“On Interpretation” Josef Mitterer • University of Klagenfurt, Austria

You should read Kant! You should read Kant! (End of a discussion between Hans Albert and Herbert Marcuse at the European Forum in Alpbach 1967)

1. Interpretations of philosophical texts can differ so much that the discussants claim that their opponents have not even read the texts they are talking about, let alone understood them. The request to read Kant was the result (not only) of different interpretations of the “Cri- tique of Pure Reason.” I can’t remember in detail the discussion I experienced as a gymnasium student at the European Forum in Alpbach, but I do remember that Herbert Marcuse and Hans Albert referred to the same text passages.

2. In Vienna after the war, Wittgenstein and the philosophers of the Vienna Circle were not even worth mentioning in academic philosophy. For analytical philosophers, even a few years ago, Hegel and Heidegger were proponents of simple and dangerous nonsense. Meanwhile quite a few of them are developing new sympa- thies for metaphysics, and a combination of Continental and Analytical philosophy is a good choice if you want to make a career in academic philosophy. The variety and range of interpretations of Nietzsche in Germany before, during, and after the days of the Third Reich are amazing. According to some interpreters, Richard Rorty, Martin Heidegger, Jaques Derrida, Ernst von Glasersfeld or Paul Feyerabend belong to the most important philosophers of the last century whilst according to others, they are not philosophers at all…and similar claims were (and still are) made about Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Allegations that a text or a book does not belong to philosophy have, for a long time, been used as a popular killer argument against qualifying works such as dissertations or habilita- tions. It is said of a still-famous British Wittgensteinian that to study with him is bad for an academic career and the same was claimed for Richard Rorty in Princeton and Paul Feyera- bend in Berkeley. The fame of a philosopher during his lifetime often fades away soon after his death and sometimes starts already to vanish once he turns emeritus… but then he has a chance for a renaissance once he has been dead for long enough.

3. What would be the result of lining up the interpretations of Kant of more than two hundred years except a library of several thousand volumes? A deeper and deeper understanding of Kant? New aspects? A critique of earlier Kant interpretations? New light? The same applies for Aristotle, Plato, Spinoza, Descartes, and all the other great dead in the history of philosophy. Have the differences become less and the quarrels died down? Has it been decided what belongs to which body of texts, where which fragments belong, which translations or posthu- mous editions are reliable and which are not? Which works of philosophy will be forgotten (like the fine books of the pragmatist philosopher, F. S. C. Schiller) and which ones will continue to proliferate new interpretations: this is a matter of contingency and depends on conditions that cannot be standardized. Philosophical fashion is hard to predict. Do interpretations of philosophers get more consistent because our distance to them in- creases over the course of time? Or because the interest in them is dying down and less work is done “on” them?

Sometimes the actuality of philosophers depends on when they have died, except when this happened a very long time ago. Birthdays and anniverseries of death of Plato & Co are not celebrated with congresses or conferences. However, when philosophers have been dead for no more than two or three hundred years, anniversaries are often a welcome chance for re- evaluations and new assessments. What would have been the impact on the reception of Wittgenstein if he had edited and published the “Philosophical Investigations” or even “On Certainty” himself? In the “arenas of philosophy” (an expression by Wilhelm Flasch) the discussions are about interpretations, rankings and evaluations, and the ongoing competition between philosophical schools and methods. Who belongs to the heroes, to the good guys, and who belongs to the bad guys, these are classifications that have changed in history more than once.

4. “The curricula of philosophy mainly consist of … reading and interpreting texts.” This is a quote from the homepage of a well-known department of philosophy and may serve as an indication of the importance of interpretation in philosophical education and philosophical discourse in general. The idea that we first read the texts, get practice reading them, and only then interpret them, leads to a strong distinction between text and interpretation, – except we really “stick close” to the text. Is it possible to imagine a non-interpretative reading of texts? Evangelical Christians sometimes emphasize that they do not interpret the bible – but they already do so via the translation and even more so by preaching the gospel. And of course books with titles such as What Jesus (or Popper, Kant, Stalin, Einstein) really said are interpreting their heroes as well.

5. Interpretation is related to explanation, to translation, analysis, exegesis, and critique, to different ways of reading, to commentaries, evaluations, and judgments. Almost everything can be interpreted, whether man, nature, word and world, literature or god. We interpret data, clouds, texts, and much more; in this paper, however, I want to restrict myself to the interpretation of texts. Philosophical texts get interpreted, analyzed, discussed, critized, commented, translated, and explicated. We read “into” texts to understand them. If we only want to know approxi- mately what they are about, we read them “across” or “diagonally,” but we can also do an “ex- act reading” so we can then interpret them “more closely to the text.” In English we can differentiate various types of reading: Critical Readings, Close Readings and Distant Readings, even Absolute Readings and Radical Readings plus Re-Readings and Fresh Readings. Readings named after different philosophers are also quite common, for example Hegelian, Wittgensteinian, Aristotelian, and Kantian Readings, and nowadays Rortyan, Lacanian, and Zizekian Readings. And I remember my perplexity when many years ago Rich- ard Rorty wrote to me that he did not quite understand my Feyerabendian Reading of Witt- genstein.

6. Now, what is the relation between text and interpretation? A text that is interpreted is often itself no more than an interpretation of texts that the author has read. Primary literature is nearly always to a large extent secondary literature to other texts, which we may be unaware of. The relationship between text and interpretation can be determined in at least two basically different ways: namely as a dualistic relation or as a nondualistic relation. The dualistic model of interpretation can be sketched like this: a text, for example the “Cri- tique of Pure Reason,” gets interpreted in different ways. When this happens, two levels are presupposed: a “lower” text-level where the text “lies” or “stands” or simply “is,” and a “situat- ed above” interpretation-level. The interpretations are directed towards the text, they get referred to it, and an evaluation/weighting of the interpretations is basically possible: depending on their relation to the text they are either correct or not, adequate or inadequate. The relation

to the text determines whether the interpretations match the text, whether they correspond to it, or whether they are correct or not, do justice to the text or not. The text has an authority over and against the interpretations: it serves as referee, and as instance and criterion for competing interpretations. At the same time the text itself is dumb and silent, but fortunately the interpreters represent the text, they speak on behalf and for it.

7. The dualistic model of interpretation not only dominates philosophical discourse, it also determines many teaching-learning situations, including seminars at universities. Here is an example. A student writes a seminar paper on the “Critique of Pure Reason” (or on a section of it). The professor usually rates/grades/judges the student’s paper depending on if the basic ideas have been grasped, if the student has understood the text, if he considers additional literature and puts his work into a certain context, and if his argumentation is clear, consistent, and comprehensible. According to the self-understanding of the dualistic mode, the professor checks the interpretation of the student above all “against” the text, by referring it “to” the text – and in addition he may also judge and grade the student paper for style and length, and even for spelling. But what does it mean to check the interpretation against the text? How shall this work? The professor already interpreted the Kant text himself before the Kant seminar started and therefore before the student interpreted it. In other words, the professorial interpretation precedes the student interpretation and, in addition, the professor has a certain knowledge of the Kant literature – that is, of various interpretations of Kant – otherwise presumably he would not have offered the seminar on Kant to begin with. The foregoing knowledge of the professor, his ante-knowledge – even if it is not made explicit and remains largely tacit – together with the text, forms the reference basis for the student’s interpretation of Kant that is going to be rated/graded by the professor. This “tacit knowledge,” this subliminal knowledge, is even necessary to be able to judge the work/paper of the student. Why? Well, the Kant text alone is not judicious, is not capable of discriminating, and does not talk by itself – and Kant is no longer available as an interpreter of his own text. In practice the student paper is not judged “against” the text. The text forms the common starting basis for both the student’s interpretation and the professorial interpretation. The professor tends to judge/interpret the student’s interpretation primarily from his own professorial interpretation of the text and, more generally, from his own authoritative teacher’s opinion – which has more authority than the student’s opinion. Only in rare cases might the student’s interpretation change the opinion of the professor and therefore possibly result in a change of his ego-interpretation so far.

8. When the professor judges/interprets the student’s interpretation of Kant, then this judgment can manifest itself in simple gradings, with or without additional comments, or, when a thesis or dissertation is at stake in an extensive review. Such a judgment/grading/review of the professor interprets the interpretation of the student. In this way the interpretation of the student gets “for the time being” the status of a text; it even “turns” into a text. So now, in the dualistic mode, the student’s interpretation relates to the judgment/interpretation of the professor like a text to an interpretation. But this is not made explicit: the professor is not going to say that he refers his interpretation of the student’s interpretation to it and that he checks it against the student’s interpretation. The student may perhaps do this, especially when the professorial judgments turns out to be critical or even negative, but the professor will not normally listen to him and therefore the student will make his judgment of the judgment of his interpretation of the text by the professor explicit only in rare cases, for example when he wants to complain about an unjustified judgment or interpretation.

9. The dualistic model of interpretation is based on the idea of the reference of interpretations against the text and of a resulting, follow-up judgment of these interpretations. It is often ne- glected or even ignored that the judging of an interpretation as true or false, as coherent or incoherent, is preceded by two interpretations: namely, in our example, by the student’s interpretation and also the (often unspoken) professorial interpretation of the Kant text. These interpretations compete with each other implicitly; however, the interpretative authority rests with the professor. The interpretation of the student is not judged against the text but via its coherence or in- coherence with the professorial interpretation, whereby both interpretations – the student’s interpretation and the professorial ego-interpretation – are compatible with the text.

10. The professor interprets the interpretation of the student, who interprets the text by Kant. He will say that he interprets/judges the interpretation of the student against the Kant text, but for this purpose the text needs to be “enriched” by and combined with the professorial interpretation. Only based on this combination can the student’s interpretation now be interpreted. In this way, the student’s interpretation changes/mutates/turns, through the professorial judgment-interpretation, into a text.

11. In short, the dualist philosopher and professor interprets the student’s text on the basis of his own interpretation of Kant. By combining his own interpretation with the Kant text and presupposing it to the student’s interpretation, he can, so-to-say, judge the student’s interpretation “objectively” “against” the text. It is from this depersonalized, presupposed ego- interpretation that the student’s interpretation gets judged/rated. And the result of this judgment is foreseeable: insofar as it deviates from the professorial interpretation, does not correspond to the text, or does not match the text, the text has not been understood properly, is misinterpreted, etc.

12. A nondualist model of interpretation. What difference does it make? Like dualists, nondualists hold seminars and judge the essays, the papers, the interpretations of their students. But the nondualist does not attempt to judge the seminar-papers “objectively” and “against” the text. For the nondualist, the text relates to the interpretation as an interpretation so far to an interpretation from now on. Each interpretation forms, together with the text, a new text for further interpretations. The Kant text, which the nondualist professor presents to the students for interpretation, forms a common starting-base for follow-up interpretations. The text is neutralistic: it allows any interpretation and has no selective power. The professorial interpretation has nothing compulsory/obligatory and does not appeal to an al- leged/supposedly neutral basis of reference, which is nothing else but one’s own interpretation once again.

13. So now the question is: Are all interpretations equally valid in a non-dualistic model? Well, for the text all interpretations are equally valid – at least the text remains silent about it. But this only means that the text alone is unable to serve as a decision maker/decision basis for competing interpretations. Perhaps we can empower the decision basis to make (cognitive) decisions if we enlarge it and present the text with the help of an additional interpretation? This way the text does gain decisional power: but only for one’s own interpretations and against any deviating interpretations. However this argumentative step is open to all competing interpreters and therefore leads to stale-mate positions. It only has an effect on our discourse if the powers of interpretation are unequally distributed – such as when, for example, a professor judges the interpretations of students.

14. Dualistic philosophers operate with two different levels: with an underlying text-level and with an interpretation-level lying above. These levels must not be mixed up, so that referring can succeed and validation-claims can be redeemed. But a continuous distinction between these two levels is not easy because the occupancy of these levels often changes. Interpreta- tions that are judged/interpreted can mutate/turn into texts and change from the interpretation level to the text level. In our example of a Kant seminar, the student’s interpretation serves as a text for the interpreting professor and therefore belongs, insofar, to the text level. For the student, however, his interpretation of the Kant text remains on the interpretation level. A stabilizing or even inter- subjectively binding assignment of language-units to text and interpretation and the respec- tive levels is very difficult.

15. The dualistic model of interpretation presupposes the possibility and realizability of a dichotomic distinction between text and interpretation. If we cannot make a reliable distinction between text and interpretation, then it will be difficult in conflict situations to put for- ward or even put through valitdity-claims of & on interpretations with reference to the text. But perhaps the possibility of such a dichotomic distinction is only an allegation, is only wishful thinking?

16. How can we distinguish in a text-interpretation situation between text and interpretation? This is not simple at all: during an interpretation we cannot distinguish between the text we interpret and our interpreting of the text. But how about after the interpretation of the text? Can we distinguish between text and interpretation after the interpretation? Yes, we can; but only within an interpretation of (text and interpretation) – and in this way we are again within an interpretative situation. In this interpretative situation we do not distinguish between (text and interpretation) and interpretation. As long as we interpret, we are always in a situation of being “during” an interpretation. A distinction between text and interpretation is only possible within a further interpretation and this distinction therefore does not bring an epistemo- logical improvement for a dualistic model of interpretation. (Of course we can distinguish without problem between the “Critique of Pure Reason” that lies in green paper-backs with traces of use on the desk and a computer-print-out of the interpretation – but in this way we do not distinguish between text and interpretation, only between a book on the desk and a computer printout.)

17. Each distinction is preceded by a non-distinction. Distinctions are based on non- distinctions.

18. Distinctions between text and interpretation succeed when we distinguish between a text and the interpretations of others, for example the interpretations of students. This distinction/difference becomes relevant when the text is empowered for judgments via the ego- interpretation. Text and ego-interpretation precede the student’s interpretation that is to be judged. The ego-interpretation normally remains tacit – otherwise the student is deprived of the chance for a better interpretation from the beginning. We judge the interpretation of the student, amongst other things, on its bringing to the surface contents or intentions that we already know. Students are often judged on whether they know what the professor already knows. And this implies that we don’t tell the students from the beginning everything we know: our pre-knowledge/advance knowledge determines the judgment of the students’ interpretations. And we would give away this basis for judgment once we share it with the students. 19. The dualistic and nondualistic models of interpretation differ as well with respect to the range of the validity-claims that are raised by the interpreters. In the dualistic model, the validity-claims onto truth, correctness, consistency, and agreement for the ego-interpretations reach beyond them and are interpretation-transcendent. In-

terpretations can conflict because they are directed towards the same text and their validity- claims overlap. In the nondualistic model, validity-claims are limited/restricted to the interpretations. The interpretations do not raise claims that go beyond them and do not contest with competing interpretations for their place in discourse. They do not assert that some interpretations (namely, our own ones) are more correct and more true than others. Perhaps they claim to be more stable, more appropriate, more convincing than other interpretations – but these claims are argumentation-immanent.

20. A significant difference between the dualistic and the nondualistic model lies in the direction of the interpretations. In the dualistic model, interpretations are directed/oriented towards the text and therefore to an instance that “lies below” but “ranks above” the text and that determines if interpretations correspond to the text, if they do justice to the text, if they are right or wrong. Only with the help of an interpretation can this instance get differentiated to an extent that it gets deci- sive power in the case of conflict. But for such a differentiation any interpretation can be used that is held and argued for by a proponent, and therefore competing interpretations will turn into stale-mate situations. These stale-mate/stand-off situations can only be dissolved by us- ing/applying interpretative power or the authority of interpretation. Dualistic interpretations are directed/oriented backwards, whereby later interpretations re- fer to earlier ones and these to a preceding text, which they should agree with. But to fulfil this task is no great deal, as this agreement can be made for each text – and similarly against other interpretations, if they are excluded from the text with the help of our own/ego- interpretations.

21. In the nondualistic model, interpretations start from the text. The text is itself an interpretation of another text. Interpretations are interpretations of interpretations, whereby the previous interpretations are incorporated into the following interpretations. This is not a purely accumulative way of proceeding: an interpretation from now on changes the text, the interpretation so far, into a new text, which can be interpreted further in an open process. Here the goal is not, as in the dualistic model, to reduce a plurality of interpretations in direction of the one and true interpretation. The goal is not an interpretation that conforms better with the text, that grasps or matches it better than other interpretations. The goal is, if at all, the change of the interpretative status quo into new, further-leading interpretations and not their conservation or even fundamentalization. The hope that the better interpretations will survive is only the hope that our own interpretations will survive. And the idea that the true or correct interpretations are going to survive is nothing but the wishful thinking that at least “in the long run” our own interpretations are the winners and not those of our competitors.

22. The idea of a “better,” “correct” or even “true” interpretation is little more than the idea of the most recent/last preferred interpretation. When I work on the interpretation of a text, then my thoughts will often return to the text, from which they start. But this interplay is only a back-and-forth consideration of whether what I say is consistent, whether it fits or not. And these back-and-forth considerations are the interpretations between which I oscillate/fluctuate and have to make up my mind. And when I finally decide for one interpretation, this could have to do with lots of things: shortage of time, lack of better ideas, or simply because I want to hold a consistent/coherent line of thought and do not want to allow contradictions. At one point it’s time to stop and the interpretation held last is the one I stick with until others may come.

23. How big are the differences between the two models of interpretation? This depends on whether the differences are determined by proponents/supporters of the dualistic or of the nondualistic model of interpretation. For a dualist, the differences are huge. His model relies on the presupposition that interpretations are directed towards the text: therefore there is a chance to realize the idea of a better, of a correct or even true interpretation in the case of conflicting interpretations. The dualist draws a grim non-dualist scenario: the mix-up or even the denial of the different levels of an interpretation-discourse will lead into an anchorless, anarchist “anything goes” and into ex- treme relativism. Whether a student’s interpretation of Kant is correct or a misinterpretation would then not depend on the text, but would depend solely on the judgment of the professor, regardless of whether this judgment is purely arbitrary or based on facts. Everbody could claim anything and our thinking would get disorientated and lose all direction. The wildest growth of interpretations could not be cut down via reference to the text; contradictions would flourish and the doors would be wide open to all kinds of contingency.

24. A nondualist will put the differences much smaller. The differences between the dualist and the nondualist model of interpretation are differences between different argumentation techniques and the vocabulary they use. As long as there are no competing interpretations, she finds the conceptual framework of the dualist rather strange and unnecessarily complex. But her framework is the result of a differentiation through the cognitive efforts of many generations of philosophers. The branching out into different schools has the consequence that principal questions are hardly asked any more. The dualistic array of concepts and the associated levels are only activated when conflicts arise between interpretations and between judgments of interpretations. The dualization of the interpretation situation allows to show any arbitrary interpretation as true-correct- adequate, as long as – and this is the only restriction – it is compatible with the ego- interpretation. The ego-interpretation gets immunized against criticism because it can secure, via the mu- tually related levels of text and interpretation, the necessary correspondences in a “beyond of interpretation.” The nondualistic model does not work with levels and references, nor with depersonaliza- tions, pre-suppositions/suppositions in advance, equivalents, or correspondences. When nondualists favor one interpretation over another, it is a matter of preference and not a matter of reference.

25. The decision between a nondualistic preference-model of interpretation and a dualistic reference-model is also a decision for a certain technique of argumentation and the conceptual vocabulary connected with it. So far, philosophical education has propagated almost exclusively the dualistic model and has tried to establish it as a condito sine qua non of rational discourse – and therefore to pre- clude it from this discourse. The nondualistic alternative makes this model optional: we can opt for it, but also against it.

To be published in 2013 in Constructivist Foundations 8(2). German original: “Über Interpretation” in: Riegler A. & Weber S. (eds.) (2010) Die Dritte Philosophie. Velbrück, Weilerswist: 286–296.