Wielding the Spiritual Sword Again: Some Considerations on Neo
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IPT0010.1177/1755088214559926Journal of International Political TheoryKalpokas 559926research-article2014 Article Journal of International Political Theory 2015, Vol. 11(3) 296 –312 Wielding the spiritual sword © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: again: Some considerations on sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1755088214559926 neo-medievalism in modern ipt.sagepub.com international order Ignas Kalpokas University of Nottingham, UK Abstract This article traces the paradoxes within the modern international system, which is guided by liberal norms and values, in particular pertaining to human rights. This system is seen here as being ruled by an empty norm: power is present, but it is disembodied. Therefore, the entire international order is open to uses and abuses by the most powerful actors in the international sphere, especially the power states. Furthermore, when combined with the fact that the modern world has been completely appropriated by humanity as a universal integrated whole, whoever falls outside the dominant normative structure is, in effect, no longer even part of humanity. To analyse the means and effects of such tension between the universal and the particular, this article draws analogies with the medieval struggle between the secular and the religious authorities. It is argued that currently one can observe a return of the Respublica Christiana in the form of a rights-centred ‘international community’. And yet, contrary to earlier scholarly attempts to draw analogies with the Middle Ages, this return is seen here as a dangerous employment of political theology. Keywords Humanitarian intervention, human rights, political theology, sovereignty Introduction This article explores the contemporary tendencies in international relations through recourse to the medieval theories of the interrelationship between the religious and secular powers. This endeavour owes its basic conceptual–analytical framework to the Corresponding author: Ignas Kalpokas, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, Law and Social Sciences Building, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK. Email: [email protected] Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 Kalpokas 297 German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt. Indeed, his emphasis on political theol- ogy, resistance to universalising notions of humanity and attempts at historical explana- tion resonates with some of the important elements of this article. However, neither of Schmitt’s alternatives proposed throughout the years, such as Großräume (Schmitt, 2011), a new nomos of a new hegemon (Schmitt, 2003) or the partisan and a guarantor of the outside of the dominant order (Schmitt, 2007b) is espoused. To take Schmitt’s roman- ticised figure of the partisan as an example, it can no longer stand for the outside of the global order. It is getting increasingly difficult to establish the partisan’s authentic, ‘tel- luric’ nature. Who, after all, is fighting in Syria, Iraq or Eastern Ukraine? Similarly, the loose networks of international terrorism cannot be an alternative. Apart from those, one is left with some tyrannical regimes that have fallen out of favour, while other similar ones continue to flourish. In short, the outside is no longer a political outside, rather pure exception and needs to be conceptualised anew. Similarly, although possible affinities with medieval political order have already been proposed a rather long time ago (see primarily Bull, [1977] 2002), these theories are seen here as failing to explore the full implications of neo-medievalism. It is maintained that the modern international system is organised around a paradox: it is concrete yet lacking real embodiment, simultaneously universal and particular, all- encompassing and still resting on an outside. Such system allows creation of an absolute enemy, that is, the one who falls outside the dominant discourse is excommunicated and deprived of the status of a just opponent. The outsider here becomes a non-value, which could be easily disposed of (Burchard, 2006: 31). Such a situation is not new. In fact, we are currently observing a partial return to the medieval Respublica Christiana, a reli- giously organised order with universalist aspirations, not unlike the modern theologico- political approach to global governance. However, whereas previously universal jurisdiction was embodied in particular religious authorities, at present it is the rule of an empty norm. This difference, in turn, allows for exploitation of the universality of the international order. Therefore, a closer look at the interplay between discourse and prac- tice is needed. The universal order of the appropriated world The changing role of sovereignty is central. While the origins of international society lie in the society of monarchs who personalised their states, with the birth of popular sover- eignty, this equality was transferred to the state as such. This system of mutual recogni- tion by sovereigns (as persons or as peoples) still did not imply a common order but merely an awareness of sameness as well as factual and territorial separation – mutual construction of each other’s identity (Carty, 2007: 6). Such has been the practice at least since the twelfth century when mutual recognition introduced the understanding of a (more or less) inviolable territorial sovereignty, equal rights and independence in domes- tic matters (Pascua, 2008: 202), although a more formal understanding of territorial sov- ereignty (the so-called Westphalian system) did not develop until much later. Subsequently, the Westphalian system where the sovereign did not acknowledge any higher executive authority, legislator or judge (see, notably, Lauterpacht, 2000: 166) pre- vailed until the twentieth century. A modern alternative to it would be a ‘global society’ Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 298 Journal of International Political Theory 11(3) of which every human is directly a member. Especially after the Cold War, the latter appeared to be coming closer to reality in a world of states which are no longer supreme authorities but have a body of law and broader norms above themselves. As Koskenniemi (2004) stresses, ‘there is no representative of the whole that would not be simultaneously a representative of some particular’ (p. 199) and these particulari- ties lie behind any supposedly universal norm. Such a formation of meaning is very often discursive. It establishes the limits of acceptable practices and worldviews while other positions are discarded and reduced to, at best, empty speech, ‘destined to disappear without any trace’ (Foucault, 1991: 60). These formations also tend to manage the inclu- sion/exclusion of certain subjects and entire states, thus delimiting the boundaries of the ‘international community’. In the case of the modern ‘international community’, such practices have led to virtual replacement of politics with morality, at least on the discur- sive level (Hoover, 2012: 233) – there can no longer be significant disagreements about universal rules but instead an unquestionable ‘ought’ prevails. Whereas politics is open to any positions and generally discards finite conclusions, morality is always singular and final; moreover, it is always somebody’s morality. The danger is that when a group usurps the category of ‘humanity’, the opponent is deprived of the very possibility of being human and turned into an outcast, a beast, a monster (Bishai and Behnke, 2007: 110). Clearly, ‘[w]hen a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a uni- versal concept against its military opponent’ (Schmitt, 2007a: 54). Thus, a hierarchy of value and non-value is created, fostering conditions for discrimination, degradation and annihilation of the enemy without allowing neutrality: everyone must be either with or against humanity (Burchard, 2006: 31). The prevalence of humanity-centred discourse is not accidental. The modern world has supposedly been appropriated not by particular powers but by humanity in general. Technological changes and the shift of global power during the second half of the twen- tieth century (including decolonisation) meant that land which was formerly free for expansion and exploitation became part of the international system and of international law on its own right. And if the confrontation between the two superpowers during the Cold War still allowed for divisions and disagreements over the right world order, cur- rently, it is supposed, the world has become an increasingly integrated whole, fit for global cosmopolitan governance (see, for example, Archibugi, 1998, 2008, 2012; Beck, 2012; Giddens, 2003; Held, 2004, 2007, 2010). The problem here is that appropriation by entire humanity does not in reality abolish lines and divisions. On the contrary, these distinctions acquire new intensity because any lines drawn in a completely appropriated world signal a distinction between humanity and inhumanity. It is a world of states that have no rights unless those are temporarily granted from outside as a reward for good behaviour (Tesón, 2014: 394). Sovereignty then becomes an essentially secondary attrib- ute, one that is contingent upon the maintenance of ‘universal standards of global citizen- ship and responsibility’ (Toumayan, 2014: 11–12). And it is a task of the universal international community to protect