To-Distribute Model and the Role of Banks in Financial Intermediation

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

To-Distribute Model and the Role of Banks in Financial Intermediation Vitaly M. Bord and João A. C. Santos The Rise of the Originate- to-Distribute Model and the Role of Banks in Financial Intermediation 1.Introduction banks with yet another venue for distributing the loans that they originate. In principle, banks could create CLOs using the istorically, banks used deposits to fund loans that they loans they originated, but it appears they prefer to use collateral Hthen kept on their balance sheets until maturity. Over managers—usually investment management companies—that time, however, this model of banking started to change. Banks put together CLOs by acquiring loans, some at the time of began expanding their funding sources to include bond syndication and others in the secondary loan market.2 financing, commercial paper financing, and repurchase Banks’ increasing use of the originate-to-distribute model agreement (repo) funding. They also began to replace their has been critical to the growth of the syndicated loan market, traditional originate-to-hold model of lending with the so- of the secondary loan market, and of collateralized loan called originate-to-distribute model. Initially, banks limited obligations in the United States. The syndicated loan market the distribution model to mortgages, credit card credits, and rose from a mere $339 billion in 1988 to $2.2 trillion in 2007, car and student loans, but over time they started to apply it the year the market reached its peak. The secondary loan to corporate loans. This article documents how banks adopted market, in turn, evolved from a market in which banks the originate-to-distribute model in their corporate lending participated occasionally, most often by selling loans to other business and provides evidence of the effect that this shift has banks through individually negotiated deals, to an active, had on the growth of nonbank financial intermediation. dealer-driven market where loans are sold and traded much Banks first started “distributing” the corporate loans they like other debt securities that trade over the counter. The originated by syndicating loans and also by selling them in the volume of loan trading increased from $8 billion in 1991 to secondary loan market.1 More recently, the growth of the $176 billion in 2005.3 The securitization of corporate loans also market for collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) has provided experienced spectacular growth in the years that preceded the financial crisis. Before 2003, the annual volume of new CLOs 1 In loan syndications, the lead bank usually retains a portion of the loan and places the remaining balance with a number of additional investors, usually issued in the United States rarely surpassed $20 billion. After other banks. This arrangement is made in conjunction with, and as part of, the loan origination process. In contrast, the secondary loan market is a 2 According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, seasoned market in which a bank, including lead banks and syndicate 97 percent of corporate loan CLOs in 2007 were structured by financial participants, can subsequently sell an existing loan (or part of a loan). institutions that did not originate the loans. Vitaly M. Bord is a former associate economist and João A. C. Santos The authors thank Nicola Cetorelli, Stavros Peristiani, an anonymous reviewer, a vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. and participants at a Federal Reserve Bank of New York seminar for useful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily Correspondence: [email protected] reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. FRBNY Economic Policy Review / July 2012 21 that, loan securitization grew rapidly, topping $180 billion loans over time, and it has complete information on investors’ in 2007. loan shares over the life of the credit. We discuss the SNC Investigating the extent of U.S. banks’ adoption of the database in more detail in the data section. originate-to-distribute model in corporate lending has proved Our study of the change in banks’ corporate lending model difficult because of data limitations. Thomson Reuters Loan yields a number of significant findings. Although the data Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database, arguably the most indicate that lead banks increasingly used the originate-to- comprehensive data source on the syndicated loan market and distribute model from the early 1990s on, we conclude that this the source used by many researchers in the past, imposes increase was limited to a large extent to term loans; in their serious limitations on the investigation of this issue. This credit-line business with corporations, banks continued to rely database includes information available only at the time of loan on the traditional originate-to-hold model. Further, we find origination, making it impossible to use it to investigate what that lead banks increasingly “distributed” their term loans by happens to the loan after origination. Furthermore, DealScan selling larger portions of them not only at the time of the loan has very limited information on investors’ loan shares at the origination, but also in the years after origination. For example, time of origination. The information on the credit shares in 1988, the first year of our sample, lead banks retained in that each syndicate participant holds is sparse, and even the aggregate 21 percent of the term loans they originated that year. information on the share that the lead bank—the bank that sets In 2007, lead banks retained only 6.7 percent of the term loans the terms of the loan—retains at origination is missing for originated in that year. By 2010, lead banks had managed to 71 percent of all DealScan credits. further lower their share in the credits they had originated in The Loan Syndication Trading Association database 2007 to 3.4 percent. contains micro information on the loans traded in the Our investigation into the entities investing in bank loans secondary market, but it has no information about the identity confirms that other banks were not quick to step in and take of the seller(s) or buyer(s), ruling out its use to close the over as lead banks reduced their stake in the loans they information gaps in DealScan. Financial statements filed with originated. Instead, we find that new loan investors, including the Federal Reserve, in turn, contain information only on the investment managers and CLOs, increasingly assumed credit that banks keep on their balance sheets and thus cannot control of the credit business. In 1993, all together, nonbank be used to ascertain the volume of credit that banks originate. investors acquired 13.2 percent of the term loans originated These statements contain information on the loans that banks that year. In 2007, they acquired 56.3 percent of the term hold for sale, but, as Cetorelli and Peristiani (2012) explain in loans originated in that year, a 327 percentage point increase detail elsewhere in this volume, this variable provides limited from fifteen years earlier. information on the extent to which banks have replaced the The trends documented in this article have important originate-to-hold model with the originate-to-distribute implications. Banks’ increasing use of the originate-to- model in their lending business.4 distribute model in their term-lending business will lead to a We rely instead on a novel data source, the Shared National transfer of important portions of credit risk out of the banking Credit program (SNC) run by the Federal Deposit Insurance system. In the process, however, it will contribute to the growth Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve of financial intermediation outside the banking system, System, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Like including a larger role for unregulated “shadow banking” DealScan, the SNC program is dominated by syndicated loans. institutions.5 It will also, over time, make the credit kept by In contrast to DealScan, however, the SNC program tracks banks on their balance sheets less representative of the still- essential role they perform in financial intermediation. 3 Researchers have suggested several explanations for the development of the In addition, banks’ increasing use of the originate-to- secondary market, including the capital standards introduced with the 1988 Basel Accord (Altman, Gande, and Saunders 2004), the standardization of distribute model could lead to some weakening of lending loan documentation and settlement procedures that came about with the standards. According to several theories—including those of establishment of the Loan Syndication Trading Association in 1995 (Hugh and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Diamond (1984), and Wang 2004), and the increase in demand and liquidity resulting from the increasing involvement of institutional investors (Yago and McCarthy 2004). Holmström and Tirole (1993)—banks add value because of See Gorton and Haubrich (1990) for a detailed description of the loan-sales their comparative advantage in monitoring borrowers. To market in the 1980s. carry out this task properly, banks must hold the loans they 4 This variable does not distinguish corporate loans from all the other loans originate until maturity. If they instead anticipate keeping only that banks may intend to sell. Further, since there is no information on when the loans held for sale were originated, ascertaining banks’ relative use of the a small portion of a loan, their incentives to screen loan originate-to-distribute model based on this variable is difficult. Lastly, the variable reports only the loans that banks “intend” to sell, not the actual 5 See Pozsar et al. (2010) for a detailed account of the growth of shadow loans that they sold. banking in the United States. 22 The Rise of the Originate-to-Distribute Model applicants properly and to design the terms of the loan contract 2.
Recommended publications
  • Guide to Predatory Lending Occurs When a Mortgage Loan Between and Gets a Fee Or Other Compensation
    What is Know the Don’t Predatory Terms Become a Lending? Mortgage Lender: A bank, savings institution, or mortgage company that offers home loans. Victim: Mortgage Broker: An individual or firm that matches borrowers to lenders and loan programs for a fee. Anyone who acts as a go- A Guide to Predatory lending occurs when a mortgage loan between and gets a fee or other compensation. with unwarranted high interest rates and fees is set Annual Percentage Rate (APR): Cost of the credit, which Predatory up to primarily benefit the lender or broker. The includes the interest and all other finance charges. If APR is more Lending loan is not made in the best interest of the borrower, than .75 to 1 percentage point higher than the interest rate you often locks the borrower into unfair loan terms and were quoted, there are significant fees being added to the loan. tends to cause severe financial hardship or default. Points: Fees paid to the lender to obtain the loan. One point is equal to 1% of the loan amount. Points should be paid at the time of the loan. If your lender insists on prepayment of these fees, find To determine if a loan is predatory in nature, ask a new lender or broker. yourself these questions: Prepayment Penalty: Fees required to be paid by you if the Does your past credit history justify the loan is paid off early. Try to avoid any prepayment penalty that lasts more than 3 years or is for more than 1-2% of the loan high rate and fees charged? amount.
    [Show full text]
  • Loan Originator (LO) Compensation II. Purpose, Coverage and Overview; “Loan
    Loan Originator (LO) Compensation II. Purpose, Coverage and Overview; “Loan 1 Originator” and “Compensation” Defined Major Components of Rule . Prohibits steering a consumer into a loan that generates greater compensation for the loan originator, unless the consummated loan is in the consumer's interest. Prohibits loan originator compensation based on the terms of a mortgage transaction or a proxy for a transaction term. Prohibits dual compensation (i.e., loan originator being compensated by both the consumer and another person, such as a creditor). Prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses and waivers of certain causes of action. 2 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION Major Components of Rule Con’t. Prohibits the financing of credit insurance (this prohibition does not include mortgage insurance). Requires depository institutions have written policies and procedures. Imposes qualification requirements on loan originators. Requires name and NMLSR identification information of loan originator with primary responsibility appear on the credit application, note, and security instrument. Permits, within limits, paying loan originators compensation based on profits derived from a bank’s mortgage-related activities. (“bank” includes an affiliate of the bank and/or a business unit within the bank or affiliate). 3 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION Key Compensation Prohibition No loan originator can receive and no person can pay to a loan originator, directly or indirectly… . Compensation in an amount that is based on terms of transactions (or proxies for terms of transactions): • a single loan originator, or • multiple loan originators (limited exception: some profits- based compensation). 4 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION Covered Transactions A covered transaction is a consumer- purpose, closed-end transaction secured by a dwelling, whether by a first or subordinate lien.
    [Show full text]
  • H0209-I-128.Pdf
    Ohio Legislative Service Commission Bill Analysis Daniel M. DeSantis H.B. 209 128th General Assembly (As Introduced) Reps. Lundy, Foley, Murray, Hagan, Phillips, Skindell, Stewart, Harris, Fende, Newcomb, Okey, Celeste, Harwood BILL SUMMARY • Prohibits licensees under the Small Loan Law (R.C. 1321.01 to 1321.19) and registrants under the Mortgage Loan Law (R.C. 1321.51 to 1321.60) from making a loan of $1,000 or less that will obligate the borrower to pay more than 28% APR unless the term of the loan is greater than three months or the loan contract requires three or more installments. • Provides that whoever ʺwillfullyʺ violates the prohibition against loans of $1,000 or less with a 28% APR (1) must forfeit to the borrower twice the amount of interest contracted for (Small Loan Law) or the amount of interest paid by the borrower (Mortgage Loan Law), and (2) will be subject to a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $1,000. • Increases the fine for certain other violations regarding the Mortgage Loan Law of not less than $100 nor more than $500 to not less than $500 nor more than $1,000. • Specifies that the current prohibition on licensees under the Small Loan Law and registrants under the Mortgage Loan Law from conducting business in a place where any ʺother businessʺ is solicited or engaged in if the nature of that business is to conceal evasion of those lending laws, includes any business conducted by a registered credit services organization, a licensed check‐cashing business, a person engaged in the practice of debt adjusting, or a person who is involved in offering lease‐purchase agreements.
    [Show full text]
  • Default Option Exercise Over the Financial Crisis and Beyond*
    Review of Finance, 2021, 153–187 doi: 10.1093/rof/rfaa022 Advance Access Publication Date: 17 August 2020 Default Option Exercise over the Financial Crisis and beyond* Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rof/article/25/1/153/5893492 by guest on 19 February 2021 Xudong An1, Yongheng Deng2, and Stuart A. Gabriel3 1Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2University of Wisconsin – Madison, and 3University of California, Los Angeles Anderson School of Management Abstract We document changes in borrowers’ sensitivity to negative equity and show height- ened borrower default propensity as a fundamental driver of crisis period mortgage defaults. Estimates of a time-varying coefficient competing risk hazard model reveal a marked run-up in the default option beta from 0.2 during 2003–06 to about 1.5 dur- ing 2012–13. Simulation of 2006 vintage loan performance shows that the marked upturn in the default option beta resulted in a doubling of mortgage default inci- dence. Panel data analysis indicates that much of the variation in default option ex- ercise is associated with the local business cycle and consumer distress. Results also indicate elevated default propensities in sand states and among borrowers seeking a crisis-period Home Affordable Modification Program loan modification. JEL classification: G21, G12, C13, G18 Keywords: Mortgage default, Option exercise, Default option beta, Time-varying coefficient hazard model Received August 19, 2017; accepted October 23, 2019 by Editor Amiyatosh Purnanandam. * We thank Sumit Agarwal, Yacine Ait-Sahalia,
    [Show full text]
  • Your Step-By-Step Mortgage Guide
    Your Step-by-Step Mortgage Guide From Application to Closing Table of Contents In this Guide, you will learn about one of the most important steps in the homebuying process — obtaining a mortgage. The materials in this Guide will take you from application to closing and they’ll even address the first months of homeownership to show you the kinds of things you need to do to keep your home. Knowing what to expect will give you the confidence you need to make the best decisions about your home purchase. 1. Overview of the Mortgage Process ...................................................................Page 1 2. Understanding the People and Their Services ...................................................Page 3 3. What You Should Know About Your Mortgage Loan Application .......................Page 5 4. Understanding Your Costs Through Estimates, Disclosures and More ...............Page 8 5. What You Should Know About Your Closing .....................................................Page 11 6. Owning and Keeping Your Home ......................................................................Page 13 7. Glossary of Mortgage Terms .............................................................................Page 15 Your Step-by-Step Mortgage Guide your financial readiness. Or you can contact a Freddie Mac 1. Overview of the Borrower Help Center or Network which are trusted non- profit intermediaries with HUD-certified counselors on staff Mortgage Process that offer prepurchase homebuyer education as well as financial literacy using tools such as the Freddie Mac CreditSmart® curriculum to help achieve successful and Taking the Right Steps sustainable homeownership. Visit http://myhome.fred- diemac.com/resources/borrowerhelpcenters.html for a to Buy Your New Home directory and more information on their services. Next, Buying a home is an exciting experience, but it can be talk to a loan officer to review your income and expenses, one of the most challenging if you don’t understand which can be used to determine the type and amount of the mortgage process.
    [Show full text]
  • The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price Lauren E
    Maryland Law Review Volume 65 | Issue 3 Article 3 Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price Lauren E. Willis Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr Part of the Banking and Finance Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons Recommended Citation Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 Md. L. Rev. 707 (2006) Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. MARYLAND LAW REVIEW VOLUME 65 2006 NUMBER 3 © Copyright Maryland Law Review 2006 Articles DECISIONMAKING AND THE LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE: THE PROBLEM OF PREDATORY LENDING: PRICE LAUREN E. WILLIS* INTRODUCTION ................................................. 709 I. PREDATORY LENDING AND THE HOME LOAN MARKET ...... 715 A. The Home Lending Revolution ........................ 715 1. The Twentieth Century Marketplace: Standardized Terms, Limited and Advertised Prices, and Low Risk. 715 2. The Brave New World of ProliferatingProducts, Price, and R isk ........................................ 718 3. Evidence of Predatory Home Lending ............... 729 B. A New Definition of Predatory Lending ................. 735 II. FEDERAL LAW REGULATING THE PRICING OF HOME- SECURED LOANS: DISCLOSURE AS PANACEA ................ 741 A. The Rational Actor Decisionmaker Model ............... 741 B. CurrentFederal Law .................................. 743 C. Even a Rational Actor Could Not Use the Federal Disclosures to Price Shop in Today's Marketplace .......
    [Show full text]
  • Predatory Lending Questions and Answers
    Attachment A Predatory Lending Questions and Answers 1) What is the difference between subprime lending and predatory lending? Subprime Lending The prime lending market offers loans to persons with excellent credit and employment history, and an income sufficient to support the loan amount. It generally offers borrowers many loan choices and the lowest mortgage rates. Prime lenders include banks, thrifts and credit unions that are subject to extensive oversight and regulation by federal and state governments. According to HUD, nine out of ten families take out prime loans when purchasing or refinancing their mortgages.1 Subprime lenders serve high-risk borrowers who would otherwise have difficulty obtaining a loan. Subprime loans usually have higher interest rates and fees than prime loans to compensate the lender for taking on higher repayment risk. Subprime lenders adjust their interest rates and fees according to the risk of the individual loan applicant and any additional loan origination costs. The subprime market is an important part of the financial system because it provides credit to consumers who would otherwise be unable to borrow money, and allows high-risk borrowers to repair their credit rating by paying back their new loan on schedule. Through home equity lines of credit and refinances, the subprime market can also provide consumers in difficult situations the ability to access part of their housing wealth to get them through bad financial periods. Predatory Lending Although there is no set definition for predatory lending, it is generally used to describe a set of practices through which a broker, lender or other participant takes unfair advantage of a borrower, often through deception, fraud or manipulation to make a loan that has terms that are a disadvantageous to the borrower.
    [Show full text]
  • Household Debt and Credit
    CENTER FOR MICROECONOMIC DATA WWW.NEWYORKFED.ORG/MICROECONOMICS QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT 2017:Q4 (RELEASED FEBRUARY 2018) FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK RESEARCH AND STATISTICS GROUP ANALYSIS BASED ON NEW YORK FED CONSUMER CREDIT PANEL/EQUIFAX DATA Household Debt and Credit Developments in 2017Q41 Aggregate household debt balances increased in the fourth quarter of 2017, for the 14th consecutive quarter, and are now $473 billion higher than the previous (2008Q3) peak of $12.68 trillion. As of December 31, 2017, total household indebtedness was $13.15 trillion, a $193 billion (1.5%) increase from the third quarter of 2017. Overall household debt is now 17.9% above the 2013Q2 trough. Mortgage balances, the largest component of household debt, increased substantially during the fourth quarter. Mortgage balances shown on consumer credit reports on December 31 stood at $8.88 trillion, an increase of $139 billion from the third quarter of 2017. Balances on home equity lines of credit (HELOC) declined again, by $4 billion and now stand at $444 billion. Non-housing balances, which have been increasing steadily for nearly 6 years overall, saw a $58 billion increase in the fourth quarter. Auto loans grew by $8 billion and credit card balances increased by $26 billion, while student loans saw a $21 billion increase. New extensions of credit declined slightly in the fourth quarter. Mortgage originations, which we measure as appearances of new mortgage balances on consumer credit reports and which include refinanced mortgages, were at $452 billion, down from $479 billion in the third quarter. There were $137 billion in auto loan originations in the fourth quarter of 2017, a small decline from 2017Q3 but making 2017 auto loan origination volume the highest year observed in our data.
    [Show full text]
  • THE EFFECTS of USURY LAWS: EVIDENCE from the ONLINE LOAN MARKET Oren Rigbi*
    THE EFFECTS OF USURY LAWS: EVIDENCE FROM THE ONLINE LOAN MARKET Oren Rigbi* Abstract—Usury laws cap the interest rates that lenders can charge. Using improved significantly over time.4 More recent empirical data from Prosper.com, an online lending marketplace, I investigate the effects of these laws. The key to my empirical strategy is that there was studies have focused on the effects of access to credit at initially substantial variability in states’ interest rate caps, ranging from very high interest rates, also known as payday loans. The 6% to 36%. A behind-the-scenes change in loan origination, however, sud- main findings of this work are that obtaining credit at high denly increased the cap to 36%. The main findings of the study are that higher interest rate caps increase the probability that a loan will be funded, rates does not alleviate economic hardship but rather has especially if the borrower was previously just “outside the money.” I do not adverse effects on loan repayments, the ability to pay for other find, however, changes in loan amounts and default probability. The interest services, and job performance (Melzer, 2011; Skiba & Tobac- rate paid rises slightly, probably because online lending is substantially, yet imperfectly, integrated with the general credit market. man, 2009; Carrell & Zinman, 2008). A recent contribution to the debate is that of Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010), who demonstrate that imposing interest rate restrictions hurts, I. Introduction rather than helps, the financially weak. EGISLATED caps on interest rates, known as usury This paper contributes to the debate by exploiting an exoge- L laws, one of the oldest forms of market regulation, nous increase in the interest rate cap that has affected some have inspired considerable debate throughout their history.1 online borrowers.
    [Show full text]
  • Mortgage Loan Origination Agreement (MLOA) with Their Company’S Information for Review with This Application
    NOTE: Applicants brokering loans must submit a Mortgage Loan Origination Agreement (MLOA) with their company’s information for review with this application. MLOAs must be in compliance with LSA-R.S. 6:1098 MORTGAGE LOAN ORIGINATION AGREEMENT UNITED FEDERAL AMERICAN MORTGAGE, INC. 2200 Mortgage Blvd., Suite 200 Baton Rouge, LA 70737 (225) 555-1212 United Federal American Mortgage, Inc. (UFAM) is a Louisiana corporation incorporated June 24, 1995, and began operations as a mortgage loan broker on . UFAM is a wholly owned subsidiary of JVF Corp., Inc. and an affiliate of JVF Settlement Enterprises and JVF Collections, Inc. JVF Settlement Enterprises will provide settlement services. UFAM is doing business under no other names. This agreement is made and entered into on DATE by and between UFAM with its principal place of business located at 2200 Mortgage Blvd., Suite 200, Baton Rouge, LA 99999 hereinafter referred to as "Broker," and the below signed applicant(s) hereinafter referred to as "Borrower." SERVICES TO BE PERFORMED: Broker agrees to perform all mortgage loan broker services normally and customarily performed in connection with the origination of mortgage loans but not limited to the services described below. Broker and Borrower both agree that under this Agreement, Broker is providing mortgage loan brokering services on behalf of Borrower as Borrower's agent. (a)taking information from the borrower and filling out the application; (b)analyzing the prospective borrower's income and debt and pre-qualifying the prospective borrower
    [Show full text]
  • FAQ Frequently Asked Questions
    FAQ Frequently Asked Questions Single-Family Housing Guaranteed Loan Program Origination USDA is an equal opportunity provider, employer, and lender. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) This document consists of answers to commonly asked questions on the Rural Development Single Family Housing Guaranteed Loan Program Technical Handbook (HB-1-3555). The policy information contained in this guide is based on the applicable Regulations and Technical Handbook, and all lending decisions should adhere to the guidance contained within. You can find a complete copy of the Regulation, 7 CFR Part 3555, and the Technical Handbook on the Rural Development Directives Website, located at www.rd.usda.gov/sites/default/files/hb-1-3555.pdf. General loan scenario or policy questions may be sent to the Guaranteed Policy, Analysis and Communications Branch at [email protected]. Additional lender resources, including up to date information on file turn times and a full listing of contacts based on topic, can be found on the Guaranteed Lender Website located at https://www.rd.usda.gov/page/sfh-guaranteed-lender. Critical program information such as policy updates, funding status, and automation changes are sent by email through GovDelivery. Lenders are encouraged to sign up for GovDelivery notices at: https://public.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDARD/subscriber/new. Thank you for supporting the Single-Family Housing Guaranteed Loan Program! Revised March 30, 2021 Page 2 Table of Contents Appraisal and Property Requirements 4 Appraisal (HB-1-3555, Chapter 12)
    [Show full text]
  • HUD-Treasury Report Recommendations
    CHAPTER I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 CHAPTER II. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 12 A. THE HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE 12 B. OTHER FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL EFFORTS 13 CHAPTER III. SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM 16 A. WHAT IS PREDATORY LENDING? 16 B. THE EFFECTS OF PREDATORY LENDING 23 CHAPTER IV. BACKGROUND ON THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET 25 A. THE ROLE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING 25 B. GROWTH AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SUBPRIME MARKET 27 1. The Growth of the Subprime Market 27 2. Subprime Mortgages and How They Are 29 3 . Subprime Mortgage Lending,Consumer Debt and Bankruptcy 30 4. Characteristics of Subprime Borrowers 32 a. Credit Characteristics 32 b. Delinquency and Foreclosure Characteristics 33 c. Borrower Demographics 34 C. OVERVIEW OF THE SUBPRIME LENDING PIPELINE: FROM BORROWERS TO INVESTORS 36 1. Borrower Entry into the Lending Pipeline 37 2. Sources of Funds 39 3. Securitization Increases Wall Street’s Participation in the Lending Pipeline 40 4. Changing Industry Fortunes in the Latter 1990s 41 5. New Entrants in the Subprime Market 43 D. SUBPRIME LENDING AND LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS 45 1. Subprime Concentration in Low-Income and Minority Neighborhoods 45 2. The Effects of Foreclosure on Low-Income and Minority Neighborhoods 47 E. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 49 CHAPTER V. CURRENT LEGAL CONTEXT 51 A. HOME OWNERSHIP AND EQUITY PROTECTION ACT (HOEPA) 52 B. TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (TILA) 53 C. REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT (RESPA) 53 CHAPTER VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 55 A. CONSUMER LITERACY AND DISCLOSURE 56 1. Need for Greater Financial Literacy 56 2. Need for Housing Counseling 57 3.
    [Show full text]