Preventing Nuclear Entrepreneurship in Russia's Nuclear Cities

Preventing Nuclear Sharon K. Weiner Entrepreneurship in Russia’s Nuclear Cities Since September 11, 2001, concern about an attack on the United States by terrorists using a stolen nuclear warhead or an improvised radiological weapon—a “dirty bomb”—has risen dramatically. In discussions about this threat, Russia is frequently men- tioned as the most likely source of black-market nuclear skills and materials. In its 2002 report to Congress, for example, the National Intelligence Council noted that Russia’s nuclear security measures are still primarily oriented to- ward external threats and “are not designed to counter the pre-eminent threat faced today—an insider who attempts unauthorized actions.”1 Reports of Rus- sian weapons experts sharing their knowledge with other countries have also proliferated.2 Whether through scientiªc exchange visits, conferences, or email, Russian nuclear experts may be sharing sensitive information with others. Al- though many of these reports are anecdotal and few have been rigorously doc- umented since the early 1990s, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has consistently reported to Congress its suspicions that Russian scientists are 3 helpingPreventing Nuclear Entrepreneurship in Russiaforeign countries pursue nuclear weapons development programs. The nuclear experts of most concern are those living in Russia’s ten “nuclear cities,” which in the late 1980s employed an estimated 150,000 people in Sharon K. Weiner is a Research Associate at the Program on Science and Global Security in Princeton Uni- versity’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. The author would like to thank Oleg Bukharin, Frank von Hippel, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments. Also, she gratefully acknowledges the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which takes no responsibility for any statements or views expressed herein. 1. National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nu- clear Facilities and Military Forces (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Ofªce [GPO], February 2002), p. 2. 2. Such reports are scattered throughout the popular media. See, for example, Tim Beardsley, “Selling to Survive,” Scientiªc American, Vol. 268, No. 2 (February 1993), pp. 92–100; Alan Cooperman and Kyrill Belianinov, “Moonlighting by Modem in Russia,” U.S. News and World Re- port, April 17, 1995, pp. 45–48; and Michael Dobbs, “Collapse of Soviet Union Proved Boon to Ira- nian Missile Program,” Washington Post, January 13, 2002, p. 19. One of the more comprehensive accounts is R. Adam Moody, “Report: Reexamining Brain Drain from the Former Soviet Union,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Spring–Summer 1996), p. 92. 3. See, for example, testimony of Robert Gates, director of Central Intelligence, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post–Cold War Era, 102d Cong., 2d sess., February 25, 1992, pp. 205, 234–236; and testimony of George Tenet, director of central intelligence, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the U.S., 105th Cong., 2d sess., January 28, 1998, p. 135. International Security, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Fall 2002), pp. 126–158 © 2002 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 126 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228802760987842 by guest on 28 September 2021 Preventing Nuclear Entrepreneurship in Russia 127 weapons-related work.4 The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the So- viet Union, and the subsequent collapse of the Russian economy brought mis- ery to many of these once-revered members of the Soviet elite. As the 1990s wore on, increasing numbers of Russian nuclear scientists, engineers, and tech- nicians were confronted with deteriorating living conditions and the threat of job loss. Many were owed months of back wages by the Russian government. As reports of the theft of weapons-usable materials began to surface in the early 1990s, the U.S. government grew alarmed that some of Russia’s nuclear weapons scientists would become “nuclear entrepreneurs,” selling their expertise to the highest bidder or collaborating with others to steal nuclear weapons or their components. These concerns prompted Congress, the ªrst Bush administration, and later President Bill Clinton to launch several nonproliferation programs between the United States and Russia.5 As the years wore on, however, the White House’s interest in these programs diminished. Slow progress, bureaucratic inªghting, and disagreements with Russia over access to its nuclear facilities led to much congressional criti- cism of these programs, especially among Republicans. After conducting their own critical internal review, President George W. Bush and his administration seemed poised to signiªcantly reduce some of these programs and eliminate others.6 The September 11 terrorist attacks, however, forced the administration and Congress to rethink this position. Amid renewed concerns that Russian nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise could leak out to terrorists, pundits and policymakers alike increasingly called for a greater U.S. commitment and more funding for U.S.-Russian nonproliferation programs. This article analyzes U.S.-Russian nonproliferation efforts designed to help workers in Russia’s nuclear cities.7 The most important of these are the Nu- 4. Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (MinAtom), “Primary Objectives and Tasks of the Implementation of the Program on Restructuring and Conversion of Nuclear Industry Enterprises (of the Nuclear Weapons Complex), in 1998–2000,” p. 3. In addition to nuclear weapons–related workers, MinAtom also employs people for nonnuclear defense–related and nuclear energy–related activities in the nuclear cities. 5. Most of these programs also included cooperation with other states of the former Soviet Union that inherited Soviet weapons of mass destruction or the scientists and facilities with which to design, test, or build them. 6. See Judith Miller with Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Review of Russia Urges Keeping Most Arms Controls,” New York Times, July 16, 2001, p. 1. The Bush administration was most critical of programs managed by the U.S. Department of Energy and especially the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). 7. For a description and assessment of U.S. efforts to help Russia monitor and control its supply of ªssile material, see Matthew Bunn, The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material (Washington, D.C.: Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and the Non- Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228802760987842 by guest on 28 September 2021 International Security 27:2 128 clear Cities Initiative (NCI), Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), and the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC). All three seek to cre- ate alternative nonmilitary jobs for nuclear weapons–related workers who might otherwise be driven to sell their nuclear knowledge or to steal weapons- related materials and components.8 I begin by describing Russia’s nuclear cities and some of the proliferation problems that they present. I also assess how these cities and their role in nuclear weapons production have changed over the last decade and the impact of these changes on proliferation risk. Next I analyze the success of NCI, IPP, and ISTC in creating jobs for workers in the nuclear cities. I conclude with recommendations for ways to refocus these programs for greater effectiveness. Russia’s Nuclear Cities: Then and Now Russia’s nuclear cities contain the Soviet Union’s principal nuclear weapons research, design, and production facilities.9 Located in remote areas around the country, they began life as “company towns” with a nuclear mission. As in the past, decisions affecting the cities are made at the federal level, and the cities are funded directly by the Ministry of Atomic Energy (MinAtom).10 If there were any private businesses, they existed only for the support of the local pop- ulation. Each nuclear city continues to have a speciªc function (see Table 1). Because of the sensitive nature of their work, the cities were “closed” during the Soviet era. Each city—including housing, schools, parks, and other facilities—was surrounded by double fences and guarded by troops from the ministry of internal affairs.11 The nuclear facilities themselves were cordoned off with additional fences and guards. Access to and from the cities was tightly controlled by representatives of the KGB, the Soviet Union’s intelligence Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2000); and Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn, and Kenneth N. Luongo, Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, August 2000). 8. Another reason to help Russia downsize its nuclear production complex is the fear that it might rebuild its nuclear arsenal. 9. Some of the Soviet nuclear weapons production infrastructure was also located in open cities. For example, Moscow was and is home to the Institute of Automatics, which works on warhead design. 10. The Ministry of Atomic Energy is the successor to the Soviet Union’s Ministry for Atomic En- ergy

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