China newsletter n. 1 – May 2021

In this newsletter:  Seeking Serenity: A New American Influence Strategy for Southeast Asia And Beyond, War on the Rocks;  Biden leaves China a Xinjiang terrorism problem with US exit from Afghanistan, South China Morning Post;  Tianhe Launch Marks a Key Step in China’s Growing Space Ambitions, The Jamestown Foundation Global Research and Analysis;  The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series in 2021: Growing Emphasis on Joint Operations on the High Seas, The Jamestown Foundation Global Research and Analysis;  Watch Out: China’s Type 093A Attack Submarine Has Powerful Upgrades, The National Interest;  Non-Nuclear EMP Weapons: How to Deter China's Growing Military Might? , The National Interest;  China Wants To Revive A Strategically Located Airfield Deep In The Pacific: Report, The Drive  Shifts in Diplomacy undermine China’s international standing, Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations

Seeking Serenity: A New American Influence Strategy for Southeast Asia And Beyond (10 May) War on the Rocks

The Authors propose a Serenity Prayer-type approach, aimed at proposing a valid US’s strategy in Southeast Asia and beyond. The core of the approach relies on de-prioritizing bilateral relationships in countries predominately influenced by China, focusing more intentionally on strategically important relationships with countries where China has approached the United States as a peer competitor, and supporting the member- states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The approach begins with accepting that China’s dominance in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar is unlikely to be substantially diminished soon. (China is by far Cambodia’s most significant provider of arms transfers; the United States sends none). China’s arms transfers to Laos are also significant, though outpaced by Russia. And while U.S. foreign aid is substantial, it fails to compete with other official financial flows from China. U.S. policymakers should cede this ground to better focus material allocations elsewhere, like in the Hub of Singapore, framed as U.S.-dominant state by the authors. Although Singapore continues to maintain its position of strategic non-alignment, the U.S. State Department describes its longstanding mutual security and economic partnerships with the country as “expansive and enduring.” More challenging cases are what the Authors call competitive states — Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Brunei — where recent years’ trends have tilted in China’s favor. Meanwhile, a potentially more difficult diplomatic task is identified in the promotion of stronger ties within Southeast Asia. Indeed, a more cohesive and single-minded ASEAN could ensure its own regional intra-dependence far outweighs its member countries’ reliance on China or the United States.

Key Points: The authors rely on the Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity Index for their analysis: it is a composite measurement of influence capacity between states developed by the War on the Rock’s team at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, informed by surveys of U.S. government analysts, and soon to be launched in a forthcoming report in collaboration with the Atlantic Council’s Foresight, Strategy, and Risks Initiative. The index can be used as a practical tool to monitor China-dominant states in Asia. As the authors suggest, the US and its Allies efforts in deterring China could be focused on US-dominant States, by increasing arms shipments and military coordination via training exercises; leveraging the overlap in each country’s demand for imports and supply of exports, particularly in the materials and information and

NOT CLASSIFIED communications technology sectors, to increase the exchange of goods and services. In the case of competitive States, the US could coordinate partnership strategies with Allies and Partners to take competitive advantage on China. For instance, in Vietnam, Washington could gain ground with the aid of its allies in Seoul, which is currently positioned as the top influencer in Vietnam since 2017, according to the team’s index. To sum up, by using these metrics to size up the competition in Southeast Asia, U.S. policymakers could recognize where American influence is significantly outmatched by China, identify opportunities where the trend of relative losses in American influence can be reversed, and direct resources accordingly.

Biden leaves China a Xinjiang terrorism problem with US exit from Afghanistan: (1st May) South China Morning Post

In April, US President Joe Biden said the United States would withdraw its remaining troops from Afghanistan before September 11, the 20th anniversary of the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. While some reports have suggested that Washington’s retreat might allow China to establish its influence in the region, Mark N. Katz, a government and politics professor at George Mason University in the US, said this was unlikely due to the poor security situation in the country, where the weak government in Kabul was likely to be overthrown by the Taliban within a year or two of allied forces departing. According to Elizabeth Wishnick, a political-science professor at the Montclair State University in the US, although China always criticised the presence of NATO forces on its Western border, NATO’s security role actually suited Beijing fine. China has few investments in Afghanistan in contrast to the billion it had invested in Pakistan by the same year. Therefore, Beijing’s risk profile was quite limited, which meant China was likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach after the US withdrawal, said Nishank Motwani, an independent analyst based in Kabul. Motwani said the withdrawal of US forces would create a political and security vacuum for actors including China to play a larger role in influencing foreign and security policy decisions in the country. Given the shared 90km border between China and Afghanistan, Beijing is worried that the East Turkestan Islamic Movement – which it has repeatedly blamed for violent acts in Xinjiang – will move to Afghanistan and threaten China’s security. Key points: The article well reflects Chinese’s conflicting sentiment around the planned military withdrawal of the United States and its allies from Afghanistan. The Chinese government over the years has declined to contribute combat forces or logistical assistance to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) and has refused to commit to support any NATO-led follow-on force, with the intention to avoid antagonizing the Taliban, which could retaliate against China’s growing economic interests in Afghanistan and perhaps again stir up trouble among China’s Muslim minority. However, now that the withdrawal is imminent it remains to be seen how Beijing will deal with the security vacuum left with the US’ forces pullout, which might provide feasible ground for extremist groups to develop and lunch cross-border attacks in China proxy territory. Either Chinese leadership decide to step up its military engagement in support of the instable Kabul government and the Afghan security forces, or to strengthen its military presence across the all-region, Beijing ’s re-think of its strategic approach in Afghanistan is something that NATO should keep eye on.

Tianhe Launch Marks a Key Step in China’s Growing Space Ambitions: (7 May) The Jamestown Foundation Global Research and Analysis

On April 29, a Long March 5B heavy rocket carrying the Tianhe 1 core module of China’s space station was successfully launched into low earth orbit from the Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site, Hainan Province. It marks the first step in the construction of the China Space Station (CSS), long seen as the culmination of a national manned spaceflight program that will aid in “realizing the shared vision of a community of destiny for the benefit of all mankind” in international space cooperation. The successful construction of a “long-term” and “large scale” Chinese space station is the third and final step of a “three step” development program for manned spaceflight (Project 921) that was laid out by the Politburo Standing Committee in 1992.

NOT CLASSIFIED According to the long-time China space watcher Andrew Jones, China plans a “high-density, highly challenging launch cadence with complex equipment and operations” completing 11 CSS-related launches over the course of 2021 and 2022. The CSS would allow China to conduct sustained scientific research in space, as well as giving it a leading edge in cooperation with other existing and emerging national space programs. Following the Tianhe 1 launch, People’s Daily published a congratulatory message from Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping which said that “building a space station and national space laboratory is an important goal…of China’s manned space program”. U.S. policymakers have grown increasingly concerned about plans to safely deorbit the ISS at the end of its lifetime, which is expected to be sometime after 2028. Chinese onlookers have rather cynically pegged the ISS’s endpoint to 2024, at which point the CSS could be the only international space station in low earth orbit, making China—by at least one metric—the de facto global leader in space. Key Points: Xi’s message in the aftermath of the Tianhe 1’s launch was a reminder that Chinese space programs is closely tied to issues of national security and global prestige. Alongside the Beidou satellite navigation system and the associated Belt and Road Space Information Corridor, the Mozi quantum satellite, the Chang’e lunar program and the Tianwen Mars missions, the Tiangong space station symbolizes that China is becoming a “space power”. Yet China’s ability and willingness to be a responsible leader remains questionable, as well as the dual-use of its capabilities which should be reason of careful consideration for NATO’s Allies and Partners.

The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series in 2021: Growing Emphasis on Joint Operations on the High Seas: (7 May) The Jamestown Foundation Global Research and Analysis

As part of its broader effort to develop a distant seas capability, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) held an annual Southern Theater Command (STC) far seas training exercise from late January to late February 2021. This event is likely the 2021 iteration of the ZHANLAN series of far seas training exercises, which the PLAN has conducted annually since at least 2016. The capabilities displayed at ZHANLAN serve as a useful metric for tracking the PLAN’s progress in far seas operations over time. The ZHANLAN-2021 training task group consisted of five vessels. Little information is available about where the task group transited during its one-month deployment. The only known geographic reference is that at some point, it passed over the equator. However, no publicly available evidence exists to corroborate this assumption. In addition to having the joint expertise and authorities within the task group’s command post, ZHANLAN 2021 also featured the first publicized participation of forces from other services within this training series. This integration of actual forces in field training provides personnel with the crucial experience of operating within a joint force. The most visually prominent joint participant in ZHANLAN 2021 was the PLA Army. Key points: China’s rise as a naval power has attracted wide attention in public military and security debate in the last decade. The PLAN’s aspiration to become a blue water navy capable of fighting wars at distance, both naval thinking and new long-range capabilities is supported by investing in capabilities necessary for “multi-mission air control, limited sea control, and deep strike proficiencies”. The ZHANLAN-2021 task group continues to build competency in the subject of underway replenishment, indicating that the PLAN remains on track towards sustaining some magazine depth in far seas. Secondly, the PLAN continues to train in using advanced intelligence assets. This year’s evolution of ZHANLAN once again involved AGI-857 as well as probable elements of the PLA Strategic Support Force’s (PLASSF) Network Systems Department. In addition, ZHANLAN 2021 notably featured a major push for increased jointness at the tactical level. In conclusion is worth nothing how this year’s ZHANLAN placed joint operations in the limelight, thus showing the PLAN’s progress in carrying on joint and integrated exercises. The US and its Allies should be mindful of the progress shown in high-end training events like ZHANLAN.

NOT CLASSIFIED Watch Out: China’s Type 093A Attack Submarine Has Powerful Upgrades (10 may) The National Interest

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is now the largest naval force in the world. However, the more significant threat from Beijing may not be the carriers or other surface vessels, or even its aircraft carrier “killer” missiles—but rather its Type 093A attack submarine, on its way to being a world-class attack submarine. According to submarine expert H I Sutton, writing for Naval News, the Type 093A Shang-II class is the most powerful attack submarine in China’s arsenal today. The roughly 7,000-ton nuclear-powered submarine is roughly the same size as the Royal Navy’s Astute-class, which puts it in between the French Navy Suffren-class and the U.S. Navy’s Virginia-class. Further, the Type 093A reportedly uses some of its larger size for noise-reducing features including acoustic stealt. The Type 093A is also reported to be quite well armed and can carry the YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles. The submarine can also carry the YJ-82 anti-ship missile, rocket mines and torpedoes including the Yu-6 thermal torpedoes. Key points: China’s ambition to become a world-leading naval fighting force poses challenges to NATO’s Allies and Partner, whose effort should be made on closely assessing Beijing’s progress in the naval strategy as well as towards monitoring its practical developments in the three domains of processes, structures and system that will speed up its goal to become a naval global power. The Type 093A Shang-II is not the world’s best attack submarine, but it should highlight the fact that Beijing continues to make progress on all fronts.

Non-Nuclear EMP Weapons: How to Deter China's Growing Military Might? (9 May) The National Interest

In the event of war with the People’s Republic of China, the United States and its Allies will face a larger Chinese force fighting largely on its home turf. It will require the development of weapons systems that can disable multiple targets within a set range. Non-Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (NNEMP) weapons could have such a promise when it comes to knocking out Chinese radars, warships, and military installations. NNEMP weapons work by generating an electrical charge that destroys sensitive electronic circuits by releasing microwaves upon contact with the target. Further, NNEMP weapons could generate an electromagnetic pulse with an effective range of a few hundred yards to a few miles depending on their size. Russia currently has its own NNEMPs under development. Key points: In a potential conflict with China, Allies ability to degrade the enemy’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance capabilities would be a key- victory factor. With the advent of alleged Chinese anti-stealth radars that purportedly can detect the F-22, F- 35 or B-2, it’s doubly important to have a weapon that can neutralize multiple targets simultaneously from long ranges. An NNEMP weapon could fry the electronics of the radars and nearby surface-to-air missiles. In other words, NNEMPs could serve as a first-strike weapon to disrupt enemy defenses and allow for conventionally armed bombers, fighters, and cruise missiles to carry out second strikes against enemy targets. Such weapons should also be supplied to allied nations including Australia, Japan, Poland, the Baltic States, and Taiwan as a deterrent against aggression.

China Wants To Revive A Strategically Located Airfield Deep In The Pacific: Report: (6 May) The Drive

The Chinese government reportedly has plans to refurbish and expand an airstrip on the island of Kanton, also spelled Canton, part of the archipelago nation of Kiribati in the central Pacific Ocean. If true, this could give Beijing an airbase in an incredibly strategical location, between North America and New Zealand, potentially giving China's military much greater reach throughout a critical and increasingly tense region. There has been talk about possible Chinese infrastructure projects in Kiribati since 2019. The existing runway at Canton

NOT CLASSIFIED Airport, once modernized, could be long enough to support fighter deployments, but the improved section would likely need to be extended out to the full 8,000 feet length to support large-size transports, as well as maritime patrol aircraft or even bombers.

Key points: China’s activities in the small Pacific Islands pose reasons of concern for the dual-use that might emerge from construction projects. It is public how persistent intelligence-gathering, sea control, and long- range maritime targeting are of interest for the People’s Liberation Army in this region. If China's developments at Canton Airport come to fruition and have an overt military component, they could also include other anti- access and area denial capabilities, such as surface-to-air missiles or shore-based anti-ship cruise missiles. Command and control and communications nodes might be another addition to any such military complex. This would all be like what has been seen on China's man-made outposts in the South China Sea, which also underscore the country's demonstrated ability to turn remote, uninhabited islands into important military facilities. Nauru, Tuvalu, and Kiribati are particularly vulnerable: their small size and geographic isolation make them especially susceptible to outside coercion. Not only these Small Pacific Islands have some of the region’s most strategic geography, but they are also committed democracies who have long sought to align with U.S. interests in international forums and at the United Nations. The U.S. and its partners should respond by assisting these Islands in the form of long-term relationships that protect their sovereignty and by guaranteeing the effectiveness of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Whatever the wider geopolitical relevance of Beijing's plans for Canton Airport might, and whether it will host any kind of Chinese military presence in the future, it is certainly another example of China's efforts to expand its geopolitical reach.

Shifts in Diplomacy undermine China’s international standing (3 May) Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations

Over the past year and a half, China’s diplomacy has attracted attention from media institutions, policy makers and scholars around the globe. As President Xi Jinping has stated on many occasions, China feels the time has come to ‘grasp the historic opportunity’ to expand China’s influence, Chinese wisdom, and China’s approach to global governance. Chinese diplomats seem to have heeded their leader’s call and are now actively promoting China’s political model and global governance concepts. While the domestic and international context in which China practices diplomacy have thus altered dramatically, China’s diplomatic goals have remained the same. The primary goals of Chinese diplomacy have always been focused on serving domestic purposes: the safeguarding of absolute sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security; and, most importantly, the contribution to domestic development. Though the goals of diplomacy have not altered, the way in which China has lately sought to achieve them gives rise to two important shifts in the conduct of diplomacy. Firstly, China no longer limits itself when expressing its frustration and anger about the lack of respect it garners, as illustrated by the increasing use of an offensive diplomatic style, often referred to as ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy. Secondly, the Chinese government increasingly forces its will on other states, rather than persuading nations to align with Chinese foreign policy goals. What is new is the ease with which China currently reverts to coercion and retaliation and the harshness of its measures. In the past two years China has sought to threaten and/or coerce numerous Western governments, companies, institutions, and individuals, in response to behavior or statements that were not to Beijing’s liking. The number of issues and the nature of activities that may provoke harsh diplomatic actions by Beijing is continuously expanding. Furthermore, the scope of China’s intimidation, coercion and retaliation is growing.

Key points: The article provides insights on China’s current diplomatic approach and is a useful reading for understanding the context in which the Chinese diplomacy is conducted, both at domestical and international level.

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