Wielding the Spiritual Sword Again: Some Considerations on Neo

IPT0010.1177/1755088214559926Journal of International Political TheoryKalpokas 559926research-article2014

Article

Journal of International Political Theory 2015, Vol. 11(3) 296–312 Wielding the spiritual sword © The Author(s) 2014 Reprints and permissions: again: Some considerations on sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1755088214559926 neo-medievalism in modern ipt.sagepub.com international order

Ignas Kalpokas University of Nottingham, UK

Abstract This article traces the paradoxes within the modern international system, which is guided by liberal norms and values, in particular pertaining to human rights. This system is seen here as being ruled by an empty norm: power is present, but it is disembodied. Therefore, the entire international order is open to uses and abuses by the most powerful actors in the international sphere, especially the power states. Furthermore, when combined with the fact that the modern world has been completely appropriated by humanity as a universal integrated whole, whoever falls outside the dominant normative structure is, in effect, no longer even part of humanity. To analyse the means and effects of such tension between the universal and the particular, this article draws analogies with the medieval struggle between the secular and the religious authorities. It is argued that currently one can observe a return of the Respublica Christiana in the form of a rights-centred ‘international community’. And yet, contrary to earlier scholarly attempts to draw analogies with the Middle Ages, this return is seen here as a dangerous employment of political theology.

Keywords Humanitarian intervention, human rights, political theology, sovereignty

Introduction This article explores the contemporary tendencies in international relations through recourse to the medieval theories of the interrelationship between the religious and secular powers. This endeavour owes its basic conceptual–analytical framework to the

Corresponding author: Ignas Kalpokas, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, Law and Social Sciences Building, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK. Email: [email protected]

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German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt. Indeed, his emphasis on political theology, resistance to universalising notions of humanity and attempts at historical explana- tion resonates with some of the important elements of this article. However, neither of Schmitt’s alternatives proposed throughout the years, such as Großräume (Schmitt, 2011), a new nomos of a new hegemon (Schmitt, 2003) or the partisan and a guarantor of the outside of the dominant order (Schmitt, 2007b) is espoused. To take Schmitt’s roman- ticised figure of the partisan as an example, it can no longer stand for the outside of the global order. It is getting increasingly difficult to establish the partisan’s authentic, ‘tel- luric’ nature. Who, after all, is fighting in Syria, Iraq or Eastern Ukraine? Similarly, the loose networks of international terrorism cannot be an alternative. Apart from those, one is left with some tyrannical regimes that have fallen out of favour, while other similar ones continue to flourish. In short, the outside is no longer a political outside, rather pure exception and needs to be conceptualised anew. Similarly, although possible affinities with medieval political order have already been proposed a rather long time ago (see primarily Bull, [1977] 2002), these theories are seen here as failing to explore the full implications of neo-medievalism. It is maintained that the modern international system is organised around a paradox: it is concrete yet lacking real embodiment, simultaneously universal and particular, all- encompassing and still resting on an outside. Such system allows creation of an absolute enemy, that is, the one who falls outside the dominant discourse is excommunicated and deprived of the status of a just opponent. The outsider here becomes a non-value, which could be easily disposed of (Burchard, 2006: 31). Such a situation is not new. In fact, we are currently observing a partial return to the medieval Respublica Christiana, a religiously organised order with universalist aspirations, not unlike the modern theologico- political approach to global governance. However, whereas previously universal jurisdiction was embodied in particular religious authorities, at present it is the rule of an empty norm. This difference, in turn, allows for exploitation of the universality of the international order. Therefore, a closer look at the interplay between discourse and practice is needed.

The universal order of the appropriated world The changing role of sovereignty is central. While the origins of international society lie in the society of monarchs who personalised their states, with the birth of popular sovereignty, this equality was transferred to the state as such. This system of mutual recognition by sovereigns (as persons or as peoples) still did not imply a common order but merely an awareness of sameness as well as factual and territorial separation – mutual construction of each other’s identity (Carty, 2007: 6). Such has been the practice at least since the twelfth century when mutual recognition introduced the understanding of a (more or less) inviolable territorial sovereignty, equal rights and independence in domestic matters (Pascua, 2008: 202), although a more formal understanding of territorial sovereignty (the so-called Westphalian system) did not develop until much later. Subsequently, the Westphalian system where the sovereign did not acknowledge any higher executive authority, legislator or judge (see, notably, Lauterpacht, 2000: 166) pre- vailed until the twentieth century. A modern alternative to it would be a ‘global society’

Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 298 Journal of International Political Theory 11(3) of which every human is directly a member. Especially after the Cold War, the latter appeared to be coming closer to reality in a world of states which are no longer supreme authorities but have a body of law and broader norms above themselves. As Koskenniemi (2004) stresses, ‘there is no representative of the whole that would not be simultaneously a representative of some particular’ (p. 199) and these particulari- ties lie behind any supposedly universal norm. Such a formation of meaning is very often discursive. It establishes the limits of acceptable practices and worldviews while other positions are discarded and reduced to, at best, empty speech, ‘destined to disappear without any trace’ (Foucault, 1991: 60). These formations also tend to manage the inclu- sion/exclusion of certain subjects and entire states, thus delimiting the boundaries of the ‘international community’. In the case of the modern ‘international community’, such practices have led to virtual replacement of politics with morality, at least on the discursive level (Hoover, 2012: 233) – there can no longer be significant disagreements about universal rules but instead an unquestionable ‘ought’ prevails. Whereas politics is open to any positions and generally discards finite conclusions, morality is always singular and final; moreover, it is always somebody’s morality. The danger is that when a group usurps the category of ‘humanity’, the opponent is deprived of the very possibility of being human and turned into an outcast, a beast, a monster (Bishai and Behnke, 2007: 110). Clearly, ‘[w]hen a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent’ (Schmitt, 2007a: 54). Thus, a hierarchy of value and non-value is created, fostering conditions for discrimination, degradation and annihilation of the enemy without allowing neutrality: everyone must be either with or against humanity (Burchard, 2006: 31). The prevalence of humanity-centred discourse is not accidental. The modern world has supposedly been appropriated not by particular powers but by humanity in general. Technological changes and the shift of global power during the second half of the twentieth century (including decolonisation) meant that land which was formerly free for expansion and exploitation became part of the international system and of international law on its own right. And if the confrontation between the two superpowers during the Cold War still allowed for divisions and disagreements over the right world order, currently, it is supposed, the world has become an increasingly integrated whole, fit for global cosmopolitan governance (see, for example, Archibugi, 1998, 2008, 2012; Beck, 2012; Giddens, 2003; Held, 2004, 2007, 2010). The problem here is that appropriation by entire humanity does not in reality abolish lines and divisions. On the contrary, these distinctions acquire new intensity because any lines drawn in a completely appropriated world signal a distinction between humanity and inhumanity. It is a world of states that have no rights unless those are temporarily granted from outside as a reward for good behaviour (Tesón, 2014: 394). Sovereignty then becomes an essentially secondary attrib- ute, one that is contingent upon the maintenance of ‘universal standards of global citizen- ship and responsibility’ (Toumayan, 2014: 11–12). And it is a task of the universal international community to protect and uphold the equally universal norms by any means necessary (McLoughlin, 2012: 142). The shift of attention from the international society of states and nations to the international society of humans is a fundamental change of paradigm, affecting the economy,

Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 Kalpokas 299 politics and security. The question of security is illustrative. It is well known that security has traditionally been the concern of states. States have been the prime objects of security and also the most important (and often sole) actors in security dilemmas. However, from the modern global standpoint, this is no longer true. Emphasis is now primarily on individual security, and therefore, military means are no longer in the spotlight. What now count are ‘economic, social and political conditions for people to lead a dignified life’ (Evans, 2005: 1), and if previously these conditions were achievable by domestic policies, in the modern globalised world, it is said, only the global level could fulfil the needs of the people (Evans, 2005: 1). Humans are supposed to now take centre stage themselves (see, for example, Kaldor, 2007, 2012; Kaldor et al., 2012; MacLean et al., 2006; Martin and Owen 2010; Stahn and Melber, 2014). Human security thus becomes a policy priority of a modern state – and not only the security of a state’s own citizens but the security of the entire humanity (Axworthy, 2012: 4–5). Correspondingly, the state is no longer seen as an end in itself, and therefore not a viable object of defence, but only an instrumental institution designed to facilitate human security (Weiss, 2012: 26). Furthermore, the boundaries of modern states are being erased by economic, environ- mental, cultural influences, technology and communication (Weiss, 2012: 15–16). Therefore, sovereignty as an enclosed totality is no longer seen as possible. In this inter- pretation, it becomes ‘some metaphysical or, better, theological conception of absolute identity’, incompatible with the modern world (Bates, 2012: 4). Ultimately, if previously the state only needed validation from within (its own people), then currently, its (il)legitimacy must be decided internationally according to some pre-set criteria of substantive justice (Tesón, 2014: 393). The international community and not the citizenry determines what order and disorder, legitimate use of force and oppression, good and bad governance are (Drayton, 2013: 226–227). The vital interest of the norm-centred international community is to be seen as embod- ying the interests of the entire humankind. Thus, it is not surprising that, as stated in the Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ‘all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage’ – clearly, more of a programme statement than verifiable reality. To go even further, the international community is being presented not merely as a community of subjects but also as an ensemble of norms, rules and practices (Fassbender, 2009: 66–69). It then seems fitting that devia- tion from universal norms is almost impossible or at least intolerable. As a result, what remains of sovereignty is the ‘capacity to engage’, that is, to maintain relations in the international system but not to act independently (Agnew, 2005: 441). Some attempts to historicise the modern condition reach as far back as the Antiquity. References are made to the Greeks and the Romans, citing their respect for otherness and the pronounced duty to protect foreigners (Glanville, 2012: 5). Alternatively, one could point to the Enlightenment, when ‘humanity’ was presented as an idea of absolute eman- cipation (Devetak, 2002: 175–176). The problem is that such attempts often pay little attention to the exact scope and definition of ‘humanity’ and the unavoidable variations in the understanding of the ‘duties’ owed to strangers, especially as far as religiously motivated accounts are concerned. In fact, a more useful exercise in understanding the modern international order would be looking for similarities with the Middle Ages. One of such attempts was made back in 1977 by Hedley Bull ([1977] 2002), for whom it

Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 300 Journal of International Political Theory 11(3) seemed likely that ‘sovereign states might disappear and be replaced not by a world government but by a modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal political organisation that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages’ (p. 245). Also, the theory goes, the very number of significant actors in the field of politics has grown, thus further dividing the loyalties of people who are no longer able to associate themselves wholly with one entity (Bull, [1977] 2002: 245–246). Similarly, in modern theories, sovereignty and political association are becoming disconnected. As a result, authority, power, terri- tory and loyalty are seen as transcending particular communities, producing new forms of dialogue and universal association based on deliberation and consensus (see, for example, Dryzek, 2010; Holzscheiter, 2014; Johnstone, 2011; Smith, 2011; Wheatley, 2011). Global consolidation of democracy would then appear to be a necessary precondi- tion to world peace. And yet, there is a need for caution, since the modern world is a rather perverse transmutation of the medieval order.

A vertical structure of authority A useful model for interpreting the tendencies of today can be found in the medieval struggle between the spiritual and the secular powers, especially in the attempts to establish the primacy of the former. From this perspective, the modern international system could be interpreted as centred around a new, quasi-religious, power, which is, nevertheless, disembodied, in stark contrast with its predecessor. Although it is impossible to account for the full medieval debate here, some parallels still have to be drawn. With the weakening and eventual fall of the Roman Empire in the West, religious power gained increasingly more autonomy vis-a-vis the secular one and finally became supreme ordering power. Since the Empire ceased to exist, religious authorities were no longer connected with the policies of a unified state but able to carry out their own agenda and exert their will over a fractured political landscape. Power was understood, then, as given by God who was not only the source of all authority but also the ultimate source of all norms; the religious normative order thus became the measure of rightness and everybody was under obligation to obey it (Jonas of Orléans, 1999: 218–220). The signifying structure became (more or less) strictly vertical. According to Honorius Augustodunensis (1999: 266), if the secular ruler disobeyed the divine order, he should be opposed and the prevalence of the higher law re-established. Even in the secular tradition, God himself was law (e.g. in Sachsenspiegel, an early Saxon legal code), and therefore law was seen as leading to salvation and the kingdom of God on earth (Berman, 1983: 521). Finally, whereas the secular normative order was extremely diverse and shared between authorities of many levels and kinds, the religious order was one (as far as Western Europe was concerned) and embodied in a single authority: the pope. The pope’s authority (auctoritas) was not a political or military power per se but a heavenly mandate to order, teach and correct for the own good of those concerned because other- wise they would perish (Bernard of Clairvaux, 1999: 273–274). On the other hand, force could still be wielded indirectly as the secular sword could be drawn against the enemies of faith (Bernard of Clairvaux, 1999: 276) on behalf of the spiritual one, with the secular ruler acting as a proxy agent of the religious power. This was a just war, intended to enforce the true faith and the supreme heavenly normative order. State law, on its own

Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 Kalpokas 301 part, was a punishment and remedy for sins (poena et remedii peccati) and a necessary consequence of the fallen human nature (see Douzinas, 2000: 58). At the same time, the state was subjected to natural law (the divine plan as observable in this world) and divine law (God’s very idea of things as they should be) (Douzinas, 2000: 58). This was a clear enhancement of the natural law, as defined in Corpus iuris civilis (where it was conflated with the law of nations) and Roman law in general, adding to it a clear moral dimension. This constituted the path to salvation, integrating both will and reason (Bauer, 2004: 205). Needless to say, such an overarching transcendent normative structure also enabled the creation of an absolute and existential enemy against whom a just war could be fought. One has to dwell on the notion of just war a little bit further. The formulation of just war theory, as a war fought to achieve peace, is mostly attributed to St Thomas Aquinas, although its roots date as far back as St Augustine (Brown, 2007: 57). For Augustine (1998), although peace was the desired state of affairs, war was the inevitable means to achieve it. War, even if it had to be lamented, was a just one if fought with the aim to spread a unified culture, norms and understanding as a bond for peace, at the same time implying that of the earthly cities, imperfect as they may be, there were some that could be seen as exemplary and worth emulation (Howard, 2010: 130–131). Diversity, therefore, had to be eradicated – by force if necessary. And if somebody had to be forced to comply or punished for not complying, it was only for the love of God and for the good of that neighbour that force is exerted (Howard, 2010: 132–133). Or else, one could turn to even earlier Church Fathers, for example, Eusebius of Caesarea, who allowed for just war by linking it with spreading harmony, culture and civilisation, and religion for the benefit of all until ‘the final conquest of the ends of the habitable world’ in an attempt to make the world ‘one well-ordered and united family’ (Eusebius of Caesarea, 1999: 58– 59). The dominance of ius ad bellum ensured that, contrary to popular imagination, in the Middle Ages, violence was not completely unbound, at least above the level of feudal skirmishes. And yet, in question is the position of those placed outside the Respublica Christiana, either temporarily (having violated the order) or permanently (such as pagans). Against them, violence was by definition justified and even restrictions on certain weaponry, applicable to intra-Christian conflicts, did not apply. Likewise, the modern enemy of humanity is placed outside the order and even the laws of war do not necessarily apply to struggles against such enemy (whereas inside the international community, even war itself has been outlawed). To a certain extent, then, one must agree with Agamben’s (1998) view of the camp as paradigm: the enemy is reduced to bare life in a permanent state of exception. That which is included through exclusion from the international community is reduced to an object of extraordinary measures without the right to defend oneself either juridically or militarily. On the discursive level, it might appear that the current international community, contrary to the Christian one, knows no borders and no otherness because there no longer are pagans or infidels who reject the true order. However, in a fully appropriated world, an exception – the outside of the law – is still created, albeit temporarily, as an instance. This is precisely the instance of potential just war and, therefore, instead of resulting in unity, a completely appropriated world only allows for new kinds of enemies. The question remains as to who decides on the inside and outside of the community (Rasch, 2003:

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141–142). Importantly, when action is taken against those deviating from a universal normative structure, this action is not war in the standard sense. It is first and foremost police action combating criminals and wrong-doers. The very possibility of distinguish- ing between war and peace is lost because the police do not sign peace treaties with criminals – the latter can only be apprehended and convicted or simply destroyed (De Benoist, 2007: 79). Judicial procedure may or may not be present (and it is increasingly absent even from domestic systems when threats to national security are concerned) but, ultimately, only one side is entitled to victory. As noted by Schmitt (2003), ‘To war on both sides belongs a certain chance, a minimum for possibility of victory. Once that ceases to be the case, the opponent becomes nothing more than an object of violent measures’ (p. 320). Therefore, the enemy must not be simply defeated – it must be eliminated in order to remove the threat to the righteous (De Benoist, 2007: 80–81). However, a question still remains: if the medieval order of the Respublica Christiana was based on religion as its unifying element, what is the political theology of the new world order? Probably the strongest political theology of the new order is the theology of human rights. Indeed, to claim something as a right is to make the strongest claim possible: to elevate the claim above any political contestation and above any authority (Koskenniemi, 2004: 208). Human rights are indeed deeply entrenched in international law with states being increasingly unable to hide behind the shield of sovereignty. Not surprisingly, the international community has reserved itself a possibility to inter- vene and enforce rights, especially because after the Cold War, the line between security and human rights has blurred (Forsythe, 2012: 57–58). In fact, the declarations of human rights and the whole body of international law relating to them have set the standard of humanity by establishing an authoritative, final and incontestable definition of human essence. Certainly, an objection can be made that there is a difference between a list of rights and a definition of essence. However, an authoritative right to something implies an essential human quality while an absence of a right or, at least, a lack of justiciability of a certain right denotes certain other human qualities as non-essential, if not absent. Essentially, ‘[t]he declaration of human rights is a judgment about man’ (Hamacher, 2006: 674–675), prescriptive rather than descriptive because it never refers to particular beings. As with any prescription, there always is a gap between the set ideal and reality. The question of real power is the question of who is able to frame that gap and decide what is to be done with it in each particular case. Furthermore, rights-based obligations also do not need to be legitimated – they only need the initial moment of belief to cover the closure of having no clear foundation in life. Indeed, they are manifestations of (secular) faith. And those who have the aforementioned power of control can definitely be called the new high clergy of this modern faith.

The rule of the void The interrelationship between the secular authorities and the representatives of transcendent universalism has never been simple. Ever since Gelasius I formulated the doc- trine of the two swords in the last years of the fifth century, an attempt at separating the spiritual and the secular always ended in an explicit or implicit postulation of supremacy of one or another (Hooker, 2009: 138). However, in practice, neither of them could exist

Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 Kalpokas 303 independently. The same impossibility of absolute separation holds today, since even the modern international law, international justice and the universal notion of humanity ‘has neither arms nor legs of its own, and therefore cannot operate if prostheses are not made available, namely the arms and legs of the states’ (Condorelli and Cassese, 2012: 16). In addition, the states are still the main actors that codify international norms in treaties, covenants and other agreements (Condorelli and Cassese, 2012: 15), even if they are no longer necessarily the sole actors that produce and initiate the norms. Paradoxically, the states are then simultaneously patres et filii (to adopt a formula from medieval imperial political theology) of the international order. This has two consequences: first, for the entire normative structure to hold, it must be believed in with quasi-religious devotion (so that its contingent and empty foundation is masked) and, second, it would be surprising if those powers (both state and non-state actors) who are actually able to shape and mould the normative structure did not do that in such a way as to further their own interests. Clearly, to proclaim oneself a representative of all is the same as not to represent any position whatsoever – both are equally impossible (Koskenniemi, 2012: 9–10). Quite clearly, in the modern worldview, the liberal international community has replaced the medieval Respublica Christiana. Also, just like the mystical body of Christian society, into which the Roman respublica had been transformed, made any constitutive part subservient to the whole of the Ecclesia (see Loughlin, 2010: 29), the new corpus mysticum of secular ‘humanity’ takes precedence to the parts that compose it. At the same time, the transcendent religious normative structure, upon which entire life, including the secular power, depended, has been replaced by an equally transcendent international normative structure based on rights. The main difference, however, is that while in the original theory the religious sword was attached to a particular holder, in the modern one, there is only the norm. Correspondingly, whereas the medieval religious normative structure was embodied by the religious establishment (sacerdotium), particularly in the pope in persona Ecclesiae, who conveyed and, in some cases, enforced the transcendent norm through the sacerdotium, the modern world order could be described as the rule of the sacerdotium-as-absence, that is, the transcendent norm is there but it is disembodied and dispersed. Of course, there exists a network of norms entrepreneurs that permeates all levels of the international community and there are some points of concentration, like the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc tribu- nals, human rights courts and so on. Human rights are also present in domestic structures, to a similar extent as secular rulers once observed religious principles. But this system still lacks a unified structure and, most importantly, a head, thus leaving a void for other actors (usually driven by their own particular interests) to fill. Also worth consideration is the status of law, which is once again more found than created, reminiscent to the law of pre-sovereign Medieval Europe, when the notions of the state and of the law-making authority had not yet been (fully) developed. Even when laws were made, they were usually based on previous custom (e.g. the Salic law of the Franks); similar understanding can also be found in the Decretum Gratiani, where the legislator has the function of protecting and developing the already existent body of law (see, generally, Harding, 2001: 192–193). Correspondingly, whenever the already existent body of law was transgressed, the rulers, in theory at least, lost their authority (Loughlin, 2010: 94), if not their power. In current terms, this is especially visible as far

Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 304 Journal of International Political Theory 11(3) as human rights are concerned. Notably, the very structure of the rights discourse pre- sents these rights as always already existent and therefore any new right is discovered rather than created, having previously been lost, unnoticed or neglected, and thus also valid retroactively. Here, one encounters what could be called a Munchhausen paradox: the whole international normative structure has to lift itself by its own hair. Furthermore, the sources of law are, just as in the medieval period, significantly mixed. In addition to the secular sources of law, there was and still is either the canon law of the Church or the transcendent norms of the ‘international community’/‘humanity’. In the Middle Ages, not only jurisdictions overlapped (i.e. the same cases could be referred to both authorities), and the same people often were simultaneously canon lawyers as well as ministers of secular justice, but also religious norms ‘influenced the secular world law both in terms of substantive legal principles and in the psychological overlap between law and morality’ (Musson, 2001: 13–14), either by transference or through preaching and teaching. In practice, this meant not only independence but also supremacy of the sacerdotium and particularly of the pope (Barber, 2004: 111). Now, as then, quasi- ecclesiastical human rights courts and the moral–political influence of transcendent norms prevail over national legislation. The new sacerdotium-as-absence is central to the formation of legal-normative consciousness and is the source of preaching. Fragmentation – yet another similarity – has been widely discussed by neo-medievalists. Definitely, the modern fragmentation is no longer in the form of oscillation between the ideal of the bonds of fidelity, based on one being ‘harmless, safe, honorable, useful, easy, possible’ (Fulbert of Chartres, 2010: 376) to the higher authority, on the one hand, and the brutal reality of treason and seizure of land (see, for example, Hugh of Lusignan, 2010: 377), on the other. What is important in this case is not only the diffusion of authority and loyalty, the ability of the people to identify themselves with a number of communities simultaneously without prioritising one or the other, so often stressed by the neo-medievalists, but first and foremost the shift of production of meaning from the national to the supra-national (and supra-political) level. As a result, the secular power’s fidelity to the transcendent supra-national order and to its earthly agents is vital to main- taining the security and integrity of the political body. As prescribed to the Frankish king Clovis by bishop Remigius after the former’s conversion to Christianity, ‘[y]ou should defer to your bishops and always have recourse to their advice. If you are on good terms with them your province will be better able to stand firm’ (Remigius of Reims, 2010: 129). Similarly, following the requirements of pope Gregory VII (2010c) to emperor Henry IV in the midst of the conflict between the imperium and the sacerdotium, a crucial element was to observe the ‘dutiful obligation’ of the earthly ruler to counsel the clergy in order to be ‘worthy of divine protection’ (p. 555). To put it in other terms, in a world of divided loyalties, fidelity can be ensured only by recourse to outside. Such is also the nature of sovereignty today. The ruler once had to fulfil the ideal of providing laws and justice as well as uphold universally commonsensical rationality (Galbert of Bruges, 2010: 383) and, most importantly, to be ‘lord and father, and advocate of the churches of God’ as well as ‘pious, gentle, compassionate, an honor to God and an orna- ment to the Church’ and constantly ‘seeking the justice of God and the welfare of those over whom he ruled’ (Galbert of Bruges, 2010: 385). One only needs to substitute the Church and God with humanity and human rights to get a perfect embodiment of the

Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 Kalpokas 305 modern discourse. In the meantime, just as the clergy had performed a crucial role in integrating the Christian community, today’s integration of ‘humanity’ is to a significant extent the work of the agents of the new sacerdotium-as-absence through universal production of meaning. Power having to be confirmed externally, with reference to the Respublica Christiana or ‘humanity’, removal from the universal – excommunication – is the ultimate punishment. An excommunicated person loses rights, protection, family and social ties, indeed the status of a person, and, most importantly, the chance of salvation (Helmholz, 2010: 373–374); admission of one’s mistakes and penitence then is the only way back (Bredero, 1994: 11). In the Middle Ages, excommunication of a secular ruler effectively meant the loss of authority (if not necessarily power) to command and severance of all ties of obligation. As stated by pope Gregory VII (2010a) in his excommunication of Henry IV,

I deprive King Henry […] who has rebelled against the Church […], of the government over the whole kingdom of Germany and Italy, and I release all Christian men from the allegiance which they have sworn or may swear to him. (p. 557)

There is, of course, a possibility to be reinstated to the Christian community (and, correspondingly, to legitimate power) if he repents (Gregory VII, 2010a: 560). In the meantime, however, the authorities of the Empire were urged to save the Church ‘from the jaws of the wolf’ with the promise of salvation if they do so (Gregory VII, 2010b: 561). Clearly, excommunication was primarily a spiritual punishment, loss of salvation, and Gregory VII was not an impartial actor but had an interest in twisting excommunication to as much political benefit as possible. But the Example of Gregory VII and Henry IV is, nevertheless, particularly illustrative of the potential of excommunication since it caused a significant weakening of the emperor’s position, leading him to humiliating repentance at Canossa. Ultimately, struggle against the power that had lost divine sanc- tion was not only necessary but also holy. If this meant resort to war, such war was undoubtedly just. Needless to say, such just war against an outcast of the ‘international community’ is the cornerstone of humanitarian intervention or, in more recent renditions, Responsibility to Protect, or support to various ‘rebel’ groups fighting outcast ‘regimes’. The international normative structure has to be enforced and policed so that its emptiness is not disclosed. Meanwhile, as long as the entire international community complies with it, the entire normative structure becomes real through its own effects, as if it was constantly being created ex nihilo. But, yet again, it is a process of creation which has no cause outside itself, no prime mover and even no stirring hand, which would transcend any particularity. It persists as long as it serves the interests of those temporal forces, powerful enough to uphold it, to maintain it. Therefore, a logical consequence of both the elimination of the national level and the rule of an all-encompassing normative system is the right of the international community to remove certain heads of state and/or to change the regime in general. And yet, the emptiness of the new sacerdotium-as-absence allows selective framing and the possibility of presenting any action as affirming the prevailing order, be it intervention or a mere attempt to mask passivity, as the difference between Libya (assistance in overthrowing a regime) and Syria (agreement to destroy chemical weapons as a ‘success’) shows. In essence, with the advent of a disembodied normative

Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 306 Journal of International Political Theory 11(3) structure, power determines the conditions of its own usage or non-usage (Cunliffe, 2010: 80-81). Also, the attempt by the ‘international community’ to eliminate war as such has to be taken into account. Indeed, already between the two world wars such attempts were made within the League of Nations and beyond. However, this elimination is particularly clear in the modern world order, where legal ‘war’ is non-existent. What do exist are the various sorts of self-defence, either as the right of a state to defend itself (Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter) or as a right of the international community (understood as humanity) to take action (conferred generally on the UN Security Council by Chapter VII of the UN Charter). Other conflicts are either various forms of civil unrest or skirmishes outside or on the outskirts of the civilised world. The issue is that the prohibition of war only means the prohibition of unjust war (Schmitt, 2003: 274). When a justa causa exists, war is allowed and even supposed to take place, albeit under a differ- ent name. As a result, the criminalisation of war does not apply to those who have the power or naming, who are able to present their wars under ‘acceptable’ names, humanitarian intervention and Responsibility to Protect being some of them. The ‘inherent soundness and justice’ of these concepts (Arbour, 2008: 453) are then merely means for furtherance of particular interests of the few. Even when a formal permission of the international community is not granted, righteous wars under the guise of police action are still being fought – one only needs to remember Kosovo or Iraq. As a result, what hap- pens is not the elimination of war but the monopolisation of legitimate use of force. To that extent, ius ad bellum is equally important as ius in bello in the modern world order. In the Middle Ages, both the imperium and the sacerdotium struggled within the same Respublica Christiana and essentially within the same theologico-political framework – this was not yet a struggle between the state and the church as clearly separable entities (Loughlin, 2010: 32), not least because the state as such was still in the making. Today, the state and the international normative order are hardly more separable, this time because of the decline of state sovereignty – the process is going full circle. And yet, as long as the universal order was embodied by a certain authority, at least there was a concrete opponent for the secular rulers to struggle against. It was still, in some ways at least, a political struggle. However, when the sacerdotium is disembodied, a struggle is possible only against the world order as such. Therefore, not only the modern world order is more prone to abuse but also any fundamental conflict involving its essence is poten- tially more dangerous and destructive. In a completely appropriated world, ‘humanity’ as such exercises a form of self-defence against its enemy. This is certainly true at least in terms of rhetoric. Of course, the locus of restraining power could be found in the UN Security Council, keeping in mind that Article 24 of the UN Charter explicitly stresses that the members of the organisation ‘confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf’. This is probably the closest that the universal humanity gets to a concrete embodiment. But even then, this embodiment is more often known for being a playground of particular, rather than universal, interests (see, among many others, Binder and Heupel, 2014; Bourantonis, 2005; Fassbender, 2011; Graubart, 2013; Roberts and Zaum, 2008). Definitely, the sacerdotium was never pure either and there have been numerous counts of secular rulers

Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 Kalpokas 307 having substantial influence even on the election of the pope. And yet, there still was at least a distinction between the two powers, and the sacerdotium, for the most part, still enjoyed autonomy. However, in the UN Security Council, the secular world of sovereignty and the quasi-religious international community reach a point of indistinction, where one is simultaneously the other, manifesting what Mendes (2014) has recently called a ‘tragic flaw’. Furthermore, when conflicts between the two arise in the UN Security Council, sovereignty prevails, leaving the Council at an impasse. Then, as the cases of Kosovo and Iraq show, the role of the protector of ‘humanity’ can still be usurped by a ‘coalition of the willing’ when state interests dictate. Yet again, it is apparent that the restraining force is open to abuse due to a lack of its own exclusive embodiment. In this sense, the rights-based community is a weapon in sovereignty’s arsenal to the extent that the Church rarely – if ever – was. To reiterate, when the entire world has been appropriated, the system depends upon temporary zones of exception that appear or are created and then either eradicated or kept as a perpetual reminder of the outside, for example, Libya (eradicated) and Iran (kept). Usually, escalation and the ability to contrast the own and the alien is enough to exert and maintain influence as well as to integrate the ‘own’ camp more closely. These exceptions both confirm the validity of the international system and often also provide a source of threat against which the global community has to be defended. In short, the status quo has to be contrasted with an inferior otherness in order to be constituted as worth protecting. This protection, in turn, is primarily the field of power: as summed up by Morgenthau (1985), ‘[t]he policy of the status quo aims at the maintenance of the distribution of power which exists at a particular moment in history’ (p. 53). However, the legitimacy and appeal of the status quo can be maintained only through the attachment of the ‘noble cause’ of the international community or society. Openly arbitrary action is unacceptable – it must appear legitimate instead. In this case, power resorts to perhaps the strongest legitimation of all – legitimation through faith. Definitely, all obligations – not just those of Human Rights – are based on faith. One must believe in the unquestionable reality and authority of a claim. But the objection here is that Human Rights obligations are por- trayed and perceived as grounded in universally uniform life and constitute an essence of human beings, leaving no outside, no possibility of a struggle between faiths or, at least, of Reformation (or atheism for that matter).

Conclusion The current international system, being a manifestation of the new order of a completely appropriated world, postulates the unity and integrity of a universalised humanity; nevertheless, it still needs an outside to affirm itself: ‘rogue states’, ‘axes of evil’, ‘tyrants’ and so on, which either retain their sovereignty as a perpetual reminder, thus remaining in the ‘international community’ as its negative side, or are effectively excommunicated and face humanitarian intervention, sanctions or other similar action. Such system is open to uses and misuses by those able to redefine the constitutive outside and thus use diplomatic, economic and military power according to their own interests in order to restrain the outside of humanity when it is expedient to have one. The rule and institu- tionalisation of bare norm and singular rationality help to maintain the status quo and

Downloaded from ipt.sagepub.com by guest on September 4, 2015 308 Journal of International Political Theory 11(3) further stigmatise the outsiders. Thus, a clear distinction is drawn between meaning and non-meaning, those who are capable of having a voice and those who are not. It is here that one can speak of the new sacerdotium-as-absence: the prevalence of transcendent international norms that govern the international community but lack the embodiment once enjoyed by the (supposedly) universal church. As such, the norms could both be claimed to be more objective (seemingly disconnected from any particularity) and be misused more readily (anyone with sufficient power can claim to be the medium through which humanity speaks). Also, any struggle against the sacerdotium-as-absence is much more difficult because that would be a struggle against humanity and reason. Indeed, Koskenniemi (2012) appears to be correct when urging caution ‘with those who speak in the name of humanity and try to impose any particular order on the world’ (p. 3). This logic of universality comes close to the old understanding of ‘standard of civilisation’ that Western countries used in order to defend their imperialist aspirations. Therefore, one could notice (more or less) the same set of players persisting during the previous centuries, only that ‘with the secularization of the Christian mission comes also the secularization of the Christian missionary, who still shows his brotherly love by exerting brotherly correction’ (Rasch, 2003: 138). As a matter of fact, such a structure could barely be seen as retaining neutrality. A parallel with the medieval Respublica Christiana is illustrative. Admittedly, think- ing in analogies is dangerous because important details can be lost and changes over time not accounted for. Therefore, only basic structural similarities can be assumed. The modern international community cannot be a replica of the old order because the circum- stances have changed. Indeed, the crucial difference is the disembodied nature of the new sacerdotium-as-absence. And yet, in a sense, we have come a full circle: from nascent sovereignty and universal community to an apotheosis of sovereignty and back to weakening sovereignty and a new international community. Thus, there is a repetition but a repetition with a difference, a sort of ‘perverse’ repetition due to its arbitrariness and reduction of the enemy to bare life (see Agamben, 1998). A much longer study would be needed to assess the full historical development of the international order as well as developments within the Respublica Christiana itself (since it changed throughout the Middle Ages). But for the time being, some core structural similarities can already be assumed.

Acknowledgements A draft of this article was first presented at the 2013 Political Studies Association Annual Conference in Cardiff. The author would like to thank the participants for their constructive com- ments. The author is also grateful to dr. J. D. Mininger (Vytautas Magnus University) for his advice on early drafts as well as the anonymous reviewers for their useful insights. All errors and omissions are the author’s own.

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Author biography Ignas Kalpokas is currently PhD candidate at the University of Nottingham. His is particularly interested in the history and contemporary problems of sovereignty, political identities, and the interrelationship between law and politics. He also researches cyber security and social media.

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