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Taiwan and the Global Economic Storm

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Taiwan and the Global Economic Storm OCTOBER 2009 AsiaSPECIAL Program REPORT No. 143 Taiwan and the Global PETER CHOW, “The Impact of the Financial Tsunami on Taiwan’s Economy” PAGE 5 Economic Storm T.Y. WANG, “Economic Rationality EDITED BY BRYCE WAKEFIELD and National Security: Taiwan’s New Government and the Global Economic Recession” PAGE 13 ABSTRACT This Special Report examines how the global economic crisis has impacted the economy and politics of Taiwan. Peter Chow gives an overview of the Taiwanese THOMAS BELLOWS, “No Change in Sight: Party Politics and the economic situation and evaluates the performance of the administration of Ma Ying-jeou, Legislative Yuan during the Global Taiwan’s current president. T.Y. Wang assesses the nexus between economics and security Economic Crisis” PAGE 20 in Taiwan, focusing in particular on the question of Taiwan’s relations with mainland China. YU-LONG LING, “Can Ma Thomas Bellows reviews dynamics in the Taiwanese legislature, as well as examining Deliver? Presidential Priorities, the extra-legislative protest activities of the opposition party during the economic crisis. And Promises, and Politics during the Global Recession” PAGE 28 Yu-long Ling assesses Ma’s leadership style and personal performance in office. INTRODUCTION BRYCE WAKEFIELD aiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou has actually represented a slight improvement over the much to fear from the political repercus- figures for the previous four months. Meanwhile Tsions of the current global financial crisis. tourist numbers, cross-Strait investment, consump- During his election campaign in 2008, Ma staked tion, and employment rates have all decreased, his political fortune on his ability to improve the and Ma has had to revise the economic targets he Taiwanese economy. However, Taiwan has been promised during his election campaign. hard hit by the slump in global demand. With the In the midst of the economic doom-and- island’s economy heavily dependent on exports, gloom, Taiwan’s relationship with mainland China, particularly in the high-tech electronics sector, the as always, looms large. One part of Ma’s strategy reluctance of consumers in China and the United that he has not sought to adjust is his stance on States to spend on non-essential items in tough relations with the mainland. Eight years of rule economic times has meant that Taiwanese busi- by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), nesses have seen export opportunities decrease whose electoral politics center on the creation sharply. Figures released in 2009 showed that of a purely Taiwanese national identity, strained exports for the month of May were down 34 per- the cross-Strait relationship. Nevertheless, com- cent compared to the same period in 2008, which merce and communication between China and Bryce Wakefield is program associate with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program. Taiwan grew informally even while the official the ECFA to an unsophisticated salesman from the cross-Strait relationship deteriorated under Ma’s south, a DPP stronghold. While the woman spoke DPP predecessor, Chen Shui-bian. Ma’s party, the standard Mandarin, the man, speaking a “local” Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, or KMT), dialect, was shown as largely ignorant about eco- stresses Taiwan’s “Chinese” identity and, as part of nomic relations between Taiwan and China. The its policy of reconciliation with the mainland, has advertisement was eventually pulled after it sparked formalized avenues for trade, communication, and accusations that it was an exercise in ethnic stereo- travel between China and Taiwan. typing, but the episode is a good example of how Ma and the KMT are intent on advancing insecurity about the ECFA feeds into suspicion the cross-Strait relationship by implementing an about the Ma administration’s views on Taiwanese Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement national aspirations. (ECFA), a cross-Strait trade agreement between Notwithstanding widespread concerns on the China and Taiwan. However, attempts to move for- island about the ECFA, the DPP faces an uphill ward on the ECFA are highly controversial. After battle in opposing Ma’s plans to implement his months of calls for the government to make the policies of closer relations with China. Although negotiation process more transparent, the Ministry the DPP captured 38 percent of the votes for single of Economic Affairs (MOEA) released an eco- member districts in the 2008 legislative election, nomic impact assessment of the ECFA in August it retained only 27 seats out of 113 overall. The 2009. The report was positive, noting that pos- KMT now presides over the executive and holds a sible benefits of an agreement with the mainland safe majority in the legislature, meaning that it has included insulating the Taiwanese economy from the formal power to enact laws unimpeded by the the adverse effects of the formation of other trade opposition. In response, the DPP has launched a areas in Asia that exclude Taiwan. However, critics highly public campaign, encouraging supporters to of the KMT, led by the DPP, charge that MOEA take to the streets in protest. While the global reces- manipulated the figures in the report to inflate the sion has taken its toll on Taiwan’s economy, the economic benefits and job prospects the ECFA island knows no deficit when it comes to heated would provide Taiwan. political debate. The ECFA debate has also overtly touched on Not all commentators, however, blame Taiwan’s issues of national and ethnic identity. For example, economic position solely on the global recession. despite Ma’s pledges to the contrary, the DPP has Peter Chow, professor of economics at the City claimed that China will attempt to sneak veiled College of New York, argues that while the global rhetoric on reunification into the text of the pro- financial crisis has hit Taiwan hard, Ma’s govern- posed agreement. Meanwhile, MOEA faced fierce ment is also responsible for declines in growth, criticism when it released a cartoon advertisement industrial production, and consumer confidence. featuring a cosmopolitan woman from Taiwan’s Chow notes, for example, that stock prices were north, where the KMT vote is strong, explaining falling well before the international crisis made THE ASIA PROGRAM The Wilson Center’s Asia Program is dedicated to the proposition that only those with a sound scholarly grounding can begin to understand contemporary events. One of the Center’s oldest regional programs, the Asia Program seeks to bring historical and cultural sensitivity to the discussion of Asia in the nation’s capital. In ASIA PROGRAM STAFF seminars, workshops, briefings, and conferences, Robert M. Hathaway, Program Director prominent scholars of Asia interact with one Michael Kugelman, Program Associate another and with policy practitioners to further Bryce Wakefield, Program Associate Susan Levenstein, Program Assistant understanding of the peoples, traditions, and 2 ASIA PROGRAM SPECIAL REPOrt behaviors of the world’s most populous continent. its presence felt. Soon after Ma was elected, many effective communication on the part of the presi- Taiwanese found that the president’s promises to dent. Unfortunately, Wang believes this is not one increase growth dramatically and provide a much of the administration’s strengths. Nevertheless, Ma higher standard of living, while cutting unem- has one significant advantage over his opponents, ployment to three percent, were overly optimistic. namely the latter have not outlined sufficient alter- Chow believes that Ma’s inability to deliver on native strategies to the president’s policy of engage- his promises has led to a “confidence crisis” in the ment with China. Taiwanese business community. With the onset of the global crisis, confidence in Ma’s ability to deliver has decreased even fur- While the political thaw ther. Chow focuses on Taiwan’s lack of both an indigenous industrial sector and export diver- between Taipei and sification, and on what he deems an overly swift move towards economic integration with China, Beijing that followed Ma’s as factors that have deepened Taiwan’s recession. According to Chow, the Taiwanese government’s inauguration has been ambiguous stance vis-à-vis the mainland has also welcomed by policymakers eroded the “animal spirits” of Taiwanese investors as they wait and see what the outcome of cross- in Washington and Strait negotiations will be. Ma’s cross-Strait policy, Chow argues, was implemented too fast and too elsewhere, Ma’s approaches early to allow for a reasonable cost-benefit analysis, and came with a hidden cost of eroding Taiwan’s towards China have “de facto independence.” Indeed, many see Taiwan’s economic policy as evoked fears that he may inherently linked to issues of national security. T.Y. Wang, professor of political science at Illinois State be “selling out Taiwan.” University, for example, notes that the island’s eco- nomic relations with China have been influenced While Ma’s opponents hold very little formal by two conflicting forces. On the one hand is the power to block the president’s agenda, they nev- desire of Taiwanese investors to take advantage of ertheless have ample opportunity to make their the proximity of the huge Chinese market and its voices heard. Indeed, Thomas Bellows, professor abundance of resources and cheap labor. On the of political science at the University of Texas, argues other hand, however, lies the danger that Beijing that in spite of KMT dominance of both elected may well use warmer economic relations to move branches of Taiwan’s government and the sense of to political integration in the future. This explains urgency created by the global economic crisis, leg- both why the Chen administration attempted to islative politics in Taipei have barely changed at all. curb economic links to the mainland and why it Stalling tactics by the opposition in the Legislative was so unsuccessful in halting the informal out- Yuan are tolerated by KMT legislators and even ward flow of investment to China.
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