Ramifications of West Bank Annexation

GAZA: AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY FOR SEPTEMBER 2018 Gaza: An Alternative Strategy for Israel

Preface

A team of Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS) comprising members who dealt with the issue while on active duty, in consultation with other experts, examined Israel’s current strategy as well as other options discussed in the Israeli security- political environment; mapped the advantages and shortfalls of each, and concluded by formulating an alternative Gaza strategy for the Israeli Government.

The proposed strategy is based on the realization that any solution will have far- reaching ramifications for the Palestinian issue as a whole and for the feasibility of an eventual two-state solution.

Accordingly, an effort was made to ensure that interim steps and partial solutions preserve – if not enhance – conditions for a future permanent agreement in which the West Bank and the constitute a single political entity. This includes supporting the resumption of civilian and security management of the Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its empowerment as the legitimate source of authority.

2 Gaza: Enhancing An Alternative West Bank Strategy for Stability and Israel Security

Table of Contents

Preface...... 2

Introduction...... 4

Basic Assumptions...... 6

Flaws of Current Policy...... 6

Hamas...... 7

The Palestinian Authority...... 8

Key Challenges...... 9

Objectives of an Alternative Strategy...... 10

Alternative Strategies...... 12

Findings...... 12

The Israeli Initiative: Israeli Undertakings...... 16

Expected Difficulties...... 23

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Introduction

When considering a strategy for the Gaza Strip, CIS accentuates the following Israeli interests: ɖɖ First and foremost – security: removing the terror threat and ensuring long term calm for residents of neighboring Israeli population centers and beyond. ɖɖ Preventing a humanitarian disaster and improving living conditions for the Gaza Strip’s two million residents. ɖɖ Completing Israel’s disengagement from Gaza by reducing Israel’s responsibility for the lives and welfare of the residents of the area be it via international involvement or otherwise. ɖɖ A time-specific interest is securing the return of the remains of the soldiers Oron Shaul and Hadar Goldin, and the release of the detained civilians Avera Mengistu, Hisham a-Sayad, and Jum’a Ibrahim Abu ‘Anima.

Our process was based on several assumptions, principally: The failings of the current policy have been manifest in the rounds of fighting and the periods of tension between them. Israel’s strength allows it to take calculated risks in attempting to change the direction and promote a more stable security reality. Conditions in the arena – including ’ political and economic distress, the willingness of key Arab countries to support the effort, and the US Administration’s support for Israel – contribute to the prospects of the proposed change of direction. The first stage of this process is to produce an immediate calming, while the subsequent stages are to consolidate long-term stability, as well as contribute to the prospects for a comprehensive agreement, when conditions mature.

In this regard, the CIS Gaza Team reached three conclusions: ɖɖ This is the only alternative that meets Israel’s security objectives. ɖɖ Israel’s strength allows it to take calculated risks in attempting to change the direction and promote a more stable security reality.

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ɖɖ Conditions in the arena – including Hamas’ political and economic distress, the willingness of key Arab countries to support the effort, and the US Administration’s support for Israel – contribute to the prospects of the proposed change of direction. ɖɖ Despite the predictable difficulties, local circumstances (in the Gaza Strip) as well as regional and international ones make implementation of this alternative possible. ɖɖ Having given it a sincere try, a failed Gaza initiative does not adversely affect Israel’s circumstances when it comes to dealing with the fallout. The adversary will not have been strengthened whereas Israel will have reinforced international legitimacy when forced to take decisive defensive measures.

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Basic Assumptions ɖɖ While the Northern Front is currently Israel’s primary security concern, in the absence of a response to the challenges presented by the crisis in the Gaza Strip, the risk of war in Gaza is rising. It may ignite the Northern Front as well. ɖɖ The closure Israel imposed on Gaza has been only partially successful in restraining the armament of Hamas and other organizations. The use of the relaxation and tightening of the closure as a lever for restraining terror activities has also failed to produce the desired results. ɖɖ Israel holds strong cards whose careful use can serve a diplomatic- security initiative as part of a comprehensive strategy whose application might prevent the next round of fighting. ɖɖ This strategy requires cooperation with countries that share the objective of stabilizing the Gaza Strip, particularly Egypt, the US, and the donor community, including its regional members. ɖɖ This new strategy must serve Israel’s strategic interests regarding the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian issue as a whole. ɖɖ If the strategy is successful, it will yield calm with the potential for long-term stability. Its failure will not expose Israel to more serious security challenges than those it already faces, but it will create a more comfortable international environment in which Israel can meet these challenges. Flaws of the Current Policy ɖɖ The Israeli Government has refrained from adopting a clear policy, and has instead chosen a reactive approach that leaves the initiative to the other side. Its approach is characterized by a tactical focus on means that can postpone the next round of fighting, rather than on a strategy designed to prevent it. ɖɖ Even within the framework of this tactical approach, the Government failed to undertake steps to alleviate the situation facing the residents of the Gaza Strip during periods of calm (such as during the four years since Operation Protective Edge). Such steps could prove that Israel rewards moderate behavior or leadership. Instead, the alleviations come only after rounds of conflict or other violent incidents (such as the Marmara Flotilla, the kidnapping of , or the incendiary

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kite terror). This approach reinforces the perception encapsulated in the cliché that ‘violence is the only language it understands’. ɖɖ Israeli policy is rife with internal contradictions, including the following: - On the one hand, Israel considers Hamas a terror organization and seeks to deny it international legitimacy. On the other, it seeks to preserve Hamas’s status as the ruler of the Gaza Strip. - On the one hand for a decade or so it has negotiated with Hamas (albeit via third parties). On the other, it has consistently refused to spell out understandings reached thus allowing for misunderstandings and undermining their durability. - On the one hand, the Government charges the IDF with the task of managing the front. On the other, it declines to implement the IDF’s recommendations concerning steps needed to stabilize the ceasefire. ɖɖ Lastly, the Israeli Government has refrained from engaging in in-depth discussion of alternatives proposed by the security system and by others and refuses to consider the viability of these options. ɖɖ As a result, every few years Israel is forced to reinforce its deterrence by means of rounds of fighting whose price – and the price of the intermediate periods of instability – is paid by the Israeli residents of the Gaza border area and surroundings, IDF soldiers, and – in the more protracted rounds of violence – a majority of the Israeli population. Hamas ɖɖ Hamas controls the Gaza Strip by virtue of its ability to impose its rule on the population. However, it is challenged both by fear of a popular uprising and by smaller and more extreme organizations. ɖɖ Hamas’ rule has the features of a state government. Consequently, third parties, including the donor community, cannot act in the Gaza Strip without its consent. ɖɖ Both as a movement and as an organization, Hamas is not homogenous. It includes more extreme and less extreme streams, but all share a resolve to preserve its rule in Gaza and to extend it to the West Bank. The leadership of Hams understands that the realization of these objectives requires resources and international legitimacy, and that

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securing these requires tactical – if not strategic – compromises. ɖɖ Hamas is currently facing the most acute political and financial crisis in its history, due to the effective Israeli and Egyptian closures reinforced by sanctions imposed by the PA; its regional and international isolation; its failure in managing the Gaza Strip; and its need to resort to violent measures against its own population in order to impose its will. ɖɖ Consequently, the Hamas leadership under Ismail Haniye and Yahya Sinwar decided to relinquish civilian management of the Gaza Strip in order to prevent the collapse of its regime and to allow the organization to regroup to enable it to compete in the future for the leadership of the Palestinian people. ɖɖ Hamas is not impervious to change in response to changing conditions and constraints. Thus, for example, recent years have seen the organization present positions and objectives that are inconsistent with its original charter. These include a willingness to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders (although to date this has not included recognition of Israel, and Hamas continues to insist on the implementation of the right of return). ɖɖ For over a decade, Hamas has forwarded to Israel by various means proposals for long-term arrangements. As mentioned, none of these proposals has included the recognition of Israel, but they have all included a willingness to commit to a protracted ceasefire. In some cases the proposed ceasefire was to cover the West Bank as well, and in some proposals (i.e. a written memo concerning “A Framework for Peaceful Coexistence” conveyed by Khaled Mashal and the Hamas Political Bureau to Prime Minister Olmert in 2005) have included an offer to negotiate the core issues – borders, Jerusalem, the refugees, security, and so forth – albeit via third parties. ɖɖ Hamas is sensitive to the issue of its prisoners in Israel. This is due to their effective organization inside the prisons as a political force; their importance as a popular emblem of the struggle against Israel; and the pressure applied by their families. The Palestinian Authority ɖɖ The Palestinian Authority (PA) regards Hamas not only as a hostile and rival force in the Gaza Strip, but also as a threat to its interests and powerbase in the West Bank. ɖɖ As long as Hamas maintains a military monopoly in Gaza, the PA has no

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interest in risking its officials by returning to the area. – do you mean the safety of their officials? Or political vulnerability of their officials? ɖɖ The PA’s powerbase in the Gaza Strip – Fatah – is weak and deflated. ɖɖ Unless it is certain that the donor countries will provide a massive injection of resources, the PA sees the situation in the Gaza Strip as a recipe for failure if it decided to accept responsibility for the area. ɖɖ The PA is also concerned that if it accepts responsibility for Gaza before all other factions are disarmed, it will bear responsibility for any violence launched from the area by third parties. ɖɖ Accordingly, from the PA’s perspective, as long as Hamas is in power, any improvement in the situation serves to strengthen Hamas whereas maintaining a state of distress in the area weakens Hamas; and if, in its weakness, Hamas again chooses to enter into a round of conflict (in part in order to provoke sympathy from the Arab world, particularly Egypt) – the PA will not pay the price. ɖɖ More recently, another factor has compounded the PA’s reluctance to resume the management of the Gaza Strip: concern that renewing the connection between the two Palestinian areas will provide an incentive for the launching of the Trump initiative. Do you need a brief word on PA antipathy toward Trump initiative?

Key Challenges The current situation in Gaza is dominated by an acute economic and financial crisis, a governmental vacuum, and rising volatility: ɖɖ Lack of clarity surrounding the ceasefire agreement The ceasefire agreement reached at the end of the round of fighting in the summer of 2014 (Operation Protective Edge) did not specify the sides’ obligations, beyond the general statement of “quiet in return for quiet.” Absent an agreed frame of reference, including principles available to the ‘empowered referee’ (Egyptian Intelligence), the level of friction and the potential for escalation are high. Each side responds to what it regards as the crossing of a red line by the other, while testing the limits of the other’s tolerance by attempting to expand its own freedom of action.

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ɖɖ Acute economic and financial crisis - The closure of the crossings has severely harmed the private sector, and particularly agriculture, due to the lack of access to raw materials and the inability to export to Israeli, Palestinian, and other markets. - This is compounded by the “salaries crisis” among public employees, due to Hamas’s inability to pay the salaries of its 43,000 (civilian) employees, and the PA’s decision to cut the salaries of its 55,000 employees in the area (who have been sitting at home since 2007).

ɖɖ Collapse of infrastructures due to a governmental vacuum The failure of the Hamas government to cover the costs needed for managing civilian affairs, and the refusal of the PA to assume responsibility for these aspects in the Gaza Strip, have created a government vacuum that affects all areas of life. The electricity crisis (residents receive just 3-4 hours of power a day), water (95% of water is unfit for consumption), health (an acute shortage of medicines and equipment), and employment (45% overall unemployment, 65% among youth) are among the most prominent features of this crisis. Should you mention schools now that UNRWA support ending many kids will not go to school but be “home-schooled”, overcrowding in newly limited classrooms, etc?

ɖɖ Internal Palestinian division; the weapons issue; external support Egypt is the only player to have developed a strategy for promoting a solution to the problem of internal Palestinian division. Launched in the fall of 2017, its initiative centers on a series of moves allowing for the gradual return of the PA to the Gaza Strip and the beginning of a process of “domesticating” Hamas – i.e. its gradual diversion from a militant terror organization to a political organization. The initiative reflects an understanding that the weapons issue – from halting armament to disarmament – is of particular importance. However Egypt argues that, as in most world precedents, this issue requires a gradual approach and will only be resolved by the end of the process. Although most of the key players (including Israel and the US) welcomed the Egyptian initiative and even promised to help, Egypt was taken aback when in late 2017, central players retracted their support and presented obstacles to the implementation of this strategy. Recently – and somewhat belatedly – both Jerusalem and Washington indicate willingness to go along with Cairo’s (revived) initiative, even though thus far neither has mobilized all its relevant resources to help make it happen. Objectives of an Alternative Strategy Context In formulating the strategy and steps for its implementation, it is vital to

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recognize the close connection between that which is needed for Gaza stabilization and required measures via-a-vis the West Bank (as detailed in the CIS’ “Security First plan”). It is also vital to acknowledge ramifications for the prospects of a future two state solution. In addition to supporting the PA’s return to, and management of the Gaza Strip (see below), there is also a need to support the PA in the West Bank, including by resuming and increasing budgetary allocations; the release of prisoners; resolving the UNRWA situation, and so forth. The CIS’s assessment that conditions are not conducive for a comprehensive two-state agreement suggests that securing Gaza disarmament is out of reach. The aspiration to see the PA security forces deployed in the area, enjoying full and exclusive security powers therein, and disarming Hamas and the other organizations – on the basis of “one authority, one weapon, one law” – cannot be achieved without a comprehensive Fatah-Hamas reconciliation coupled with substantial progress toward a permanent agreement between Israel and the PLO. The combination of these two agreements will provide the PA with the legitimacy it needs to enforce its will, and will motivate relevant third parties to assist it in enforcing disarmament.

Objectives An alternative strategy for the Gaza Strip must serve the following goals: ɖɖ Create conditions for extended quiet: The primary Israeli interest is security, particularly removing the threat of cross-border terror; preventing further conflict- certainly one involving ground operations; and preventing a simultaneous conflict on two fronts (Gaza and the Syria-Lebanon theatre). ɖɖ Preventing a humanitarian disaster : Ensuring decent living conditions for the two million residents of the Gaza Strip and preventing harm to them, and to Israelis in the surrounding areas and beyond, due to failings in the health system, sewage, and other infrastructures in Gaza. ɖɖ Reducing Israel’s responsibility for the situation in the Gaza Strip: Completing the disengagement from Gaza by ending Israel’s responsibility for solving humanitarian problems, rehabilitating infrastructures, and developing the area by enhancing the involvement of the international community, or otherwise. ɖɖ Separation from the Palestinians: Concurrently, any strategy regarding the Gaza Strip should also serve – or, at least, should not

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undermine – the process of civilian separation from the Palestinians in the West Bank, while preserving conditions for a future two-state solution. ɖɖ Returning the bodies of our soldiers and releasing civilians: Any Israeli initiative should lead to the return of the bodies of the Israeli soldiers and the release of the civilians held by Hamas. Alternative Strategies The CIS Gaza Team examined the five alternative strategies under discussion in Israel:

More of the same ɖɖ Adhering to the current strategy, based on deterrence and on the opening and closing of “faucets” for the passage of merchandise and people to and from the Gaza Strip, in an attempt to postpone rounds of violence.

Bypassing the PA and Hamas ɖɖ An attempt to identify and consolidate an ‘independent’ rehabilitation mechanism by transferring responsibility to an international player, including varying degrees of “international trusteeship.”

A Deal with Hamas ɖɖ Formulating an arrangement with Hamas combining a long-term ceasefire with a significant relaxation in the closure.

Overthrowing Hamas ɖɖ An extensive military campaign intended (in its more extreme forms) to eliminate Hamas or (in a less ambitious form) to overthrow its regime, involving or avoiding Gaza Strip re-occupation.

The return of the PA ɖɖ A gradual initiative to restore PA control of the Gaza Strip. Findings

More of the same ɖɖ The current strategy perpetuates instability, fails to prevent escalation and future rounds of fighting. It perpetuates the threat to the population in the south of Israel and impairs prospects of a future comprehensive agreement. (And, I would add, any sense of future horizon for the populations that could contribute to different mindset)

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Bypassing PA and Hamas ɖɖ In light of the unwillingness of the relevant international players to assume responsibility for rehabilitating the Gaza Strip in the absence of agreement with the PA, and under conditions of instability that jeopardize their representatives, the rehabilitation work, and their investment, the establishment of an international trusteeship is not a viable option. ɖɖ The exception might be a framework limited to entrusting responsibility for a specific aspect (water, electricity, etc.) with a regional player. Such a partial solution could help calm the situation on a temporary basis but would not provide the stability needed for a long-term ceasefire.

Overthrowing Hamas ɖɖ Eliminating leaders does not lead to the collapse of a popular movement. Likewise, overthrowing the Hamas regime does not result in eliminating the organization. Both efforts are more likely to force changes in its form of combat: from a unified organization with a central leadership that controls its grassroots and population to a scattered guerrilla warfare based on dispersed terror cells. ɖɖ An attempt to overthrow the Hamas regime and to demilitarize the Gaza Strip requires an extensive military campaign involving a high number of casualties on both sides. Following such a campaign, the IDF will have to manage the needs of two million Palestinians and to cope with the ensuing security challenges. The donor nations can be expected to withdraw all funding, leaving Israel to bear the cost of managing daily life in the Strip. ɖɖ As the PA is likely to refuse to return to the Gaza Strip “on the back of Israeli tanks,” Israel will have no exit strategy.

A Deal with Hamas ɖɖ An Israeli-Hamas deal, albeit struck ‘by proxy’, would strengthen the organization in the Gaza Strip with a spillover effect to its standing in the West Bank. ɖɖ It would weaken the PA, exacerbate the division between the two parts of the Palestinian people, and reinforce Gaza’s dependence on Israel. ɖɖ This would undermine prospects of Israel’s separation from the Palestinians as well as of a future permanent agreement.

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ɖɖ Moreover, such an arrangement cannot respond to the current crises in energy, water, and other infrastructures with their destabilizing effect.

Return of the PA ɖɖ This strategy could meet all five objectives as defined above. Itis intended to include: ɖɖ Significant steps to improve the reality in the Gaza Strip onan immediate basis; ɖɖ The stabilization of the ceasefire; ɖɖ Steps to improve the situation in the West Bank and to strengthen the PA as part of the effort to motivate the PA to resume the management of Gaza; ɖɖ All the actions will be coordinated with the US, Egypt, and Jordan, and through these countries with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as with the donor countries outside the region and key international organizations.

Recommended Strategy ɖɖ Israel will employ all its relevant assets – military, diplomatic and economic – in launching an initiative designed to: - Stabilize the ceasefire; - Relieve the distress facing the Gaza population and launch a major rehabilitation program; - Reduce the involvement of Hamas in Gaza Strip management; - Return the PA to manage the area. ɖɖ To this end, Israel will recruit key regional and international players who share these objectives and whose support is vital for improving the situation in Gaza and in securing the PA consent: - Egypt – which has unique experience, interest, and capabilities to help in the proposed program; - US – whose vital contribution will be clarified below; - Saudi Arabia and the UAE – who supported the Egyptian initiative (see below) and are willing to continue to provide assistance;

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- The UN envoy – who has been a most energetic and valued supporter of the Egyptian initiative; - The Quartet and the EU.

Background: The Egyptian Initiative as a Catalyst ɖɖ Over the four years since Operation Protective Shield, under instructions from President Sisi, the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) designed a strategy to promote five objectives: - Decouple hostile elements in the Gaza Strip from terror operatives in Northern Sinai; - Disconnect Hamas from the Muslim Brotherhood; - Restore PA management of the Gaza Strip; - Stabilize the Israel-Gaza ceasefire; - Begin the process of “domesticating” Hamas, i.e. its transition from a militant military organization to a political force in the Palestinian arena (unarmed, by the end of the process). Concluding that an ‘all or nothing’ approach yields ‘nothing’, the common denominator of the GID’s approach to all five was ‘gradualism’. ɖɖ Over the ensuing three years, the GID conducted a five-track preparation: - By closing most smuggling tunnels, tightening the Rafah closure, and with other means, increase the pressure on Hamas with the goal of forcing the organization to acknowledge its failure in managing the Gaza Strip and to force it to cooperate with the Egyptian proposed alternative strategy in order to avoid facing an Arab Spring-like popular uprising; - Training a 1200 strong nucleus of future moderate Hamas leaders through their “reeducation” in an Egyptian resort by exposing them to moderate interpretations of Islam and to a different quality of life that can be realized in the Gaza Strip if Hamas changes its course; - Exploiting the opportunity created by the rift in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to reduce the involvement in Gaza of Hamas’s supporters – Qatar, Turkey, and Iran – and replacing them with the UAE and Saudi Arabia; - Reinforcing the leadership of, and cooperation with Yihya Sinwar, once it became apparent that his image as a tough extremists only served his surprising pragmatic approach whereby he reached the conclusion that Hamas survival, relieving the

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humanitarian situation of his people, and his own ambition for overall Palestinian leadership, all called for cooperation with the Egyptian strategy; - Receiving a green light and an undertaking to help from the US and Israel, whose involvement was vital in overcoming Mahmud ‘Abbas’s anticipated reluctance to shoulder responsibility for the Gaza Strip. - As noted above, the Egyptian initiative was based on the principle of gradual implementation – in the return of the PA to the area, the change in Hamas’s behavior, and Hamas disarmament. ɖɖ It was this feature – gradualism - that doomed the October 2017 effort: - President Abbas insisted on an “all or nothing” approach, that is: he would not shoulder responsibility for the Strip before Hamas is disarmed. - Israel and the US had a sudden change of heart, not only refusing to use their levers of persuasion on the PA but reinforcing Abbas’ reluctance to cooperate. ɖɖ Once the initiative failed, those in Hamas who had been hostile to the idea (for ideological reasons or for fear of losing positions and power) but had been deterred from standing up to Sinwar, re-emerged and the consensus once again crystallized around violent resistance. Hamas thence seized control of storming the perimeter fence and of the use of incendiary kites and balloons. This process peaked with the round of violence in July 2018. ɖɖ Since the stalling of the Egyptian initiative, the GID has informed Israel the US, Hamas and the PA that they and their allies in the Gulf are convinced that there is no alternative to their plan in stabilizing the situation; that they expect all parties to require their re-engagement in the wake of another round of violence; and that they stand ready to resume the process to avoid that eventuality. Their only prerequisite has once again been a commitment by Jerusalem and Washington to endorse and contribute to its implementation. The Israeli Initiative: Israeli Undertakings Affecting a change in Hamas and causing the PA to resume responsibility for the Gaza Strip are expected to encounter considerable difficulties, as illustrated by the Egyptian precedent. These difficulties, and some possible responses, are addressed below (see Expected Difficulties).

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However, much depends on Israeli (and US) resolve to employ powerful levers. In coordination with relevant regional and international players, Israel will need to take immediate steps to change the reality in the Gaza Strip (see below); to reach detailed understandings that stabilize the ceasefire and limit Hamas armament; and to create the conditions and incentives for the PA to cooperate with the emerging initiative. The required Israeli undertakings include the following: ɖɖ Immediate steps in the security, diplomatic, and economic-civilian spheres to alleviate current conditions in the Strip [as detailed in the CIS’s “Security First” plan and discussed in- drop below]. ɖɖ Concurrent effort (to be led by the US) to mobilize resources for a comprehensive Gaza rehabilitation plan (and a concurrent added investment in West Bank economic development) to be made available to the PA once it resumes civil management of the Strip. ɖɖ Assure the PA that once the PA’s agreement to the initiative is secured, Israel will support the training and equipping of additional PA security forces (to be governed by the USSC) in preparation for their deployment to the Gaza passages, along the Egyptian border, and gradually elsewhere in the Strip. ɖɖ Likewise, Israel will provide the PA with assurances that as long as the process of disarming Hamas is not complete, it will not hold the PA responsible – nor retaliate against it – once third parties violate the ceasefire. Moreover, to the extent possible and without forfeiting its right to retaliate, Israel will offer the PA and the ceasefire monitors the opportunity to deal with violators before retaliating. To the extent possible, the same principle will apply to foiling terror acts. ɖɖ Israel will involve the PA in coordinating the role of the Egyptian GID and other international cease fire monitors who will also oversee implementation of Hamas’s undertakings regarding arms limitations.

A Phased Approach The initiative will comprise two stages, with defined milestones and objectives (below). Progression to the second stage will be conditioned on Israeli confirmation of the success of the first. For example, an initial removal of impediments to access and movement will only take place as part of the transfer of civilian authority to the PA (including tax

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collection at the crossings), while a more advanced stage of the removal of impediments will be conditioned on the transfer of police and other powers to PA forces and on Hamas compliance with restrictions on its armament (including the complete cessation of tunnel digging). Concurrent with the implementation of the first stage, and as a condition for sustaining the relief measures enacted and progressing to the second stage (below), Israel will insist that the bodies of the fallen soldiers Oron Shaul and Hadar Goldin are returned, and that the civilians held by Hamas – Avera Mengistu, Hisham a-Sayad, and Jum’a Ibrahim Abu ‘Anima – are released. While pursuing this comprehensive stabilization program, Israel will make clear that it will not hesitate to use of the full force of the IDF whenever it determines that a violation of the ceasefire requires this. Likewise, Israel will make all parties realize that it reserves the right to withdraw and closure relaxation agreed to, should others fail to meet their obligations.

Stage 1: Steps for Immediate Improvement ɖɖ Security measures: - Ceasefire stabilization: With Egyptian mediation, a detailed and agreed (but not signed) statement of understandings will be formulated between Israel, the PA, and Hamas, specifying the parties’ undertakings, including an undertaking by Hamas to end construction of offensive tunnels and to restrain armament. The document will also detail the mandate, structure and operational procedures of the ceasefire monitors (likely to be headed by the Egyptian GID). - In themselves, these understandings will not prevent Hamas or any other party from violating the understandings if they so choose. The combination of deterrence, the wish not to lose closure relaxation steps already made, the expectation of further relaxations, and the fear of losing the opportunity of far reaching improvement in quality of life for all Gazans may suffice to deter violations. - The understandings and monitoring system are designed to prevent a ceasefire collapse not due to any party’s intent, but due to preventable misunderstandings, and to restore and re-stabilize the ceasefire before things escalate out of control. - Assurances for the PA: As noted above, as long a Hamas has not been

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disarmed and provided that the PA takes steps to prevent ceasefire violation and to punish violators, Israel will provide the PA with assurances that it will not penalize the PA in the event that the ceasefire is violated by a third party. Israel will allow the ceasefire monitors (headed by Egyptian Intelligence) and the PA to handle the violation before retaliating. - Training the PA forces: In order to deploy additional PA forces to Gaza (beyond the 3,000 people already trained and equipped for this purpose, who were supposed to take control of the crossings and deploy along the border with Egypt as part of the Egyptian initiative), new PA police units will undergo training. Their training will take place in Egypt and/or Jericho and/or Jordan, with international assistance, and with agreement for their equipment to be provided by Israel. This effort will be coordinated by the US Security Coordinator (USSC). - Ceasefire monitoring: As noted above, a ceasefire monitoring mechanism will be established and its international representatives will be deployed to the Gaza Strip. Negotiating the terms of the ceasefire as well as of the mandate, structure, composition and operational procedures of the mechanism will all be done either by, or in close coordination with the Egyptian GID.

ɖɖ Diplomatic/economic measures: - Establishing a joint working team for Israel and the PA to coordinate the three spheres: security, diplomacy, and civilian affairs. - Authorization, initial planning, and resource mobilization for the establishment of a seaport for the Gaza Strip to operate under the authority of the PA and in accordance with inspection procedures to be determined by the Israeli security system (construction to begin only subject to progress in stage 2 of Initiative implementation).

ɖɖ Civil/economic measures: - Issuing permits for several thousand Israeli-security-vetted Gazans, to work in the agricultural sector in the areas surrounding the Gaza Strip. - Subject to concluding the tunnels section in the document of ceasefire understandings, allowing shipment to the Strip of dual-use materials presently prohibited to avoid diversion for tunnel construction. - Consolidating a mechanism for the transfer of more sensitive dual-use materials for use by authorized/vetted companies, supervised by the

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monitoring mechanism and acceptable to Israel, to be implemented in coordination the PA. - Increasing quotas for agricultural produce export to Israel. - Improving conditions at the crossing points to facilitate exports to Europe. - Increasing the quota of entry permits to Israel for Gaza merchants. - Removing obstacles and simplifying procedures for the movement of students and tourists from Gaza to Jordan; patients for treatment; and worshippers to Temple Mount. - Extending the fishing zone to 10 miles.

Stage 2: Rewarding Hamas moderation and empowering the PA Subject to Israel’s determination that Hamas has met the conditions of stage 1, including returning the bodies of the soldiers and releasing the civilians, the process will continue to stage 2. As part of this stage, Israel will initiate the following: ɖɖ ‘Benchmarking’ the “Quartet conditions:” - Insisting on the simultaneous implementation of the three conditions presented by the Quartet – non-violence; respecting past agreements; and recognizing Israel – provides Hamas with no incentive (except the threat of Israeli retaliation) to meet the first of these conditions. Since meeting this condition alone offers no reward (including from the international community), Israel is deprived of the one condition Hamas can meet and the only one Israel presently needs. - Consequently, insisting on the two conditions that Hamas is unable or unwilling to meet, and which are not important to Israel at this point (respecting past agreement or recognizing Israel) denies Israel the opportunity to consolidate the only aspect that it demands and which Hamas is capable – and in all probability willing – to provide (in return for relaxations): the immediate and ongoing cessation of violence. - In line with the above, it is proposed that Israel continues to insist on all three conditions, but suggest that their application be ‘benchmarked’, so that each condition kicks-in when relevant: • Ceasefire – immediately and unconditionally.

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• Respecting past agreements – when Hamas is to be admitted to the PLO. • Recognizing Israel – when the time comes to sign a comprehensive agreement. ɖɖ Security measures: - Deploying PA police force to enforce law and order, prevent the diversion of dual-purpose materials, and secure the Gaza borders. ɖɖ Diplomatic/economic measures: - Authorization to begin construction of the seaport under PA management. - Posting of PA customs officials at the Rafah Crossing. ɖɖ Civil/economic measures: - Increasing the number of work permits in Israel for security vetted Gaza residents. - Removing additional restrictions on dual-use materials, alongside the deployment of the PA police and their integration into the inspection mechanism. - Opening an additional crossing for merchandise at the Erez Crossing point. - Beginning work to connect Erez Crossing to Ashdod Port (railroad track for containers).

Prisoners ‘Bonus’ ɖɖ Some 10,000 security prisoners are held in Israel. Both Hamas and Fatah attach great importance to securing their release due to the prisoners’ popularity among the Palestinian public, the influence of their organizations in the prisons on the decision-making processes of the various Palestinian organizations, and pressure from their families. ɖɖ In the past, Israel released prisoners to mark the Muslim festivals, or when forced to do so as part of exchange deals. It is proposed that the prisoners ‘card’ be used not under pressure but as a proactive incentive on an ongoing basis.

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ɖɖ Accordingly, concurrent with promoting the Initiative, and with the goal of encouraging adherence by Hamas and the PA to their undertakings therein, consideration should be given to releasing security prisoners on a gradual basis over a period of time. ɖɖ The declaration of the intention and plan to release prisoners is to accompany Israel’s launching the Initiative, but while clarifying that actual release will only begin on the transition from stage 1 to stage 2. ɖɖ The release will include prisoners from Fatah and Hamas, as well as from other organizations. It will take place at pre-declared intervals and involve a pre-declared number of prisoners. Among other factors, the order of release will reflect the gravity of accusations, length of sentence, as well as Shin Bet and Israel Prison Service judgment regarding the commitment of each prisoner to the process and to the ceasefire as well as the extent of the threat they present. ɖɖ Each candidate for release will sign an undertaking to meet the conditions of release. ɖɖ The process of release will not start before the bodies of the Israeli soldiers are returned and the civilians released. Israel will clarify that violation of the understandings and the ceasefire will lead to the freezing of the release process. Israel will also maintain its freedom of action in re-arresting any released prisoner who violates the release conditions.

The Role of the Regional and International Players As noted above, to implement the Initiative, Israel will need the support of the relevant international and regional players, primarily for two tasks: ɖɖ Encouraging the PA to play its part – i.e. help overcome the reluctance of Mahmud ‘Abbas to take part in the Initiative, and to support senior PA officials who do not share his hesitation. ɖɖ To restrain Hamas and empower elements in the organization that support the process. The international and regional players can exert influence in various ways. For example: ɖɖ ‘Finger the Villain’ - Expose those responsible for thwarting the Initiative to the Palestinian public in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which is strongly supportive of ending the division between the two movements and the two areas.

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ɖɖ Pressure Hamas - Resume Israeli, Egyptian and international economic pressure and support punitive measures by the PA if Hamas disrupts the process. ɖɖ Induce PA Support: - Using measures to affect PA decisions, whether by conditioning or increasing West Bank funding depending on its conduct (to this end, it is important that the US Administration restores funding not related to the Taylor Force Act). Re-upping US funding is neither easy nor quick, how does it impact initiative if Trump says no? - Threaten to bypass the PA if it disrupts the initiative As PA may well reject cooperation, do you need to include a word of what bypassing PA might look like? ɖɖ Gaza Management and Rehabilitation - Ensure the availability of adequate resources for the PA management and rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip, as well as additional funding for West Bank development. In this context, the regional and international players will demand that the PA: ɖɖ Cooperate with the process, despite its reservations about the gradual nature of the effort to disarm Hamas. ɖɖ Send the relevant ministers to the Gaza Strip and activate the government ministries as agreed. ɖɖ In coordination with Egypt and Israel, begin the deployment of police forces in the Gaza Strip. ɖɖ Stop blocking and accelerate work on projects under its authority, particularly those that are vital for solving the water and electricity crises. ɖɖ Take the administrative and commercial steps needed to increase the amount of electricity supplied to the Gaza Strip from Israel. ɖɖ Solve the salary problem based on the arrangements already agreed under international mediation. Expected Difficulties The proposed Initiative requires attention to two key clusters of challenges: In Hamas Failure of the Hamas leadership that supports the process to overcome two centers of opposition – senior Hamas members who will lose

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power and income due to the transfer of management to the PA; and ideological elements in the movement that will refuse to accept the trend toward moderation. Israel and its potential partners can support those leading the process in Hamas to galvanize support by recruiting quick international assistance for modest projects; changing the policy at the crossings; and providing an initial quota of permits for workers from Gaza who have been vetted by the Shin Bet for employment in Israeli centers close to the Gaza Strip. These steps can be implemented immediately and will demonstrate to the public in Gaza that the strategy of change and ceasefire observance yield immediate results. However, Israel and its partners have no way of preventing process collapse, if those leading it in Hamas fail to overcome internal opposition or to impose their will on other organizations in the Gaza Strip. In these circumstances, Israel will face the same challenges it does today. However, it will confront these challenges in significantly better conditions in terms of the attitude of the international community toward its defensive actions, once Israel will have proven its genuine intentions through the proposed initiate. Is there any reason to believe Israeli government will go for this and if not are there repercussions to suggest, as in bypassing PA?

In the PA The refusal of the PA to cooperate constitutes a substantial challenge for initiative implementation. As detailed above, the regional and international community have considerable levers for affecting decision-making in Ramallah, including by increasing or reducing budget allocations; making or denying diplomatic gestures; nurturing contacts with those who challenge the PA or refraining from doing so, and so forth. These players can also strengthen and reward senior figures in the PA who support the initiative. Indeed, there are good reasons to anticipate that countries that supported the PA’s response to the decisions of the Trump Administration on the Jerusalem issue and the Washington office closure, or even supported the imposition of sanctions on Hamas prior to the desired change, will not back the PA if it thwarts a process in which they all have a stake.

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Israel also has powerful levers for exerting influence, both positive and negative. The former – incentives and rewards that empower the PA – include steps such as solving the problem of the demolition orders facing thousands of Palestinian homes constructed without permits in Area C by re-designating their locations as Area B; solving the problem of the deployment of the Palestinian police in section of Area B where there is currently no law and order enforcement; creating territorial contiguity between “islands” of Area A and B in specific locations in order to enhance the PA economy; and so forth (for full details, see the CIS plans on the organization’s website). Despite all these levers, the possibility that the PA will not be placated and will continue to procrastinate -- as was the case during the previous attempted initiative by Egypt – cannot be ruled out. The failure of means of encouragement and persuasion will require Israel to clarify and demonstrate that it is not willing to accept an escalation along the Gaza Strip due to the PA’s procrastination. In these circumstances, Israel will take steps to bypass the PA, emphasizing its determination to improve living conditions in Gaza in order to calm the situation and avoid – or at least delay -- a further round of fighting. Within this context, Israel will need to consider much less desirable options, some of which will might undermine other Israeli interests (as discussed under “A Deal with Hamas” above). These include reaching a long-term ceasefire agreement with Hamas as well as transferring the responsibility for the management of the water and/or electricity sectors in the Strip to an international or regional (Gulf) player. Finally, the very progress along this (far less desirable) path, may serve as the most potent lever in forcing the PA to reconsider.

25 Ramifications of West Bank Annexation

Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS) is a non-partisan movement. Its members are retired generals and equivalents in Israel’s security services (the IDF, the Shin Bet, Mossad and Israel Police) who are motivated solely by concern for the future of Israel.

CIS took a decision to promote a security-political initiative that will extricate Israel from the current impasse as an interim step toward implementing its vision.

The movement’s vision is centered around the need to reach a permanent two-state agreement with the Palestinians, to normalize relations and enter into security arrangements with pragmatic Arab states, and thus to secure Israel within final, recognized boundaries while ensuring its future as the democratic state of the Jewish people.

en.cis.org.il