show the constants for each country, and can be interpreted as baseline levels of Euroscepticism. Across all models, the

United Kingdom, Austria, and Finland exhibit the highest levels of underlying Euroscepticism, while Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands all have the lowest levels of Euroscepticism across all time periods. This is an important finding in that it conforms to our general expectations, and it correlates somewhat with Eurosceptic party performance.

Discussion

These results have broad implications for the position of the media in the context of the formation of a European public sphere and common identity. The aim of the quantitative model was to investigate the explanatory powers of economic versus social identity variables with the addition of media coverage. Through the observation of these factors in the times leading up to

European Parliamentary elections, we are able to ascertain the effect that increased media coverage has on Euroscepticism, which in turn was expected to provide insight into voting behavior. The overall results suggest two main conclusions: first, the variance in explanatory power across time periods is relatively minimal, and second, that economic factors have less explanatory power than identity and media variables.

This first finding is substantively significant, as it goes against what would be expected from the extant literature. Changes in social policy, or the expansion of European social efforts do not change the explanatory power of more “socially” oriented variables across time. This Gordon 16 suggests that identity factors either gained their explanatory strength prior to 1999 or have always existed along with structural economic factors.

In terms of the relative explanatory power, a key takeaway is that perceptions ultimately are the largest determining factor of Euroscepticism, as opposed to hard realities. While GDP is not found to have a significant effect on Euroscepticism, the perceived economic expectations of households are. In the “soft” factor model as well, actual immigration rates do not matter as much as the perceived identities of the populations. This unexpected (negative or none) effect might be explained by limitations in the data available. While contact with immigrants can increase cultural tolerance and understanding (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Voci and Hewstone

2003; Ward and Masgoret 2006), I have no data detailing intergroup communication.

Alternatively, there may be a lagging effect in the number of immigrants to a country and the time that it takes for those immigrants to effect changes in a cultural or political identity. Further research count account for this possibility by surveying perceptions of the presence of immigrants, rather than actual numbers.

Unsurprisingly, the finding that a stronger connection with Europe and a European identity corresponds to lower euroscepticism should come as no surprise and further justifies the

EUs continued efforts in social policy. That being said, the level of identification with Europe remains far below the level of national identity, which indicates that efforts to expand the

European identity may continue to struggle.

The inclusion of the media block is also important to understand, and merits further examination. A key observation is that while total media coverage influences euroscepticism, negative media coverage does not. This may be explained by the time period. Because the media survey was conducted in the time leading up to an election, political parties were also pursuing Gordon 17 people’s attitudes. It may be that coverage rate works in conjunction with other sources of information outside my sample to result in greater Euroscepticism.

That the media variables were not found to be significant in the final model is surprising.

It is possible that, like in the media block, the sample of media sources did not take into account enough places where people get their information. Instead, this model suggests that the media plays a more second order effect. As perceptions and identities are found to be the most important driver of Euroscepticism, the media can be viewed as a means for reinforcing those variables, instead of directly contributing to Euroscepticism.

Despite these findings, however, there are limitations to this study that must be accounted for. First, complete data were only available from 1999 onwards, and did not include the most recent European elections, held in May of 2014. Second, European elections occur only once every five years, which did not allow us to observe possible fluctuations between periods.

Closely related to this is the issue of EU expansion. There are now 28 EU countries, as opposed to 15 in 1999, and this study did not incorporate the rise of skepticism within more recent members to the EU. Finally, as noted because of differences in political parties and in the types of Euroscepticism across countries, the dependent variable is Eurosceptic attitudes, and not vote totals. This last point may provide another insight into the role of the media. While the media may not influence how people feel directly about their countries membership in the EU, the media may play an important role in how political parties translate sentiments into votes.

Case Studies

The United Kingdom

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While most of the 28 EU members joined for clear and enduring reasons, Britain entered in 197 without enthusiasm and in a moment of transient economic anxiety. Indeed, the UKs entrance was motivated more by access to the benefits of European free trade rather than subsidy regimes such as the Common Agricultural Program. With a long history of isolationism,

Euroscepticism pervades the Conservative Party and a majority of Britons, which could lead to

Britain voting to exit the EU through a referendum in 2017. Moreover, Britain was a net contributor to the European budget for its first three decades of membership. The steady encroachment of EU powers and regulations into British law has caused much greater resentment.

Out of these structural conditions, a new party has emerged. Founded in 1993 as a reaction to the treaty of Maastricht, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), has had one of the most successful histories of contestation in the European Parliament, but until recently has evaded domestic political success. Although barely established by their first EP parliament elections in 1994, by 2009 UKIP had broken through, placing second and earning more votes than the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats. In 2014, UKIP achieved a new level of domestic success as well, becoming the first party that wasn’t Labour or Conservative since 1906 to win the majority of seats in any UK-wide election.

The greatest driver of UKIP’s success has been an overall shift in party strategy, led by charismatic leader Nigel Farage. A longtime MEP for the party, Farage took over control in 2010 and translated EU funds into financial resources for the party. In turn, the party began to climb in both public opinion polls as well as in media coverage.

In figure 3, a chart of LexisNexis data shows the number of citations for UKIP and

Farage from 2008, when UKIP was a largely fringe party with only three MEPs, to May of 2014, Gordon 19 when it won the UK EP elections. Media interest in UKIP has surged, particularly since 2012. In

2008, the party was mentioned just over 2000 times. Just 5 years later it had increased that number ten times over. Nigel Farage himself received over 8,000 mentions. The party also maintains an active presence on Facebook, updating at least once every weekday. As the

European elections got closer the frequency of posting increased. On May 22nd, the date of elections in the UK, UKIP posted five times throughout the day delivering key messages in support of their cause.

It’s important to note that under Farage’s leadership electoral success cannot be attributed only to increased media coverage. According to an interview in 2010, Farage called the policy positions of the 2010 party manifesto “drivel” and has worked in subsequent years to move the party towards the mainstream in terms of manifesto structure and policy positions (BBC News

2014). While it may be argued that this is evidence of the mediating effect of increased political power, the primary focus of the party remains UK withdrawal from the European Union.

UKIP presents a case of how a Eurosceptic party was able to take nascent anti-EU sentiment and translate it into electoral victory. By leveraging the resources of the initial MEP election in broader public support, Farage and UKIP commanded the attention of the media, which in turn increased their exposure to their domestic constituencies. While undoubtedly benefiting from country-level factors, UKIP was able to capitalize on anti-European attitudes in a way that the more moderate right-wing party, the Conservatives, were not.

Germany

In contrast to the United Kingdom, Germany displays nearly the exact opposite characteristics. A founding member of the European Union, and longtime proponent of further integration, Germany has consistently exhibited some of the lowest levels of Euroscepticism on Gordon 20 the continent, resulting in the longtime suppression of skeptic political groups. In general,

European integration has not typically been a very salient issue in German electoral politics. In

2014, however, a new party, Alternative Für Deutschland (AfD), captured over 7 percent of the vote in their first EP elections, raising questions of the degree of nascent Euroscepticism in countries that have traditionally enjoyed high rates of approval for European integration.

The onset of the financial crisis provides some insight. Data from the German

Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) shows that in the months prior to the Federal election of

2013 over 30 percent of voters nominated the euro crisis as one of the top two problems facing

Germany, second only to social welfare/justice as the issue of greatest concern (Faas 2014). At the same time, Eurobarometer data from the time period shows that only 29 percent of Germans polled tended to trust the EU, while 59 percent tended to distrust it. In the same survey, only 25 percent of Germans thought that the EU was heading in the right direction, compared to 43 percent who thought it was heading in the wrong direction. Germans were also shown as being fairly pessimistic about the economic outlook in the EU. Only 19 percent of those surveyed thought that the next 12 months would be better, while 33 percent believed they would be worse

(Standard Eurobarometer 80 2013).

Such tensions notwithstanding, in the lead up to Germany’s 2014 election none of the major parties offered an outlet for citizens opposed to bailouts and other aspects of the euro rescue policies. In fact, despite the salience of the euro crisis for German voters, European issues hardly featured in the major parties’ election campaigns. It was under these circumstances that

Alternative für Deutschland was formed. The party was founded February 2013 with a central pillar of an “orderly dissolution” of the Eurozone on the grounds that “Germany doesn’t need the euro” (Alternative für Deutschland 2014). The party’s manifesto argued that national curries Gordon 21 ought to be reintroduced or a smaller and more stable currency union created (Alternative für

Deutschland 2014). In the September 2013 election, AfD fell just short of entering the

Bundestag, with 4.7 percent of the vote. It has since improved on this showing in the EP elections, winning 7 percent of the vote and gaining seven MEPs.

Though highly critical of the EU, especially by German standards, it is not an anti-EU party like UKIP. Whereas UKIP’s primary political objective is Britain’s withdrawal from the

EU, AfD declares itself in favor of “a Europe of sovereign states with a common internal market” (Alternative für Deutschland 2014). Indeed the main focus of AfD is opposition to the monetary union, not to the entire cooperative effort. These statements focus heavily on the economic impact on German taxpayers of sustaining a single currency, but also appeal to less tangible considerations of sovereign nationhood (Alternative für Deutschland 2014).

That being said, AfD is not a far-right party or political movement. AfD’s leaders have claimed that the party is neither left nor right, although some of its policy positions and voter base suggest that it leans slightly to the right (Bulmer 2014). Instead, it occupies the space created by deteriorating support for the EU. In doing so, it occupies the same space articulated by the extreme left (Die Linke) or extreme right (National Democratic Party of Germany NPD), neither of which appeals to the moderate voter. Thus, its impact may also be measured by the extent to which it is able to make Euroscepticism a moderate, rather than extremist position.

France

Like Germany, France was one of the founding members of the EU. The 2014 electoral campaign in France was influenced by the strong presence of a Eurosceptic party, the Front

National (FN). Apart from being the largest EP party in France, FN is also the largest extreme- right party in all Europe. Unlike other Eurosceptic parties, however, the FN belongs to no Gordon 22

European-level party group. Its party manifesto describes itself as a social movement, and is old enough that it escapes the label of being purely anti-EU, like the AfD or UKIP to a lesser extent

(Le Front National 2014).

A large part of the FN’s recent success is owed to the charisma of its leaders. The FN has only ever been led by the Le Pens (first party founder Jean-Marie, and now his daughter Marine) and they have become the very personification and embodiment of the party (Barbet and Honoré

2014). In the eyes of the French electorate, name of the party is synonymous with the last name of its leaders, now epitomized by a third generation of following the election of Marion

Maréchal-Le Pen (niece of Marine and granddaughter of Jean-Marie) as the youngest member of the French National Assembly. The Le Pen factor in a key factor in explaining why the party has been able to repeatedly rally normally apolitical voters to their cause. Jean-Marie Le Pen successfully fought off internal factions and breakaway parties in the 1990s, while Marine Le

Pen saw off the challenge of deputy leader Bruno Gollnisch in the contest to replace her father as the new leader of the party in 2011. In that instance the party used the challenges to retool party dynamics, unite disparate groups, and come back stronger. Under Marine Le Pen, in particular, the party has sought to gain legitimacy by moderating the message of her father while staying firm to the party’s anti-EU positions. In interviews, the Le Pens are brash, charismatic, and nationalistic, creating an appropriately populist message for a receptive audience

There is also a strong link between the charismatic leadership of the Le Pens and the role and influence of the media. Ever since Jean-Marie Le Pen’s appeared on national television in

1984, the previous FN leader enjoyed regular media coverage, sometimes but by no means always negative, which enabled him to build up a profile with the French public. Some have claimed that the media had played a significant role in contributing to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Gordon 23 credibility (Bonnafous 1998; Charlot 1986). Marine Le Pen has followed in her father’s footsteps, and has become a legitimate player in the French media establishment. Following the

FN victory in the 2014 European elections, political commentators suggested that the media contributed to its victory by consistently asking the question ‘will the FN be first’ and by giving

Marine Le Pen too much media exposure (Kissane 2014).

Finally, country level factors also explained the success of the FN in 2014. Before the election, polls already captured the unprecedented result FN was heading for, estimating that FN would become the largest party in France, owning mostly to the growing discontent with

President François Hollande and the Socialist Party. FN did not meet strong opposition, not even on the right, thus it was FN that dictated the terms and issues of the campaign to the two large moderate parties, who did not succeed in imposing a different agenda nor managed to mobilize voters. The FN presented itself to the voters not being part of any EU party group, thus enabling it to capitalize on rising resentment of Europe that occurred in France between the 2009 and

2014 elections.

Discussion

The case studies presented help illuminate some of the lingering questions related to

Euroscepticism. First, it is clear across cases that party leadership is key to building credibility with voters and establishing lasting success. In the cases of UKIP and FN, as well as with Geert

Wilder’s PVV in the Netherlands and Beppe Grillio’s (an Italian comedian) Five Star Movement, strong personalities and identification, when used properly can build on existing Eurosceptic where other parties cannot. In more moderate countries where Euroscepticism is more recent, it remains to be seen whether or not a strong party figurehead will emerge, or if the current constellation of parties will continue to exist past the 2019 EP elections. Gordon 24

Second, although the media plays a second order function in building Euroscepticism, it is undeniable that the media plays a large role in determining political outcomes. In the cases of the UK and France, where Eurosceptic parties were the most successful, there is clear evidence of the media playing to the favor of the parties. In both cases too, the party leadership used media outlets, and in UKIP’s case, funding from the EU itself, to gain exposure and build a base of political support. In the case of Germany, the success of the AfD can be attributed to its alignment with a salient issue, in this case monetary union, which was certainly of debate in the most recent EP elections.

Third, the success of Eurosceptic parties across the different typological groupings can be attributed in large part to country level factors. In Great Britain, UKIP was able to build political capital slowly, capitalizing on a long-standing ambivalence to Europe that dates back to its entrance to the EU. In Germany and France, by contrast, both parties took advantage of the absence of an anti-EU narrative in the political environment. By making themselves the default party for voters to express their EU attitudes, the FN and AfD were able to gain votes that may have otherwise not been cast. This is consistent with findings showing that mainstream parties hardly altered their stances in response to the euro crisis while over the same period of time, public perceptions of the EU deteriorated (Göncz 2013). One consequence of these divergent trends was that mainstream parties were less able to articulate citizens’ preferences, leaving an opening for Eurosceptic parties.

Conclusions

Confronted by a rising tide of Eurosceptic political power, scholars and policy makers attribute responsibility to two places, first, an absence of a common identity and public sphere to Gordon 25 promote discursive exchange, and second a lack of knowledge and understanding about the benefits of European public policy. In this analysis, I present evidence of party mobilization based primarily on perceptions of Europe and its institution, as well as a distinct use of the media to gain votes.

In my quantitative analysis of European media content, I find that the level of media coverage dedicated to the EU, its institutions and other EU-level topics is at minimum commensurate with that of other developed polities, thus debasing an argument about an insufficiency of media coverage, as some have claimed. I go further and analyze the relationship between public opinion and media coverage to better understand driving factors behind declining public support for European integration. I find attitudes on Europe are driven primarily by mood and political identity, and not by distinct policy outcomes or pure economic realities.

I turn to case studies to understand the connection between political parties and expressions of Euroscepticism. Across political parties, media preference, driven by charismatic party leaders, plays a large role in determining electoral outcomes. Furthermore, its clear that in the latest European election, large mainstream political parties did not move to capitalize on declining public opinion, leaving the door open to more fringe political parties.

Overall the media plays a substantive role, both as a second order effect in crafting frames for European citizens to view their own standing as well as enabling Eurosceptic parties to translate nascent attitudes into political power. Although media coverage in and of itself does not drive the rise of Eurosceptic opinions, it’s clear the use of the media and media preferences is key to understanding political performance.

Despite these conclusions, many questions still remain. Perhaps most compelling are the implications that this analysis has for the future of EU governance. It serves to mention that Gordon 26

Eurosceptic parties remain widely disparate and not united, neither rhetorically nor formally in one party block. In order for these parties to truly accomplish the goals laid out in their manifestos, they will need to unite politically in a way that has yet to be seen. Furthermore, the nationalist rhetoric of many parties, combined with the fundamental differences in attitudes between countries and parties makes such cooperation unlikely.

One practical effect of the election of Eurosceptic MEPs is that it may move the mainstream parties to adopt more centrist positions on the budget or in constitutional and institutional areas. They have no intention of involving themselves sufficiently in policy making to make any fundamental difference to the legislative process. Evidence to date shows that populist groups have a significantly lower cohesion rate than others, meaning they do not always vote in the same way, due to their ideological diversity and disorganization.

Questions also remain in the domestic politics of states where Eurosceptic parties performed well. As parties gain more exposure, and as European politics continue to play a larger role in national conversations, it’s possible that Eurosceptic voices will spread into national-level discussions. This is already evident to an extent in the domestic political crisis in

France following the success of the FN, and in Great Britain, which may exit the EU in 2017 following rising pressure on the Conservative government. Further research should investigate the link between electoral successes on the international level with changes in domestic policy.

What is clear is that Euroscepticism will not go away by being ignored. With the financial crisis yet unresolved, and major political parties unwilling to directly oppose Europe, there is a distinct opening in the European political sphere for smaller parties to capitalize on declining public sentiment. More than anything else, these parties will not compete on the Gordon 27 questions of what direction the European Union should take, but rather the larger question of what competences the European Union should have at all.

Gordon 28

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Appendix A: Eurosceptic Parties and Political Orientation

Country Party Political Orientation Austria Freedom Party R Belgium Flemish Block R National Front R Denmark People's Movement against the EU Anti-EU June Movement Anti-EU Socialist People's Party L Progress Party R Danish People's Party R Unity List L Finland Communist Party of Finland L True Finns Anti-EU Christian league R France Communist Party L Gordon 31

Lutte Ouvrière L Revolutionary Communist League L National Front (Le Pen) R Citizens Movement Anti-EU Movement for France R Rally for France and Independence of Europe R Germany Republicans R German People's Union R German National Democratic Party R Party of Democratic Socialists L Alternative For Germany Anti-EU Greece Communist Party L Democratic Social Movement L Political Spring R SYNapsimos L Ireland Green Party L Socialist Party L Sinn Fein L Italy Five Star Movement Anti-EU Northern League R National Alliance R Luxembourg Action Committee for Democracy and Pensioner's R Justice The Left L Netherlands Green Party L Socialist Party L Reformed Political Federation R Political Reformed Party R Reformed Political League R Portugal Communist Party L Greens L Sweden Green Party L Left Party L Centre Party R Social Democratic Party L United UK Independence Party Anti-EU Kingdom Conservative Party R Democratic Unionist Party R British National Party R

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Appendix B – Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Media Coverage of the EU in the EU15

Figure 2: Euroscepticism in the EU 15

Gordon 33

Table 1: Hard Factor Model

Euroscepticism B (CI) p -0.01 GDP Growth 0.097 (-0.01-0.00) Perceived 0.33 Economic 0.000 (0.17-0.49) Situation -0.01 Unemployment 0.177 (-0.03-0.01)

Observations 15 countries across 3 panels R2 / adj. R2 .41/.25

Table 2: Soft Factor Model

Euroscepticism

B (CI) p 0.24 Immigration 0.102 (-0.03-0.51) Exclusive National 1.08 0.447 Identity (-1.65-3.82) 1.36 European Identity 0.337 (-1.36-4.08) Observations 15 countries across 3 panels R2 / adj. R2 .16/.08

Table 3: Media Factor Model

Euroscepticism B (CI) p Negative Media -1.11 0.199 Coverage (-2.77-0.54) Total Media -1.66 0.032 Coverage (-3.10--0.22) 9.94 Interaction Term 0.038 (0.99-18.88) Observations 15 countries across 3 panels R2 / adj. R2 .18/.10

Gordon 34

Table 4: Total Model

Euroscepticism B (CI) p -0.01 (Intercept) 0.095 (-0.01-0.00) Percieved 0.55 Economic 0.000 (0.34-0.75) Situation 0.05 Unemployment 0.656 (-0.17-0.27) 2.11 Immigration 0.081 (-0.10-4.31) Exclusive National 2.69 0.024 Identity (0.58-4.80) -0.01 European Identity 0.242 (-0.04-0.01) Negative Media 1.22 0.213 Coverage (-0.62-3.05) Total Media 1.18 0.284 Coverage (-0.90-3.26) -4.22 Interaction Term 0.454 (-14.98-6.53) Observations 15 countries across 3 panels R2 / adj. R2 .73/.28

Table 5: Fixed Effects Summary by Country and Model. Colors indicate position relative to the mean

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Figure 3 : UKIP in the Media, data: http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/11/just-how-much-media- coverage-does-ukip-get

1 Ideally, I would be able to use an ordered Probit regression, to test for the likelihood of specific answers to the Eurobarometer questions across individuals. Because my independent variables are national-level aggregates, however, the panel analysis done at the country level is the most feasible. Future studies of individuals should assess their own media consumption and political participation in order to address this issue.

2 I preform a series of diagnostic tests to determine the appropriate model to utilize, and the validity of each successive model. First I run a Hausman test to determine whether or not a fixed or random effects model is appropriate. This tests whether the unique errors are correlated with the regressors. I find that they are, thus I use a fixed-effects model. I use a Bruesch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test to assess the need for time-fixed effects, and find that no time-fixed effects are needed. I use the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldrige test to test for the presence of serial correlation, and find that serial correlation is not present in my models. Finally, I use a Breusch- Pagan test to test for the presence of heteroskedasticy, and find no issues with any of my models. Additionally, I use complete panels for each year across all variables used, so there are no issues with missing data and thus reduced n.