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Total War, Air War, and Suffering

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Total War, Air War, and Suffering Chapter 8: TotalWar,Air War, and Suffering This chapter analyzes total war in contemporary Second World Warexhibitions by exemplifying representations of aerial warfare duringthe Second World War.¹ As with the Holocaust in the previous chapter,the Air Waroffers athematic and comparative lens to understand the complexities of representing the Second World Warinthe museum, the tendencies to create master narrativesand restrict experientiality in doing so, the question of how museums can simulate primary historical experiences,and the need to find ways of developing secondary expe- rientiality between historical specificityand the anthropological and universal characteristics of aerial warfare. With regard to the question of whetheraperpe- trator nation (Germanyinparticular) can and should commemorate its own suf- fering in the twenty-first century,the Air Waristhe prime example. The Air War also symbolizes civilian sufferingand collective will in manyother occupied countries or territories includingPoland,the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, France, Serbia, and the Philippines. Great Britain plays aparticularlysignificant role, both as acountry wherecivilians experienced bombingand as the primary Allied nation, togetherwith the USA, responsible for conducting the Air War. Canada is another special case, since its strongsupport of the British Bomber Command made the Air Warone of its prime contributions to the Allied war ef- fort.Finally, there are complex discussions surrounding the Allied bombing of occupied territory to preparefor invasions,exemplified by the Americanbomb- ing of Normandyinthe lead up to D-Day. TheAir Warisatheme thatcontains ethical, cognitive,and affective dimensions thatcan be related to memory poli- tics, to questions of heritage and history,and to anthropological and humanist approachesthat emphasize its destruction and call for reconciliation and peace. Consequently, it is an ideal case studyfor understanding the representa- tional challenges and possibilities of contemporary museum exhibitions. What memorial functions can the Air Warserveinexhibitions?Furthermore, how does this specific theme relatetothe key concepts of this study – restricted ex- perientiality,primary experientiality,secondary experientiality,and transnation- al memory? Foranoverview of memories, narratives, and experiences of the Air Warsee Wilms and Rasch 2006.The chapterfocuses on the representation of aerial warfareinEurope, but considers the depiction of aerial warfareand nuclear bombinginthe Asia-Pacific theaterofwar when it ad- vances the analysis of the exhibitions in question. OpenAccess. ©2020 Stephan Jaeger,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110664416-012 266 8Total War, Air War, and Suffering In museums wherethe Air Warisunderstood conceptually, it cannot be sep- arated from total war and the sufferingofcivilians in general. It is seen as part of awar that increasinglyencompassed all combatants and civilians and brutalized the war’sconductsothat violence withoutboundaries has come to dominate how the war is perceived. Although it is not one of the main institutions consid- ered by this study, the ‘Peace’ Mémorial de Caen (opened in 1988), can serveas an excellent example of how amuseum can establish aglobalmemory of total war.The third part of its permanentexhibition (revised in 2009 –2010)² is enti- tled “World War, Total War.” The stronglyimage- and text-based exhibition dis- plays astream of escalatingviolence regarding German warfare in the East,an in-depth section on the Holocaust,and developments and atrocities in the war’s Pacifictheater.³ The Mémorial de Caen provides adetailed contextualization of the concept of ‘total war,’ locating it in “the logic of industrial rationality, of tech- nological weaponry,and the radicalisation of violence,” all originating in the First World War. It carefullycontextualizes the concept of totalwar as related to all partiesand highlights – next to adepiction of Goebbels’ssport stadium speech in which he declared “total war” on February 18, 1943 – how Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin used similar rhetoric. Atext-heavy panel of more than200 words defines the concept of totalwar in detail. Itsfirst paragraph notes that op- erations spread to all areas of society: “Everything is subordinatedtothe con- duct of the war and its objectives. The whole of society is involved in the conflict and privatelife is no longer set apart. The foe is demonisedwithout exception, and becomes nothing more thanagroup of targets that have to be destroyed.” Further points emphasize thattotal war must lead to totalvictory.Consequently, the conflict “becomes afight to the death ‘for survival,’ an ideological war of an- nihilation with the same characteristics and fanaticism as civilorreligious wars.” Itsprovocative thesis that bothparties followed these principles of total The museum regularlychangeselementsofits permanentexhibition. It is certainlyaprime achievement that the Mémorial de Caen emphasized – as earlyasthe late1980s – the theme of violencebeyond national master narrativesand collective perspectives of the different parties involved in the war.Displayingthe Holocaust and the Second World War as interwoven parts of the same exhibition was another very innovativemoveonthe part of the Frenchmuseum (see also the discussion of the exhibition in chapter 7onHolocaust and perpe- tration). Forananalysis of the first permanent exhibition, see Brower 1999.Brower points to the traumatic absences expressed through the museum’sscenographic approach, which allows for a working-through of historical trauma: “the Mémorial’smuseumification points to the traumatic absences of the past by means of banishingtheir loss.Inthe Mémorial it is as if the war were yesterday; the absences of the past,absences resultingfromthe passingoftime as well as those inflicted by the violent events of the war,are displaced by its omnipotent media” (1999,91–92). Foramorecritical reading of this scenographic approach, see Thiemeyer 2010a, 248–253. 8Total War, Air War, and Suffering 267 war allows the exhibition to put forth astandpoint of universalsuffering.One could certainlyargue that its overall presentation demonstrates that both sides conducted the principle of total war differently. However,particularlyinrefer- ence to the Air War, the concept of total war challenges the perception that there is acategoricaldifferencebetween the earlyGerman or Japanese bombard- ments of civilians and British and American bombardments solely on the basis of which nation began the bombing.⁴ The narrative of the total war section ends with the Air War. The exhibition panel “Bombing the Cities” explains how the Allies conduct- ed their part in the ‘war of annihilation’: Strategic bombingwas the ‘anonymous’ version of civilian annihilation. The levellingofcit- ies under hundreds of tonnes of bombs,incompletedisregard of internationalagreements, crossed new thresholds in the blind violenceofwarfare. The atom bombs dropped on Hir- oshima and Nagasaki on 6and 9August 1945, broughtsuch escalation to apeak. The next threeparagraphs highlight how both sides characterized their bomb- ingsasamilitary necessity.Itisclear that the bombingsofGuernica,Rotterdam, Coventry,and the Blitz occurred first,yet the museum also bluntlydescribes Al- lied aerial warfare. Without further contextualization, the panel’sfinal para- graph challenges the visitor to speculate, from amoral perspective,about why the Allies did not bomb the railroads leading to Auschwitz. The message of the Peace Memorial is clear: bombing campaigns are part of total wars of anni- hilation on both sides. The images and objectsondisplayshow the impact of all bombingcampaigns. Within the argument of total war, their interpretations are left fairlyopen; this can be seen in the description of the stand-out object at the end of the sub-section, abronze headknocked out of place in abombing in August 1944,pointing toward Caen’sown civilian causalities: “By the end of August,having suffered countless aerial and naval bombardments and end- less artillery shelling,Caen, likesomanyother townsinLower Normandy, had paidaheavy price for Liberation.” The text then lists the human and mate- rial losses suffered in the attacks. There is no judgment of the bombings; at the same time,the visitor does not have the opportunitytoevaluatethe Allies’ de- cision to bomb French townsinpreparation for the D-DayLanding and the in- vasion of Normandy. Consequently, the museum’sdepiction seemingly lacks con- One could certainlyargue that the two sides’ varyingtreatment of prisoners of war warrant an exhibition that moreclearlystatesthat therewere, nevertheless, different methods of conduct- ing war.This becomes indirectlyclear,since sub-sections such as “Propaganda” and “Mobilisa- tion” refer to both sides,whereas the sub-section “Deportation” onlyrefers to the German side. 268 8Total War, Air War, and Suffering textualization and thereforehas the possibility to manipulate the visitor into tak- ing ahumanist-pacifist view and condemningall bombings. The House of European History – as discussed in detail above⁵ – usesasim- ilar universalizing technique to thatofthe Mémorial de Caen. However,itruns the risk that total war and civilian suffering become so all-encompassing that nuances between individual sufferingand those responsible could disappear. The civilian is always the victim, and while the Holocaust is
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