Taiwan and the Global Economic Storm
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Taiwan Stock Exchange Jun. 9, 2018
Foreign Listings on TWSE Taiwan Stock Exchange Jun. 9, 2018 1 Big U.S. companies like Apple Inc. and Pfizer Inc. have the world’s largest corporate bond market in their backyard. So why have they been rushing to Taiwan lately to issue debt? The reason: a feature of the Taiwanese bond market that—for now—makes it easy and relatively cheap for companies to redeem any debt they issue there before its due date. For sure, the Formosa bond market—so-called after the Portuguese Issuer Currency Scale name for the island—is tiny compared with the U.S.’s $8.6 trillion corporate bond market. Yet blue-chip companies including Apple, AT&T USD 5,344 mil. Pfizer, Verizon Communications Inc. and Comcast Corp. have each issued north of $1 billion of such debt this year. AT&T Inc. issued a Apple USD 2,377 mil. $1.43 billion 30-year Formosa bond with a 5.5% coupon earlier this month. Pfizer USD 1,065 mil. In the Formosa market, the call option adds only an extra 0.1 Verizon USD 5,214 mil percentage point to 0.15 percentage point in yield, compared with 0.8 percentage point to a full percentage point in other markets, Source: WSJ according to Deutsche Bank’s Mr. Stephen. 2 Outline I. Why IPO? II. Why Taiwan? III. How to List on TWSE? IV. Foreign Listed Companies on TWSE V. Summary VI. Appendix 3 I. Why IPO? 4 Benefits of IPO What Boss Worries ! The cost of regulatory compliance, business succession plan, dilution of shareholding etc. -
Sorcerer's Apprentices
Faculty & Research The Spirit of Despotism: Understanding the Tyrant Within by M. Kets de Vries 2004/17/ENT Working Paper Series The Spirit of Despotism: Understanding the Tyrant Within Manfred F. R. Kets de Vries* * Raoul de Vitry d’Avaucourt Clinical Professor of Leadership Development, INSEAD, France & Singapore. Director, INSEAD’s Global Leadership Centre. 1 Abstract The objective of this article is to better understand the developmental history of despotic regimes and the existence of leadership by terror. To gain greater insight into this phenomenon, the unusual relationship between leaders and followers in despotic regimes is explored, and the self-destructive cycle that characterizes such regimes is examined. The price paid in the form of human suffering and the breakdown of the moral fabric of a society is highlighted. In this article, particular attention is paid to highly intrusive totalitarian regimes. The levers used by such regimes to consolidate their power base are discussed in detail. The role of ideology, the enforcement of mind-control, the impact of the media, the inception of the illusion of solidarity, and the search for scapegoats are part of the review. Finally, suggestions are made on how to prevent despotic leaders from gaining a hold on power. Observations are made about the newly founded International Criminal Court, a permanent international judicial body that has been specially set up to try despotic rulers for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. KEY WORDS: Despotism; tyrant; leadership; totalitarianism; autocracy; tyranny; dictatorship; societal regression; democracy; paranoia; narcissism; scapegoat; ideology; mind-control; aggression; violence; sadism; terror; genocide; war; crimes against humanity; war criminal; International Criminal Court. -
North Korea's Economic Strategy, 2018
North Korea’s Economic Strategy, 2018 William B. Brown 326 | Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies This chapter takes the perspective of North Korea’s leadership as it confronts difficult economic problems in the remaining months of 2018. The major current and potential issues are listed and prioritized. Short and longer-term remedies are presented, each with trade-offs that affect other economic and policy issues. Given the absence of direct reporting from North Korea, the issues and debates presented are speculative, designed to give the reader a more comprehensive understanding of North Korea’s current problems than is ordinarily presented in western media. Kim Jong-un’s recent diplomatic offensive, reaching out to South Korea, China, and the United States is, in this view, suggestive of these internal economic troubles in addition to the nuclear security issues. The troubles are both short-term—the collapse in trade with China in just the past few months—and long-term, the slow-motion collapse of the communist country’s “command” economy. And much more than in the past, the problems relate to the regime’s unusual and dangerous monetary system, money being a normal issue for most governments but a relatively new one for this still partially rationed, or planned, oriented system. The leadership may have little choice but to let the domestic economy move further from the plan—allowing decentralized market and private activities more sway—than ever before. This would help cushion the central government from losses due to the sanctions and open the door to a much more prosperous future. -
The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan Independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010)
University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2012 The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010) Dalei Jie University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Jie, Dalei, "The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010)" (2012). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 524. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/524 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/524 For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Rise and Fall of the Taiwan independence Policy: Power Shift, Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness (1988-2010) Abstract How to explain the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy? As the Taiwan Strait is still the only conceivable scenario where a major power war can break out and Taiwan's words and deeds can significantly affect the prospect of a cross-strait military conflict, ot answer this question is not just a scholarly inquiry. I define the aiwanT independence policy as internal political moves by the Taiwanese government to establish Taiwan as a separate and sovereign political entity on the world stage. Although two existing prevailing explanations--electoral politics and shifting identity--have some merits, they are inadequate to explain policy change over the past twenty years. Instead, I argue that there is strategic rationale for Taiwan to assert a separate sovereignty. Sovereignty assertions are attempts to substitute normative power--the international consensus on the sanctity of sovereignty--for a shortfall in military- economic-diplomatic assets. -
Taiwan Stock Exchange Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure
Taiwan Stock Exchange Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure Disclosure Report (CCP&SSS) Responding institution: Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Jurisdiction(s) in which the FMI operates: Taiwan Authority(ies) regulating, supervising or overseeing the FMI: the Securities and Futures Bureau of the Financial Supervisory Committee The date of this disclosure is 2018.9.12. This disclosure can also be found at http://www.twse.com.tw/ For further information, please contact [email protected] 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Executive summary………………………………………………..…4 II. Summary of major changes since the last update of the disclosure…………………………………………………………….11 III. General background of TWSE……………………………………..12 IV. Principle-by-principle summary narrative disclosure……………13 Principle 1: Legal basis……………………………………………...13 Principle 2: Governance……………………………………………..15 Principle 3: Framework for the comprehensive management of risks……………………………………………………...22 Principle 4: Credit risk………………………………………………28 Principle 5: Collateral………………………………………………..39 Principle 6: Margin…………………………………………………..41 Principle 7: Liquidity risk…………………………………………...44 Principle 8: Settlement Finality……………………………………..51 Principle 9: Money settlements……………………………………...53 Principle 10: Physical deliveries…………………………………….54 Principle 11: Central securities depositories………………………..55 Principle 12: Exchange-of-value settlement systems………………55 Principle 13: Participant-default rules and procedures…………...55 Principle 14: Segregation and portability…………………………..57 Principle 15: General business risk…………………………………60 -
Transcript Prepared By
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES TAIWAN’S ECONOMY AND A U.S.-TAIWAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT The Brookings Institution Washington, DC February 6, 2007 Transcript prepared by ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100 Alexandria, VA 22314 Phone (703) 519-7180 Fax (703) 519-7190 Keynote speech Dr. ShihYen-Shiang Political Deputy Minister, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan Panel I: The state of Taiwan’s economy Moderator Dr. Richard Bush, Senior Fellow and CNAPS Director, The Brookings Institution The political economy of Taiwan Dr. Tun-Jen Cheng Class of 1935 Professor, College of William and Mary China’s role in Taiwan’s economy Mr. Paul S.P. Hsu Chairman and CEO, PHYCOS International Co., Ltd. Taiwan’s economic position and participation in East Asia Dr. Chen Pochih Chairman, Taiwan Think Tank Taiwan’s economic and trade relationship with the United States Mr. John C.C. Deng Deputy Representative, Taipei Cultural and Economic Representative Office Panel II: Toward a U.S.-Taiwan free trade agreement Moderator Mr. Rick Ruzicka Director, Trade and Commercial Programs, American Institute in Taiwan Political and economic effects of a U.S.-Taiwan FTA Mr. Rupert Hammond-Chambers President, U.S.-Taiwan Business Council The outlook for an FTA: a Taiwan perspective Dr. Mignonne Chan Professor, Yu Da College of Business The outlook for an FTA: a U.S. perspective Mr. Eric Altbach Deputy Assistant United States Trade Representative for China Affairs Office of the United States Trade Representative Taiwan’s Economy and a U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement 2 CNAPS Seminar February 6, 2007 DR. -
ICE® Factset® Taiwan Core Semiconductor Index (ICEFSTS)
ICE® FactSet® Taiwan Core Semiconductor Index (ICEFSTS) Version 1.0 Valid from November 19, 2020 Contents Version History: ................................................................................................................................................ 1 1. Index summary .............................................................................................................................................. 2 2. Governance ................................................................................................................................................... 3 3. Index Description .......................................................................................................................................... 5 4. Publication..................................................................................................................................................... 6 4.1 Publication of Index values. .................................................................................................................... 6 4.2 Exceptional market conditions and corrections....................................................................................... 6 4.3 Changes to the Index ............................................................................................................................... 7 5. Calculation .................................................................................................................................................... 9 5.1 Calculation of the Index -
Incoming Letter: Taipei Exchange Main Board and Taipei Exchange
New York Paris Northern California Madrid Washington DC Tokyo São Paulo Beijing London Hong Kong James C. Lin Partner Resident Hong Kong Partners Davis Polk & Wardwell 852 2533 3368 tel William F. Barron* Gerhard Radtke* Hong Kong Solicitors 852 2533 1768 fax Bonnie Chan* Martin Rogers † The Hong Kong Club Building [email protected] Karen Chan † Patrick S. Sinclair* 3A Chater Road Paul K. Y. Chow* † Miranda So* Hong Kong James C. Lin* James Wadham † Hong Kong Solicitors * Also Admitted in New York † Also Admitted in England and Wales August 29, 2019 Re: Application for Designation of the Taipei Exchange Main Board and Taipei Exchange Bond Market as a “Designated Offshore Securities Market” Michael Coco, Chief Office of International Corporate Finance Division of Corporation Finance United States Securities and Exchange Commission 450 Fifth Street. N.W. Washington, DC 20549 Dear Mr. Coco: We are writing to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or the “Commission”) on behalf of the Taipei Exchange (the “TPEx”) to apply for the classification of a “designated offshore securities market” for purposes of Regulation S (“Regulation S”) under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended, for (i) the portion of the TPEx known as the Taipei Exchange Main Board (the “TPEx Main Board”) and (ii) the portion of the TPEx known as the Taipei Exchange Bond Market (the “TPEx Bond Market” and together with the TPEx Main Board, the “TPEx Platforms”). Designation is being sought in order to assist market participants to the TPEx Platforms who are eligible for the safe harbor provision provided by Rule 904 of Regulation S to satisfy the requirements specified in that rule when reselling securities “in, on or through the facilities of” the TPEx Platforms. -
The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Cross Strait Relatiions
Track Two Dialogue on EU-China-Relations and Cross Strait Relations London, LSE, 29-31 May 2009 A workshop jointly organised by Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, London School of Economics (LSE), London and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), Shanghai, with the friendly support of the Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH, Stuttgart. Discussion Paper Do not cite or quote without author’s permission The Political Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Cross Strait Relations Christopher R Hughes London School of Economics and Political Science SWP Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org 1 In the years leading up to Taiwan’s 2008 elections a number of measures were planned by the CCP and the KMT to liberalise cross-Strait relations and give Taiwan’s economy a substantial boost under a future Ma Ying-jeou administration. Few people predicted that in September 2008 this process would be thrown into turmoil by the deepening of the global financial crisis. Policies that had been devised for improving cross-strait relations in the context of growth in world trade and investment have had to be reassessed in the context of a recession in Taiwan and a serious slowdown of the mainland economy. How this interplay between economic policy and public opinion plays out will be crucial for shaping the future of cross-Strait relations. While it is too late to predict the outcome, this paper will explore the importance of cross-Strait economic relations for Taiwan’s politics, make a preliminary assessment of the political impact of the economic crisis on cross-strait relations and point to some speculative scenarios for the future. -
Liquidity Cost of Market Orders in Taiwan Stock Market: a Study Based on an Order-Driven Agent-Based Artificial Stock Market
Liquidity Cost of Market Orders in Taiwan Stock Market: A Study based on An Order-Driven Agent-Based Artificial Stock Market Yi-ping Huang a∗, Shu-Heng Chen b, Min-Chin Hung a aDepartment of Financial Engineering and Actuarial Mathematics, Soochow University bDepartment of Economics, National Chengchi University Abstract This thesis construct an order-driven artificial stock market base on Daniels et al. (2003) model. We also use autoregressive conditional duration (ACD) model initiated by Engle and Russell (1998) to model duration or order size. We analyzed the transaction cost of ten securities, including stocks, Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), in Taiwan stock market and compared this result with the simulated cost of our models. We find that for those frequently traded securities, for example, TSMC (2330.TW) or China Steel (2002.TW), it is better not to incorporate ACD model of duration in the model, and for those not frequently traded securities, for example, President Chain Store (2912.TW) or Gallop No.1 Real Estate Investment Trust Fund (01008T.TW), it is better to incorporate ACD model of duration in the model. Our empirical estimates show that the liquidity costs of market order of these ten securities are generally smaller than 3%, and largely lied between -1% and 1%. We, however, find that simulation costs of market orders in our model, with a range from 0% to 10%, are generally larger than those of real data. One possible reason for this departure is that investors in stock markets generally do not place their orders blindly. -
Emerging Legislature Or Rubber Stamp? the South African National Assembly After Ten Years of Democracy
CENTRE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH EMERGING LEGISLATURE OR RUBBER STAMP? THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AFTER TEN YEARS OF DEMOCRACY Joel Barkan CSSR Working Paper No. 134 Published by the Centre for Social Science Research University of Cape Town 2005 Copies of this publication may be obtained from: The Administrative Officer Centre for Social Science Research University of Cape Town Private Bag Rondebosch, 7701 Tel: (021) 650 4656 Fax: (021) 650 4657 Email: [email protected] Price in Southern Africa (incl. VAT and postage): R 5.00 or it can be downloaded from our website http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/index.html ISBN 1-77011-068-2 © Centre for Social Science Research, UCT, 2005 CENTRE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH Democracy in Africa Research Unit EMERGING LEGISLATURE OR RUBBER STAMP? THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AFTER TEN YEARS OF DEMOCRACY Joel Barkan CSSR Working Paper No. 134 November 2005 Joel D. Barkan is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Iowa in Iowa City, and a Reagan-Fascell Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington. He was a Research Fellow at the Democracy in Africa Research Unit within the CSSR at the University of Cape Town in 2004. Emerging Legislature or Rubber Stamp? The South African National Assembly After Ten Years of 1 Democracy Abstract This paper examines the role of the South African National Assembly in comparative perspective by discussing the experience of the Assembly since 1994 in comparison to the development of legislative institutions elsewhere in Africa. The paper thus begins with an overview of seven sets of variables that seem to drive the process of legislative development across the continent, and then turns to the South African case. -
The Political Economy of U.S.-Taiwanese Trade and Other International Economic Relations
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Trade and Protectionism, NBER-EASE Volume 2 Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, editors Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-38668-6 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_93-2 Conference Date: June 19-21, 1991 Publication Date: January 1993 Chapter Title: The Political Economy of U.S.-Taiwanese Trade and Other International Economic Relations Chapter Author: Robert E. Baldwin, Douglas Nelson Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8079 Chapter pages in book: (p. 307 - 337) 11 The Political Economy of U. S.-Taiwanese Trade and Other International Economic Relations Robert E. Baldwin and Douglas Nelson In most systematic work by economists on the political economy of trade pol- icy, the primary causal mechanism is the competing demands for different trade policies by various domestic pressure groups, who are motivated by eco- nomic self-interest. I The supply side is modeled quite simply. Politicians also pursue their economic self-interest by seeking to be reelected and, conse- quently, supply the trade policies desired by the group or groups who, by providing votes and campaign contributions, give them the best opportunity for being reelected. This framework has led to a substantial body of theoreti- cal and empirical work that has significantly improved our understanding of trade policy. This model does, however, mainly emphasize the “demand’ side since the demands of pressure groups are weighted to determine the equilibrium level of protection. In the typical political economy model of economists, the sup- plying of particular forms of trade policy by politicians, bureaucrats, and, more generally, the state, as part of their efforts to promote such collective goals as national security, is ruled out.