Making the 1973 Oil Crisis
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Blowout in the Gulf: the BP Oil Spill Disaster and the Future of Energy in America
UCLA Electronic Green Journal Title Blowout in the Gulf: The BP Oil Spill Disaster and the Future of Energy in America Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1ps043ht Journal Electronic Green Journal, 1(32) Author Ferrara, Enzo Publication Date 2011 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Review: Blowout in the Gulf: The BP Oil Spill Disaster and the Future of Energy in America By William R. Freudenburg and Robert Gramling Reviewed by Enzo Ferrara L'Istituto Nazionale di Ricerca Metrologica, Italy Freudenburg, William R. and Gramling, Robert. Blowout in the Gulf. The BP Oil Spill Disaster and the Future of Energy in America. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2011. 240 pp., 5 graphs. ISBN: 9780262015837.US$18.95, cloth. On April 20th 2010, eleven oil workers died as the Deepwater Horizon, a gigantic offshore plant rented by BP to drill deep in the Gulf of Mexico, exploded and, after burning for 36 hours, sank, causing an uncontrolled eruption of oil one mile below the sea level. Oil poured out at a rate of 56,000 barrels per day, until July 15th, causing one of the largest marine disasters in the history – second only to Saddam Hussein’s intentional opening the oil spigots as his forces retreated from Kuwait in 1991 – and frustrating the hopes of the Gulf residents, reassured in vain by BP and the government of a quick solution of the spill. Just like the complexity of its assessment, the magnitude and duration of the Gulf disaster were distinctive, due to its wide-reaching and prolonged impact in the region associated with the extensive use of dispersants. -
The Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition and the Middle East
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Rowley, Robin; Bichler, Shimshon; Nitzan, Jonathan Working Paper The Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition and the Middle East Working Papers, Department of Economics, McGill University, No. 10/89 Provided in Cooperation with: The Bichler & Nitzan Archives Suggested Citation: Rowley, Robin; Bichler, Shimshon; Nitzan, Jonathan (1989) : The Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition and the Middle East, Working Papers, Department of Economics, McGill University, No. 10/89, The Bichler and Nitzan Archives, Toronto, http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/134/ This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/157847 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an -
Britain, British Petroleum, Shell and the Remaking of the International Oil Industry, 1957-1979
Empires of Energy: Britain, British Petroleum, Shell and the Remaking of the International Oil Industry, 1957-1979 Author: Jonathan Robert Kuiken Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104079 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2013 Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. Boston College The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of History EMPIRES OF ENERGY: BRITAIN, BRITISH PETROLEUM, SHELL AND THE REMAKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY, 1957-1979 [A dissertation by] JONATHAN R. KUIKEN submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy August, 2013 © copyright by JONATHAN ROBERT KUIKEN 2013 Empires of Energy: Britain, British Petroleum, Shell and the remaking of the international oil industry, 1957-1979 Jonathan R. Kuiken Dissertation Advisor - James E. Cronin Dissertation Abstract This dissertation examines British oil policy from the aftermath of the Suez Crisis in 1956-1957 until the Iranian Revolution and the electoral victory of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party in 1979. It was a period marked by major transitions within Britain’s oil policy as well as broader changes within the international oil market. It argues that the story of Britain, and Britain’s two domestically-based oil companies, BP and Shell, offers a valuable case study in the development of competing ideas about the reorganization of the international oil industry in the wake of the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries and the companies’ losing control over the production of oil. -
The 1973 Oil Embargo Arab Oil Diplomacy
Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Master's Theses Graduate College 12-1980 The 1973 Oil Embargo Arab Oil Diplomacy Amal Mustafa Shamma Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses Part of the International Law Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Shamma, Amal Mustafa, "The 1973 Oil Embargo Arab Oil Diplomacy" (1980). Master's Theses. 1930. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/masters_theses/1930 This Masters Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE 1973 OIL EMBARGO ARAB OIL DIPLOMACY Amal Mustafa Shamma A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of The Graduate College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science Western Michigan University Kalamazoo, Michigan December, 1980 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE 1973 OIL EMBARGO ARAB OIL DIPLOMACY Araal Mustafa Shamma, M.A. Western Michigan University, 1980 1 The Arah oil producing countries, following years of a stalemate in the Arab-Israeli dispute,- decided to put their oil resource in the service of the Arab cause using it as an instrument of pressure against the West. Their objective was to induce a change in the Western world Middle East policy and to work toward achieving a lasting and peaceful solution for the Arab-Israeli problem. The purpose of this thesis is to show that the ap plication of Arab oil diplomacy has been effective into producing a more even handed policy in the area, and into breaking the deadlock in the search for peace. -
Egyptian Foreign Policy (Special Reference After the 25Th of January Revolution)
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PÚBLICO Y RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES TESIS DOCTORAL Egyptian foreign policy (special reference after The 25th of January Revolution) MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTORA PRESENTADA POR Rania Ahmed Hemaid DIRECTOR Najib Abu-Warda Madrid, 2018 © Rania Ahmed Hemaid, 2017 UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID Facultad de Ciencias Políticas Y Socioligía Departamento de Derecho Internacional Público y Relaciones Internacionales Doctoral Program Political Sciences PHD dissertation Egyptian Foreign Policy (Special Reference after The 25th of January Revolution) POLÍTICA EXTERIOR EGIPCIA (ESPECIAL REFERENCIA DESPUÉS DE LA REVOLUCIÓN DEL 25 DE ENERO) Elaborated by Rania Ahmed Hemaid Under the Supervision of Prof. Dr. Najib Abu- Warda Professor of International Relations in the Faculty of Information Sciences, Complutense University of Madrid Madrid, 2017 Ph.D. Dissertation Presented to the Complutense University of Madrid for obtaining the doctoral degree in Political Science by Ms. Rania Ahmed Hemaid, under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Najib Abu- Warda Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Information Sciences, Complutense University of Madrid. University: Complutense University of Madrid. Department: International Public Law and International Relations (International Studies). Program: Doctorate in Political Science. Director: Prof. Dr. Najib Abu- Warda. Academic Year: 2017 Madrid, 2017 DEDICATION Dedication To my dearest parents may god rest their souls in peace and to my only family my sister whom without her support and love I would not have conducted this piece of work ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Acknowledgments I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Prof. Dr. Najib Abu- Warda for the continuous support of my Ph.D. -
NEPA Exemptions, Tragic Results the Devastating 1969 Blowout and Oil
NEPA Exemptions, Tragic Results The devastating 1969 blowout and oil spill at the Union Oil platform Santa Barbara Channel was one of the worst environmental disasters in the nation’s history, and is widely regarded as one of the events that impelled the passage of NEPA in 1970. Alas, we don’t always learn from our mistakes. In response to the energy crises of the 1970s, the U.S. undertook to dramatically increase domestic oil production, which, unfortunately, enshrined exemptions to NEPA for the central and western Gulf of Mexico. The 1978 Amendment to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act required fast- tracked approvals of exploration plans and: “expressly singles out the Gulf of Mexico for less rigorous environmental oversight under NEPA. As a result of political compromise with oil and gas interests, the Act exempts lessees from submitting development and production plans (which include environmental safeguards) for agency approval. Accordingly, Gulf leases, unlike those applicable to other offshore areas, are not subject to the requirement of at least one NEPA environmental impact statement for development plans for a particular geographic area.” (BP Oil Spill Commission Report, page 80) The Interior Department went even further: “In January 1981, the Department promulgated final rules declaring that exploration plans in the central and western Gulf of Mexico were ‘categorically excluded’ from NEPA review” (page 81), and though it later allowed for NEPA reviews in certain circumstances, that was the exception rather than the rule. As a result, the Minerals Management Service “performed no meaningful NEPA review of the potentially significant adverse environmental consequences associated with its permitting for drilling of BP’s exploratory Macondo well” (page 82) or subsequent drilling permits, and therefore one of their plans “carefully considered site-specific factors relevant to the risks presented by the drilling of the Macondo well” (page 83). -
Poisoned by Gas: Institutional Failure, Energy Dependency, and Security
POISONED BY GAS: INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE, ENERGY DEPENDENCY, AND SECURITY EMILY J. HOLLAND SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2017 © 2017 EMILY J. HOLLAND ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ABSTRACT POISONED BY GAS: INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE, ENERGY DEPENDENCY, AND SECURITY EMILY J. HOLLAND Many states lack domestic access to crucial energy supplies and must deal with the challenge of formulating an energy security policy that informs their relations with energy producing states. While secure and uninterrupted access to energy is crucial to state security and welfare, some states fail to implement energy security policies and remain dangerously dependent on a foreign supplier. In the post-Soviet region many states even actively resist attempts by the European Union and others to diversify their supplies. Why and under what conditions do states pursue energy security? Conversely, why do some highly dependent states fail to maximize their security vis-à-vis a dominant supplier? I argue that that to understand the complex nature of energy dependence and security it is necessary to look beyond energy markets to domestic political capture and institutional design. More specifically, I argue that initial reform choices guiding transition had long-lasting affects on the ability to make coherent policy choices. States that did not move away from Soviet era property rights empowered actors with an interest in maintaining the status quo of dependence. Others that instituted de facto democratic property rights to guide their energy transitions were able to block energy veto players and move towards a security maximizing diversification policy. -
Success Story
VAM ® BOLT-II selected by LUKOIL for its Caspian Sea well Overview SUCCESSSUCCESS LUKOIL-Nizhnevolzhskneft has chosen Vallourec to deliver its VAM ® BOLT-II solution with a large (18") outer diameter for the STORY Caspian Sea Khazri-2 well. In February, its high performance levels were proven when the VALLOUREC connection was successfully deployed with zero reject on a Neptune jack-up drilling rig. Technical Sales Manager in Russia, Ukraine, CIS, Andrei Motovilin talks us through each step of this success story. "We are particularly proud SEPT. 2020 of this success. LUKOIL- Nizhnevolzhskneft is one of our key customers developing some of the most complex Challenge The VAM® BOLT-II solution has a double- start thread design and make-up is quick offshore oil fields and wells." and easy — it saves platform installation Andrei Motovilin The most recent design-improved Technical Sales Manager in Russia, Ukraine, CIS time and make for perfect connection to generation of VAM® flush connections large bore subsea well heads. "We were gives higher torque capacity and able to deliver on time and, by working outstanding performance. Vallourec hand in hand with Lukoil, run perfectly supplied LUKOIL with 5 casing strings our VAM® BOLT-II solution, demonstrating and 345 tons of VAM® BOLT-II as well as operational product performance with zero accessories such as lifting and handling rejection." said Andrei Motovilin. circulation head. A complex well LUKOIL-Nizhnevolzhskneft, is a LUKOIL has been especially 0.64 inches with a maximum make- wholly owned subsidiary of LUKOIL technically demanding, as the up torque not exceeding 109.9 klb and specializes in oil and gas field nearest gas formation was at per ft. -
The BP Blowout: What the Evidence Reveals | Kvue.Com | KVUE News
9/9/2010 The BP blowout: What the evidence re… The BP blowout: What the evidence reveals by Dave Fehling/11 News Posted on September 9, 2010 at 11:46 AM HOUSTON -- The report BP released on its website Wednesday morning is the company’s version of the events that led to the Deepwater Horizon blowout, but the 11 News I-Team has been sifting through evidence gathered by a more objective source. That is the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation, the ongoing effort by the U.S. Coast Guard and the new Bureau of Ocean Energy, Management and Enforcement (BOEMRE). For months now, Houston-based employees have been grilled by government investigators in sometimes tense exchanges. There have been hundreds of hours of testimony given and thousands of pages of internal documents and e-mails gathered. Some of the testimony has been dramatic, some of the documents revealing, but does any of it yet show one clear-cut cause, a “smoking gun?" Congressman Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) was quick to pounce on one e-mail that he said showed BP’s corporate attitude to "cut corner after corner" to save time and money -- proof, he said, of what led to the disaster. Written by BP engineer Brett Cocales in Houston just four days before the rig exploded, the e-mail is about the debate they were having over what some say were shortcuts taken in drilling the well. Cocales wrote: “But who cares, it's done, end of story, will probably be fine and we’ll get a good cement job." In testimony, August 27th, Cocales told investigators, "I did write: but who cares, it's done, end of story." But far from proof of a “who cares” attitude, Cacales’s lawyer, Philip Hilder, told the 11 kvue.com/…/The-BP-blowout-What-th… 1/3 9/9/2010 The BP blowout: What the evidence re… News I-Team that the e-mail was taken out of context. -
Well Blowout Rates and Consequences in California Oil and Gas District 4 from 1991 to 2005: Implications for Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide
Well Blowout Rates and Consequences in California Oil and Gas District 4 from 1991 to 2005: Implications for Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide Preston D. Jordan and Sally M. Benson P. D. Jordan (&) Earth Sciences Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA e-mail: [email protected] S. M. Benson Department of Energy Resources Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA Abstract Introduction Well blowout rates in oil fields undergoing Migration up abandoned and active wells is thermally enhanced recovery (via steam considered to pose perhaps the greatest risk of injection) in California Oil and Gas District 4 leakage for geological storage of CO2 (Gasda et from 1991 to 2005 were on the order of 1 per al. 2004; Benson et al. 2005). Well blowouts are 1,000 well construction operations, 1 per 10,000 formally defined as ‘‘the uncontrolled flow of active wells per year, and 1 per 100,000 shut- well fluids and/or formation fluids from the well in/idle and plugged/abandoned wells per year. bore to the surface (surface blowout), or into This allows some initial inferences about leakage lower-pressured subsurface zones (underground of CO2 via wells, which is considered perhaps blowout; Hauser and Guerard 1993).’’ The the greatest leakage risk for geological storage of ‘‘Underground geological storage’’ chapter in CO2. During the study period, 9% of the oil the IPCC special report on carbon dioxide produced in the United States was from District capture and storage (Benson et al. 2005) 4, and 59% of this production was via thermally concluded that the local risks of geological CO2 enhanced recovery. -
The 1973 Oil Crisis by Sarah Horton
The 1973 Oil Crisis By Sarah Horton In October of 1973 Middle-eastern OPEC nations stopped exports to the US and other western nations. They meant to punish the western nations that supported Israel, their foe, in the Yom Kippur War, but they also realized the strong influence that they had on the world through oil. One of the many results of the embargo was higher oil prices all throughout the western world, particularly in America. The embargo forced America to consider many things about energy, such as the cost and supply, which up to 1973 no one had worried about (Spiegelman). In order to understand the main cause of the oil crisis one must first know the history of the region and the Arab- Israeli conflict. World War II a Zionist state, known as Israel, was created on 56% of the land that was formerly known as Palestine. This state served as a homeland for Jews. The local Arabs were enraged by the fact that the Palestinian land had been taken to create this state. They refused to acknowledge Israel as an independent state. The Arabs began to launch efforts to recapture the land that they felt was rightfully theirs. This created the Suez-Sinai War. The British and the French sided with the Israelis in order to punish Nasser for nationalizing the Suez Canal. The strong Israeli military forces quickly defeated the Arabs. The Arabs responded to this defeat by uniting. In 1967 Israel launched the Six-Day War, claiming much land. In 1973 Arab forces retaliated. On Yom Kippur, the holiest Jewish holiday, Arab forces attacked, backed by Soviet technology (The Mid-east Oil Crisis). -
Company Policy on Sustainable Development
APPROVED BY Rosneft Board of Directors On 7th of November, 2017 Minutes dated 7th of November, 2017 No. 4 Effective as of 7th of December, 2017. By Order dated 7th of December, 2017 No. 760 COMPANY POLICY ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT No. P3-09 P-01 VERSION 2.00 MOSCOW 2017 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................................... 2 INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS ....................................................................................................................... 3 PURPOSE 3 SCOPE 3 VALIDITY AND AMENDMENT PROCEDURE .......................................................................................................... 3 1. TERMS AND DEFINITION ......................................................................................................................... 5 2. DESIGNATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. 7 3. GENERAL PROVISIONS ........................................................................................................................... 8 3.1. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY GOALS OF THE COMPANY ..................................................... 8 3.2. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT TASKS ........................................................................................................ 8 3.3. PRINCIPLES OF THE COMPANY’S ACTIVITY IN THE AREA OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ........... 8 4. CORE AREAS