Political Participation and Voting Behavior in the Midst of Violence
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Citizens in Fear: Political Participation and Voting Behavior in the Midst of Violence by Sandra Jessica Ley Guti´errez Department of Political Science Duke University Date: Approved: Karen L. Remmer, Supervisor John Aldrich David Soskice Guillermo Trejo Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2014 Abstract Citizens in Fear: Political Participation and Voting Behavior in the Midst of Violence by Sandra Jessica Ley Guti´errez Department of Political Science Duke University Date: Approved: Karen L. Remmer, Supervisor John Aldrich David Soskice Guillermo Trejo An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2014 Copyright c 2014 by Sandra Jessica Ley Guti´errez All rights reserved except the rights granted by the Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial Licence Abstract How does violence affect political participation and voting behavior? Why does a violent context push some to be politically active, while others decide to stay at home? Our current understanding of political behavior is mostly derived from analyses conducted in a peaceful and democratic context, or in post-conflict periods. However, citizens in many developing countries make their political decisions in the midst of violence. The dissertation's central argument is that political participation and voting be- havior largely depend on the context surrounding the individual. In particular, the level of criminal violence greatly impacts 1) citizens' decision to participate politi- cally, 2) their forms of participation, and 3) the logic of their vote choice. Faced with violence, voters are generally pushed away from electoral politics. I argue that those that do decide to take part of the electoral process will consider their evaluations of security when deciding to punish or reward the incumbent government. While some may be inclined to take further action and demand peace through non-electoral par- ticipation, such a decision carries certain risks that are not easily overcome. I con- tend that social networks can encourage participation by shaping the understanding of crime, as well as the perception of costs and benefits associated with participation amid violence. To evaluate this argument, I draw on a rich array of sources. I designed an original post-electoral survey that took place in Mexico a few days after the 2012 presidential iv election. I also created a novel newspaper databank of protests against crime in Mexico during the 2006-2012 period. In addition, together with Guillermo Trejo, I developed a unique dataset on criminal violence in Mexico. My statistical evidence is complemented with participant observation in marches for peace and qualitative in-depth interviews with victims and non-victims of crime in four Mexican cities. Statistical evidence shows that violent criminal activity depresses electoral turnout. Voters living in violent contexts are less likely to participate in elections. Victims of crime are significantly less likely to participate in elections. However, faced with rising violence, active voters are able to consider both economic and insecurity evalu- ations in their assessments of government performance and voting decisions. Overall, as a voter's evaluation of national security worsens, her likelihood of supporting the incumbent national party and government diminishes. At the same time, while in- stitutional channels are not attractive to victims of crime, societal accountability mechanisms are also available to citizens affected by insecurity. Victims of crime and those connected to mobilizing networks are more likely to participate in protests against insecurity than non-victims and \socially disconnected" individuals. v A mis pap´as,por ense~narmea no ser indiferente al dolor y la injusticia. A Ricardo, por marchar de la mano por un mundo m´asjusto. vi Contents Abstract iv List of Tables xi List of Figures xiii List of Abbreviations and Symbols xv Acknowledgements xvi 1 Introduction1 1.1 Argument and Findings.........................3 1.2 Research Design..............................4 1.3 Evidence..................................6 1.3.1 Quantitative Evidence......................6 1.3.2 Qualitative Evidence.......................9 1.4 Roadmap................................. 10 2 A Theory of Political Behavior in the Midst of Violence: Organized Crime, Elections, and Protest 12 2.1 Defining Organized Crime........................ 13 2.2 The Logic of Drug Violence....................... 15 2.3 Political Behavior in the Midst of Violence............... 16 2.3.1 Electoral Participation...................... 17 2.3.2 Security Issue Voting....................... 19 vii 2.3.3 Non-Electoral Participation................... 21 2.3.4 Summary of the Argument.................... 26 2.4 Conclusions................................ 27 3 To Vote or Not to Vote: How Criminal Violence Shapes Electoral Participation 28 3.1 Political Violence and Political Participation.............. 29 3.2 How Does Criminal Violence Affect Electoral Participation?..... 32 3.3 Crime and Elections in Mexico...................... 35 3.4 Aggregate-Level Analysis......................... 39 3.4.1 Dependent Variable........................ 40 3.4.2 Independent Variable....................... 41 3.4.3 Controls.............................. 42 3.4.4 Analytical Strategy........................ 43 3.4.5 Statistical Results......................... 43 3.5 Individual-Level Analysis......................... 50 3.5.1 Dependent variable........................ 50 3.5.2 Independent variables...................... 52 3.5.3 Controls.............................. 53 3.5.4 Analytical strategy........................ 54 3.5.5 Statistical Results......................... 55 3.6 Why Does Criminal Violence Depress Turnout?............ 60 3.7 Conclusions................................ 63 4 Security and Crime Issue Voting: Electoral Accountability in the Midst of Violence 65 4.1 Economic and Noneconomic Voting................... 66 4.2 Security and Crime Issue Voting..................... 68 viii 4.3 Insecurity, Campaigns, and Elections in Mexico............ 70 4.4 Aggregate-Level Analysis......................... 73 4.4.1 Dependent Variable........................ 73 4.4.2 Independent Variables...................... 74 4.4.3 Controls.............................. 74 4.4.4 Analytical Strategy........................ 74 4.4.5 Statistical Results......................... 75 4.5 Individual-Level Analysis......................... 81 4.5.1 Dependent Variable........................ 82 4.5.2 Independent Variables...................... 82 4.5.3 Controls.............................. 83 4.5.4 Analytical Strategy........................ 84 4.5.5 Statistical Results......................... 84 4.6 Conclusions................................ 90 5 Participation in High-Risk Activism: Protesting Amid Violence 92 5.1 Violence, Victimization, and Non-Electoral Forms of Participation.. 94 5.2 Violence, Victims, and Protest against Insecurity in Mexico: History, Risks, and Challenges...................... 97 5.3 Aggregate-Level Analysis......................... 101 5.3.1 Dependent Variable........................ 101 5.3.2 Independent Variables...................... 103 5.3.3 Controls.............................. 106 5.3.4 Analytical Strategy........................ 106 5.3.5 Statistical Results......................... 106 5.4 Individual-Level Data........................... 109 5.4.1 Dependent Variables....................... 109 ix 5.4.2 Independent Variables...................... 110 5.4.3 Controls.............................. 111 5.4.4 Analytical Strategy........................ 112 5.5 Individual-Level Evidence........................ 112 5.6 The Effectiveness of Protest amid Violence............... 119 5.7 Conclusions................................ 121 6 Conclusion 123 6.1 Summary of Argument and Main Findings............... 123 6.2 Theoretical Implications......................... 125 6.3 Policy Implications............................ 127 6.4 Future Research.............................. 127 6.5 Final Remarks............................... 128 A Survey Methodology Report 130 B Survey Questionnaire 147 C Mexican Protest Against Crime Database 173 D Criminal Violence in Mexico Database 179 E Criminal Aggression against Political Actors in Mexico Database 183 F Additional Statistical Results 187 Bibliography 189 Biography 206 x List of Tables 3.1 Turnout and Violence in Local Elections, 1996-2012.......... 45 3.2 Turnout and Violence in Federal Elections, 1997-2012......... 49 3.3 Individual Turnout and Violence in the 2012 Presidential Election.. 56 4.1 Responsibility Attribution for the Situation of National Security in Mexico................................... 73 4.2 Electoral Support and Violence in Local Elections, 2009-2012..... 76 4.3 Electoral Support and Violence in the 2012 Mexican Presidential Elec- tion.................................... 80 4.4 Individual Vote Choice in the 2012 Mexican Presidential Election.. 86 4.5 Individual Presidential Approval in Mexico, 2012........... 89 5.1 Organizers of Protests against Insecurity, 2006-2012.......... 105 5.2 Protest, Violence, and Social Networks in Mexico, 2006-2012..... 108 5.3 Participation in Protest against Crime in Mexico, 2012 (Relogit)..