Social Learning Theory, Self-Regulation, and Morality Author(S): Thomas E
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Social Learning Theory, Self-Regulation, and Morality Author(s): Thomas E. Wren Source: Ethics, Vol. 92, No. 3, Special Issue: Symposium on Moral Development (Apr., 1982), pp. 409-424 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2380729 Accessed: 26/02/2009 04:25 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ethics. http://www.jstor.org SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY Social Learning Theory, Self-Regulation, and Morality* Thomas E. Wren Moral psychology divides nicely into three relatively autonomous do- mains: cognitive-developmental theories of moral judgment, psychoana- lytic theories of motivational processes, and social learning theories of moral behaviors and inhibitions. For instance, a well-known review of the literature on moral development opens by correlating these three domains with the romantic view of man as innately perfectible, the reformationist view of man as naturally inclined to evil, and the empiricist conception of the mind as a tabula rasa. Its author, Martin Hoffman, is a prominent social learning theorist, but the same principles of division recur in sim- ilar reviews by Lawrence Kohlberg and Jane Loevinger, to name just two major figures in the cognitive-developmental and psychoanalytic tradi- tions, respectively.' Both of these domains have been surveyed in detail by philosophers over the last several years. However, considerably less has been said philosophically about the third one, at least as far as morality is concerned. This is regrettable for many reasons, not the least of which is the dominant position social learning theory holds in present-day Ameri- can psychology. The neglect is not altogether benign: social learning theory has grown up out of behaviorism, and many philosophers regard behaviorist accounts more as capitulations to the opacity of the data than as explanations. It is to remedy this neglect as well as for the intrinsic interest of the issue that I shall discuss some recent variations in social learning theory on a theme that moral philosophy has long regarded as a formal feature of * Research for this project was made possible by grants from the Spencer Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities, which are here gratefully acknowledged. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the universities of Oxford, London, and Hawaii, and I am grateful for the comments I received on those occasions. 1. M. Hoffman, "Moral Development," in Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology, ed. P. H. Mussen, 3d ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970), vol. 2; L. Kohlberg, "Moral Development," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. E. R. Seligman (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968), and "Education for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View," in Moral Education: Five Lectures, ed. N. Sizer and R. Sizer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970): J. Loevinger, Ego Development (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1976). The most recent, and most comprehensive, review of the literature is A. Blasi, "Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action," Psychological Bulletin 88 (1980): 1-45. Ethics 92 (April 1982): 409-424 ? 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/82/9203-0001$01.00 409 410 Ethics April 1982 morality as such: the theme of personal responsibility or self-direction. Because of constraints of space I shall pass over the many interesting things social learning theory has said about the contents of morality, that is, specifically moral (or immoral) behaviors, including the stereotypical ones of helpfulness, truth telling, cheating, and sexual deviance. I shall pass over these constraints in order to discuss the cognitive and moral form which professional and nonprofessional moralists alike commonly ascribe to them in the course of assigning praise, blame, responsibility, and so on. My general thesis is that, for all the research done on morally toned behaviors, there remains within social learning theory a terribly important metaethical deficiency. This deficiency is the altogether inade- quate account taken of the role which self-direction or self-directed pre- scribing plays in authentically moral conduct and, for that matter, in the whole process of socialization. To give point to my charge I shall take up in turn the very theorists who have come the furthest from the early, avowedly noncognitive views of learning theory regarding the socialization process: Albert Bandura, Walter Mischel, F. H. Kanfer, and Justin Aronfreed. They have developed the concept of socialization from the noncognitive level of merely overt conformity to the much more cognitively sophisticated and potentially moral level of self-regulation, a semitechnical term which some social learning theorists use to designate a level of personal autonomy or nonre- liance on external incentives. Here if anywhere in the vast literature of social psychology we ought to be able to discern a self-prescribing charac- ter corresponding to that which is traditionally identified with morality.2 That we cannot is, I think, a cause for profound concern on the part of philosophers and others interested in morality and human nature; but it is not, I hope to show at the end, a cause for despairing of moral psychol- ogy altogether. I. SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY AND THE LAW OF EFFECT Social learning theory is not a single theory but rather a family of theories that attempt to explain behavior primarily in terms of learning and learn- ing in terms of the behaviorist credo, the Law of Effect. Consequently, its discussions of morality are distinguished from their cognitive-devel- opmental and psychoanalytic counterparts by the motivational role it assigns to rewards. That is, the moral agent's motivation for being and acting in a moral fashion is understood to be his more or less conscious pursuit of benefits such as social approval, whose reinforcing value con- sists in their culturally contingent attachment to deep-seated drives, 2. Philosophers will recognize that I am taking an "internalist" position on the ques- tion of whether there is included, as part of the very meaning of a moral principle, some corresponding motivation on the part of anyone who accepts it (see W. D. Falk, " 'Ought' and Motivation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48 [1947-48]: 111-38; W. Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy," in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. A. I. Melden [Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958]). Wren Social Learning Theory 411 needs, or aversions. As in psychoanalytic theories, moral development is understood as the acquisition of someone else's norms, either the norms of one's parents (Freud) or those of the society at large (social learning the- ory). But no unconscious motivational processes are posited, nor are any self-propelling stage-developmental sequences of cognitive structures-in fact, even the most adult phases of morality have minimal cognitive com- plexity. Like all other forms of human development, moral development or "socialization" is envisioned as a more or less smooth and ordered change in the person's feelings or affects and his behaviors, not in his mode of thinking and evaluating. To the extent that social learning theory comprehends this change, it does so in terms of the Law of Effect, which in the present context declares that a moral agent comes to adopt the morality that he does because its adoption has resulted in more reinforcing events.3 Here "morality" means a socially endorsed pattern of behaviors, with additional connotations of altruism ranging from simple noninterference to sacrificing one's life for others. Just what "reinforcement" means depends on which of two moti- vational theories is adopted: the expectancy theory or the tension- or drive-reduction theory. To characterize them in the ordinary language terms favored by philosophers, the former theory conceives desire in terms of anticipated pleasures, whereas the latter conceives pleasure-at least one of its most important modalities-as the resolution of desire. Both theories are compatible with the Law of Effect, although the psycholo- gists we shall discuss below generally cast their research in expectancy categories. In short, social learning theory regards moral actions as having the same earthy dependence on reinforcement schedules as all the other kinds of human behavior have. Their respective motivations all work in the same way, competing on the same level. As Alston has pointed out,4 the standard picture offered by American social psychologists is that of a motivational field in which various tendencies, moral, nonmoral, and immoral, engage in a single interaction for control of behavior. As we shall see, even those learning theorists who have come the furthest in detente with cognitivism-viz., those mentioned above as recognizing the cognitive dimension of self-regulation-have this one-level, nonhier- archical picture of human motivation.