Gaza-An-Alternative
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Ramifications of West Bank Annexation GAZA: AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY FOR ISRAEL SEPTEMBER 2018 Gaza: An Alternative Strategy for Israel Preface A team of Commanders for Israel’s Security (CIS) comprising members who dealt with the issue while on active duty, in consultation with other experts, examined Israel’s current strategy as well as other options discussed in the Israeli security- political environment; mapped the advantages and shortfalls of each, and concluded by formulating an alternative Gaza strategy for the Israeli Government. The proposed strategy is based on the realization that any solution will have far- reaching ramifications for the Palestinian issue as a whole and for the feasibility of an eventual two-state solution. Accordingly, an effort was made to ensure that interim steps and partial solutions preserve – if not enhance – conditions for a future permanent agreement in which the West Bank and the Gaza Strip constitute a single political entity. This includes supporting the resumption of civilian and security management of the Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its empowerment as the legitimate source of authority. 2 Gaza: Enhancing An Alternative West Bank Strategy for Stability and Israel Security Table of Contents Preface..............................................................................................2 Introduction.............................................................................................4 Basic Assumptions.....................................................................................6 Flaws of Current Policy..............................................................................6 Hamas..........................................................................................7 The Palestinian Authority..........................................................................8 Key Challenges...........................................................................................9 Objectives of an Alternative Strategy...................................................10 Alternative Strategies.............................................................................12 Findings....................................................................................................12 The Israeli Initiative: Israeli Undertakings.................................................16 Expected Difficulties...............................................................................23 3 Gaza: An Alternative Strategy for Israel Introduction When considering a strategy for the Gaza Strip, CIS accentuates the following Israeli interests: ɖ First and foremost – security: removing the terror threat and ensuring long term calm for residents of neighboring Israeli population centers and beyond. ɖ Preventing a humanitarian disaster and improving living conditions for the Gaza Strip’s two million residents. ɖ Completing Israel’s disengagement from Gaza by reducing Israel’s responsibility for the lives and welfare of the residents of the area be it via international involvement or otherwise. ɖ A time-specific interest is securing the return of the remains of the soldiers Oron Shaul and Hadar Goldin, and the release of the detained civilians Avera Mengistu, Hisham a-Sayad, and Jum’a Ibrahim Abu ‘Anima. Our process was based on several assumptions, principally: The failings of the current policy have been manifest in the rounds of fighting and the periods of tension between them. Israel’s strength allows it to take calculated risks in attempting to change the direction and promote a more stable security reality. Conditions in the arena – including Hamas’ political and economic distress, the willingness of key Arab countries to support the effort, and the US Administration’s support for Israel – contribute to the prospects of the proposed change of direction. The first stage of this process is to produce an immediate calming, while the subsequent stages are to consolidate long-term stability, as well as contribute to the prospects for a comprehensive agreement, when conditions mature. In this regard, the CIS Gaza Team reached three conclusions: ɖ This is the only alternative that meets Israel’s security objectives. ɖ Israel’s strength allows it to take calculated risks in attempting to change the direction and promote a more stable security reality. 4 Gaza: An Alternative Strategy for Israel ɖ Conditions in the arena – including Hamas’ political and economic distress, the willingness of key Arab countries to support the effort, and the US Administration’s support for Israel – contribute to the prospects of the proposed change of direction. ɖ Despite the predictable difficulties, local circumstances (in the Gaza Strip) as well as regional and international ones make implementation of this alternative possible. ɖ Having given it a sincere try, a failed Gaza initiative does not adversely affect Israel’s circumstances when it comes to dealing with the fallout. The adversary will not have been strengthened whereas Israel will have reinforced international legitimacy when forced to take decisive defensive measures. 5 Gaza: An Alternative Strategy for Israel Basic Assumptions ɖ While the Northern Front is currently Israel’s primary security concern, in the absence of a response to the challenges presented by the crisis in the Gaza Strip, the risk of war in Gaza is rising. It may ignite the Northern Front as well. ɖ The closure Israel imposed on Gaza has been only partially successful in restraining the armament of Hamas and other organizations. The use of the relaxation and tightening of the closure as a lever for restraining terror activities has also failed to produce the desired results. ɖ Israel holds strong cards whose careful use can serve a diplomatic- security initiative as part of a comprehensive strategy whose application might prevent the next round of fighting. ɖ This strategy requires cooperation with countries that share the objective of stabilizing the Gaza Strip, particularly Egypt, the US, and the donor community, including its regional members. ɖ This new strategy must serve Israel’s strategic interests regarding the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian issue as a whole. ɖ If the strategy is successful, it will yield calm with the potential for long-term stability. Its failure will not expose Israel to more serious security challenges than those it already faces, but it will create a more comfortable international environment in which Israel can meet these challenges. Flaws of the Current Policy ɖ The Israeli Government has refrained from adopting a clear policy, and has instead chosen a reactive approach that leaves the initiative to the other side. Its approach is characterized by a tactical focus on means that can postpone the next round of fighting, rather than on a strategy designed to prevent it. ɖ Even within the framework of this tactical approach, the Government failed to undertake steps to alleviate the situation facing the residents of the Gaza Strip during periods of calm (such as during the four years since Operation Protective Edge). Such steps could prove that Israel rewards moderate behavior or leadership. Instead, the alleviations come only after rounds of conflict or other violent incidents (such as the Marmara Flotilla, the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit, or the incendiary 6 Gaza: An Alternative Strategy for Israel kite terror). This approach reinforces the perception encapsulated in the cliché that ‘violence is the only language it understands’. ɖ Israeli policy is rife with internal contradictions, including the following: - On the one hand, Israel considers Hamas a terror organization and seeks to deny it international legitimacy. On the other, it seeks to preserve Hamas’s status as the ruler of the Gaza Strip. - On the one hand for a decade or so it has negotiated with Hamas (albeit via third parties). On the other, it has consistently refused to spell out understandings reached thus allowing for misunderstandings and undermining their durability. - On the one hand, the Government charges the IDF with the task of managing the front. On the other, it declines to implement the IDF’s recommendations concerning steps needed to stabilize the ceasefire. ɖ Lastly, the Israeli Government has refrained from engaging in in-depth discussion of alternatives proposed by the security system and by others and refuses to consider the viability of these options. ɖ As a result, every few years Israel is forced to reinforce its deterrence by means of rounds of fighting whose price – and the price of the intermediate periods of instability – is paid by the Israeli residents of the Gaza border area and surroundings, IDF soldiers, and – in the more protracted rounds of violence – a majority of the Israeli population. Hamas ɖ Hamas controls the Gaza Strip by virtue of its ability to impose its rule on the population. However, it is challenged both by fear of a popular uprising and by smaller and more extreme organizations. ɖ Hamas’ rule has the features of a state government. Consequently, third parties, including the donor community, cannot act in the Gaza Strip without its consent. ɖ Both as a movement and as an organization, Hamas is not homogenous. It includes more extreme and less extreme streams, but all share a resolve to preserve its rule in Gaza and to extend it to the West Bank. The leadership of Hams understands that the realization of these objectives requires resources and international legitimacy, and that 7 Gaza: An Alternative Strategy for Israel