Michigan Law Review Volume 116 | Issue 2 2017 Rationing Criminal Justice Richard A. Bierschbach Wayne State University Law School Stephanos Bibas University of Pennsylvania Law School Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr Part of the Law and Economics Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons Recommended Citation Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 187 (2017). Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol116/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. RATIONING CRIMINAL JUSTICE Richard A. Bierschbach* & Stephanos Bibas** Of the many diagnoses of American criminal justice’s ills, few focus on exter- nalities. Yet American criminal justice systematically overpunishes in large part because few mechanisms exist to force consideration of the full social costs of criminal justice interventions. Actors often lack good information or incen- tives to minimize the harms they impose. Part of the problem is structural: criminal justice is fragmented vertically among governments, horizontally among agencies, and individually among self-interested actors. Part is a mat- ter of focus: doctrinally and pragmatically, actors overwhelmingly view each case as an isolated, short-term transaction to the exclusion of broader, long- term, and aggregate effects. Treating punishment like other public-law problems of regulation suggests various regulatory tools as potential solutions, such as cost-benefit analysis, devolution, pricing, and caps.