Section 5 of the Clayton Act and the Nolo Contendere Plea
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SECTION 5 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND THE NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA In order to insure the effectiveness of the Sherman Act,' Congress assigned an important policing role to private parties; persons2 injured by an antitrust violation were allowed to bring an action for treble damages against the offender. As originally conceived, private enforce- ment was intended to operate independently of Government prosecu- tion.3 But by 1914 Congress recognized that the private litigant could not perform his function without assistance.4 In that year Congress attempted to strengthen the private enforcement scheme by enacting 1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890). as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (194). 2. The "persons" authorized to invoke the treble damage action provision included corporations and assodations existing under the laws of the United States, of any state or territory, or of any foreign country. This has been held to encompass municipalities, Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). and states, Georgia v. Evans, 316 US. 159 (1942). But the United States was excluded as a beneficiary of the treble damage action. United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600 (1941). In 1955 Con- gress added section 4A to the Clayton Act to permit the United States the additional remedy of a private action, but only for actual damages. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15a (194). The purposes and effects of the treble recovery arc discussed in McConnell, The Treble Damage Action, 1950 U. ILL. L.F. 659; Void, Are Threefold Damages Under the Antitrust Act Penal or Compensatory? 28 KY. L.J. 117 (1940). 3. See Statement of Walton Hamilton, Hearings on H.R. 7905 Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the judiciary, 81st Cong.. 2d Sess., 56 (1950). 4. See 51 CONG. R c. 13,851 (1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh): "We all know that the private individual is always at a disadvantage. He is never armed with the means at his command to cope with these great organizations; and that was the very reason why this act was passed -.. ." See id. at 15,825 (remarks of Senator Reed); id. at 16.046 (remarks of Senator Norris). The first twenty-five years of the Sherman Act produced only forty-six private actions, of which plaintiffs were successful in only four. A. D. Neale, TnE A.%nn- TRUSt LAWS oF THE UNrrim STATm oF AMERiCA 389 (1960). Undoubtedly the private liti- gants' lack of success during this period may be in part attributable to the general unfa- miliarity in the legal community with the meaning of the new law. But equally significant was the fact that private suitors were not equipped with the tools to promote independent antitrust enforcement. One of the most essential ingredients of law enforcement is the power to detect and investigate possible infractions and then to apprehend the wrong- doers. The private litigant, however, without the services of a grand jury and without the powers of subpoena or discovery, was helpless to conduct any meaningful inquiry. And the treble damage action furnished to him by Congress was not useful for that purpose. That remedy, by itself, was hardly an enforcement tool in this sense; it was no more than a potential for inflicting severe punishment once the offender was detected and appre- hended. For a picturesque account of the formidable burden of private litigants prior to 1914 see V. HAMILTON & I. TILL, ANTrrmusr IN AcTloN, 82-83 (TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1940). THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75:845 Section 5 of the Clayton Act,5 which allowed private suitors to intro- duce as prima facie evidence of violation the judgments entered in prior Government proceedings against the same defendants for the same offense. However, Congress added a proviso making Section 5 inapplicable to "consent judgments or decrees entered before any tes- timony has been taken." In order to enjoy the benefits of the proviso, antitrust defendants revived the nolo contendere plea.7 That plea has since become a standard fixture in criminal antitrust cases, and its value to defendants is incalculable. Since a case disposed of on a nolo plea will involve a trial only on the issue of punishment, the plea relieves a defendant of the great burden in time, expense,8 and personal inconvenience involved in making a full defense. The plea, furthermore, is attractive to defen- dants because it "does not normally carry with it in the courts or in 5. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). The text of Section 5 as originally enacted read, in part: That a final judgment or decree hereafter rendered in any criminal prosecution or in any suit or proceeding in equity brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any suit or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws as to all matters respect. ing which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel between the parties thereto: Provided, this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken." The section was amended in 1955 to permit the United States to introduce its own prior judgments as prima facie evidence in its own private damage actions under the newly enacted Section 4A of the Clayton Act. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). 6. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964). 7. For discussion on the history and characteristics of the nolo contendere plea see Lenvin & Myers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Implications, 51 YAL, L.J. 1255 (1942); Comment, Nolo Contendere-Its Use and Effect, 52 CALw. L. REv. 408 (1964). See also Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926). Because nolo contendere is but an "implied confession," it establishes the fact of guilt solely for the purpose of the particular case in which it is tendered and accepted. Accordingly, in a subsequent civil action predicated upon the same set of facts to which the defendant pleaded nolo in the criminal proceed- ing the plea will not be admissible against the defendant as an evidentiary admission to prove those facts, and the defendant will not be estopped from denying them. It Is this feature of the nolo plea that distinguishes it from the plea of guilty, and accounts for tile difference of treatment accorded to the two pleas for the purpose of § 5. 8. The costs of defense is one of the primary concerns of the antitrust defendant. In fact, one commentator remarked: "Many defendants will enter into a consent decree and plead nolo contendere even though in their minds and hearts they are satisfied that they have never violated the antitrust laws. The pressure there is the avoidance of an expensive or a lengthy trial." See Testimony of Milton Handler, Hearings on H.R. 7095 Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committce on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1950). 1966] SECTION 5 AND THE NOLO PLEA the public mind the same stigma of knowing guilt and moral turpitude as does the plea or conviction of guilty." Defendants plead nolo to avoid adverse publicity, and for this reason the plea is useful even when the possibility of subsequent private actions is limited. 10 The primary value of the nolo contendere plea to the antitrust defendant, however, is that a judgment entered upon its acceptance is a "consent 9. Memorandum of the Government in Opposition to the Acceptance of Pleas of Nolo Contendere 4-5, I Antitrust Pleading File, United States v. Westinghouse Co., Cr. 20234 (E.D. Pa.) (The Antitrust Division Pleading File, cited hereinafter as Antitrust Pleading File, is located in the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.). It may be, and often is, instead characterized as a "'compromise" between the defen- dants and the Government, or as a confession of technical guilt under circumstances where the violation of the law involved results from an honest disagreement as to the proper scope of the law rather than as a conscious and knowing attempt to vio- late the criminal laws of the United States. Ibid. Part of the desire of the antitrust defendant to avoid the stigma of criminal conviction is the belief that the offense committed, being of an economic nature, is necessarily less reprehensible and should entitle the wrongdoer to special consideration. One defense attorney, pressing for acceptance of a nolo plea, reflected this attitude: []hese acts involved in these indictments are said to be violations of these regula- tory measures that deal with the economy of the country. [We arc not con- cerned . with crimes of violence . or other serious crimes against the Gov- ernment; we are dealing here with crimes having to do with the regulation of the economy.... United States v. Westinghouse Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 76753, 76755 (E.D. Pa.). This notion was strongly rejected by Judge Weinfeld in United States v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1955): The concept that antitrust violations really are "minor" and "technical" infractions, involve no wrongdoing, and merely constitute "white collar" offenses, has no place in the administration of justice. A conviction upon a nolo plea may, however, have some minor undesirable conse- quences. In some jurisdictions it is not treated differently from any other conviction. Hence the nolo conviction could make the defendant a multiple offender for the purposes of collateral proceedings.