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USIP – ADST Afghanistan Experience Project Interview #5 Executive Summary the Subject Served in Afghanistan from September

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USIP – ADST Afghanistan Experience Project Interview #5 Executive Summary the Subject Served in Afghanistan from September USIP – ADST Afghanistan Experience Project Interview #5 Executive Summary The subject served in Afghanistan from September 2003 until January 2004. He was a political advisor to the Joint Task Force 180 at Bagram airbase. From this vantage point he was able to observe the workings of the PRTs and to use the information they developed. The PRTs grew out of the CORDS experience in Vietnam. Changes and modifications were made to meet the Afghan environment. When the subject first arrived in Afghanistan there were four PRTs. The one at Mazar-e Sharif was manned by the British using SAS troops and headed by an experienced colonel. Subject felt that this was the best operation. Another was run by New Zealand forces in Central Afghanistan. The U.S. had two, both headed by lieutenant colonels. The primary task, at the time, was to help the newly appointed Karzai governors run their provinces. These governors had little in the way of support from the central government; they were short of staff, had little transport, communations equipment, or office supplies. Also there was a shortage of money to invest in the provinces. The PRTs helped fill in some of these gaps, often by acting as a liaison with the local U.S. military commanders who had transport, money, communications, and money, or with the UN, USAID or NGOs. While in Afghanistan subject saw the PRTs expand from four to sixteen. They gave the embassy a window into what was happening in the field. The effectiveness of the governors ran from good to bad. All were limited in what they could do because of small staffs and lack of governing tools. Much depended on the personality of the governor. Some were appointed for political reasons and were not judged by the Karzai government on their governing but on their political connections. Subject saw a major problem in the effectiveness of the PRTs because the State, Justice and Agriculture departments could not supply enough officers for the program. Often those recruited served only a short time and were not trained before they arrived. He noted that the Defense Department was running on a wartime basis and was funded as such, but the three civilian departments were not. These departments talked of war but were not given the funds to recruit and train officers as they had been during the Vietnam war. There was no Air America to get our people from one place to another, the PRTs had to rely on the kindness of the Army for transport. There was tension between some of the NGOs and the PRTs as the NGOs did not have the mobility and protection of the PRTs and often they had an instinctive aversion to the military. Two problems that were not fully addressed were drugs and the role of women in Afghanistan. These were major cultural and economic issues and the PRTs did have the resources or time to work on them. Subject felt that the embassy was not well structured to work with the PRTs, it was too traditional in it division into political, economic sections that did not work well with the PRTs. 2 United States Institute of Peace Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Afghanistan Experience Project Interview #5 Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: April 13, 2005 Copyright 2005 USIP & ADST Q: Can you tell me your connections to Afghanistan? A: Stu, I went to Afghanistan in early September of 2003 and served there until late January of 2004. I was assigned to the Combined Joint Task Force 180 based at Bagram Airbase, about 40 miles northwest of Kabul, and I was a political advisor to two CJTF- 180 commanders, both lieutenant generals. Q: What was the situation in Bagram? A: The situation in Bagram in September of 2003 was as follows. We had at that time, approximately 11,500 U.S. military under CJTF-180, and we had approximately 2,000 coalition forces, made up of troops from Romania, from the United Arab Emirates, from France, from Egypt, from South Korea, from Thailand and elsewhere. I think a total of seven or eight coalition allies, totaling 2,000. So we had a total of about 13,500 operating out of Bagram. Four months before I got there, in May of 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had visited Kabul, and he said, in May of 2003, during his visit to Kabul, that the military campaign in Afghanistan, in doctrinal terms, had now moved from phase three, which was decisive combat, to phase four, which was stability and reconstruction. So in his view, the emphasis henceforth, after May 2003, was to be on promoting stability and reconstruction. That was the lead priority, and the continuing counterinsurgency was the secondary, or reinforcing, priority. However, on the ground when I arrived in Bagram in early September 2003, the facts on the ground were the combating the insurgency was the primary preoccupation of CJTF- 180. They were just, four months after Rumsfeld’s pronouncement, in the process of pulling themselves together to make this shift. The focus of the counterinsurgency was against three groups. The first group was Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, and they are regarded as a strategic foe, because Al Qaeda operating in the eastern, south-eastern border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, was a foe who was not only attacking Afghanistan, but attacking Pakistan, attacking Saudi 3 Arabia, and they had a strategic aim to hurt the United States. So they were the strategic foe, and they were the best equipped, and they had the most tenacious fighters. The second foe of the three groups that we were fighting in the counterinsurgency was the Taliban. Again, we were dealing with remnants of the Taliban because the main forces had been thoroughly defeated earlier in ’01 and ’02. Nevertheless, they still persisted, they were still out there and in some provinces, particularly in places like Helmand and Uruzgan, and Kandahar and Kalak, in southern and southeastern Afghanistan, they were still a serious security problem. Many of their leaders had sought refuge in these very difficult border areas with Pakistan. The third foe we were fighting was the militia continuant, arms contingent of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who had been a former prime minister of Afghanistan in the civil war that followed the Soviet departure, and he was bitter foe of the United States, and he was based out of a refuge camp near Peshawar, in northern Pakistan. He operated north of Kabul, in Nangahar and Kunar, north and east, Nangarhar and Kunar provinces, and also in Kabul proper. Those were the three groups we were facing. We had a total of 13,500 U.S. and coalition forces operating out of Bagram. We had approximately six or seven different brigades. We had a Special Forces brigade, we had a light infantry brigade from the 10th Mount Infantry operating out of Kandahar, we had an aviation brigade, we had a medical brigade, we had an engineer brigade, we had a Civil Affairs Brigade. All of these diverse forces were part of this Combined Joint Task Force, supported by about 75 to 80 helicopters, transport helicopters, and Huey attack helicopters, plus we had an A10 Air Force squadron of 18 to 20 planes based at Bagram. This force was focused on the 11 provinces along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and that’s where the contacts with these three forces, Al Qaeda, Taliban, and the Hekmatyar forces, which were called HIG, that’s where these contacts were. The other two-thirds of the country we had very little U.S. and coalition presence. Finally, around Kabul, we had the NATO International Security Assistance Force, and they numbered about 5,500. As I mentioned, we had 75 to 80 helicopters for our 13,500 member force, they had 5,500 hundred people and four helicopters. So they had very little mobility. The Canadians, the Brits, the Turks, some French were down there, Poles were down there, some Spanish, Germans were there, and they rotated in and out, but they were a force which was charged with providing security for Kabul proper, and an area in the immediate vicinity of Kabul. The situation was, that in these 11 provinces along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, from Nangarhar in the northeast all the way down to Helmand and Nimruz in the south, there were constant series of operations going. In the other two-thirds of the country, the west, the center, the north, the issue there was trying to extend the presence of the central government in areas where warlords, militia warlords, left over from the civil war were still exerting primary control. That was the general situation. 4 Q: We want to concentrate on the… A: Provincial Reconstruction Teams? Sure. Q: Had that concept when you got out there been established, and what did it mean? A: Yes. The short answer is yes, the concept had been established, and this is what it meant. The Provincial Reconstruction Team concept was put together by three lieutenant colonels working out of CJTF, the Combined Joint Task Force up at Bagram, Army colonels, who were looking for a means to help extend central government presence and authority in the countryside, away from these border areas, now that the main Al Qaeda, Taliban and Hekmatyar forces had been defeated and somewhat dispersed. The big issue was extending the presence of the central government, and historically, in Afghanistan, there’s always been this tension between the central authority in Kabul and its ability to extend its writ out to the provinces.
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