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Sstic-2021-Actes.Pdf Préface Mercredi 2 juin 2021, 8 heures du matin. Sous perfusion de café, les yeux à peine entrouverts, je suis avec le reste du comité d’organisation (CO), qui est sur les rangs et veille aux derniers détails, vérifiant que la guicheteuse et les lecteurs de badge fonctionnent. Pendant ce temps, certains irréductibles sont déjà dehors, malgré le crachin breton, prêts à se ruer pour pouvoir découvrir en premier les goodies et s’installer confortablement dans l’amphi, à leur place favorite, pour feuilleter les actes et lire la préface. On ouvre les portes, c’est parti pour le 19e SSTIC ! Fondu. Huit cents personnes dans l’amphi face à nous, je vérifie avec l’orateur invité qui fait l’ouverture que tout est prêt. Avec le trac, les spots qui m’éblouissent, je m’avance pour prononcer quelques mots et lancer la conférence... Et dire qu’il y a environ un tiers de nouveaux ! Fondu. Petit tour en régie, pour discuter avec les techniciens du Couvent et s’assurer que le streaming se passe bien. Oups, on me dit sèchement de m’éloigner de la caméra ; apparemment, les talkies-walkies qui assurent la liaison avec le reste du CO, éparpillé entre le premier rang et l’accueil, font trembler les aimants du stabilisateur... Fondu. Après la présentation des résultats du challenge, une session de rumps réussie où il a fallu courir dans l’amphi pour apporter le micro, nous voilà dans le magnifique cloître du Couvent, sous un soleil bienvenu. Les petits fours sont excellents et je vois, à l’attroupement qui se forme rapidement, que le stand foie gras vient d’ouvrir. Entre les boissons et les discussions, la soirée passe très vite mais n’est pas terminée... direction le Petit Vélo. Fondu. Vendredi matin, 10h. Réveil difficile. Heureusement, d’autres membres du CO ont été plus raisonnables... Je rattraperai avec les vidéos... Fondu. Vendredi soir, épuisé mais heureux que cette édition se soit une nouvelle fois bien déroulée. Une bière bien méritée en terrasse et un premier coup d’œil aux résultats du sondage pour confirmer les retours à chaud... quand un bruit strident retentit... C’était un rêve. 1 En réalité, voilà deux, deux éditions consécutives du SSTIC qui auront donc eu lieu uniquement en ligne, à notre grand regret. En attendant que la vaccination, entre autres, écarte les nuages d’un nouveau report, j’espère que vous n’êtes pas encore vaccinés contre les conférences en ligne après plus d’un an de visioconférence ! Nous tenons d’ailleurs à remercier chaleureusement toutes les autrices et auteurs qui ont soumis leurs travaux à l’évaluation du comité de programme (CP), malgré les contraintes supplémentaires. Un grand merci également au CP, qui a dû travailler dans des conditions inhabituelles mais a néanmoins fourni des retours détaillés. Car – peut-être l’ignoriez-vous 2 – chaque soumission, qu’elle soit acceptée ou non, fait l’objet de commentaires afin de permettre aux auteurs d’améliorer leurs travaux. Alors, n’hésitez pas à soumettre ! Nous le rappelons chaque année, mais c’est vous qui faites le programme du SSTIC. Votre sujet de prédilection n’est pas ou peu présent ? Lancez-vous ! Enfin, cette année, le challenge a été pour la première fois proposé en anglais et, vous l’aurez peut-être remarqué, le classement rapidité a été remporté par un non-francophone. Il n’aura malheureusement pas la chance de recevoir des mains du dernier gagnant le hideux totem de la victoire. Bref, vous aurez compris notre envie de vous retrouver l’an prochain, avec des surprises que nous espérons ardemment pouvoir vous concocter pour fêter dignement la vingtième édition du SSTIC, à Rennes. Bon symposium, Raphaël Rigo, pour le Comité d’Organisation. 1. Si, j’ose ! 2. Si vous n’avez pas encore lu l’article de blog Comment j’ai appris à ne plus m’en faire et à soumettre au SSTIC ? Comité d’organisation Aurélien Bordes ANSSI Camille Mougey ANSSI Colas Le Guernic Thales Jean-Marie Borello Thales Nicolas Prigent Ministère des Armées Olivier Courtay Viaccess-Orca Pierre Capillon ANSSI Raphaël Rigo Airbus Sarah Zennou Airbus L’association STIC tient à remercier les employeurs des membres du comité d’organisation qui ont soutenu leur participation au CO. Airbus – ANSSI – Ministère des Armées – Thales – Viaccess-Orca Comité de programme Adrien Guinet Quarkslab Alexandre Gazet Airbus Anaïs Gantet Airbus Aurélien Bordes ANSSI Benoit Michau P1 security Camille Mougey ANSSI Colas Le Guernic Thales Damien Cauquil David Berard Synacktiv Diane Dubois Google Gabrielle Viala Quarkslab Guillaume Valadon Jean-Baptiste Bédrune Ledger Jean-François Lalande CentraleSupélec Jean-Marie Borello Thales Marion Lafon TEHTRIS Nicolas Iooss Ledger Nicolas Prigent Ministère des Armées Ninon Eyrolles Viaccess-Orca Olivier Courtay Viaccess-Orca Pascal Malterre CEA/DAM Pierre Capillon ANSSI Pierre-Sébastien Bost Raphaël Rigo Airbus Renaud Dubourguais Synacktiv Ryad Benadjila ANSSI Sarah Zennou Airbus Yoann Allain DGA Graphisme Benjamin Morin Table des matières Conférences Analyse des propriétés de sécurité dans les implémentations du Bluetooth Low Energy ....................................... 3 T. Claverie, N. Docq, J. Lopes-Esteves InjectaBLE : injection de trafic malveillant dans une connexion Bluetooth Low Energy ....................................... 33 R. Cayre, F. Galtier, G. Auriol, V. Nicomette, M. Kaâniche, G. Marconato Hyntrospect: a fuzzer for Hyper-V devices ...................... 63 D. Dubois Vous avez obtenu un trophée : PS4 jailbreaké ................... 93 Q. Meffre, M. Talbi HPE iLO 5 security: Go home cryptoprocessor, you’re drunk! ..... 113 A. Gazet, F. Périgaud, J. Czarny From CVEs to proof: Make your USB device stack great again .... 147 R. Benadjila, C. Debergé, P. Mouy, P. Thierry Ne sortez pas sans vos masques ! Description d’une contre-mesure contre les attaques par canaux auxilliaires ...................... 177 N. Bordes Defeating a Secure Element with Multiple Laser Fault Injections .. 199 O. Hériveaux EEPROM: It Will All End in Tears ........................... 219 P. Teuwen, C. Herrmann Runtime Security Monitoring with eBPF ....................... 249 G. Fournier, S. Afchain, S. Baubeau Protecting SSH authentication with TPM 2.0 ................... 273 N. Iooss U2F2 : Prévenir la menace fantôme sur FIDO/U2F ............. 299 R. Benadjila, P. Thierry The security of SD-WAN: the Cisco case ....................... 329 J. Legras Taking Advantage of PE Metadata, or How To Complete your Favorite Threat Actor’s Sample Collection ..................... 349 D. Lunghi Exploitation du graphe de dépendance d’AOSP à des fins de sécurité 357 A. Challande, R. David, G. Renault Return of ECC dummy point additions: Simple Power Analysis on efficient P-256 implementation ............................. 367 A. Russon Monitoring and protecting SSH sessions with eBPF ............. 377 G. Fournier Analyzing ARCompact Firmware with Ghidra .................. 389 N. Iooss Index des auteurs ....................................... 399 Conférences Analyse des propriétés de sécurité dans les implémentations du Bluetooth Low Energy Tristan Claverie2, Nicolas Docq1 et José Lopes-Esteves2 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] 1 Ministère des armées 2 ANSSI Résumé. Le Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) est issu d’une norme com- plexe et qui laisse une grande latitude aux implémentations. Les fonctions de sécurité du BLE sont disséminées dans plusieurs couches protocolaires. Le fonctionnement du BLE et de sa sécurité ont été étudiés, avant qu’un état de l’art ne permette de comprendre les différentes attaques possibles et leurs impacts. Puis la propagation des propriétés de sécurité est étudiée sous le prisme de la norme avant d’étudier son implémentation dans les piles BLE de Linux et d’Android. Cette étude permet de conclure que la norme comporte des incohérences et de détecter des non conformités sur les implémentations étudiées. 1 Introduction Le Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) a été initialement créé par Nokia sous le nom de Wibree en 2006 pour compléter le Bluetooth mais sans le remplacer [10]. Le consortium Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) a décidé d’intégrer cette technologie à la norme Bluetooth. Cette évolution du Bluetooth a été commercialisée en 2010 dans sa version 4.0. C’est l’iPhone 4S qui a été en 2011 le premier équipement grand public à l’utiliser. Aujourd’hui, le BLE est intégré dans un nombre incalculable d’équipements tels que smartphone, casque audio ou serrure connectée par exemple. L’Internet des Objets exploite de manière importante ce protocole dont l’intérêt est d’être léger et peu consommateur d’énergie électrique. Du point de vue de l’utilisateur, le BLE se comporte exactement de la même manière que le Bluetooth bien que les protocoles sous-jacents soient extrêmement différents. Comme le Bluetooth, le BLE peut nécessiter une phase d’appairage entre les deux équipements qui veulent communiquer ensemble. Une fois cet appairage initial réalisé ; ayant en principe nécessité une action utilisateur ; il est possible que chacun des équipements stocke un secret pour qu’à la prochaine connexion, aucune action utilisateur ne 4 Analyse des propriétés de sécurité dans les implémentations du ... soit nécessaire. Lors de l’appairage, l’utilisateur averti pourra estimer le niveau de sécurité de sa liaison BLE en fonction de la méthode d’appairage utilisée, mais ensuite il n’y aura aucune indication sur le niveau de sécurité de la connexion BLE entre deux équipements. Un article [1] publié en 2019 a démontré (en partie tout du moins) que la pile BLE BlueZ n’était pas totalement conforme à la norme sur le plan de la sécurité. Les auteurs ont pu accéder au niveau de sécurité le plus élevé de la pile BLE sans que toutes les conditions édictées par la norme ne soient vérifiées (et en particulier ici, la taille de la clé LTK dérivée de l’appairage). Cet article s’intéresse donc à la confiance qui peut être placée dans le BLE ainsi qu’aux garanties de sécurité apportées lors d’une connexion BLE.
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